Created by Fuzzy Cloud

Bombay High Court

VINAYAK KISHORE GARVEversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR

Decided
Disposal
Allowed

Holding

The High Court quashed the FIR under Section 528 of the BNSS and ordered the petitioner to pay costs.

Summary

The petitioner, Vinayak Kishore Garve, sought quashing of FIR No. 762 of 2019 and related proceedings, alleging that the dispute underlying the criminal complaint was purely civil, arising from a partnership business, and that the parties had settled their accounts by a consent affidavit. The High Court examined its inherent powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (mirroring Section 482 of the CrPC), and considered precedent from the Supreme Court and this Court on consent quashing of non‑heinous offences. Citing Lovely Salhotra v. State of NCT Delhi, Alpesh Patel v. State of Maharashtra, and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, the Court held that where the dispute is civil and the offences do not impact society at large, the FIR may be quashed. The Court also emphasized the need to impose costs to deter misuse of criminal law and ordered the petitioner to pay Rs. 25,000 to a charitable trust. Accordingly, the petition was allowed, the FIR quashed, and costs directed.

Issues considered

  • Whether an FIR arising from a civil/commercial partnership dispute can be quashed on the basis of a consent settlement.
  • Whether the High Court’s inherent powers under Section 528 of the BNSS (and Section 482 of the CrPC) permit quashing of the FIR in the present circumstances.
  • Whether costs should be imposed on the petitioner in a consent‑quashing petition.

Legislation cited

Subjects

  • consent quashing
  • inherent powers
  • Section 528
  • Section 482
  • civil settlement
  • costs
  • criminal procedure
  • partnership dispute
  • non‑heinous offences

Judgment

                                                                      172. CRI WP-2036-26.odt


Amberkar

                       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                   CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                               WRIT PETITION NO. 2036 OF 2026

           Vinayak Kishore Garve                                     .. Petitioner
                      Versus
           State of Maharashtra & Anr.                               .. Respondents
                                      ....................
            Mr. Veer Kankaria, Advocate for Petitioner
            Mr. Yogesh M. Nakhwa, APP for State
                                           ...................
                                          CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.
                                          DATE          : OCTOBER 8, 2026
           P. C.:

           1.       Heard Mr. Kankaria, learned Advocate for Petitioner and Mr.

           Nakhwa, learned APP for State.


           2.       Present Application is filed seeking quashing and setting aside of

           the FIR and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom.


           3.       This is a Petition for consent quashing partially for Petitioner -

           accused No. 1. Parties have resolved their dispute which was

           essentially civil in nature     arising out of the partnership business.

           Parties have        settled their accounts. Consent affidavit dated

           25.03.2026 is appended at page Nos. 81-87 of Petition. I have perused

           the same.


           4.       Case of the Applicant before me is clearly covered by the

           decision of Supreme Court in the case of Lovely Salhotra and Anr. Vs.



                                                                                       1 of 7
                                                                    172. CRI WP-2036-26.odt


State of NCT Delhi and Anr. (Supra)1 and of this Court in the case of

Alpesh Arvindbhai Patel and Others Vs. The State of Maharashtra and

Other2 , Hence there can be no impediment in allowing the present

Application for quashing the Complaint qua the Petitioner before me

who is accused No. 1 in the present crime.


5.          Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 conferred

inherent powers on High Courts to pass such orders as are justified to

give effect to any order in the Court, prevent abuse of process of any

Court or secure the ends of justice. In the BNSS this provision stands

incorporated with Section 528 which substantially reproduces the

language and intent of Section 482 of the CRPC, 1973 High Courts

invoke this provision to step in where cases have been instituted with

malafide motives or to harass the accused person thereby avoiding

procedural harassment. It empowers Court to dismiss FIRs or criminal

proceedings if there is no prima facie case or evidence against the

accused person/s or if orders are made in violation of the principles of

natural justice. The exercise of such powers under Section 482 of

CRPC and now Section 528 of BNSS remains discretionary and varies

from case to case.




1    Criminal Appeal No.670 of 2017 decided on 10 th April 2017
2    Criminal Writ Petition No.3721 of 2018 Decided on 17.03.2023



                                                                                     2 of 7
                                                       172. CRI WP-2036-26.odt


6.       In State of Harayana vs Bhajan Lal3 the Supreme Court laid

down model categories and guidelines in paragraph No. 102 of the

said judgment in which the FIRs can be quashed. The Supreme Court

has furthered asserted that power under Section 482 is an

acknowledgment of "powers inherent" and not the source of powers

additional. It has held that even non compoundable offences can be

quashed where necessary. It has held that High Courts have to decide

whether the prosecution of an offence would further or be against the

interest of justice. It is also held that grievous offences such as murder,

rape, and dacoity cannot ordinarily be quashed even after settlement

because they involve societal implication.


7.       In the above context, when parties settle their private dispute or

the lis between them is purely civil and commercial or matrimonial

and the offence is not heinous or does not impact the society at large,

the Court can consider such request. In such a case awarding costs for

putting the criminal law into motion on the act of the accused persons

and thereafter both parties seeking quashing of proceedings by

consent, in my opinion, can be considered by Court which can impose

costs on the parties, especially so in matters coming before the Court

by “consent quashing”.




3    1992 AIR 604

                                                                        3 of 7
                                                    172. CRI WP-2036-26.odt


8.    For above levy of costs the legal principle rests on the logic that

criminal law cannot be used as a bargaining chip or a tool for private

settlements after draining the State and judicial resources. In simple

words, Courts cannot be used as a recovery mechanism to settle scores

and/or bring the parties into subjugation. I am of the firm opinion that

imposition of costs in consent quashing matters is required to be levied

for three main reasons viz., wastage of public resources, consumption

of valuable judicial time and for deterrence against vexatious

litigation. This is because after criminal machinery is set into motion,

the Police Department is forced to take cognizance, conduct

investigations, attend courts, deploy personnel, collect evidence and

draft chargesheets, all using public funds/ public exchequer. Equally

substantial judicial time of the Trial Courts and Sessions Courts is

wasted for handling a case, presentation of a case, issuance of

summons, scheduling of trial dates, appointment of prosecutors and

their fees, etc. and ultimately if consent quashing is allowed such

judicial time stands completely wasted, which could have otherwise

been used for genuine Trial Court matters/ litigation. in one way such

matters result in clogging the legal system and lead to humongous

pendency which becomes difficult to tackle.


9.    Another aspect to consider for imposing costs is that it curbs the

growing trend of filing strategically exaggerated criminal complaints


                                                                     4 of 7
                                                    172. CRI WP-2036-26.odt


(especially matrimonial or commercial disputes) simply to force

financial and legal settlements. In a given case made out on merits of

the matter, even the Complainant can be put to costs while considering

a quashing Petition purely on merits depending upon the facts of each

case before Court. In some strong circumstances, even the State

machinery can be put to costs if a purely civil dispute between parties

strongly emanating from the facts on record is registered as criminal

case and given the flavor of criminality. This Court is also equally

conscious about not imposing costs blindly or mechanically if a

particular party is not found to be remiss or at explicit fault for

abusing the law, as also conscious about heinous offences impacting

the society at large while considering consent quashing.


10.   Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case,

I am of the opinion that the Petitioner for his actions resulting in the

complainant invoking criminal proceedings and now both the parties

seeking quashing by consent, the Petitioner should pay costs. Hence,

Petitioner is directed to pay costs of Rs. 25,000/- towards the Corpus

of A.K. Munshi Yojana a trust which runs medical centres, vocational

training centres and which also runs a Special School called J.T. Sheth

Mandbuddhi Vikas Kendra, imparting education and training to the

needs of 150 special children in the field of Education (Classes for 6 to

18 years), early intervention (upto 6 years) and vocational training


                                                                     5 of 7
                                                           172. CRI WP-2036-26.odt


(18 years above) having its school address and building at A.K. Munshi

Yojana Chowk, 3rd Panjarapole Lane, C.P. Tank, Mumbai – 400 004

[Contact Nos. 22425513 / 22423654] registered under the Society

Registration Act, XXI of 1980 under No. : 387/81 GBBSD and the

Public Trust Act, XXIX of 1950 under No. F-6809. RCI Reg. No. 0163.


11.    Petitioner through his Advocate agree to pay the aforesaid costs

amount to the charity within a period of two weeks from today..


12.   In view of the above matter, the present Petition deserves to be

allowed subject to payment of costs as directed herein above. It is so

allowed in terms of prayer clauses ‘a’ which read thus:-

          “a)   Quash and set aside the F.I.R. No. 762 of 2019 dated 16/10/2019
                registered with Sangvi Police Station, Pimpri-Chinchwad, Pune,
                for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 464, 467, 468,
                471, 472 and 474 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
                1860 along with the proceedings arising therefrom and pending
                before the Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pimpri in
                R.C.C. No. 808 of 2020, as against the present Petitioner, Vinayak
                Kishor Garve (Original Accused No. 1), in exercise of the inherent
                powers of this Hon'ble Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya
                Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023;"


13.    List the Writ Petition for compliance of the order regarding

payment of costs on 22nd October, 2026.


14.   Advocate for the Petitioner shall remain present and show

compliance on the returnable date for compliance. If he does not

remain present and there is non-compliance of this order, Court will




                                                                            6 of 7
                                                                172. CRI WP-2036-26.odt


           pass appropriate order for recall of this order, which shall be noted by

           the Petitioner.


           15.       Writ Petition is allowed and disposed.




Amberkar                                            [ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ]

                     Digitally signed
                     by RAVINDRA
           RAVINDRA MOHAN
           MOHAN    AMBERKAR
           AMBERKAR Date:
                     2026.10.09
                     14:51:44 +0530




                                                                                 7 of 7


Continue reading with your account

Sign in to read the full judgment. It’s free.

Sign in to read

Checking your session…

Lawyer court records for this case

Associated through the court’s case reference.

For a signed copy suitable for filing, refer to the court's website.