Bombay High Court
MRUDULA SUHAS SHUKLAversusD S KULKARNI AND CO
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
The moratorium provisions of the IBC do not apply to the criminal aspect of Section 138 NI Act proceedings, rendering the stay orders unlawful.
Summary
Petitioners Suhas Gopal Shukla and Mrudula Suhas Shukla challenged two orders of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nashik that stayed criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on the ground that insolvency proceedings before the NCLT were pending. They contended, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Dineshchand Surana v. UCO Bank, that the IBC moratorium does not apply to the criminal aspect of Section 138 offences. The High Court examined the Supreme Court’s reasoning, which bifurcates the offence into a criminal tier (Tier I) and a compensatory tier (Tier II), and held that the moratorium cannot stay the criminal tier. Consequently, the stay orders were deemed illegal, quashed, and the applications dismissed. The Court also directed the trial court to dispose of the pending criminal cases by 31 December 2027.
Issues considered
- Whether the moratorium provisions under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 apply to criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
- Whether a stay of criminal proceedings is valid when insolvency proceedings before the NCLT are pending.
- Whether directors of a corporate debtor can escape personal criminal liability for offences under Section 138 NI Act.
Legislation cited
- Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — s. 79(15), 96
- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — s. 138
Subjects
- Section 138 NI Act
- Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
- moratorium
- criminal liability
- cheque dishonour
- NCLT
- stay order
- personal liability of directors
Judgment
18-WP-2223-2025.DOC
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.2223 OF 2025
Suhas Gopal Shukla …Petitioner
Versus
D. S. Kulkarni & Co. & Anr. …Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.2225 OF 2025
Mrudula Suhas Shukla …Petitioner
Versus
D. S. Kulkarni & Co. & Anr. …Respondents
Mr. Lakshyaved R. Odhekar a/w. Mr. Omkar N. Mhasde and Mr.
Sujen Shaikh, for the Petitioners.
Mr. P. P. Jadhav, APP, for Respondent No.3-State.
CORAM: MADHAV J. JAMDAR, J.
DATED : 1st SEPTEMBER 2026
P. C.:
1. Heard Mr. Odhekar, learned Counsel appearing for the
Petitioners and Mr. Jadhav, learned APP appearing for Respondent
No.2-State.
2. In Writ Petition No.2223 of 2025, the challenge is to the
legality and validity of the order dated 31st October 2023 passed by
the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nashik, below
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Exhibit-73 in SCC No.4270 of 2017, by which the said Application
bearing Exhibit-73 filed by accused No.2 to stay the matter till the
pendency of the proceedings before the National Company Law
Tribunal (“NCLT”), Mumbai was allowed.
3. In Writ Petition No.2225 of 2025, the challenge is to the
legality and validity of the order dated 31st October 2023 passed by
the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nashik, below
Exhibit-74 in SCC No.4269 of 2017, by which the said Application
bearing Exhibit-74 filed by accused No.2 to stay the matter till the
pendency of the proceedings before the NCLT, Mumbai was
allowed.
4. It is the submission of Mr. Odhekar, learned Counsel
appearing for the Petitioners that the NCLT proceedings filed under
the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
(“IBC”) are still pending. However, he submits that the Supreme
Court in the case of Dineshchand Surana vs. UCO Bank1 has
clarified that as far as the proceedings under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“NI Act”) are concerned, they
1 2026 SCC OnLine SC 987
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are divided into two parts. One part is regarding criminal aspect
and other part is regarding compensation aspect. He submits that
the Supreme Court has clarified that the moratorium which is
contemplated under Section 96 of the IBC is not applicable to the
criminal aspects of the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act and
the same may apply to the compensation aspect of Section 138 of
the NI Act and that stage has not yet arrived at. He more
particularly relied on paragraph Nos.198 to 202 of the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Dineshchand Surana (supra). He
also relied on the decision of the learned Single Judge dated 18 th
August 2026 in the case of Jagmohan Garg vs. National Spot
Exchange Limited & Anr2 and connected matters and more
particularly, on paragraph Nos.78 to 94.
5. Before considering the rival contentions, it is necessary to set
out the order dated 30th June 2026, passed by this Court:
“1) A learned Single Judge by order dated 19 th
June, 2024 has issued notice to the Respondents
and further directed that the notice to indicate
that the Petition be disposed of finally.
2 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 10654
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2) The office note indicates that Respondent
Nos.1 and 2 have been duly served. Despite
service of notice, none has appeared on behalf of
Respondent Nos.1 and 2. By way of a last
opportunity, stand over to 6th July, 2026. To be
shown fairly high on board.
3) It is made clear that if, inspite of this
opportunity, Respondent Nos.1 and 2 fail to
appear, this Court shall proceed to hear and
decide both these Writ Petitions finally.”
Thus, although the Respondents are served, none appears for
the Respondent No.1 and 2, even after granting opportunity, none
appears.
6. By the impugned orders, the learned Trial Court stayed the
criminal cases filed under Section 138 of the NI Act on the ground
that proceeding under IBC Act are pending before the NCLT. In
view of the said reasoning given by the learned Trial Court, it is
necessary to set out the paragraph Nos.198 to 202 of Dineshchand
Surana (supra) on which the learned Counsel appearing for the
Petitioners relied, which read as under:
“198. However, we have also noted the decisions
of this Court and the 2008 Amendment to the NI
Act which place emphasis on the compensatory
and remedial framework of Section 138 of the NI
Act. Upon examination of the nature and dual
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objectives of Section 138, we found it prudent to
treat the legal action taken under Section 138 as
tiered proceedings. Tier I of the proceeding under
Section 138 is without any doubt, criminal and
culminates into punishment of either
imprisonment, fine or both, if the drawer of the
cheque is convicted. Tier I is mandatory in nature
unlike Tier II which is dependent upon the
discretion of the courts to order compensation.
Tier II is the compensatory aspect of Section 138
which causes an inevitable overlap between
criminal and civil actions.
II. Whether the proceedings under Section 138 of
the NI Act are protected during the moratorium
period provided under Part-III of the IBC?
199. Having discussed the dual objective and
nature of the proceedings under Section 138 of
the NI Act, we have found that the applicability
of moratorium provisions to the same is rife with
complexity. If Section 138 proceeding in its
entirety is stayed by the operation of moratorium,
then it would do violence to the avowed object of
attaching criminal consequences to the wrong of
cheque dishonour. On the other hand, if the
Section 138 proceedings are kept outside the
purview of moratorium, then it would be
detrimental to the interests of the debtor as well
as other creditors whose claims are similarly
placed but are kept secondary due to adoption of
methods of payments other than cheques.
200. Therefore, it is imperative to balance
between the objectives sought to be achieved by
both the legislations. We have attempted to
balance the provisions of both the NI Act and the
IBC by bifurcating the offence of cheque
dishonour into (i) criminal aspect of the offence
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(Tier I), and (ii) compensatory aspect of the
Section 138 proceedings (Tier II).
201. The criminal aspect of Section 138
proceedings results in punishment including
imprisonment, fine or both. This makes it
sufficiently clear that moratorium provisions
under Part III of the IBC cannot be made
applicable on the criminal impact of Section 138
of the NI Act. We have said so because Section
79(15) of the IBC which defines “excluded debts”
has excluded the ‘liability to pay fine’ from debts
in respect of which legal actions and proceedings
are stayed by the operation of moratorium under
Part III of the IBC. We are of the view that
allowing Section 138 proceedings to enjoy the
benefit of moratorium, especially in light of such
express exclusion of criminal liability, is not a
good law.
202. We have also dealt with the compensatory
aspect of Section 138 proceedings and have taken
the view that the same is in the nature of a civil
remedy that would result in the depletion of the
assets of the individual debtor if not stayed.
Therefore, we are of the view that the
moratorium provisions under Part III of the IBC
must be made applicable in respect of recovery of
compensation in Section 138 proceedings.”
(Emphasis added)
Thus, it is very clear that as held by the Supreme Court,
criminal aspect of Section 138 proceedings results in punishment
including imprisonment, fine or both and that moratorium
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provisions under Part III of the IBC cannot be made applicable on
the criminal aspect of Section 138 of the NI Act.
7. Learned Single Judge in Jagmohan Garg (supra) after
considering the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of
Dineshchand Surana (supra) and Ajay Kumar Radheshyam Goenka
vs. Tourism Finance Corporation of India3 and in the case of
Rakesh Bhanot vs. M/s. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd.4 has observed in
paragraph No.85 as under:
“85. In the respectful understanding of this Court,
the two-judge Bench decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Dineshchand Surana (supra),
cannot be said to have taken a view which is
completely contrary to the one recorded in the
decisions in the cases of Ajay Kumar
Radheyshyam Goenka (supra) and Rakesh
Bhanot (supra). Nay the two-judge Bench
observed in no unequivocal terms that the
criminal aspect of the prosecution under Section
138 of the Act, 1881 would not be affected by the
moratorium provisions of the IBC 2016 and the
directors of the corporate debtor cannot escape
personal criminal liability.”
(Emphasis added)
3 (2023) 10 SCC 545
4 (2025) 6 SCC 781
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8. Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in
the case of Dineshchand Surana (supra), it is very clear that the
criminal aspect of the prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act,
will not be affected by the moratorium provisions of the IBC and
the directors of the corporate debtor cannot escape personal
criminal liability.
9. Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court,
both these Writ Petitions are disposed of by passing the following
order:
ORDER
Writ Petition No.2223 of 2025:
(a) The order dated 31st October 2023 passed by the
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nashik,
below Exhibit-73 in S.C.C. No.4270 of 2017 is
quashed and set aside and the said Application
bearing Exhibit-73 is dismissed.
Writ Petition No.2225 of 2025:
(b) The order dated 31st October 2023 passed by the
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nashik,
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below Exhibit-74 in S.C.C. No. 4269 of 2017 is
quashed and set aside and the said Application
bearing Exhibit-74 is dismissed.
(c) As the said criminal cases are pending since the year
2017, the learned Trial Court is requested to
expeditiously dispose of the said criminal cases on or
before 31st December 2027.
10. The Writ Petitions are disposed of in above terms with no
order as to costs.
[MADHAV J. JAMDAR, J.]
SONALI
MILIND
PATIL
Digitally signed by
SONALI MILIND PATIL
Date: 2026.09.03
10:34:26 +0530
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