Bombay High Court
ZOHRA SHAKIR KHANIAversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
The petition for consent quashing is allowed, and both parties are ordered to pay costs of Rs.10,000 each.
Summary
The petitioner, Zohra Shakir Khania, and the complainant (respondent No.2) settled a personal dispute arising from a relationship with the complainant's son and jointly sought consent quashing of FIR No. 262/2018 and related criminal proceedings. The High Court examined its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 528 of the BNSS, referencing the Supreme Court's guidelines in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal for quashing FIRs. The Court noted that while non‑heinous offences may be quashed on settlement, costs may be imposed to deter misuse of criminal law. Applying these principles, the Court allowed the petition for consent quashing and directed both parties to pay Rs.10,000 each to a charitable trust. The writ petition was subsequently disposed.
Issues considered
- Whether the petition for consent quashing of the FIR and related criminal proceedings should be granted.
- Whether costs should be imposed on the parties in a consent quashing matter.
Legislation cited
- BNSS — s. 528
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 482
- Indian Penal Code — s. 323, 34, 427, 452, 504, 506
- Public Trust Act — s. XXIX of 1950
- Society Registration Act — s. XXI of 1980
Subjects
- consent quashing
- Section 482 CRPC
- non‑heinous offence
- costs in criminal proceedings
- settlement of disputes
- abuse of process
Judgment
41.WP.3324.2026.doc
Ajay
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 3324 OF 2026
Zohra Shakir Khania .. Petitioner
Versus
State of Maharashtra and Anr. .. Respondents
....................
Ms. Gayatri Gokhale, Advocate for Petitioner.
Ms. Sangeeta E. Phad, APP for Respondent – State.
Ms. Zainba Abdi, Advocate i/by Ms. Sneha Jethna for Respondent
No.2.
......…...........
CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.
DATE : SEPTEMBER 17, 2026.
P.C.:
1. Heard Ms. Gokhale, learned Advocate for Petitioner; Ms.
Phad, learned APP for Respondent – State and Ms. Abdi, learned
Advocate for Respondent No.2.
2. Both the parties are present in Court and consent Affidavit of
the Complainant - Respondent No.2 is filed which is appended at
Exhibit ‘C’ - page No.68 of the Petition. I have perused the same. The
dispute arose out of a relationship between the Petitioner and the
Complainant's son and the parties with the intervention of well-wishers
have amicably settled their disputes and differences and have desired
to move ahead in life. They have requested the Court for consent
quashing. On perusal of the Affidavit of consent at page No.68 and the
request by the learned Advocate, the Petition Stands allowed.
1 of 6
41.WP.3324.2026.doc
3. Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 conferred
inherent powers on High Courts to pass such orders as are justified to
give effect to any order in the Court, prevent abuse of process of any
Court or secure the ends of justice. In the BNSS this provision stands
incorporated with Section 528 which substantially reproduces the
language and intent of Section 482 of the CRPC, 1973 High Courts
invoke this provision to step in where cases have been instituted with
malafide motives or to harass the accused person thereby avoiding
procedural harassment. It empowers Court to dismiss FIRs or criminal
proceedings if there is no prima facie case or evidence against the
accused person/s or if orders are made in violation of the principles of
natural justice. The exercise of such powers under Section 482 of CRPC
and now Section 528 of BNSS remains discretionary and varies from
case to case.
4. In State of Harayana vs Bhajan Lal 1 the Supreme Court laid
down model categories and guidelines in paragraph No. 102 of the
said judgment in which the FIRs can be quashed. The Supreme Court
has further asserted that power under Section 482 is an
acknowledgment of "powers inherent" and not the source of powers
additional. It has held that even non compoundable offences can be
quashed where necessary. It has held that High Courts have to decide
whether the prosecution of an offence would further or be against the
1 1992 AIR 604
2 of 6
41.WP.3324.2026.doc
interest of justice. It is also held that grievous offences such as murder,
rape, and dacoity cannot ordinarily be quashed even after settlement
because they involve societal implication.
5. In the above context, when parties settle their private dispute
or the lis between them is purely civil and commercial or matrimonial
and the offence is not heinous or does not impact the society at large,
the Court can consider such request. In such a case awarding costs for
putting the criminal law into motion on the act of the accused persons
and thereafter both parties seeking quashing of proceedings by
consent, in my opinion, can be considered by Court which can impose
costs on the parties, especially so in matters coming before the Court
by “consent quashing”.
6. For above levy of costs the legal principle rests on the logic
that criminal law cannot be used as a bargaining chip or a tool for
private settlements after draining the State and judicial resources. In
simple words, Courts cannot be used as a recovery mechanism to settle
scores and/or bring the parties into subjugation. I am of the firm
opinion that imposition of costs in consent quashing matters is
required to be levied for three main reasons viz., wastage of public
resources, consumption of valuable judicial time and for deterrence
against vexatious litigation. This is because after criminal machinery
is set into motion, the Police Department is forced to take cognizance,
3 of 6
41.WP.3324.2026.doc
conduct investigations, attend courts, deploy personnel, collect
evidence and draft chargesheets, all using public funds/ public
exchequer. Equally substantial judicial time of the Trial Courts and
Sessions Courts is wasted for handling a case, presentation of a case,
issuance of summons, scheduling of trial dates, appointment of
prosecutors and their fees, etc. and ultimately if consent quashing is
allowed such judicial time stands completely wasted, which could have
otherwise been used for genuine Trial Court matters/ litigation in one
way such matters result in clogging the legal system and lead to
humongous pendency which becomes difficult to tackle.
7. Another aspect to consider for imposing costs is that it curbs
the growing trend of filing strategically exaggerated criminal
complaints (especially matrimonial or commercial disputes) simply to
force financial and legal settlements. In a given case made out on
merits of the matter, even the Complainant can be put to costs while
considering a quashing Petition purely on merits depending upon the
facts of each case before Court. In some strong circumstances, even the
State machinery can be put to costs if a purely civil dispute between
parties strongly emanating from the facts on record is registered as
criminal case and given the flavor of criminality. This Court is also
equally conscious about not imposing costs blindly or mechanically if a
particular party is not found to be remiss or at explicit fault for abusing
the law, as also conscious about heinous offences impacting the society
4 of 6
41.WP.3324.2026.doc
at large while considering consent quashing.
8. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, I am of the opinion that the Petitioner for his action resulting in
the complainant invoking criminal proceedings and now both the
parties seeking quashing by consent, in the facts of the present case the
Petitioner and Respondent No.2 – Complainant both should pay costs.
Hence, both Petitioner and Respondent No.2 - Complainant are
directed to pay costs of Rs.10,000/- each towards the Corpus of A.K.
Munshi Yojana a trust which runs medical centres, vocational training
centres and which also runs a Special School called J.T. Sheth
Mandbuddhi Vikas Kendra, imparting education and training to the
needs of 150 special children in the field of Education (Classes for 6 to
18 years), early intervention (upto 6 years) and vocational training (18
years above) having its school address and building at A.K. Munshi
Yojana Chowk, 3rd Panjarapole Lane, C.P. Tank, Mumbai – 400 004
[Contact Nos. 22425513 / 22423654] registered under the Society
Registration Act, XXI of 1980 under No. : 387/81 GBBSD and the
Public Trust Act, XXIX of 1950 under No. F-6809. RCI Reg. No. 0163
within a period of two weeks from the date of uploading of this order.
Parties are present in Court and through their learned Advocates agree
to pay the aforesaid costs amount as directed.
9. In this view of the above, both the learned Advocates
5 of 6
41.WP.3324.2026.doc
persuade the Court to allow the Petition by consent quashing. The
Petition stands allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) which
read thus:-
“(a) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to quash and set aside
the FIR bearing no. C.R. No. 262/2018 registered with
D.N. Nagar Police Station, Mumbai, as well as Case No.
PW/1500/2023, along with the cognizance order dated
01.12.2023 passed by the Learned JMFC, 10 th Court at
Andheri, Mumbai, for the alleged offences punishable
under Sections 452, 427, 323, 504, 506 read with Section
34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 against the Petitioner
and any other application arising therefrom and incidental
thereto on such terms and conditions as this Hon’ble Court
may deem fit to grant in the circumstances of the case.
(b) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to quash and set aside
all matters / applications arising out of F.I.R. No.
262/2018 and CC No. PW/1500/2023 and Cognizance
order dated 01.12.2023, and incidental thereto.”
10. List the Writ Petition on board for compliance on 5th October
2026.
11. In view of the above, Writ Petition is disposed.
[ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ]
Ajay
Digitally signed
by AJAY
AJAY TRAMBAK
TRAMBAK UGALMUGALE
UGALMUGALE Date:
2026.09.18
10:21:54 +0530
6 of 6
Checking your session…