Bombay High Court
NURUDDIN BADRUDDIN AJANIversusFAYYAZ AMIRALI SHROFF AND ANR
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
An order under Section 143-A must be based on a prima facie assessment of the complaint and must consider all relevant factors as prescribed by the Supreme Court, otherwise it is liable to be quashed.
Summary
The petitioner Arjun Vitthal filed a writ petition seeking quashing of a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and to challenge an order directing 20% of the cheque amount to be deposited as interim compensation under Section 143-A. The High Court noted that the petitioner withdrew the request for quashing and limited the relief to challenging the interim compensation order. The petitioner argued that the Metropolitan Magistrate had failed to consider the factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand when exercising power under Section 143-A. The Court examined the Supreme Court’s guidelines, emphasizing the need for a prima facie evaluation of the complaint, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139, and consideration of the accused’s financial capacity and other relevant factors. Finding that the magistrate’s order did not address these requirements, the Court quashed and set aside the order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration. Since the petition for quashing was withdrawn, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn.
Issues considered
- What factors must a court consider when exercising power under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act to direct interim compensation?
- Whether the Metropolitan Magistrate’s order directing 20% interim compensation complied with the Supreme Court’s guidelines in Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand?
Legislation cited
- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — s. 138, 139, 143-A
Subjects
- Section 143-A
- interim compensation
- Negotiable Instruments Act
- presumption under Section 139
- quashing of complaint
- writ petition
- high court
Judgment
35-WP-3395-2025.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.3395 OF 2025
ARJUN
VITTHAL Nuruddin Badruddin Ajani ...Petitioner
KUDHEKAR Versus
Digitally signed by
ARJUN VITTHAL Fayyaz Amirali Shroff & Anr. ...Respondents
KUDHEKAR
Date: 2026.09.17 ——————
12:47:18 +0530
Mr. Siddhesh Borkar a/w Prachi Parte & Harsh Parte, for the Petitioner.
Mr. Suraj Dessai Almeida, for Respondent No.1.
Ms. M. R. Tidke, APP, for Respondent No.2-State.
——————
Coram: Madhav J. Jamdar, J.
Date: 16 September 2026
P.C.:
1. Heard Mr. Borkar, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner
and Mr. Almeida, learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No.1.
2. In this Writ Petition, the relief sought is seeking quashing of
Complaint being CC No.2723/SS/2021 and also the challenge is to the
Order dated 13th February 2024 passed below Exhibit-23 in CC No.
2723/SS/2021 by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 63th Court,
Andheri, Mumbai, by which 20% of cheque amount has been directed to
be deposited by exercising power under Section 143-A of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881.
3. At the outset, Mr. Borkar, learned Counsel, states that he has
instructions to withdraw the Writ Petition as far as relief of quashing of
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35-WP-3395-2025.doc
complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act and only to press relief
seeking to challenge the Order dated 13th February 2024.
4. Mr. Borkar, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, states
that the impugned Order has been passed without taking into
consideration various aspects and factors required to be taken into
consideration while passing Order under Section 143-A of the NI Act as
directed by the Supreme Court in the decision of Rakesh Ranjan
Shrivastava v. The State Of Jharkhand 1.
5. Mr. Almeida, learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No.2
points out several aspects on merits.
6. The relevant directions issued by the Supreme Court are to be
found in Paragraph Nos.22 to 24 of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava (supra),
which read as under:
“22. When the court deals with an application under
Section 143-A of the NI Act, the court will have to prima facie
evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant
and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the
reply to the application under sub-section (1) of Section 143-A.
The presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, by itself, is
no ground to direct the payment of interim compensation. The
reason is that the presumption is rebuttable. The question of
applying the presumption will arise at the trial. Only if the
complainant makes out a prima facie case, a direction can be
issued to pay interim compensation. At this stage, the fact
that the accused is in financial distress can also be a
consideration.
23. Even if the court concludes that a case is made out for
grant of interim compensation, the court will have to apply its
1 (2024) 4 SCC 419 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 309
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mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted.
Even at this stage, the court will have to consider various
factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship,
if any, between the accused and the complainant and the
paying capacity of the accused. If the defence of the accused is
found to be prima facie a plausible defence, the court may
exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation.
24. We may note that the factors required to be
considered, which we have set out above, are not exhaustive.
There could be several other factors in the facts of a given
case, such as, the pendency of a civil suit, etc. While deciding
the prayer made under Section 143-A, the Court must record
brief reasons indicating consideration of all the relevant
factors.”
7. Perusal of the impugned Order clearly shows that above aspects
are not at all taken into consideration.
8. Thus, the impugned Order dated 13th February 2024 passed
below Exhibit-23 in CC No. 2723/SS/2021 by the learned Metropolitan
Magistrate, 63th Court, Andheri, Mumbai, by which 20% of cheque
amount has been directed to be deposited by exercising power under
Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is quashed and
set aside and said application bearing Exhibit-23 in CC No.2723/SS/2021
is remanded back to the learned JMFC for deciding the same afresh
after giving hearing opportunity to both the sides and in accordance
with law by following the directions of the Supreme Court in Rakesh
Ranjan Shrivastava (supra).
9. It is specifically noted that as the Writ Petition is withdrawn with
respect to the relief regarding quashing, the Writ Petition concerning
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said reliefs stands dismissed as withdrawn.
10. The Writ Petition is accordingly disposed of in above terms.
[Madhav J. Jamdar, J.]
Arjun 4
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