Bombay High Court
DEVIDAS ADINATH HALEGHONGDE (C-5706)versusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER
- Disposal
- RULE ABSOLUTE
Holding
When a convict’s case falls under multiple categories of the 2010 Guidelines, the more beneficial category must be applied, so the petitioner is to be placed under Category 3(b) rather than Category 2(c).
Summary
Devidas, convicted of murder, attempted murder and related offences under Sections 302, 307, 452 and 34 of the IPC, sought premature release under the 2010 Government Guidelines. The State placed him in Category 2(c) requiring 26 years of imprisonment, citing "exceptional violence". The petitioner argued the offence arose from a long‑standing family feud and should fall under Category 3(b), which requires only 22 years. The Court examined the definitions of "family feud", the relevant Guidelines, and Supreme Court precedents (Jagdish, Uday) that a more beneficial category must be applied when multiple categories are possible. Applying this principle, the Court held that Category 3(b) was appropriate and more beneficial. Consequently, the order placing him in Category 2(c) was quashed and he was directed to be placed in Category 3(b).
Issues considered
- Whether the petitioner should be classified under Category 2(c) or Category 3(b) of the 2010 Guidelines for premature release
- Whether the principle of applying the more beneficial category under the Guidelines applies when multiple categories are attracted
Legislation cited
- Arms Act — s. 25, 4
- Code of Criminal Procedure — s. 432
- Indian Penal Code, 1860 — s. 302, 307, 34, 452
Subjects
- premature release
- Category 3(b)
- family feud
- Guidelines 2010
- remission
- Section 432 CrPC
- exceptional violence
- murder conviction
Judgment
2026:BHC-AUG:41949-DB
364.2026WP(4)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 364 OF 2026
Devidas S/o Adinath Haleghongde (C-5706)
Age : 58 years, Occ : Convict,
At present confined in Open Jail
Paithan, Dist. Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar
... PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. State of Maharashtra,
Through Superintendent of Jail,
Open Jail Paithan,
Dist. Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar.
2. Secretary,
Home Department (Prison),
Mantralaya, Mumbai.
... RESPONDENTS
...
Mr. Rupesh A. Jaiswal, Advocate for the Petitioner
Mr. N. B. Patil, APP for Respondent/s - State
...
CORAM : SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE &
VAISHALI PATIL-JADHAV, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 28th August, 2026
PRONOUNCED ON 9th September, 2026
JUDGMENT [Per Vaishali Patil-Jadhav, J.] :
. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard
finally with the consent of learned advocate for the
petitioner and the learned APP.
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364.2026WP(4)
2. By way of this criminal writ petition, the
petitioner, who is the original convicted accused no. 1 in
Sessions Case No. 118 of 2010, is seeking quashment of
the order dated 02.02.2026 passed by Respondent No.2-
State, whereby he is placed under Category 2(c) of the
Guidelines issued under Government Resolution dated
15.03.2010 (hereinafter referred to as "Guidelines of 2010"),
prescribing 26 years period of imprisonment (including
remissions) to be undergone for considering the proposal
for premature release. It is also prayed to direct Respondent
No.2 to place him under Category 3(b) of the Guidelines of
2010, prescribing 22 years period of imprisonment
(including remissions), and then, to direct Respondent No.1
to release the petitioner forthwith.
3. The petitioner was convicted by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge-4, Nanded, in Sessions Case
No.118 of 2010 on 11.05.2012 for the offences punishable
under Sections 302, 307, 452 read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer imprisonment
for life. The petitioner had preferred an appeal against his
conviction before this Court by filing Criminal Appeal
No.403 of 2012, which came to be dismissed on
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364.2026WP(4)
08.09.2015. The petitioner has undergone actual
imprisonment of 14 years and 2 months, and 22 years, 6
months and 29 days inclusive of all remissions till
28.02.2026.
4. Learned advocate for the petitioner submits that
the impugned order is passed erroneously. It is submitted
that the petitioner ought to have been placed under
category 3(b) of the Guidelines of 2010, and not under
category 2(c), as the crime committed by the petitioner
clearly arises out of a family feud/family dispute and does
not involve “exceptional violence” as alleged by the
respondents.
Learned advocate submits that the facts and
evidence on record, more particularly the judgment of the
learned Additional Sessions Judge-4, Nanded, in Sessions
Case No. 118 of 2010, clearly establish that the incident
was rooted in a long-standing family dispute. The crime
was a direct outcome of a family feud, and hence the
petitioner deserves to be categorized under Category 3(b).
Learned advocate in support of his arguments
relied on the judgment in the case of State of Haryana
and Ors. Vs. Jagdish, [2010 AIR (SC) 1690] and Vinod
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364.2026WP(4)
Bapurao Sontakke and another Vs. The State of
Maharashtra and others in Criminal Writ Petition
No.160 of 2024 dated 25.09.2024.
5. Per contra, learned APP supports the impugned
order and submitted that the petitioner was convicted for
the offence punishable under Sections 302, 307, 452 read
with Section 34 for causing the death of Laxmibai by
assaulting her with a 'katti' and iron pipe, along with co-
accused. According to him, considering the nature of the
offence and the manner in which it was committed, the
State Government has rightly placed the petitioner under
Category 2(c) of the Guidelines of 2010. Learned APP
further submits that the brutal manner of assault on
multiple victims, including the complainant, her daughter
and her mother, clearly falls within the ambit of
“exceptional violence.”
6. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Rupesh Jaiswal for
the petitioner and learned APP Mr. N. B. Patil for the
respondent- State.
7. The only question before us is whether the
petitioner should be placed under category 2(c) or category
3(b) of the Guidelines of 2010 ?
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364.2026WP(4)
8. For ready reference, we have reproduced
category 2(c) of the Guidelines of 2010, wherein the
petitioner is placed by order dated 02.02.2026 as well as
category 3(b), which the learned advocate for the petitioner
has relied upon in support of the claim for premature
release, which read thus :
Category 2(c) of the Guidelines of 2010 :-
Category Sub Categorisation of Crimes Period of Imprisonment to be
No. category undergone including remission
subject to a minimum of 14
years of actual imprisonment
including set off period.
2 OFFENCES RELATING TO
CRIME AGAINST WOMEN
AND MINOR
c Where the crime is committed 26 years
with Exceptional violence and
or with brutality or death
victim due to burns.
Category 3(b) of the Guidelines of 2010 :-
Category Sub Categorisation of Crimes Period of Imprisonment to be
No. category undergone including remission
subject to a minimum of 14
years of actual imprisonment
including set off period.
3 MURDERS ARISING OUT OF
LAND DISPUTE, FAMILY
FEUDS, FAMILY PRESTIGE
AND SUPERSTITION.
b Crime committed as above 22 years
with premeditation, either
individually or by a gang.
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364.2026WP(4)
9. In the present case, the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Nanded (the convicting Court), has opined
that the petitioner, having regard to the nature of the
offence, is not entitled to premature/early release from jail.
This opinion must, however, be examined in the light of the
Full Bench decision of this Court in Yovehel Vijaykumar
Gouri Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2020 (6)
Mh.L.J. 571. The Full Bench has laid down that the
opinion of the Presiding Judge of the trial court, when
expressed under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (for short Cr.P.C.), is binding on the authorities
while deciding an application for grant of remission.
However, such opinion must be reasoned and must reflect
due consideration of the facts of the case, the nature of the
offence, manner of its commission and applicable
guidelines as required under Section 432(2) of Cr.P.C. If the
opinion of the Convicting Court is perused, it is not in
consonance with the requirements under Section 432(2) of
Cr.P.C.
10. The office of the Superintendent of Police,
Nanded, has submitted a report recommending that
premature release should not be granted to the petitioner,
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364.2026WP(4)
apprehending that releasing the petitioner prematurely
could lead to a breach of law and order as well as a breach
of the peace. The District Magistrate, Nanded, has agreed
with the said report.
11. The Prison Advisory Board Committee and the
Inspector General of Police (Prisons) and Correctional
Service, Maharashtra State, Pune, taking into
consideration the nature of the crime and in accordance
with the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Jagdish (supra), have opined that the petitioner’s case falls
under Category 2(c) of the Guidelines of 2010 and have
recommended his release after 26 years (inclusive of all
remissions).
12. The petitioner wants his case to be considered
under the category 3(b) pertaining to murders arising out of
family feuds. It is relevant, in this context, to consider the
dictionary meaning of the word "feud". "Feud" is defined
under various dictionaries as follows :-
OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER’S DICTIONARY :
Family : a group consisting of one or two parents and their
children : the other members of family.
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364.2026WP(4)
Feud : an angry and bitter argument between two people or
groups of people that continues over a long period of time :
a family feud (= within a family or between two families).
COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY :
Family : a primary social group consisting of parents and
their offspring, the principal function of which is provision
for its members.
Feud : long and bitter hostility between two families, clans,
or individuals ; vendetta, a quarrel or dispute.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY :
Family : A group of persons connected by blood, by affinity,
or by law, esp. within two or three generations. 2. A group
consisting of parents and their children. 3. A group of
persons who live together and have a shared commitment
to a domestic relationship.
Blood feud : A state of hostility between families in which
one family seeks to avenge the killing of one of its members
by killing a member of the other family.
CAMBRIDGE LEARNER’S DICTIONARY :
Family : a group of people who are related to each other,
such as a mother, a father, and their children
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364.2026WP(4)
Feud : a serious and sometimes violent argument between
two people or groups that continues for a long period.
These dictionary definitions collectively
contemplate "family feud" as a long standing dispute arising
out of family relationships.
13. Independently, we would take note of the facts of
the case as appearing in the judgment and order dated
11.05.2012 passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge-4, Nanded, in Sessions Case No.118 of 2010, in
paragraphs 10 and 46, which read thus :-
"10- POINT Nos. 1 to 5 :- The admitted facts in this case
are that the accused Nos. 1 and 2 are the husband and son
of the complainant. PW-2 is the daughter of accused No.1 &
PW-1 and sister of accused No.2. the complainant had a
brother Dattatraya. He married with one Anita. Anita and
Dattatraya were not sailing well as such, Anita had filed
criminal case against the complainant, her husband
Dattatraya and mother-in-law-deceased Laxmibai. At the
same time, the accused No.1 and complainant were not
sailing well. As such, the complainant has filed case
against accused No.1 u/sec. 498-A of I.P.Code. Previously,
PWs. 1 and 2 and accused Nos. 1 and 2 were residing
together at Dhanegaon. Thereafter it is the contention of the
PW-1 that accused No.1 developed love relations with
accused No.4 Laxmibai. Thereafter they performed court
marriage. As such, the accused No.1 and accused No.4
were residing separately. Accused No.1 was a teacher at
Dhanegaon. After some period of time, accused No.2 joined
accused No.1 and accused No.4 Laxmibai. The murder of
Dattatraya who was the brother of complainant was
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364.2026WP(4)
committed on 15-07-2008. Since then the accused Nos.1
and 2 were absconding. In that case, the mother of
complainant-deceased Laxmibai had filed complaint
against accused Nos. 1 and 2. In that case, PWs. 1 and 2
were the witnesses. Therefore, the prosecution claims that
the accused Nos.1 and 2 had developed grudge against the
complainant, PW-2 Bhagyashree and deceased Laxmibai.
Hence, on 13-11-2008 accused attempted to commit the
murder of Meenabai and caused the death of her deceased
mother Laxmibai Malikarjun Jadile. Further it is also not in
dispute that the death of deceased Laxmibai is homicidal.
The prosecution claims that it is a murder committed by the
accused whereas the defence taken by the accused in
cross-examination of the witnesses is that thieves caused
the death of deceased Laxmibai, as such, the accused Nos.
1 and 2 have no concern with the offences charged against
them. The accused Nos. 1 and 2 were absconding and
traced after about 1 1/2 years. At the time of incident, PW-1
was residing at Dhanegaon, Vinkar Vasahat and her
mother resides at some distance therefrom."
46. ....................Thus, even looking to the case in hand,
there is prompt FIR by the complainant, she is the victim of
the assault and her testimony and testimony of PW-2
coupled with the other witnesses examined by the
prosecution, their version corroborates with each other. As
such, it inspires confidence to believe the same, therefore, I
hold that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the
accused Nos. 1 and 2 beyond reasonable doubts for the
offences punishable u/secs. 452, 324, 307 and 302 r/w 34
of I.P.Code and u/sec. 4/25 of Arms Act. ..... "
14. The petitioner had challenged the said judgment
and order of the Sessions Court by filing Criminal Appeal
No.403 of 2012 before this Court and the same was
dismissed on 08.09.2015. While dismissing the Appeal,
this Court in paragraph 17 has observed as follows:-
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364.2026WP(4)
"17. The next submission by the learned counsel for the
appellants is that a lower offence is proved and not the
offence of murder. We do not agree. In the first place, the
appellants were absconding in the murder case of
Dattatraya and during abscontion having come to know
about PW 1 Meena and PW 2 Bhagyashree being witnesses
in that case, they entered the house of PW 1 Meena, PW 2
Bhagyashree and her mother Laxmibai and attacked them
with deadly weapons like katti and iron pipes. PW 1 Meena
was severely assaulted by deadly weapons and suffered
several injuries and was luckily saved. PW 2 Bhagyashree
was also injured. Laxmibai was also assaulted with
deadly weapons with chop wounds all over the body, who
died instantaneously. The appellants have acted brutally
against their blood relatives. Looking to the injuries caused
by the appellants, the weapons chosen by them for assault
and the determination with which they entered the house of
Meena, Bhagyashree and Laxmibai at 6.00 a.m., to our
mind no other offence except the murder is proved by the
prosecution against the appellants."
15. In the case in hand, the facts clearly indicate a
chain of disputes between the petitioner, the complainant
and the deceased, who admittedly are members of the same
family. The complainant Meenabai is the wife of the
petitioner (husband) and their son is accused No. 2. The
petitioner and the complainant i.e. husband and wife were
not having cordial relations for about seven years prior to
the incident, and the complainant (wife) was residing at her
parental house along with her mother, deceased Laxmibai.
Deceased Laxmibai - mother-in-law of the petitioner had
filed a complaint against him and his son for murder of her
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364.2026WP(4)
son Dattatraya, wherein the complainant and her daughter
Bhagyashree were witnesses. Due to filing of the complaint,
the petitioner and his son had developed a grudge against
Meenabai- the complainant (wife), Bhagyashree- their
daughter and Laxmibai- mother-in-law of petitioner. Hence
they both assaulted them. In the said assault, the
complainant and Bhagyashree were severely injured and as
Laxmibai was assaulted with a deadly weapon, she died
instantaneously.
16. The term “family feud” as understood in
common parlance and as per the meaning given in various
dictionaries, essentially means a long-standing dispute
between members of a family or between two families. The
expression “family” has a broad meaning. It includes not
just blood relatives but also relatives by affinity and those
connected by law, extending up to various generations.
Thus, a feud can arise even within the extended family. A
family feud does not necessarily mean a dispute that has
been going on for generations. When a prior dispute
between family members of the same generation becomes
the reason for a subsequent offence, the resulting conflict
certainly amounts to a family feud.
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364.2026WP(4)
Considering the facts of the case and the above
noted meaning of the word "family feud", the case of the
petitioner will fall in category 3(b) which deals with
"Murders arising out of Land Dispute, Family Feuds, Family
Prestige, and Superstition, committed with premeditation"
and not in 2(c), which deals with "offences relating to crime
against women and minor, committed with exceptional
violence and or with brutality".
17. Further at this stage, it would be apposite to
refer to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the matter of Jagdish (supra). In that case, the issue
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether a convict's
case for premature release ought to be considered under
the policy prevalent at the time of his conviction or under a
subsequent policy. The convict in that case was entitled to
the benefit of a more liberal policy that existed on the date
of his conviction. However, the State sought to apply a
subsequent policy which was less beneficial to him. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that while the policy in
force at the time of conviction ordinarily applies, if a more
liberal policy is introduced and is in force on the date when
the convict's case is actually considered for premature
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364.2026WP(4)
release, the convict must be afforded the benefit of such a
favourable policy.
18. Taking into consideration the principles laid
down in Jagdish (supra), this Court [Coram: Revati Mohite
Dere & Madhav J. Jamdar, JJ.] at Principal Seat in the
matter of Uday S/o Dhaku Sutar Vs. The State of
Maharashtra and Anr.; Criminal Writ Petition No. 4544
Of 2021, dated 08.09.2022 has held :-
“9. ….
Thus Supreme Court has held that in case of
convicts the policy which was prevalent when the
conviction takes place will apply and if any other
liberal policy prevails on the date of consideration
of case for premature release then such policy will
apply. The said principle of giving benefit to the
convict of beneficial policy certainly applies to the
two different policies/guidelines but the same will
also apply to the categories in the same
policy/guidelines, if case falls under both the
categories.”
19. Thus, considering the law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish (supra) and
Uday (supra), the underlying principle is that the benefit of
a liberal policy must be extended to a convict. This
principle is not confined merely to a situation where
policies have changed over time, but is equally applicable
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364.2026WP(4)
when a convict's case falls under different categories within
the same set of Guidelines. In a situation where the facts of
the case attract multiple categories under the very same
Guidelines, the category which is more beneficial to the
convict must be considered and shall be made applicable to
him.
20. Applying the aforementioned principle in the
instant case, category 3(b) of the Guidelines of 2010 would
be more beneficial to the petitioner as it requires a total
imprisonment of 22 years to be undergone including
remission for premature release as against 26 years under
category 2(c). Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to be
placed under category 3(b) of the Guidelines of 2010. As
such, we pass the following order:
ORDER
(i) The Writ Petition stands allowed.
(ii) The impugned order dated 02.02.2026 passed by
respondent no.1, is hereby quashed and set aside.
(iii) The respondents are directed to place the petitioner
under category 3(b) of the Guidelines issued under
Government Resolution dated 15.03.2010.
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364.2026WP(4)
(iv) Necessary order to that effect shall be passed within
15 days from the date of this order.
(v) Rule is made absolute in the above terms and the
petition is disposed of accordingly.
[VAISHALI PATIL-JADHAV] [SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE]
JUDGE JUDGE
sga
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