SATISH TEJMAL BORAversusMAHARASHTRA INDUSTRIAL DEVELPMENT CORPORATION THROUGH THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY AND ANOTHER

2026:BHC-AUG:41360
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                           IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                      BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                                 901 WRIT PETITION NO. 3853 OF 2019

             Satish S/o. Tejmal Bora                                     … Petitioner
                                                                         (Org. Appellant)

                   VERSUS
             1. Maharashtra Industrial Develpment Corporation,
                Through The Competent Authority and
                Executive Engineer, Office of the Executive Engineer
                MIDC Region, Latur.

             2. The Regional Officer
                Office of Regional Manager,
                MIDC, Latur.                                            … Respondents
                                                                     (Org. Respondents)
                                               …..
             Mr. Atul Karad h/f., Mr. Gaanesh Kedar, Advocate for the Petitioner.
             Mr. S. S. Dande for Respondent Nos.1 and 2.
                                                …..

                                      CORAM            : ROHIT W. JOSHI, J.
                                      DATE             : 04 SEPTEMBER 2026

             PER COURT :


             1.        The present petition is filed in order to challenge the judgment and

             order dated 6/10/2018 passed by the learned District Judge-1, Latur, by

             which the learned Court has dismissed the appeal preferred by the

             present petitioner under Section 7 of the Maharashtra Government

             Premises Eviction Act, 1955.


             2.        The respondent – Corporation is constituted under the provisions

             of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Act, 1961. The

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provisions of Bombay Government Premises Eviction Act are applicable to

the land held by the respondent – MIDC, in view of Section 29 of the

MIDC Act. The petitioner was allotted an industrial shed in MIDC area by

respondent No.2 under the lease deed dated 28/1/1988 for a period of

15 years for the purpose of establishing a factory for the manufacture of

plastic home appliance.


3.        Perusal of the lease deed will demonstrate that the same was

granted on a premium of Rs. 1,68,392/-. The initial lease period was for

15 years starting from 1/1/1988. Clause - 6 of the lease provides that, in

case the lessee has duly paid the entire amount of premium as agreed

and as has performed the terms and conditions on his part, he shall

before a period of six months prior to the date of completion of period of

15 years, approach the respondent – MIDC for grant of new lease for a

further period of 80 years without payment of any additional premium.


4.        The tenure of initial period of 15 years of lease expired on

31/12/2003. It is not in dispute that the petitioner did not make any

application requesting execution of fresh lease deed for a further period

of 80 years, as contemplated under clause - 6 of the agreement. The first

application for execution of a fresh lease deed for further period 80 years

commencing from 1/1/2004 was made on 1/7/2010 (page 51 of the

petition).



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5.        It appears that the request was thereafter repeatedly made by

various communications. The respondent No.1 issued a communication

dated 19/4/2011 rejecting the request for execution of fresh lease deed

made out by the petitioner (page 52 of the petition). Having rejected the

request for execution of a fresh lease deed, the respondent No.2 issued a

letter dated 16/1/2011 calling upon the petitioner to vacate the suit shed

and deliver possession thereof to respondent No.2.


6.        This communication dated 16/11/2011 was challenged by the

petitioner by filing a suit being Regular Civil Suit No.619 of 2011. The

learned Civil Court passed an order dated 25/7/2014 holding that it did

not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Section 8-A of the

Maharashtra Government Premises Eviction Act, 1955, and returned the

plaint to the plaintiff for presenting the same before competent forum

under the said Act.


7.        The   Executive   Engineer       of   respondent   No.1    issued       a

communication dated 11/11/2014 to the petitioner calling upon him to

furnish his explanation in view of the aforesaid order dated 25/7/2014

passed by the learned Civil Judge. The petitioner has furnished a reply to

the said letter dated 28/11/2014, making a request to allow him to

restart his business in the suit property. The said request made by the

petitioner came to be rejected vide communication dated 14/2/2015.



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Notice dated 29/5/2015 was issued to the petitioner to remain present to

hand over possession of the suit property along with the related

documents.


8.        On 26/6/2015, the respondent No.2 had drawn panchanama of the

Suit Property in the presence of petitioner. Actual possession of the Suit

Property is taken by the respondent on 27/8/2015.


9.        In this backdrop, the petitioner preferred the aforesaid appeal

before the learned District Judge under Section 7 of the Maharashtra

Government Premises Eviction Act. The learned District Judge, as stated

above, has dismissed the appeal vide judgment and order dated

6/10/2018 which is subject matter of challenge in the present petition.


10.       The petitioner had assailed the letter dated 14/2/2015 whereby

the request for execution of a fresh lease deed was rejected and directions

to hand over possession were issued. The learned District Judge has

referred to the material on record to hold that the petitioner had failed to

utilize the Suit property for the purpose for which it was let. It is held

that the petitioner also did not approach the respondent for execution of

fresh lease deed within a period stipulated under the lease deed. The

learned District Judge found that the petitioner was in breach of the

agreement and therefore was not entitled to occupy the Suit property.

The learned District Judge has also held that the initial order dated

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16/11/2011 was not challenged by the petitioner.


11.       Mr. Atul Karad, learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently

argued that the possession of Suit property was taken from the petitioner

without following the due process of law. The learned counsel contends

that although there were some difficulties in making payment of the

premium initially, it is not in dispute that payment of premium is in fact

made in the year 1996. He further contents that the record will indicate

that the manufacturing plant was in fact set up by the petitioner. The

contention of the learned counsel is that the learned District Judge has

erred in treating the communication dated 16/11/2011 to be an order of

eviction and further in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the said

communication dated 16/11/2011 was not challenged.


12.       As regards, the electricity and water connection, the learned

counsel argues that the petitioner had in fact obtained a water

connection at the Suit property.


13.       The learned advocate contends that it is a settled legal proposition

that a person in settled legal possession of immovable property cannot be

dispossessed without following due process of law, even if he is a

trespasser. The contention of learned advocate is that the petitioner was

lawfully inducted in the suit property as a lessee and that he was making

an endeavor to get fresh lease deed executed for a further period of 80


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years in exercise of his rights vested under the initial agreement. The

learned advocate, therefore argues that if at all possession of the suit

property was to be taken from the petitioner, it ought to have taken by

following due process of law as contemplated under the Government

Premises Eviction Act. It is contended that possession of the suit property

was taken without issuing a notice under Section 4 and, as such, the

order of eviction dated 14/2/2015 is wholly unsustainable. Reliance is

placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of State of

Maharashtra Vs. Marwanjee F. Desai & Ors 1. and Dipak Babaria & Anr. Vs.

State of Gujarat & Ors2., for the purpose that every order passed by the

Competent Authority under the Government Premises Act is appealable

and therefore the learned District Judge ought not to have dismissed the

appeal on the ground that the appeal was not maintainable.


14.       Per contra, Mr. Dande, learned counsel for respondent, justifies the

order. The learned advocate contends that an industrial shed was let to

the petitioner for a specific purpose that industry would be set up

resulting in industrial development of the area and creation of

employment. The learned counsel contends that allotment of lands by

MIDC is with a specific aim and object and unless the allottee

satisfies/fulfills the purpose for which the plot is allotted, he has no right

to remain in occupation of the property. The learned counsel contends

1     (2002) 2 SCC 318
2     (2014) 3 SCC 502

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that notice as contemplated under Section 4 was in fact issued by the

Executive Engineer on 11/11/2014 and that the petitioner had also filed

his reply to the said notice on 28/11/2014. The learned counsel contends

that an opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner and after

hearing the petitioner on 9/12/2014, the order of Eviction dated

14/2/2015 is passed.


15.       The undisputed facts of the case are that a property in MIDC area

was allotted to the petitioner initially for a period of 15 years. Perusal of

the offer of allotment indicates that the allotment was for a specific

purpose of setting up the plant for manufacturing of plastic appliances.

The initial lease deed provides that failure to install plant and machinery

other equipment for stating manufacturing activity will confer right upon

the respondent – lessor to resume possession of the property.


16.       It will also be appropriate to refer circular dated 26/2/1985 issued

by respondent No.1 – MIDC. It speaks about grant of extension in order

to enable to the allottee to commence manufacturing activity. Perusal of

the circular will demonstrate that in the event the allottee is unable to

install the plant and machinery within the initial period of 12 months,

initial extension of six months can be granted without recovery of

additional premium. The circular further provides that a further

extension of six months after initial period of 18 months can be granted

subject to payment of 10% additional premium. It is further provided that

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a further extension of six months may be granted after lapse of 24

months on forfeiture of additional premium of 10% paid while seeking

extension after 18 months. The circular provides that further extension

after 2½ years is permissible only if genuine difficulties beyond the

control of the allottee are established, subject to payment of further

premium of 10% of the land rate prevailing as on date of grant of

extension. Clause - 6 provides for grant of further extension in a fit case

case on condition of forfeiture of additional premium paid while seeking

extension. The scheme appears to be to extend cooperation to the

allottee/industrialist to enable him to set up the plant and machinery and

not to terminate the agreement upon any failure to set up the plant and

machinery within the originally stipulated period of 12 months.


17.       In the present case, the initial period of 15 years expired on

31/12/2003. Perusal of record will indicate that first request letter for

execution of a fresh lease deed was made in the year 2010, on 1/7/2010

to be precise. There is no material on record to indicate that the

petitioner had approached the respondent with a request to execute fresh

lease deed prior to 1/7/2010. Such is not even the pleadings. Clause -6 of

the lease deed provides that in case the allottee/lessee desires to retain

the property for a further period of 80 years, he should approach the

lessor/respondent 6 months prior to the expiration of the initial term of

15 years with a request to execute fresh lease deed. However, in the


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present case, the first attempt as securing fresh lease deed is after a

period of 6½ years from the date on which the initial term of 15 years

expired.


18.       It is undisputed that the petitioner did not obtain Electricity

connection for the suit property till date. Although the learned counsel

for the petitioner states that water connection was obtained, perusal of

record indicates that even a water connection was not obtained. The

petitioner has contended that the plant was set up at the suit property

and for same period the plant was also operated. However, except for a

passing observation in the report there is no material on record in

support of the said contention.


19.       The learned District Judge has recorded categorical findings in

paragraph No.16 of the order that the petitioner did not obtain any

Electricity Connection or Water Connection and did not produce any

documentary evidence on record to show that the factory was started as

per the project report on the basis for which the suit plot was allotted to

him. The petitioner has placed on record LIC receipt dated 1/3/1996

regarding payment of premium with respect to 20 employees in the name

of M/s. Bora and Sons. The learned District Judge has rightly appreciated

the said document and has observed that payment of a single premium

for the year 1996 will not establish that the plant was being run



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continuously from 1988-1989 till the year 2010. The receipt is also not in

the name of “M/s. Sangeeta Plastics”, the proprietorship concern of the

petitioner. The findings that the petitioner did not produce any evidence

to establish that the suit property was utilized for operations of a

workshop, as contended by the petitioner, is therefore justified.


20.       On the contrary, the learned District Judge has referred to a letter

dated 11/5/2001 wherein the petitioner admitted that the suit property

was not being used for any purpose since the year 2001. Although the

letter/order dated 16/11/2011 cannot be interpreted to be an order of

Eviction, it is certainly an order/communication intimating refusal to

execute fresh lease deed as requested by the petitioner. After culmination

of initial period of 15 years, the petitioner will have right to occupy the

suit property only if fresh lease deed were to be executed. Admittedly,

such lease deed is not executed.


21.       Civil   Suit   which   was      filed   in   order   to      assail      the

order/communication dated 16/11/2011 rejecting the request for

execution of fresh lease deed was challenged in the Civil Suit. The Civil

Suit was not entertained by holding that the Civil Court did not have the

jurisdiction to decide the said Suit. Thereafter, further steps were not

taken by the petitioner in order to assail the said order/communication

refusing to execute fresh lease deed.



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22.       In the light of the reasons recorded above, in the considered

opinion of this Court, the petitioner has failed to make out a right to seek

execution of fresh lease deed. Breach of the terms and conditions of

allotment of plot in apparent on the face of record and/or almost

undisputed.


23.       The right to occupy the suit plot was vested with the petitioner

under the lease deed. The leas deed is only for a period of 15 years. The

period of 15 years expired in the year 2003, to be precise, on

31/12/2003. From 1/1/2004 on-wards there is no document in favour of

the petitioner entitling him to occupy the suit property.


24.       The lease for the subsequent period of 80 years, as would be

apparent from a reading of Clause - 6 of the lease deed, was to be a fresh

lease. A fresh lease is admittedly not executed in favour of the petitioner.

The letter/order rejecting the request for execution of a fresh lease was

rejected on 16/11/2011. This letter was unsuccessfully challenged in a

Civil Suit. After the suit was dismissed as not maintainable, the said letter

is not challenged at all.


25.       The petitioner has thus lost right to hold possession of the suit

property upon expiration of the initial period of lease. The petitioner has

not taken effective steps for execution of a fresh lease deed. Thus, apart

from failure to observe the most important condition of the lease, i.e., to


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set up a plant and utilize the suit property for industrial purpose, the

petitioner has also lost the right to be in possession of the suit property.


26.       It will be appropriate to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla v.

Hargovind Jasraj and Anr3., wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held

that when right to occupy the suit property is based on a lease deed and

challenge to termination of lease, is barred by limitation, a suit for

possession is not maintainable and further that the plaintiff must file a

suit within a period of three years from the date of termination for the

lease in order to challenge the cancellation of lease.


27.       In the case at hand, since the tenure of the lease had already

expired on 31/12/2003 and the request for execution of a fresh lease was

rejected on 16/11/2011, which is not under challenge, in the considered

opinion of this Court, the petitioner has no right to occupy the suit

property. The relevant observations in paragraph Nos.27 and 31 are

reproduced hereunder:

              “27. The termination of the lease deed was by an order which the
              plaintiffs ought to get rid of by having the same set aside, or declared
              invalid for whatever reasons, it may be permissible to do so. No order
              bears a label of its being valid or invalid on its forehead. Anyone affected
              by any such order ought to seek redress against the same within the
              period permissible for doing so. We may in this regard refer to the
              following oft-quoted passage in Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council.
              The following are the observations regarding the necessity of recourse to
              the Court for getting the invalidity of an order established:

              ... An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal
              consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead.

3     (2013) 3 SCC 182

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              Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause
              of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as
              effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.’

                                                                     (emphasis supplied)
              …

              ….

              31.     It is true that in some of the above cases, this Court was dealing
              with proceedings arising under Article 226 of the Constitution, exercise
              of powers whereunder is discretionary but then grant of declaratory relief
              under the Specific Relief Act is also discretionary in nature. A civil court
              can and may in appropriate cases refuse a declaratory decree for good
              and valid reasons which dissuade the court from exercising its
              discretionary jurisdiction. Merely because the suit is within time is no
              reason for the court to grant a declaration. Suffice it to say that filing of a
              suit for declaration was in the circumstances essential for the plaintiffs.
              That is precisely why the plaintiffs brought a suit no matter beyond the
              period of limitation prescribed for the purpose. Such a suit was neither
              unnecessary nor a futility for the plaintiff's right to remain in possession
              depended upon whether the lease was subsisting or stood terminated. It
              is not, therefore, possible to fall back upon the possessory rights claimed
              by the plaintiffs over the leased area to bring the suit within time
              especially when we have, while dealing with the question of possession,
              held that possession also was taken over pursuant to the order of
              termination of the lease in question.”


28.       In the absence of any legally enforceable right in favour of the

petitioner, this Court is not inclined to exercise its extra ordinary writ

jurisdiction under Article 226 or supervisory jurisdiction under Article

227 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioner.


29.       With the reasons recorded above, this Court sees no reason to

interfere with the impugned order Writ petition is therefore dismissed

with no order as to costs.


30.       At this stage, the learned counsel for the petitioner makes a request

to extend the interim order dated 4/1/2019. It needs to be stated that

possession of the suit property was taken from the petitioner in the year

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2015 i.e. on 27/8/2015. The said fact is an admitted fact. By the said

order, this Court has restrained the respondent – MIDC from making

allotment of the said property in favour of any other person till final

disposal of the petition. I am afraid, in view of the findings that the suit

property was never utilized for the purpose for which it was allotted to

the petitioner, coupled with the fact that for a period around 6½ years

the petitioner did not even approach the respondent – MIDC for

execution of a fresh lease deed and further that the letter of rejection for

execution for fresh lease deed is not under challenge, the request for

extension of interim order cannot be extended. The said request is

therefore rejected.



                                              [ ROHIT W. JOSHI, J. ]




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