Bombay High Court
SUSHANT ALIAS HARI DINKAR WAYDANDEversusDISTRICT MAGISTRATE AND OTHERS
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
The detention order dated 02‑03‑2026 under Section 3 of the MPDA Act is quashed and set aside for procedural defects and lack of a live link to public order.
Summary
Sushant Waydande was preventively detained under the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities (MPDA) Act, 1981 by the District Magistrate on 2 March 2026. He challenged the detention, arguing that the proposal was returned with five deficiencies, the order was passed after an unexplained eleven‑month delay, the detaining authority failed to record subjective satisfaction, and the confidential witness statements were not verified. The Court examined the return of the proposal, the delay, the lack of a live and proximate link between the offences and public order, and the procedural lapses. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the Court held that the detention order was vitiated by these defects. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, the detention order was quashed, and the petitioner was ordered to be released forthwith.
Issues considered
- The proposal for detention was returned with deficiencies yet the order was passed without correcting them.
- Whether the eleven‑month delay between the last offence and the detention order breaks the live and proximate link required under the MPDA Act.
- Whether the detaining authority recorded independent subjective satisfaction as mandated by the Act.
- Whether reliance on unverified confidential witness statements renders the order invalid.
- Whether the offences alleged establish the petitioner as a dangerous person affecting public order under the MPDA Act.
Legislation cited
- Maharashtra Police Act — s. 56(1)(a), 56(1)(b)
- Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities (Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers and Persons engaged in Black‑Marketing of Essential Commodities) Act — s. 2(b)(1), 3, 3(1), 8
Subjects
- preventive detention
- MPDA Act
- subjective satisfaction
- delay
- live and proximate link
- public order
- quashing of detention order
- procedural defect
Judgment
WP-312-2026,J.(CR).doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 312 OF 2026
1) Sushant Alias Hari Dinkar Waydande, ]
Age: 24 Yrs, R/o Alsand, Tal. Khanapur, ]
District- Sangli. ]
[Presently detained at:- Sangli District Jail ]
Sangli]. ] … Petitioner
Versus
1) District Magistrate, Sangli ]
2) The State of Maharashtra ]
(Through Addl. Chief Secretary to ]
Government of Maharashtra Mantralaya, ]
Home Department Mantralaya, Mumbai. ]
3) The Superintendent Sangli Central Prison, ]
Sangli. ] … Respondents.
***
Mr. R. M. Haridas a/w Mr. Ritesh M. Thobde, Mr. Somnath Thengal,
Mr. Pushkraj Deshmukh i/by Mr. Darshan Singh Rajpurohit,
Advocates for the Petitioner.
Mr. Anand S. Shalgaonkar, A.P.P. for Respondent-State.
***
CORAM : RAJESH S. PATIL &
ABHAY J. MANTRI, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 23rd September, 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : 07th October, 2026.
JUDGMENT: (PER: ABHAY J. MANTRI, J).
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and by consent taken up
for final hearing. Heard the learned Advocate appearing for the
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Petitioner and the learned APP for the State. Perused the record and
the judgments relied upon by the learned Advocate for the Petitioner.
2. The detenue challenges the order of detention dated 2nd
March 2026, passed by Respondent No. 1, District Magistrate, Sangli,
which the State of Maharashtra confirmed on 14 th May 2026, whereby
he has been preventively detained. The Petitioner challenging the
detention order has preferred this Petition.
3. On 22nd August 2025, the Sub-Divisional Police Officer,
Jat, Deputy Division, Jat (for short, “SDPO”), through the
Superintendent of Police, District Sangli, submitted a proposal to the
District Magistrate, Sangli, to initiate detention proceedings against
the Petitioner as four offences have been registered against the
Petitioner and he has been indulging in certain criminal activities from
2020 to 2025, which include creating terror by possessing dangerous
weapons, threatening to kill, verbally abusing, committing extortion
and violating the order of externment.
4. Having considered the proposal, Respondent No. 1-
District Magistrate, after recording his satisfaction that the
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detenue/Petitioner was indulging in activities prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order and, to prevent him from acting in any
manner detrimental to public order, held that it was necessary to pass
the order. Accordingly, he passed the detention order under Section
3(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of
Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Dangerous Persons, Video
Pirates, Sand Smugglers and Persons engaged in Black-Marketing of
Essential Commodities Act, 1981 (for short, “the MPDA Act”) against
the Petitioner on 02.03.2026. Accordingly, the grounds of the
detention order were communicated to the Petitioner under Section 8
of the MPDA Act. Aggrieved by the same, the Petitioner has preferred
this Petition.
SUBMISSIONS
5. Learned Advocate for the Petitioner vehemently
contended that the detention order is patently illegal as it suffers from
basic defects. His main thrust of the argument was that the impugned
order suffers from non-compliance with the mandate laid down under
the provisions of the MPDA Act. He emphasised that, on the
following four grounds, the order suffers from basic defects:
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(i) Initially, on 12th November 2025, after recording five
substantive deficiencies in the proposal, the District Magistrate
returned it. Despite returning the said proposal, Respondent No.
1 subsequently approved it without recording any subjective
satisfaction and passed the impugned order.
(ii) There was a delay in passing the impugned order of
detention from the date of the proposal, thereby snapping the
“live and proximate link between the prejudicial activities and
the purpose of detention, and the Detaining Authority failed to
explain such delay in any manner”.
(iii) The Respondent No. 1-Authority erred in relying on the
fraudulent statements of witnesses.
(iv) Respondent No. 1 failed to record his subjective satisfaction
while passing the impugned order.
6. During arguments, he took us through paragraphs 2, 4,
and 6 of the reply and the statements of the so-called witnesses A and
B and submitted that the order was passed only on the basis of those
two witnesses' statements. Their statements are stereotyped and,
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therefore, cannot be relied upon. He further drew our attention to the
fact that the last offence was registered on 20 th March 2025; however,
the impugned order was passed belatedly, after 11 months, without
explaining the delay in passing it.
7. He has drawn our attention to the initial proposal
submitted by the Superintendent of Police to Respondent No. 1 on 3rd
September 2025 (page No. 39), which was returned by the District
Magistrate vide communication dated 12th November 2025, pointing
out five deficiencies therein for passing the detention order (page Nos.
248 and 249). He further submitted that Respondent No. 1, without
verifying the statements of the witnesses and merely based on his
interaction with the Deputy S.P., passed the impugned order, which is
not permissible under the Act.
8. Lastly, he submitted that the impugned order does not
refer to the reply filed by the detenue before Respondent No. 1 and
that, without recording his subjective satisfaction, he passed the
impugned order. He also submitted that Respondent No. 1 passed the
impugned order mechanically in a very casual and cavalier manner.
Therefore, the impugned order is not sustainable in law, is illegal and
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deserves to be quashed and set aside.
9. To buttress his submissions, he has relied upon the
following judgments:
a) Sushanta Kumar Banik vs. State of Tripura and others 1
(for short “Sushanta”)
b) T. A. Abdul Rahman vs. State of Kerala and others 2 ( for
short “ T. A. Abdul”)
c) Pradeep Nilkanth Paturkar vs. S. Ramamurthi and others 3
(for short “ Pradeep”)
d) Ram Manohar Lohia vs. State of Bihar and another 4 (for
short “Ram”)
e) Arun Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal5
f) Banka Sneha Sheela vs. State of Telangana and others6
g) Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana and others7
h) Mallada K. Sri Ram vs. State of Telangana and others 8
(for short “Mallada”)
i) Joyi Kitty Joseph vs. Union of India and others9
j) Dhanya M. vs. State of Kerala and others10
k) Arjun Sidram Salgar vs. The State of Maharashtra and
anr (for short “Arjun”) (Judgment of this Court in Criminal
1 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1333
2 (1989) 4 SCC 741
3 1993 Supp (2) SCC 61
4 1965 SCC OnLine SC 9
5 1970 (1) SCC 98
6 (2021) 9 SCC 415
7 (2023) 9 SCC 587
8 (2023) 13 SCC 537
9 (2025) 4 SCC 476
10 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1315
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Writ Petition No. 254 of 2025)
l) Sourabh Kalu Koli vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.
(Judgment of this Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 3380 of
2025)
m) Gulab Mehra vs. State of U. P. and others11
n) Khudiram Das vs. The State of West Bengal and others12
10. On the contrary, Mr. Shalgaonkar, learned APP, strongly
opposed the Petition and submitted that the detaining authority
recorded its subjective satisfaction while passing the impugned order;
therefore, Respondent No. 1 did not fail to record its satisfaction.
11. The Petitioner acted in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order, as evidenced by the registration of four
offences against him. He placed on record a chart showing the
criminal history of the Petitioner and submitted that, in view of his
dangerous and harmful activities, preventive action was taken against
him under Section 56(1)(a) and (b) of the Maharashtra Police Act,
1951, in the year 2023; however, he violated the said order. He
submitted that Respondent No. 1-Authority has explained the delay
caused in passing the order. Even if some delay is caused, merely on
the ground of delay, it would not be proper to hold that the detention
11 (1987) 4 Supreme Court Cases 302
12 (1975) 2 SCC 81
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order is illegal. Therefore, he submitted that the dictum laid down in
the judgments relied upon by the learned Advocate for the Petitioner is
not helpful to the Petitioner in support of his submissions.
12. Lastly, he submitted that the statements of the two
confidential witnesses sufficiently indicate that the detenue has been
continuously and consistently indulging in criminal activities, and that
the ordinary measures of law were not sufficient to restrain him.
Moreover, it was found that his criminal activities disturbed public
order; therefore, the Detaining Authority's satisfaction is proper and
beyond question. He thus submitted that the Petition has no merit.
13. To buttress his submissions, he relied on the judgment of
this Court in Aman @ Amaan Jamir Shaikh vs. The Commissioner of
Police, Pune City, Pune in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1717 of 2025,
delivered on 15th October 2025, and drew our attention to paragraph
Nos. 11, 16, 18 and 24 of the said judgment and submitted that the
Petitioner's detention was necessary to prevent him from acting in a
prejudicial manner affecting public order. As such, he contended that,
in view of the dictum in the said decision, no interference is warranted
with the impugned order.
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REASONS AND ANALYSIS
14. We have considered the rival contentions of the parties
and have gone through the record as pointed out by the respective
learned Advocates for the parties. We have also gone through the
judgments relied upon by the learned Advocate for the Petitioner. It is
appropriate to deal with the four crucial objections raised by the
learned Advocate for the Petitioner one by one.
(i) Return of the proposal by Respondent No. 1, after
recording five substantial deficiencies.
15. On perusal of the record, it appears that on 3 rd September
2025, the SDPO through the Superintendent of Police submitted the
proposal for detaining the Petitioner under the provisions of the
MPDA Act to Respondent No. 1. Respondent No.1, after recording
five substantial deficiencies, vide communication dated 12 th
November 2025, returned the said proposal. Those deficiencies are as
under:
a) Only one offence has been registered against the detenue.
b) On the basis of the registration of one offence, the
detenue cannot be termed a habitual offender.
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c) As per Section 2(b)(1) of the MPDA Act, the detenue
does not fall under the category of a dangerous person.
d) Only one offence has been registered against the detenue
during the last six months. Therefore, it would not be
appropriate to initiate action under the provisions of the
MPDA Act against him.
e) No documents in respect of bail have been produced
before him.
Based on the above deficiencies, the proposal was returned.
16. The Superintendent of Police, vide communication dated
29th November 2025, tried to explain the five deficiencies raised by
Respondent No. 1; however, he has not produced any material beyond
what was earlier placed before the Respondent No. 1 Authority while
submitting the proposal on 3rd September 2025.
17. Thus, it appears that when Respondent No. 1 initially
returned the proposal for passing the order of detention against the
Petitioner on 12th November 2025, without complying with or
explaining the deficiencies pointed out in the said proposal, it passed
the impugned order. This itself indicates that the impugned order
suffers from serious lacunae and infirmities. Initially, Respondent No.
1 had observed that registration of one offence could not be termed the
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detenue as a dangerous person and that registration of one offence
during the last six months was not sufficient to initiate proceedings
against the detenue under the MPDA Act. Therefore, it would not be
proper to pass the impugned detention order. Accordingly, on this
ground alone, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
DELAY
18. It is pertinent to note that the last offence was committed
on 20th March 2025, and the impugned order was passed on 2 nd March
2026, i.e. nearly eleven months after the occurrence of the last
offence. Therefore, in view of the dictum laid down in Sushanta
(supra), delay in passing the order of detention from the date of the
proposal, thereby snapping the live and proximate link between the
prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention, coupled with failure
on the part of the Detaining Authority to explain such delay, renders
the order unsustainable in law. The said decision squarely applies to
the case in hand. Therefore, we find substance in the contention of the
learned Advocate for the Petitioner that Respondent No. 1 failed to
explain the delay caused in passing the impugned order and, therefore,
failed to establish the live and proximate link between the prejudicial
activities and the purpose of passing the detention order.
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FRAUDULENT STATEMENT
19. Learned Advocate for the Petitioner drew our attention to
the statements of the confidential witnesses recorded by the SDPO and
submitted that both the statements are stereotyped and, therefore,
cannot be relied upon. He submitted that it is not possible for the
witnesses to state identical facts when their statements were recorded
on two different dates. Similarly, he argued that the Detaining
Authority did not verify the said statements; instead, it interacted only
with the SDPO and then concluded that the incident and the fear
expressed by the witnesses were genuine. According to him, such
interaction was not permissible and, therefore, Respondent No. 1,
without recording his subjective satisfaction, erred in passing the
impugned order.
20. He drew our attention to the communication dated 30 th
August 2025 and submitted that the said communication itself
indicates that the Police Inspector, Vita Police Station, requested the
Superintendent of Police, Sangli, to appoint the SDPO for verification
of the statements of the two confidential witnesses and, accordingly,
the Superintendent of Police, vide communication dated 20th August
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2025, appointed the SDPO to verify the statements. Thus, it appears
that Respondent No. 1 did not verify the witnesses' statements but
only interacted with the SDPO and passed the impugned order. Thus,
it appears that Respondent No. 1 passed the order without verifying
the statements, which is a serious defect.
21. In Arjun (supra), this Court recorded that Respondent No.
1 has to disclose an independent and meaningful subjective
satisfaction and cannot mechanically pass the order based on in-
camera statements.
REGISTRATION OF THE OFFENCES
22. One of the grounds raised is regarding the registration of
the four offences. While considering the said fact, it would be
appropriate to reproduce the chart about details of the criminal cases
as under:
Sr. Police C. R. No. Act and Sections Date of Present
No. Station Registration Status
1 Vita 149/2020 Indian Penal Code 19.05.2020 Pending
Sections 509, 323, before Court
504 R.C.C. No.
09/2023
2 Vita 471/2023 Indian Penal Code 23.09.2023 Pending
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Section 307 before Court
Sessions
Case No.
456/2024
3 Vita 40/2025 Maharashtra Police 22.01.2025 Pending
Act Section 142 before Court
S.C.C. No.
69/2025
4 Vita 315/2024 Bharatiya Nyaya 20.03.2025 Pending
Sanhita Sections before Court
118(1), 115(2), 352, R.C. C. No.
351(2), 3(5) and 167/2025
Arms Act Sections 4,
25.
23. The criminal cases at Serial Nos. 1 and 2 are from 2020
and 2023, respectively, and are stale offences. Therefore, it cannot be
said that a live and proximate link exists between the detenue's past
conduct and the imperative need to detain him. The offence at Serial
No. 3 is under Section 142 of the Maharashtra Police Act, registered
on the ground that the Petitioner violated the order of externment, and
therefore, the only offence at Sr. no. 4, of the year 2025, i.e. Crime
No. 315 of 2025, registered at Vita Police Station, is the offence based
on which the proceedings were initiated.
24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court, in a catena of
judgments, have held that the mere registration of one offence cannot,
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by itself, establish that a person is a dangerous person or that his
activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
25. In the case at hand, the said offence was committed
against an individual, not the public at large. The nature of the offence
prima facie does not indicate that the same is heinous or serious;
therefore, it cannot be said that it would affect the maintenance of
public order. A mere apprehension of breach of law and order is not
sufficient to meet the standard of adversely affecting the maintenance
of public order.
26. Even assuming that the allegations against the detenue in
the said crime are grave, the personal liberty of a detenue cannot be
sacrificed at the altar of preventive detention merely because he is
implicated in criminal proceedings. The powers of preventive
detention are exceptional and even draconian.
27. Apart from that, to pass an order of detention under the
MPDA Act against any person, the Detaining Authority must be
satisfied that he is a dangerous person within the meaning of Section
2(b)(1) of the MPDA Act or that he habitually commits, or attempts to
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commit, or abets the commission of, any offences punishable under
Chapters XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
28. Section 3 of the MPDA Act provides that the State
Government must be satisfied that a person is required to be detained
to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order.
29. Section 3(1) of the MPDA Act confers powers on the
District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, under the direction
of the State Government, to detain a person on being satisfied that it is
necessary to do so with a view to preventing him from acting in any
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Public order
shall be deemed to have been affected adversely, or shall be deemed
likely to be affected adversely, inter alia, if any of the activities of the
person referred to in sub-section (4), directly or indirectly, are causing
or are likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of
insecurity among the general public or any section thereof, or a grave
or widespread danger to life, property or public health.
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30. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mallada (supra) has held
that “mere apprehension of a breach of law and order is not sufficient
to meet the standard of adversely affecting the maintenance of public
order”. It has also observed that the personal liberty of the accused
cannot be sacrificed at the altar of preventive detention merely
because a person is implicated in one or more criminal proceedings.
The liberty of a citizen cannot be allowed to be curtailed by reason of
any delay on the part of the State.
31. In the case of Sushanta (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in paragraph Nos. 11 to 13 and 19, has observed as under:
“11. We are persuaded to allow this appeal on the following
two grounds:
(i) Delay in passing the order of detention from the date of
proposal, thereby snapping the "live and proximate link"
between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention
& failure on the part of the detaining authority in explaining
such delay in any manner.
(ii) The detaining authority remained oblivious of the fact that
in both the criminal cases relied upon by the detaining
authority for the purpose of passing the order of detention, the
appellant detenu was ordered to be released on bail by the
special court. The detaining authority remained oblivious, as
this material and vital fact of the appellant detenu being
released on bail in both the cases was suppressed, or rather
not brought to the notice of the detaining authority by the
sponsoring authority at the time of forwarding the proposal to
pass the appropriate order of preventive detention.
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DELAY IN PASSING THE ORDER OF DETENTION
12. We may recapitulate the necessary facts which have a
bearing so far as the issue of delay is concerned. The
proposal to take steps to preventively detain the appellant at
the end of the Superintendent of Police addressed to the
Superintendent of Police (C/S) West Tripura, Agartala is
dated 28th of June 2021. The proposal, in turn, forwarded by
the Assistant Inspector General of Police (Crime) on behalf
of the Director General to the Secretary, Home Department,
is dated 14.07.2021. The order of detention is dated 12 th of
November, 2021. There is no explanation worth the name as to
why it took almost five months for the detaining authority to
pass the order of preventive detention.
13. There is indeed a plethora of authorities explaining the
purpose and the avowed object of preventive detention in
express and explicit language. We think that all those
decisions of this Court on this aspect need not be
recapitulated and recited. But it would suffice to refer to the
decision of this Court in Ashok Kumar v. Delhi
Administration, (1982) 2 SCC 403, wherein the following
observation is made:
"Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society.
The object is not to punish a man for having done something
but to intercept before he does it and to prevent him from
doing it."
x
xx
xxx
19. Chinnappa Reddy. J. speaking for the Bench in Bhawarlal
Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1979) 1 SCC 465, has
explained as follows:
"It is further true that there must be a "live and proximate
link" between the grounds of detention alleged by the
detaining authority and the avowed purpose of detention,
namely the prevention of smuggling activities. We may in
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appropriate cases assume that the link is "snapped" if there is
a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of
detention and the arrest of the detenu. In such a case, we may
strike down an order of detention unless the grounds indicate
a fresh application of the mind of the detaining authority to
the new situation and the changed circumstances. But where
the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be
the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the
detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the
"link" not snapped but strengthened."
(Emphasis supplied).”
32. In the case of T. A. Abdul (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in paragraph No. 10, has observed as under:
“10. The conspectus of the above decisions can be
summarised thus: The question whether the prejudicial
activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of
detention is proximate to the time when the order is made, or
the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose
of detention is snapped, depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be
precisely formulated that would be applicable under all
circumstances, and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down
in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid
or mechanical test by merely counting the number of months
between the offending acts and the order of detention.
However, when there is undue and long delay between the
prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the
court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has
satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable
and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has
occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court
has to investigate whether the causal connection has been
broken in the circumstances of each case.”
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33. In the case of Pradeep (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in paragraph No. 13, has observed as under:
“13. Coming to the case on hand, the detention order
was passed after 5 months and 8 days from the date of the
registration of the last case and more than 4 months from
submission of the proposal. What disturbs our mind is that the
statements from the witnesses A to E were obtained only after
the detenu became successful in getting bail in all the
prohibition cases registered against him, that too in the later
part of March 1991. These statements are very much referred
to in the grounds of detention and relied upon by the detaining
authority along with the registration of the cases under the
Act.”
34. In Ram (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court interpreted
the expression “public order” in paragraph Nos. 51 and 52 and,
therefore, in paragraph No. 53, held that the meaning of the expression
“public order” is distinct from expressions such as “public safety” and
“security of the State.”
35. To summarise the above discussion, it appears that
initially, vide communication dated 12th November 2025, Respondent
No. 1-Authority returned the proposal for passing the detention order
and, without complying with the defects mentioned in the said letter or
explaining the same, merely on the basis of the further communication
dated 29th November 2025, passed the impugned order. Therefore, the
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said order suffers from the defects already noticed in the
communication dated 12th November 2025. Secondly, it appears that
the offence was registered on 20th March 2025 and the impugned order
was passed on 2nd March 2026, i.e. nearly eleven months thereafter.
This fact itself indicates that the order of detention has failed to advert
to the material aspects and suffers from non-application of mind on
the part of the Detaining Authority to the fact that the conditions
imposed on the detenue while granting bail had been duly fulfilled.
Therefore, the impugned order suffers from delay and laches, and such
delay does not serve the purpose for which it was passed. Thirdly,
there is no nexus or live link between the last offence registered
against the Petitioner and the detention order passed by the Authority.
36. Consequently, the order of detention suffers from a
serious infirmity and defect that goes to the root of the matter. The
liberty of the detenue is an extremely precious right which cannot be
taken away by passing the impugned order without the requisite
satisfaction being recorded by Respondent No. 1-Authority. Fourthly,
Respondent No. 1 has not verified the confidential statements of the
witnesses recorded by the SDPO and, therefore, it cannot be said that
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the order passed by the Authority is justified or that, on the basis of
the said statements, it can be held that the activities of the detenue
would cause disturbance to public order. No material was placed
before Respondent No. 1-Authority in respect of the bail orders, and
this lacuna, in our opinion, vitiated the satisfaction reached by the
Detaining Authority, as it was deprived of the opportunity to consider
the relevant material, though the same was available.
37. In the light of the above discussion and the dictum laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court in the above-cited
decisions, it is apparent that Respondent No. 1 failed to record its
subjective satisfaction while passing the detention order nearly after
eleven months. Therefore, in our opinion, in the present case, for more
than one reason, including non-recording of subjective satisfaction,
delay and laches, and failure to explain the delay and laches while
passing the impugned order, the order passed by Respondent No. 1
cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and stands vitiated.
38. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed in terms of prayer
clause (c), which reads as under:
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“(c) The order of Detention bearing No.
Home-1/Section-6/MAG-1/MPDA/SR-02/2025
dated 02.03.2026 issued under Section 3 of
M.P.D.A. Act 1981 by the Respondent No. 1 be
quashed and set aside and on quashing the same
the Petitioner be ordered for release forthwith.”
39. Needless to clarify, the Detaining Authority-Respondent
No.1 is directed to forthwith release the Petitioner, if not required in
any other case.
40. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. No order as to
costs.
41. The Petition is disposed of in the above terms.
(ABHAY J. MANTRI, J.) (RAJESH S. PATIL, J.)
Digitally
signed by
TALLE
TALLE SHUBHAM
SHUBHAM ASHOKRAO
ASHOKRAO Date:
2026.10.07
15:15:34
+0530
Shubham 23
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