Bombay High Court
SUSHAMA BABASO PATILversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the detention order was not mala‑fide, was based on material placed before the authority, and the petition lacked merit.
Summary
The petition filed by Sushama Babaso Patil under Article 226 sought a writ of mandamus to quash a preventive detention order issued against her son, Rajvardhan Patil, under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities (MPDA) Act, 1981. The petitioner alleged that the order was passed for a wrong purpose, on vague and irrelevant grounds, and was mala‑fide because the detainee had been acquitted or granted anticipatory bail in several cases and was engaged in legitimate political activity. The respondents contended that the detaining authority was subjectively satisfied that detention was necessary for public order and that the petitioner’s challenge was premature as the order had not yet been executed. The Court examined the jurisprudence on the limited jurisdiction of High Courts in preventive‑detention matters, particularly the principles laid down in Additional Secretary v. Alka Subhash Gadia and related cases, and held that the material before the authority was sufficient and no mala‑fide was evident at the pre‑execution stage. Consequently, the Court found the petition devoid of merit and dismissed it, directing that the detention order remain in force.
Issues considered
- The maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 challenging a preventive detention order before its execution
- Whether the detention order under Section 3 of the MPDA Act was passed for a wrong purpose or on vague, extraneous grounds
- Whether the detaining authority acted mala‑fide or without applying its mind to relevant material
Legislation cited
- Indian Penal Code, 1860 — s. 132, 223, 249, 281, 309(4), 3(5), 351(2), 351(3), 62
- Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 — s. 55
- Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug‑offenders, Dangerous persons and video pirates Act, 1981 — s. 3, 3(2)
Subjects
- preventive detention
- Article 226
- writ of mandamus
- mala fide
- wrong purpose
- subjective satisfaction
- public order
- detaining authority
Judgment
wp-24-2026.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.24 OF 2026
Sou. Sushama Babaso Patil,
Age-60 Years, Occupation: Household,
Residing at Vadgaon,
Taluka Hatkanangale, District Kolhapur ...Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra
Through the Secretary, Home Department
(Special), Mantralaya, Mumbai - 400
2. The District Magistrate /Collector, Kolhapur
Office of the Collector, Nagala Park Kolhapur.
3. The Superintendent of Police, Kolhapur
Opp. Police Headquarters, Kasaba
Bavada Road, Kolhapur ...Respondents
…..
Mr. Deepak Patil a/w. Adv. Sujit Mishra a/w. Adv. Swapnil Naik,
Advocate for petitioner.
Dr. Ashwini Takalkar, APP for respondent-State.
…..
CORAM : R.G. AVACHAT AND
AJIT B. KADETHANKAR, JJ.
DATE : 6th FEBRUARY, 2026.
P.C:
. This Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
1 of 17
adn
wp-24-2026.doc
India, is preferred for the following reliefs :
a. This Court be pleased to a Writ of
Mandamus or any other appropriate
writ, order, or direction to quash and
set aside the Detention Order passed
against Rajvardhan Babasaheb Patil
under Section 3 of the MPDA Act;
2. The order of detention has been passed against the son of
the petitioner under Section 3(2) of the Maharashtra Prevention of
Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-offenders,
Dangerous persons and video pirates Act, 1981 (MPDA). The said
order could not be executed as he appears to have been evading
service thereof. The impugned detention order has been passed by
Respondent No. 2 on being subjectively satisfied that the activities
of the detenue, being a dangerous person, are prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order.
3. Since the challenge to the detention order is prior to its
execution, an issue as to the maintainability of the writ petition
was faintly raised. In view of the judgment of the Apex Court in
Additional Secretary to the Government of India v. Alka Subhash
Gadia, reported in 1991 Supp (1) SCC 496 the petition is
2 of 17
adn
wp-24-2026.doc
considered on its merits within the limited parameters laid down
therein.
4. According to the learned Advocate for the petitioner, the
detention order is liable to be set aside on the following grounds:
(i) It is passed for a wrong purpose.
(ii) It is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds.
5. In support of his contentions, the learned Advocate for the
petitioner submits that the fundamental rights of the petitioner’s
son would be violated if the detention order is executed. It is
contended that crimes in which the detenue has either been
acquitted or in which no charge-sheet has been filed were taken
into consideration while passing the detention order. It is further
submitted that in the last three crimes registered against him,
anticipatory bail has been granted. The detenue has been in active
politics for a long period and has not breached the externment
order. With the permission of the High Court, he was allowed to
enter the externed area for the recently concluded local body
elections. He is likely to be co-opted as a Councillor. It is alleged
that since he belongs to a political outfit which is in opposition,
the impugned order has been passed mala fide.
3 of 17
adn
wp-24-2026.doc
6. Reliance is placed upon the judgments of this Court in
Jogindershing Ranjitshing Chvan v/s. The State of Maharashtra &
Anr passed in Criminal Writ Petition No.1621 of 2024 and (ii)
Ishwarsingh Jaswantsingh Girniwale V.s. The District Magistrate &
Ors. passed in Criminal Writ Petition No.578 of 2024.
7. It is further submitted that in the crime which allegedly
triggered the proposal for detention, anticipatory bail was granted
after the learned Additional Sessions Judge perused the video clip
of the alleged incident and observed that no such incident had
taken place. As regards in-camera statements, it is submitted that
the same are cyclostyled and stereotyped. The detenue has not
been arrested in connection with the recent crimes. The order,
therefore, according to the petitioner, smacks of mala fides and
deserves to be quashed.
8. The learned APP, on the other hand, has relied upon the
judgments in Additional Secretary to the Government of India v.
Alka Subhash Gadia and Naresh Kumar Goyal v. Union of India &
Ors., submitted that the detenue has been evading execution of
the detention order. She has taken us through the detention order
to submit that the same has been passed on the basis of relevant
4 of 17
adn
wp-24-2026.doc
material placed before the Detaining Authority, who was
subjectively satisfied that detention was necessary for the
maintenance of public order. It is submitted that efforts were made
to serve the detention order, but the detenue could not be traced.
Hence, no interference is warranted at the pre-execution stage.
9. We have considered the submissions and perused the
impugned order as well as the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of
the respondents
10. In case of the Additional Secretary (supra) the Apex Court
has observed thus :
“11. The provisions of Articles 21 and 22 read together,
therefore, make it clear that a person can be deprived of
his life or personal liberty according to procedure
established by law, and if the law made for the purpose is
valid, the person who is deprived of his life or liberty has
to challenge his arrest or detention, as the case may be,
according to the provisions of the law under which he is
arrested or detained. This proposition is valid both for
punitive and preventive detention. The difference between
them is made by the limitations placed by sub-clauses (1)
and (2) on the one hand and sub-clauses (4) to (7) on the
other of Article 22, to which we have already referred
above. What is necessary to remember for our purpose is
that the Constitution permits both punitive and preventive
detention provided it is according to procedure established
by law made for the purpose and if both the law and the
procedure laid down by it, are valid.
12. This is not to say that the jurisdiction of the High Court
and the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 32
respectively has no role to play once the detention -
punitive or preventive - is shown to have been made under
the law so made for the purpose. This is to point out the
limitations which the High Court and the Supreme Court
have to observe while exercising their respective
jurisdiction in such cases. These limitations are normal and
5 of 17
adn
wp-24-2026.doc
well known, and are self-imposed as a matter of prudence,
propriety, policy and practice and are observed while
dealing with cases under all laws. Though the Constitution
does not place any restriction on these powers, the judicial
decisions have evolved them over a period of years taking
into consideration the nature of the right infringed or
threatened to be infringed, the scope and object of the
legislation or of the order or decision complained of, the
need to balance the rights and interests of the individual as
against those of the society, the circumstances under which
and the persons by whom the jurisdiction is invoked, the
nature of relief sought etc. To illustrate these limitations:
(i) in the exercise of their discretionary jurisdiction the
High Court and the Supreme Court do not, as courts of
appeal or revision, correct mere errors of law or of facts;
(ii) the resort to the said jurisdiction is not permitted as an
alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained by suit
or other mode prescribed by statute. Where it is open to
the aggrieved person to move another tribunal or even
itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the
manner provided in the statute, the Court does not, by
exercising the writ jurisdiction, permit the machinery
created by the statute to be by-passed; (iii) it does not
generally enter upon the determination of questions which
demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish
the right to enforce which, the writ is claimed; (iv) it does
not interfere on the merits with the determination of the
issues made by the authority invested with statutory
power, particularly when they relate to matters calling for
expertise, unless there are exceptional circumstances
calling for judicial intervention, such as, where the
determination is mala fide or is prompted by extraneous
considerations or is made in contravention of the principles
of natural justice or any constitutional provision; (v) the
Court may also intervene where (a) the authority acting
under the concerned law does not have the requisite
authority or the order which is purported to have been
passed under the law is not warranted or is in breach of
the provisions of the concerned law or the person against
whom the action is taken is not the person against whom
the order is directed; or (b) where the authority has
exceeded its powers or jurisdiction or has failed or refused
to exercise jurisdiction vested in it; or (c) where the
authority has not applied its mind at all or has exercised its
power dishonestly or for an improper purpose; (vi) where
the Court cannot grant a final relief, the Court does not
entertain petition only for giving interim relief. If the Court
is of opinion that there is no other convenient or
efficacious remedy open to the petitioner, it will proceed to
investigate the case on its merits and if the Court finds that
there is an infringement of the petitioner's legal rights, it
14 ptwill grant final relief but will not dispose of the
petition only by granting interim relief; (vii) where the
6 of 17
adn
wp-24-2026.doc
satisfaction of the authority is subjective, the Court
intervenes when the authority has acted under the dictates
of another body or when the conclusion is arrived at by the
application of a wrong test or misconstruction of a statute
or it is not based on material which is of a rationally
probative value and relevant to the subject matter in
respect of which the authority is to satisfy itself. If again
the satisfaction is arrived at by taking into consideration
material which the authority properly could not, or by
omitting to consider matters which it ought to have, the
Court interferes with the resultant order; (viii) In proper
cases the Court also intervenes when some legal or
fundamental right of the individual is seriously threatened,
though not actually invaded.
13. These limitations are not only equally observed by the
High Court and the Supreme Court while exercising their
writ jurisdiction in preventive detention matters, but in
view of the object for which the detention law is enacted
and is permitted by the Constitution to be enacted, the
courts are more circumspect in observing them while
exercising their said extraordinary equitable and
discretionary power in these cases. While explaining the
nature of the detention law and of the orders passed under
it and the scope of the powers of the Court in these
matters, this Court has often emphasised the distinction
between the existence of its wide powers and the propriety
and desirability of using them.
14. In the Keshav Singh, Re 3 which arose out of the dispute
as to the constitutional relationship between the High
Court and the Uttar Pradesh State legislature, this Court
pointed out that when a citizen moves the Court and
complains that his fundamental right under Article 21 is
contravened, it would plainly be the duty of the Court to
examine the merits of the said contention and that
inevitably raises the question as to whether the personal
liberty of the citizen has been taken away according to the
procedure established by law. The Court held that the
power of the High Court under Article 226 and the
authority of this Court under Article 32 are not subject to
any exceptions. Therefore, it cannot be contended that a
citizen cannot move the High Court or this Court to invoke
their jurisdiction even in cases where his fundamental
rights have been violated. The judicial power conferred on
the High Courts and this Court is meant for the protection
of the citizens' fundamental rights.
15. In Dwarkanath, Hindu Undivided Family v. ITO4 while
dealing with the nature and scope of power under Article
226, this Court observed that though the High Court under
that article has a wide power to reach injustice wherever it
is found, it does not mean that the High Court can function
7 of 17
adn
wp-24-2026.doc
arbitrarily under it. Some limitations are implicit in the
article and others may be evolved to direct the article
through defined channels.
16. State of Bihar v. Rambalak Singh "Balak” 5 was a case
dealing with the question whether the High Court had
under Article 226 jurisdiction to release a detenu on bail
pending the final disposal of the petition. The detenu in
that case was detained under Rule 30 of the Defence of
India Rules. The Court observed that if on proof of certain
conditions or grounds it is open to the High Court to set
aside the order of detention and direct the release of the
detenu, it would not be possible to hold that in a proper
case, the High Court had no jurisdiction to make an
interim order giving the detenu the relief which the High
Court would be entitled to give him at the end of the
proceeding. The Court referred to its earlier decision in
Keshav Singh, Re3 and pointed out that the general
principle on which the observations of this Court were
based in that case would apply as much to the habeas
corpus proceedings commenced on behalf of the detenu
detained under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules as to
any other habeas corpus proceeding. According to the
court, the interim relief which can be granted in habeas
corpus proceeding must no doubt be in aid of and auxiliary
to the main relief. The Court added that it is true that in
dealing with the question as to whether interim bail should
be granted to the detenu, the Court would naturally take
into account the special objects which are desired to be
achieved by orders of detention passed under Rule 30 but,
stated the Court, "We are dealing with the bare question of
jurisdiction and are not concerned with the propriety or
the reasonableness of any given order. Considering the
question as a bare question of jurisdiction, we are reluctant
to hold that the jurisdiction of the High Court to pass
interim auxiliary orders under Article 226 of the
Constitution can be said to have been taken away by
necessary implication when the High Court is dealing with
habeas corpus petitions in relation to orders of detention
passed under Rule 30 of the Rules". The Court then dealt
with the contention that the order of bail in detention
proceedings would not be interim, but would be final and,
therefore, that fact distinguished cases of preventive
detention under detention law from other cases of habeas
corpus petitions. Negativing the said contention the Court
held: (SCR pp. 349-351)
"(9) This argument also is not well founded. It is
obvious that when the High Court releases a detenu on bail
pending the final disposal of his habeas corpus petition,
the High Court will no doubt take all the relevant facts into
account and it is only if and when the High Court is
satisfied that prima facie, there is something patently
8 of 17
adn
wp-24-2026.doc
illegal in the order of detention that an order for bail
would be passed. The jurisdiction of the High Court to pass
an interim order does not depend upon the nature of the
order, but upon its authority to give interim relief to a
party which is auxiliary to the main relief to which the
party would be entitled if it succeeds in its petition.
Therefore, considered as a mere proposition of law, we see
no reason to accept the argument of the learned Advocate-
General that the principle enunciated by this Court in the
Special Reference3 has no application to habeas corpus
petitions filed under Article 226 in relation to orders of
detention passed under Rule 30 of the Rules.
(10) Having thus rejected the main argument urged by
the learned Advocate-General, we must hasten to
emphasise the fact that though we have no hesitation in
affirming the jurisdiction of the High Court in granting
interim relief by way of bail to a detenu who has been
detained under Rule 30 of the Rules, there are certain
inexorable considerations which are relevant to
proceedings of this character and which inevitably
circumscribe the exercise of the jurisdiction of the High
Court to pass interim orders granting bail to the detenu.
There is not doubt that the facts on which the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority is based, are not
justiciable, and so, it is not open to the High Court to
enquire whether the impugned order of detention is
justified on facts or not. The jurisdiction of the High Court
to grant relief to the detenu in such proceedings is very
narrow and very limited. That being so, if the High Court
takes the view that prima facie the allegations made in the
writ petition disclose a serious defect in the order of
detention which would justify the release of the detenu,
the wiser and the more sensible and reasonable course to
adopt would invariably be to expedite the hearing of the
writ petition and deal with the merits without any delay.
Take the case where mala fides are alleged in respect of an
order of detention. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the
Court to come to any conclusion, even prima facie, about
the mala fide alleged, unless a return is filed by the State.
Just as it is not unlikely that the High Courts may come
across cases where orders of detention are passed mala
fide, it is also not unlikely that allegations of mala fides are
made light heartedly or without justification; and so,
judicial approach necessarily postulates that no conclusion
can be reached, even prima facie, as to mala fides unless
the State is given a chance to file its return and state its
case in respect of the said allegations, and this emphasises
the fact that even in regard to a challenge to the validity of
an order of detention on the ground that it is passed mala
fide, it would not be safe, sound or reasonable to make an
interim order on the prima facie provisional conclusion
that there may be some substance in the allegations of
9 of 17
adn
wp-24-2026.doc
mala fides. What is true about mala fides is equally true
about other infirmities on which an order of detention may
be challenged by the detenu. That is why the limitation on
the jurisdiction of the Court to grant relief to the detenus
who have been detained under Rule 30 of the Rules,
inevitably introduces a corresponding limitation on the
power of the Court to grant interim bail.
(11) In dealing with writ petitions of this character, the
Court has naturally to bear in mind the object which is
intended to be served by the orders of detention. It is no
doubt true that a detenu is detained without a trial; and
so, the courts would inevitably be anxious to protect the
individual liberty of the citizen on grounds which are
justiciable and within the limits of their jurisdiction. But in
upholding the claim for individual liberty within the limits
permitted by law, it would be unwise to ignore the object
which the orders of detention are intended to serve. An
unwise decision granting bail to a party may lead to
consequences which are prejudicial to the interests of the
community at large; and that is a factor which must be
duly weighed by the High Court before it decides to grant
bail to a detenu in such proceedings. We are free to confess
that we have not come across cases where bail has been
granted in habeas corpus proceedings directed against
orders of detention under Rule 30 of the Rules, and we
apprehend that the reluctance of the courts to pass orders
of bail in such proceedings is obviously based on the fact
legal and that they are fully conscious of the difficulties -
legal and constitutional, and of the other risks involved in
making such orders. Attempts are always made by the
courts to deal with such applications expeditiously; and in
actual practice, it would be very difficult to come across a
case where without a full enquiry and trial of the grounds
on which the order of detention is challenged by the
detenu, it would be reasonably possible or permissible to
the Court to grant bail on prima facie conclusion reached
by it at an earlier stage of the proceedings.
(12) If an order of bail is made by the Court without a
full trial of the issues involved merely on prima facie
opinion formed by the High Court, the said order would be
open to the challenge that it is the result of improper
exercise of jurisdiction. It is essential to bear in mind the
distinction between the existence of jurisdiction and its
proper exercise. Improper exercise of jurisdiction in such
matters must necessarily be avoided by the courts in
dealing with applications of this character. Therefore, on
the point raised by the learned Advocate-General in the
present appeal, our conclusion is that in dealing with
habeas corpus petitions under Article 226 of the
Constitution where orders of detention passed under Rule
30 of the Rules are challenged, the High Court has
10 of 17
adn
wp-24-2026.doc
jurisdiction to grant bail, but the exercise of the said
jurisdiction is inevitably circumscribed by the
considerations which are special to such proceedings and
which have relevance to the object which is intended to be
served by orders of detention properly and validly passed
under the said Rules."
17. Explaining the nature of preventive detention, this
Court in Khudiram Das v. State of W.B. 6 stated as follows:
(SCC pp. 90-91, para 8)
"... The power of detention is clearly a preventive
measure. It does not partake in any manner of the nature
of punishment. It is taken by way of precaution to prevent
mischief to the community. Since every preventive measure
is based on the principle that a person should be prevented
from doing something which, if left free and unfettered, it
is reasonably probable he would do, it must necessarily
proceed in all cases, to some extent, on suspicion or
anticipation as distinct from proof.... This being the nature
of the proceeding, it is impossible to conceive how it can
possibly be regarded as capable of objective assessment.
The matters which have to be considered by the detaining
authority are whether the person concerned, having regard
to his past conduct judged in the light of the surrounding
circumstances and other relevant material, would be likely
to act in a prejudicial manner as contemplated in any of
sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of clause (1) of sub-section (1)
of Section 3, and if so, whether it is necessary to detain
him with a view to preventing him from so acting. These
are not matters susceptible of objective determination and
they could not be intended to be judged by objective
standards. They are essentially matters which have to be
administratively determined for the purpose of taking
administrative action. Their determination is, therefore,
deliberately and advisedly left by the legislature to the
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which by
reason of its special position, experience and expertise
would be best fitted to decide them. It must in the
circumstances be held that the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority as regards these matters constitutes the
foundation for the exercise of the power of detention and
the Court cannot be invited to consider the propriety or
sufficiency of the grounds on which the satisfaction of the
detaining authority is based. The Court cannot, on a
review of the grounds, substitute its own opinion for that
of the authority, for what is made condition precedent to
the exercise of the power of detention is not an objective
determination of the necessity of detention for a specified
purpose but the subjective opinion of the detaining
authority, and if a subjective opinion is formed by the
detaining authority as regards the necessity of detention
for a specified purpose, the condition of exercise of the
11 of 17
adn
wp-24-2026.doc
power of detention would be fulfilled. This would clearly
show that the power of detention is not a quasi-judicial
power."
11. Let us now consider whether the petitioner is entitled to any
relief. The order of detention reads thus :
3. The list of past offences and preventive action taken against you are shown in the
following chart-
3.1. According to the available records, it is revealed that you have been involved in
various serious offences against public order as defined under Chapters XVI and XVII of the
Indian Penal Code, as well as under the provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and other
legal enactments implemented for maintaining public order. The offences listed below
constitute your past criminal history, and the same has not been relied upon while passing the
order of detention; however, it has been referred to solely for the purpose of demonstrating
that you have been habitually committing serious offences. Copies of the First Information
Reports have been supplied to you to show your propensity to engage in such grave criminal
activities. Your criminal history is shown in the chart below.
Cognizable Offences
Sr. Police C.R. No. Sections Date of Charge RCC No. Present
No. Station applied registration Sheet No.& status.
Date
1 Vadgaon 55/2009 IPC 08/06/200 38/15,Dt. 74/2015 Pending in
Sections 9 08/05/201 court
457, 380, 5
411,34
2 Vadgaon 235/2016 IPC 157/2016, Session Pending in
Sections 22/07/201 Dt.12/10/2 Case court
363, 6 026 no.137/20
364(a), 16
342, 324,
323, 504,
506, 34
r/w Maha.
Money
Lending
Act sec. 39
3 Vadgaon 237/16 IPC 24/07/201 05/2017,Dt 40/2017 Pending in
Sections 6 .20/01/20 court
363, 385, 17
386, 341,
452, 323,
504, 506,
34
4 Vadgaon 516/2029 SCST Act 21/10/201 40/2020, Spl. Case Pending in
Sec. 3(1) 9 Dt.26/02/2 no, court
(r) (s), 020 125/2020
3(2) (VA)
r/w IPC
Sections
323, 504,
12 of 17
adn
wp-24-2026.doc
506, 171
(P)(F),
143,147,14
9, 188 r/w
Sec. 135 of
the MP Act
5 Vadgaon 46/2023 IPC 25/01/202 --- --- Pending in
Sections 3 court
364(a),
384, 387,
452, 447,
427, 323,
143, 147,
149
6 Vadgaon 297/2024 IPC 11/05/202 139/2024, 151/2024 Pending in
Sections 4 Dt.07/08/2 court
307, 024
120(b),
143, 147,
148, 149,
323, 336
r/w Sec.
135 of the
MP Act
The above-mentioned offences have been registered against you from time to time for
your criminal acts. You have been arrested in connection with these offences, but the same
has had no reformatory effect on you or your conduct. On the contrary, your illegal and
dangerous criminal activities have continued to show an ascending trend.
Serious cognizable offences have been registered against you within the jurisdiction
of Vadgaon Police Station in connection with incidents committed by you in a prejudiced and
deliberate manner, with the intention of disturbing public order in public places. Upon
examining the details of the recently registered cognizable offences, it is evident that they
predominantly arise from serious acts directly opposed to the maintenance of public order.
Furthermore, considering your past criminal history and record, it has been revealed that,
apart from the offences already registered with the police, you have committed several other
grave offences. However, due to the atmosphere of fear and terror you have created in the
minds of ordinary people in the locality, there is sufficient reason to believe that they have
been unable to come forward to lodge complaints with the police..
3.2. To deter you from committing habitual offences, preventive action was initiated
against you, details of the preventive action is given below-
Sr. No Police Station Chapter Case Sections Date Status.
No.
1 Vadgaon 1/2011 The 01/02/2011 The Gang led
Maharashtra by you was
Police Act 1951 externed from
sec. 55 Kolhapur
District for a
period of two
years
2 Vadgaon 1/2022 The 25/06/2025 The Gang led
Maharashtra by you was
Police Act 1951 externed from
sec. 55 Kolhapur
13 of 17
adn
wp-24-2026.doc
District for a
period of two
years
You have previously been subjected to externment proceedings under Section 55 of the
Maharashtra Police Act, 1951, during the years 2011 and 2025. The externment order passed
against you in 2011 was set aside by the Hon'ble High Court, Mumbai, on certain technical
and procedural grounds raised during the hearing. However, the setting aside of the
externment proceedings on such procedural considerations cannot be construed as conferring
upon you any liberty to indulge in unrestricted criminal activities.
On the contrary, taking undue advantage of the said order of the Hon'ble High Court,
you have subsequently resumed and intensified your prejudiced, habitual, and dangerous
criminal activities targeting public peace, public order, and the life and property of citizens, as
is clearly reflected by the offences registered against you continuously thereafter.
Following the registration of multiple offences and your lawful arrests therein, you
secured release by furnishing sureties and bonds guaranteeing good behaviour. However,
instead of reforming yourself, you misused these statutory safeguards-intended to protect
ordinary citizens to further your own unlawful purposes. After obtaining such relief, you
reverted to your entrenched, prejudiced, and habitual criminal tendencies and continued to
commit offences that gravely disturb public order.
Your conduct, as well as the acts committed by the gang operating under your
leadership, exhibit a clear and alarming pattern of continuity and escalation. Your continued
presence in the area has generated sustained fear, intimidation, and a sense of insecurity
among law-abiding citizens. It has become evident that you and the gang under your
command are firmly committed to acting in defiance of the law. Accordingly, you were
externed from Kolhapur district on two separate occasions.
Despite being subjected to such stringent preventive measures, no positive or
reformative change has been observed in your socially harmful and disruptive criminal
behaviour. On the contrary, even after the externment order passed in 2025 came into effect,
you repeatedly violated the said order, thereby demonstrating a deliberate and conscious
disregard for statutory authority and revealing your continued inclination towards
lawlessness. Your long-standing role as the influential head of an active criminal gang,
combined with the fear, terror, and danger generated by your activities and those of your
gang, has persisted continuously from 2011 to 2025.
It is thus evident that even rigorous measures such as externment have proved
insufficient to restrain your habitual, premeditated, and socially disruptive criminal conduct.
In view of the persistent threat posed by your organized, continuous, and dangerous activities
to the public, public peace, and public safety, it has become necessary, urgent, and legally
imperative to initiate the present preventive action to effectively curb your activities.
By virtue of your continuous and habitual criminal activities, you have created an
atmosphere of terror among the general public. You have persistently engaged in acts of
intimidation and coercion to instill fear in ordinary citizens. A review of your criminal record
shows that, with deliberate and malicious intent to terrorize law-abiding citizens, you have
repeatedly committed serious offences against public order and persons, including: habitually
wielding deadly weapons in public places; threatening innocent persons; participating in
armed assaults in crowded areas resulting in grievous injuries; kidnapping individuals for the
purpose of extortion and wrongfully confining them; abusing and assaulting members of the
Dalit community using caste-based derogatory expressions; oporating illegal money-lending
activities; and cheating members of the public thereby indulging in socially abhorrent acts
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
14 of 17
adn
wp-24-2026.doc
It has further come to notice that you deliberately violated the externment order
issued against you for the preservation of public order and, during such violation, assaulted a
public servant with eriminal force to prevent him from discharging his lawful duty. You have
also disobeyed lawful directions of public authorities, harboured offenders, and, by driving a
vehicle in a rash and dangerous manner, attempted to commit a violent robbery. You have
been arrested on multiple occasions for such offences. However, immediately upon release on
bail-misusing statutory provisions intended to safeguard the public-you have again engaged
in premeditated acts that disrupt public order, often of an even more serious nature.
This is substantiated by the recent offence registered at Vadgaon Police Station vide
FIR No. 413/2025 dated 20/07/2025, under Sections 132, 223, 249, 281, 309(4), 62,
351(2), 351(3), 3(5) of the IPC read with Section 142 of the Maharashtra Police Act.
Evidently, previous preventive actions have had no positive effect on you. It is
therefore clear that ordinary preventive measures are insufficient to curtail your dangerous
criminal activities, which continue to escalate and are prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order. However, it is clarified that this detention order is not itself based on preventive
action; rather, the preventive measures have been cited solely to highlight your persistent
tendency to habitually commit violent crimes.
4. Recently, your involvement is noticed in the following offence which is of serious
nature and is suggestive of your violent tendencies and inclinations to perpetuate your
criminal activities as a dangerous person. From your participation in the crime shown below
and from the criminal act, it becomes evident that you are a 'dangerous person'. This criminal
activity of yours is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as defined in section 2 (a)
(iv) r/w (b) (1) of the said Act and hence, I, being the Detaining Authority, have relied
mainly upon the same while passing the order of detention. I have considered the following
one offence mentioned below at Para No. 5.1 along with two in-camera statements
mentioned at Para No. 6.1 in addition to 6.2 to issue this detention order. The relevant
document regarding the investigation of this offence is enclosed herewith in order to enable
you to make an effective representation.
Sr. No. Police Crime Section Date of Charge RCC No. Remarks
Station No. Registrati Sheet No.
on & Date
1 Vadgaon 413/202 BNS Sec. 20/07/20 -- -- Pending
5 132, 223, 25 investigat
249, 281, ion
309(4),
62,
351(2),
351(3),
3(5) r/w
the
Maharash
tra Police
Act Sec.
142
5. Particular of Offence Considered for Passing Detention Order:-
5.1 Vadgaon Police Station has registered an offence vide FIR No. 413/2025 dated
20/07/2025, u/s 132, 223, 249, 281, 309(4), 62, 351(2), 351(3), 3(5) of theIPC r/w Section
142 of the Maharashtra Police Act against you, along with your associate for violation of the
externment order issued for the maintenance of public order by assaulting a public servant to
15 of 17
adn
wp-24-2026.doc
deter him from performing his lawful duty, providing shelter to offenders, and attempting
forcible robbery by recklessly driving a vehicle.
5.1.1 The complainant in this offence is Shri Laxman Tukaram Sargar, aged 34 years, Police
Sub-Inspector, posted at Vadgaon Police Station. The incident took place on 20/07/2025 at
approximately 03:16 a.m., on the road from Vadgaon Court to Vadgaon, Taluka
Hatkanangale. The FIR was registered on the same day, i.e., 20/07/2025, at 14:00 hours.
5.1.2 The complainant was on duty as Night Patrolling and Night Checking Officer from
21:00 pm. on 19/07/2025 to 09:00 am. of 20/07/2025. On 19/07/2025 at 23:09 pm, after
recording the station diary at the police station, the complainant, along with Constable 1605
Wangikar, left for checking duty with the Peter Mobile from Vadgaon Police Station covering
Vadgaon city, Khochi, Latwade, Bhendwade, Sawarde, Bhadole, Mauje Tasgaon, Kapurwadi,
and then scanned the QR code of the Hon'ble First Class Magistrate, Vadgaon Court, at about
03:16 am. While returning from Vadgaon Court towards Vadgaon city on the Kolhapur-
Vadgaon road, two young men on a motorcycle overtook the patrol vehicle in a rash manner.
On noticing this, the complainant pursued them and asked them to stop, but the two young
men did not comply and continued at high speed.
The complainant overtook the motorcycle at Vathar Naka and attempted to stop
them. On the motorcycle you, the externed offender from the Kolhapur district, along with
your accomplice Suyog Patil were riding. When the complainant asked, "Why didn't you stop
despite the warning? Why are you out at this late hour?" (" इशारा कुन दे खील का थांबला नाही.
एका रात्री का ि रताय,") you continued moving forward on the motorcycle. The complainant
tried to remove the keys of your motorcycle to stop you, asking you to sit in the patrol
vehicle. You shouted at the complainant, "Sir, we are leaving, why are you taking the keys
unnecessarily?" ("अहो साहेब िनघालोय थांबवू नका िवनाकारण िक्ली कावुन घे ्याचा काय संबंध,") At
that time, when the complaitant attempted to video the incident on his mobile phone, you
tried to snatch the mobile phone, and provoked your accomplice, Suyog Patil, by saying 'Call
the boys; should not let thera go,'(" तु पोर बोलावून घे यांना सोडायच नाही.") you pushed the
complainant from the front as such your accomplice, Suyog Patil, who got down from the
motorcycle and made a phone call. Despite repeated instructions from the complainant to sit
quietly in the vehicle, you drove the motorcycle in a hurry towards Vathar Bridge and
threatened the complainant, "will see you, are you trying to stop me" (" तु ्हाला बघुन घे तो मला
आठवताय काय") and fled. The complainant pursued your vehicle up to Vathar Bridge, but you
escaped.
Externee as per the order of The Externment Authority, i.e., the Superintendent of
Police, Kolhapur, in accordance with Order No. 22LCB/MPA 55/Externment/2025-3288 dated
25/06/2025, and your accomplice Suyog Patil were signaled by the complainant to stop, you
attempted to snatch the complainant's mobile phone. Further, by threatening you said to your
accomplice, Suyog Patil, that, 'Do not let them go today; I will deal with you. How dare you
obstruct me," ("आज यांना सोडायचे नाही तु ्हाला बघुन घे तो मला आडवताय काय") you pushed the
complainant and fled on the motorcycle, therefore being as a government servent the
complainant lodged the complaint against you and your accomplice, and an offence has been
registered as stated above. The offence is being investigated Shri Santosh Mane, Assistant
Police Inspector, Vadgaon Police Station.
12. There are two in-camera statements which prima facie
indicate the involvement of the petitioner’s son in criminal
activities. The detention order is dated 29th December 2025. The
16 of 17
adn
wp-24-2026.doc
conduct of the petitioner’s son indicates that he appears to have
been absconding with a view to evade execution of the said order.
13. Upon perusal of the detention order, we prima facie find that
the grounds on which the same has been challenged do not appear
to be sustainable at this stage. The petitioner’s son may surrender
pursuant to the detention order and thereafter raise such grounds
of challenge as are available to him in law.
14. Suffice it to observe that the impugned order appears to
have been passed on the basis of material placed before the
Detaining Authority and does not, at this stage, disclose any mala
fides. This is not the stage to scrutinize the sufficiency or adequacy
of the material unless the detenue first submits to the order.
15. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find that the writ petition is
devoid of merits. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
[AJIT B. KADETHANKAR, J.] [ R.G. AVACHAT J.]
17 of 17
adn
Checking your session…