Bombay High Court
JITENDRA BHARATSING PATIL AND ORSversusVASAI VIRAR CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION THR. MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER AND ANR
- Decided
- Disposal
- Allowed
Holding
Long‑serving contractual medical employees of VVMC are entitled to regularisation without the imposition of a written examination, and the State’s impugned communications directing such an examination are quashed.
Summary
The petitioners, doctors and other medical staff employed on contractual basis by Vasai Virar Municipal Corporation (VVMC), claimed they had served continuously for 8‑11 years and sought regularisation and permanency of their posts. They argued that the MMC Act, 1949 permits only six‑month temporary appointments and that the corporation repeatedly renewed their contracts, creating a legitimate expectation of absorption, especially after the State had regularised similarly situated employees without an examination. The State and VVMC contended that contractual appointments are temporary, that the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Maharashtra v. Anita bars regularisation of such employees, and that a government‑issued examination order must be complied with. The Court examined precedents on equality, legitimate expectation, and the distinction between illegal and irregular appointments, concluding that the petitioners were similarly situated to those already regularised and that imposing an examination was arbitrary. It quashed the impugned government letters, directed VVMC to regularise the petitioners without an examination, and ordered the regularisation orders within two weeks.
Issues considered
- The applicability of Section 53(3) of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 to long‑term contractual appointments.
- Whether the State’s directive for a written examination for regularisation violates the principle of equality and legitimate expectation.
- Whether the petitioners, having served continuously for over eight years, are entitled to regularisation under the MMC Act and relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence.
- Whether the impugned government letters dated 21 January 2026 and 28 January 2026 are legally valid.
Legislation cited
- Indian Contract Act, 1872 — s. 23
- Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 — s. 51, 52, 53, 54, 55
Subjects
- contractual employment
- regularisation
- municipal corporation
- equality
- Article 14
- legitimate expectation
- public health
- COVID-19
- ad‑hocism
- model employer
Judgment
WP-4079-2021-07-07-26.DOCX
2026:BHC-AS:37648-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 4079 OF 2021
1. Dr. Bhakti Deepak Chaudhary )
Age: 33 yrs. Occupation: Service )
R/at: House no.70, ‘Bhakti Yog’ )
Zenda Bazar, Bhandar Ali, )
Vasai West 401 201 )
2. Dr. Merina Philips )
Age: 37 yrs.; Occupation: Service )
R/at: 204, Bldg. No.3/A Wing, )
Evershine Garden, Krishna Township )
Vasai (West) 401 202 )
3. Dr. Juilee Kundan Vanmali )
Age: 28 yrs., Occupation: Service )
R/at: 301, Vanmali Sadan, Mahatma )
Jotiba Phule Nagar, Manickpur, )
Vasai (West) 401 202 ) ...Petitioners
Versus
1.Vasai Virar City Municipal Corporation)
Through Municipal Commissioner, )
Add: Opposite to Virar Police Station, )
Bazaar Ward, Virar East, )
Maharashtra 401 305 )
2. The State of Maharashtra )
through its Secretary, )
Urban Development Department, )
4th floor, Mantralaya, Mumbai-400032 ) ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 4094 OF 2021
Mojes Ashok Kale & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Vasai Virar City Municipal corporation & Anr. ...Respondents
WITH
Page 1 of 49
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WRIT PETITION NO. 4677 OF 2022
Vishawanath Waman Haldankar & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Vasai Virar City Municipal corporation & Anr. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 9670 OF 2022
Sarala Jagannath Hinwar & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Vasai Virar City Municipal corporation & Anr. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 9669 OF 2022
Vaibhav Anil Sawant & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Vasai Virar City Municipal corporation & Anr. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 4087 OF 2021
Kavita Anant Naidu & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Vasai Virar City Municipal corporation & Anr. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 4088 OF 2021
Dinesh Tukaram Bhoir & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Vasai Virar City Municipal corporation & Anr. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 4090 OF 2021
Priyanka Chandrakant Sankhe & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Vasai Virar City Municipal corporation & Anr. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 4091 OF 2021
Ramesh Chhabinath Prajapati & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Vasai Virar City Municipal corporation & Anr. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 4092 OF 2021
Jitendra Bharatsing Patil & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Vasai Virar City Municipal Corporation & Anr. ...Respondents
Page 2 of 49
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WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 4676 OF 2022
Vijay Janardan Darade & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Vasai Virar City Municipal Corporation & Anr. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 4080 OF 2021
Anupama Ganesh Rane & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Vasai Virar City Municipal Corporation & Anr. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 4083 OF 2021
Anita Nilesh Shedge & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Vasai Virar City Municipal Corporation & Anr. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 4085 OF 2021
Atif Husain Faukat & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Vasai Virar City Municipal Corporation & Anr. ...Respondents
_________
Mr. Abhijeet Desai a/w Mohini Rehpade, Daksha Madhav, Vijay Singh, Karan
Gajra and Deepesh Ramrakhiyani i/b Desai Legal LLP for Petitioners in all Writ
Petitions.
Mr. P. P. Kakade, Addl. G.P. a/w A. K. Naik, AGP, Smt. M. P. Thakur, AGP, N.
M. Mehra, AGP and Smt. D. S. Deshmukh, AGP for State.
Mr. Vishwanath Patil, for Respondent No.1.
Mr. Arun Panickar i/b Mr. Milind N. for Respondent No.5.
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__________
CORAM: G. S. KULKARNI &
AARTI SATHE, JJ.
RESERVED ON: 01 JULY 2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 11 SEPTEMBER 2026
JUDGMENT (Per G. S. Kulkarni, J.)
Part Particulars Paragraph Nos.
I Preface 3
II Facts 4 to 17
III Reply Affidavit on behalf of Respondent No.1-VVMC 18 to 19
IV Orders passed by the Court on the present proceedings 20 to 22
V Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners 23 to 26
VI Submissions on behalf of the Respondents 27 to 28
VII Analysis 29 to 44
VIII Concluding paragraphs 45 to 46
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent of the parties, heard
finally.
2. This batch of petitions involves common issues of facts and law, hence,
they are being decided by this common judgment.
(I) Preface
3. It is the petitioners’ case that they are in contractual employment of
respondent No.1 - Vasai Virar Municipal Corporation (for short ‘VVMC’) for
very long periods, working on different posts which include posts of Medical
Officer, para-medical staff, administrative staff etc. The reliefs as prayed for in
these petitions inter alia are to the effect that the VVMC be directed to absorb
and regularize the petitioners’ services. Writ Petition No.4079 of 2021 (Bhakti
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Deepak Chaudhary & Ors. vs. Vasai Virar Municipal Corporation & Anr.) is
taken up as the lead petition. The substantive prayers in the said petition are
required to be noted, which read thus:
“b) That this Hon'ble Court upon calling record and proceedings be pleased
to issue a writ of mandamus or writ in the nature of mandamus or any other
appropriate writ, order or direction to the Respondent No.1 to absorb /
regularize and confer permanency on the Petitioners working on their posts
on contractual basis with Respondent No.1;
g) Issue a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate Writ, Order or Direction
quashing and setting aside the impugned Government letter dated
21.01.2026 bearing No. Vavibhpa- 1924/P.No.177/Navi-23 issued by the
Government of Maharashtra, Urban Development Department, marked as
EXHIBIT – "H";
…. … … … .
h) Issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ, Order or
Direction directing the Respondents to regularise the services of the
Petitioners in accordance with the principle of parity and equal treatment, on
the same terms and conditions as have been extended to other similarly
situated contractual employees who have already been regularised by
Respondent No.1;
j) Issue a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate Writ, Order or Direction
quashing and setting aside the impugned letter dated 28.01.2026 bearing No.
V.V.S.M/V.A.V./3013/2026 addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Legal
Department, Vasai Virar City Municipal Corporation, marked as EXHIBIT –
"I";”
(II) Facts
4. The facts, as culled out from the lead writ petition, are required to be
noted:
The petitioners, who are domiciled in Maharashtra, are employed with the
VVMC as Doctors (MBBS) on contractual basis. Such appointment was in
pursuance of the petitioners applying under an advertisement issued by the
VVMC and after undergoing an independent selection process. It is the
petitioners’ case that the VVMC has the following medical institutions in its
jurisdiction:
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Sr. No. List of Institutions Numbers
1 Hospitals 2
2 Urban Primary Health Centre 21
3 Mother and Child Care Centre 3
4 Clinics and Medical Health Units 8
5 Dedicated Covid Hospital (DCH) 2
6 Dedicated Covid Health Centre (DCHC) 1
7 Covid Care Centre 1
5. The petitioners have referred to the provisions of the Maharashtra
Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (for short the ‘MMC Act’), more particularly
Section 51 thereof, which provides for the number, designations, grades,etc., of
other municipal officers and servants. Section 52 provides for restrictions on the
employment of permanent officers and servants. Section 53 provides for ‘Power
of appointment in whom to vest.’ Section 54 provides for the manner of making
appointments. Section 55 provides for saving in respect of officers and servants
appointed under Chapter XX.
6. It is the petitioners’ case that under the provisions of Section 53(3) of the
MMC Act, the power of appointing municipal officers and servants, whether
permanent or temporary, vests with the Commissioner of the Municipal
Corporation, which inter alia provides that no temporary appointment shall be
made by the Commissioner for any period exceeding six months, and no such
appointment shall be renewed by the Commissioner on the expiry of the said
period of six months without the previous sanction of the Standing Committee.
The petitioners contend that under the said provisions of the MMC Act, the
VVMC, through its Deputy Commissioner, floated advertisements on different
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dates under the nomenclature "walk-in-interview" for the purpose of recruitment
of various posts for Hospitals, Urban Primary Health Centers, Mother and Child
Care centers, Clinics, Medical Health Units, I.C.U and Dialysis Centre on a
contractual basis for a temporary period of six months. The said temporary
contractual appointments were made under a selection process, which included
conducting interviews as scheduled in the advertisement to fill up the post of
Nephrologists, Gynecologist, Pediatrician, Doctors, Orthopedic, General
Surgeon, Radiologist, Anesthesiologist, Medical Pathologist, Officer (MBBS),
Medical Officer (BAMS), PHN Public Health Nurses, General Nurse Midwife,
Auxiliary Nurse Midwife, X-Ray Technician, Laboratory Assistants, Counsellor,
Cold-chain Technicians, Dialysis Supervisor and Dialysis Technician. The said
advertisements also followed the reservation policy in respect of which a
reservation roster was applied. The petitioners accordingly joined their respective
employment. This is not in dispute.
7. The petitioners contend that they were qualified/eligible to participate in
the selection process. Accordingly, they applied for the said posts having fully
satisfied the qualifications and the eligibility criteria as prescribed under the
advertisement as issued by respondent No.1 / VVMC. It is contended that the
selection process was duly carried out under the provisions of Section 54 of the
MMC Act. The petitioners were interviewed for the aforesaid posts by a Selection
Committee constituted under the provisions of Section 54 of the MMC Act. The
said Committee comprised of the Commissioner being the Chairman of the
Committee; it also comprised of an officer designated by the Commissioner
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together with the Chief Accounts Officer, the concerned Head of the
Department, another Officer designated by the Commissioner/ representative of a
backward class as a member, the District Women & Child Welfare Officer as a
member, District Social Welfare Officer as a member, Project Officer, Integrated
Tribal Development Project as member and the Deputy Commissioner
(Establishment) as the Secretary and Conveyor of the said Selection Committee
being the other members of the Selection Committee.
8. The petitioners have categorically contended that the constitution of the
said selection Committee and the process undertaken by the VVMC for selection,
was published by the VVMC in the Government Gazette dated 16 December
2010 inter alia prescribing the qualifications with respect to the appointment for
the posts of Medical officers, which also sets out the rules and regulations with
respect to the selection procedure for the aforesaid posts.
9. It is the petitioners’ case that after scrutinizing the documents of the
petitioners and interviews being conducted by respondent No. 1, the petitioners
were found eligible and appointed to the posts for which they had applied. It is
their contention that the said selection was as per the recruitment norms set out in
the aforesaid Government Gazette. It is further contended by the petitioners that
under the provision of Section 53 (3) of the MMC Act, from time to time, after
the expiration of the initial contract for the period of six months, the
Commissioner of the VVMC placed a proposal for renewal of the said contracts
before the Standing Committee of the VVMC. It is contended that the Standing
Committee, on each occasion, considered the proposals and upon finding that the
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services of the petitioners fell within the emergency services, and accordingly,
sanctioned renewal of the petitioners’ appointment on the posts held by them,
considering the nature of the services rendered by the petitioners. This however,
was done by giving the petitioners a one day break / technical break in service,
just to show that the petitioners were not allowed to continue as regular
employees or to avoid any further consequences with respect to a claim of
permanency or regularization in their service with the VVMC by the petitioners.
10. It is hence, submitted that in fact, the petitioners, on the day of such one
day break (technical break), had reported for duties, which, according to the
petitioners, made their services continuous and uninterrupted. It is contended
that the contractual appointments of the petitioners till date are periodically
revised by the VVMC by their respective orders. It is the petitioners’ case that
insofar as the posts held by them are concerned, they have been working for more
than 8 to 11 years, the details of which are as under:
Sr. Name of Petitioner Designation Date of Years of
No. joining with Experience till
VVCMC date
(Not Regularised)
W.P.4080 of 2021 Consultant
1 Dr. Vaishali Prashant Rane Consultant 21-Aug-2014 11 Years
2 Dr. Suraj Ashok Baghel Consultant 23-Mar-2015 10 Years
3 Dr. Madhavi Nitin Deshpande Consultant 1-Apr-2015 10 Years
4 Dr. Amrut Antar Pawar Consultant 10-Sep-2015 10 Years
5 Dr. Parigha Rahul Patil Consultant 10-Sep-2015 10 Years
6 Dr. Varun Vijay Shirishkar Consultant 10-Mar-2017 8 Years
7 Dr. Dr. Shobha Vinod Adhikari Consultant 8-Jun-2017 8 Years
8 Dr. Anju Tiwari Shukla Consultant 20-Jun-2017 8 Years
9 Dr. Rajendra Subhash Pingale Consultant 30-Jun-2017 8 Years
10 Dr. Venkat Tukaram Gunale Consultant 30-Jun-2017 8 Years
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11. The petitioners contend that with such long years of service as rendered by
them, the position which exists today is that the petitioners have no choice or any
meaningful choice, but to give their assent to the contract or sign on the dotted
line, in a prescribed or standard form or to accept such contract with the VVMC,
as the petitioners’ stand in a well established position in the services of the
VVMC.
12. In the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioners made representations to the
VVMC seeking absorption and/or regularization of their services, as they were at
such a stage that with their age they can neither be considered for any public
employment, nor could they appear for any competitive examination. However,
such representations (annexed to the petition) were not considered by the VVMC.
This more particularly, when it is not the case that work is not available with the
VVMC, nonetheless, such contractual appointments were made. Despite an open
acknowledgment that there was a continuous workload available with the VVMC,
and hence the VVMC was continuing the services of the petitioners by giving
them a technical break on paper.
13. It is contended by the petitioners that, although being appointed on
contractual basis, the VVMC followed the constitutional mandate and schemes
framed thereunder for such public employment, in undertaking the selection
procedure. Hence, absorbing and regularizing the services of the petitioners
would not harm the VVMC in respect of administrative and financial
management, as also a reservation roster was maintained in making such
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appointments.
14. It is contended that the petitioners are health workers, and their actual
appointment on a contractual basis by the VVMC is nothing but a need of the
hour. It is contended that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the petitioners had
discharged duties on their respective posts, risking their lives and had wholly
managed the actual functioning of the hospitals and health centers situated within
the VVMC. It is thus contended that the work allotted to the petitioners is not
temporary in nature and each and every petitioners’ work is interrelated to that of
the others. Hence, the petitioners cannot be expected to discharge their duties in
the employment with the VVMC, on exploitative terms with no guarantee of
livelihood, with such uncertainty of there being no provision for bonus, retiral
benefits etc. It is thus submitted that for such reason, there is a clear contravention
of constitutional provisions and the aspirations of the downtrodden classes. It is
the petitioners’ case that the principles of law in regard to absorption and
regularization, as applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, are
well settled, relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sheo Narain Nagar
and Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 1; Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors.
Vs. Umadevi & Ors.2; as also the decision of this Court in Madhukar Bhavanrao
Sadgir & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.3.
15. It is the petitioners’ contention that this is not a case, that sanctioned
permanent posts are not available for regularization and for granting permanency
1
AIR 2018 SC 233
2
(2006)4 SCC 1
3
2019(2) Mh.L.J. 119
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of service to the petitioners, as there are adequate number of posts which are
available with the VVMC. It is also the petitioners’ case that the State
Government is also not averse to the petitioners being absorbed in such posts
which are available, however, the State Government has issued the letter dated 21
January 2026 addressed to the Commissioner, VVMC whereby the Government
directed the Municipal Corporation to conduct an examination (Computer
Programme Based Test/Examination) for all working contractual officers/
employees in accordance with the General Administration Department's
Government Decision dated 21 November 2022 as a condition to regularize their
services. It is the petitioners’ case that such insistence of the State Government is
contrary to the earlier stand of the State, as also of the VVMC. Hence, the same is
also inconsistent with the principle of parity and equal treatment in respect of
those who have already been regularized without any such examination, while
excluding the petitioners, i.e., 33 out of the total 479 petitioners have already
been absorbed and regularized by respondent No.1 into the regular establishment
of the VVMC vide Government Resolutions dated 23 November 2023 and 15
March 2024. It is contended that these regularized employees/petitioners were
granted regular appointment orders and placed on probation in accordance with
the applicable service rules. It is also contended that such regularized employees
have successfully completed their probation periods and have now been duly
confirmed in their respective posts as regular employees of the VVMC. It is
contended that the said regularization and confirmation were carried out without
requiring the concerned employees to undergo any examination, as now being
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foisted under the impugned Government letter dated 21 January 2026.
16. On behalf of the petitioners, it is next submitted that the Deputy
Commissioner (Medical Health), VVMC, on 28 January 2026, issued the
impugned letter addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Legal Department,
VVMC, reiterating and confirming the directions contained in the impugned
Government letter dated 21 January 2026, so as to impose the condition of
examination for regularization, which according to the petitioners, is applying of a
different yardstick from that applied to those who are already regularized. In
supporting such contention, the petitioners have placed reliance on the decision
of this Court in Dr. Smita Hule Vs. Kalyan Dombivali Municipal Corporation 4
which is a case similar to that of the petitioners wherein absorption was granted to
those doctors appointed on a contractual basis. The petitioners submit that by the
impugned order dated 21 January 2026, the petitioners cannot be foisted with
such an examination more particularly, when the petitioners are serving for long
duration as if they are the regular employees. It is hence submitted that imposing
of such examination in the present circumstances would be arbitrary,
unreasonable, bad in law as also contrary to the norms which were earlier set out
and implemented.
17. It is on the aforesaid premise, the petitioners have prayed for the reliefs as
noted hereinabove. The other companion matters pray for identical reliefs.
(II) Reply Affidavit on behalf of Respondent No. 1-VVMC
18. On behalf of VVMC/respondent No.1, reply affidavit of Mr. Santosh
4
2017 SCC OnLine Bom 497
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Deherkar, its authorised signatory, dated 25 September 2021 is filed opposing the
writ petition. At the outset, the affidavit denies the petitioners' allegations and
states that the present petition is one amongst a group of writ petitions filed by
contractual employees of the health department seeking absorption and
regularisation on similar grounds.
18.1 It is stated that the VVMC was constituted on 3 July 2009 by
amalgamating four Municipal Councils and “fifty-three Gram Panchayats”. It is
contended that owing to rapid urbanization, expansion of municipal limits and
increasing administrative responsibilities, Respondent No.1 submitted proposals
to the State Government for approval of a revised staffing pattern and creation of
additional sanctioned posts.
18.2 It is stated that pursuant to the Government Order dated 5 June 2014,
recruitment to Class B (Non-Gazetted) and Class C posts was required to be made
through written examinations instead of interviews. The State Government
thereafter approved the staffing pattern by Government Resolution dated 9
September 2014, sanctioning 1610 additional posts subject to prescribed
conditions and simultaneously notified the Vasai Virar City Municipal
Corporation (Service Sector and Classification of Service) Rules, 2014. It is
clarified that the said recruitment rules do not apply to contractual, ad hoc or
temporary appointments.
18.3 It is further stated that, pursuant to subsequent Government notifications,
recruitment to eligible posts was required to be conducted only through the
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online recruitment system operated by MahaOnline and later through the
mandatory e-MahaPariksha portal. Respondent No.1 accordingly initiated the
necessary administrative process, including approval of reservation rosters,
budgetary sanctions and coordination with the State authorities for undertaking
recruitment through the prescribed mechanism.
18.4 The reply affidavit further states that, during the process of implementing
the revised recruitment mechanism, the Supreme Court in the case of State of
Maharashtra vs Anita & Anr5 by its order dated 12 July 2016 held that the persons
appointed on contractual basis for a temporary period shall not be entitled to
claim permanency. The State Government thereafter on 9 February 2018
circulated the said decision and directed all local authorities to ensure that
contractual appointments are not regularized contrary to law and that appropriate
conditions are incorporated in appointment orders.
18.5 It is further stated that, although the State Government permitted
recruitment to certain Grade 'A' medical posts under Section 54 of the MMC Act,
the procedure for regular recruitment to other posts remained incomplete.
Respondent No.1, therefore, repeatedly sought guidance from the State
Government regarding the recruitment process, reservation roster and the role of
the Maharashtra Public Service Commission (MPSC). The MPSC, however,
informed that it was not empowered to undertake such recruitment until the
requisite statutory guidelines were framed.
5
AIR 2016 SC 3333
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18.6 It is next stated that, as the procedure for regular recruitment was not
finalized and the e-MahaPariksha portal had become inoperative, respondent
No.1 was compelled to continue temporary contractual appointments to ensure
uninterrupted health services. During the COVID-19 pandemic, respondent
No.1 again sought approval for regular recruitment and the reservation roster;
however, the process could not be taken forward due to the stay on recruitment
against the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) category and the
consequent pendency of roster verification as ordered by the Supreme Court.
18.7 It is contended that the continuous correspondence exchanged with the
State Government clearly demonstrates that Respondent No.1 had constantly
made efforts to finalize a lawful procedure for regular recruitment. It is submitted
that permanent appointments can be made only in accordance with the statutory
recruitment procedure prescribed by the State Government and not otherwise. It
is contended that since the contractual appointments were made without
following the regular recruitment process or reservation roster applicable to
permanent recruitment, the petitioners cannot seek absorption or regularization.
It is contended that granting regularization would be unfair to eligible candidates
who did not apply pursuant to the contractual advertisements, which expressly
stipulated that the appointments were purely temporary.
18.8 The reply affidavit thereafter proceeds to answer the petition paragraph-
wise inter alia contending that the Government Circular dated 16 December 2010
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relied upon by the petitioners is inapplicable to Respondent No.1 and that the
formation of the Selection Committee is governed by the Vasai Virar City
Municipal Corporation (Service Sector and Classification of Service) Rules, 2014.
18.9 In regard to the petitioners' contention concerning repeated contractual
appointments, it is stated that every appointment was expressly made for a period
of six months in accordance with Section 53 of the MMC Act. Each appointment
letter specifically provided that no claim for regularization or absorption would
arise. The appointment letters were also issued in conformity with the State
Government's Circular dated 9 February 2018 issued pursuant to the judgment of
the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Anita & Anr (supra). The allegation
of the petitioners that Respondent No.1 deliberately granted a one-day technical
break to deprive the petitioners of permanency has been denied. It is submitted
that each appointment was an independent contractual appointment made in
accordance with Section 53 of the MMC Act and accepted by the petitioners
without protest. It is contended that the petitioners, having accepted the terms of
appointment and continued to serve thereunder, cannot subsequently claim that
the contractual conditions are arbitrary or seek the benefits available to
permanent employees. It is next contended that the petitioners have
misrepresented the terms of appointment. The appointment letters were issued
strictly in accordance with Section 53 of the MMC Act and pursuant to the
authorization granted by the Standing Committee. The petitioners accepted the
contractual terms without protest and continued in service. It is next contended
that the service conditions applicable to permanent employees cannot
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automatically be extended to temporary contractual appointees, until the
statutory recruitment procedure is completed, respondent No.1 is not legally
empowered to confer permanent status upon the petitioners. The petitioners’
contentions on the challenge to the appointment conditions on the ground of
violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution or Section 23 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 are specifically denied. The affidavit further states that the
contractual conditions contained in the appointment letters are neither arbitrary
nor discriminatory and do not violate the principles of natural justice. The
appointments were made only as temporary appointments under the statutory
scheme and cannot be characterized as exploitative. It is submitted that there is no
violation of the constitutional provisions, hence, the petitioners' interpretation of
the decisions relied upon by them is erroneous. It is lastly contended that the
petitioners have no vested right to seek regularization or absorption and that any
direction to regularize contractual appointees without following the prescribed
recruitment procedure would be contrary to the constitutional scheme governing
public employment. It is hence contended that the writ petition is liable to be
dismissed.
19. Another reply affidavit has been filed on behalf of the VVMC on 28 April
2026 in which it is inter alia contended that the Government of Maharashtra,
Urban Development Department had issued a communication dated 21 January
2026 to the VVMC by which the Government directed the VVMC to conduct an
examination process (Computer programme based test/Examination) for all
working contractual officers/employees in accordance with the General
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Administration Department’s Government decision dated 21 November 2022. It
is contended that the VVMC is a local authority and is bound by the policy
decisions and directions issued by the State Government in exercise of its
administrative powers, and hence, the VVMC has no independent authority to
disregard or act contrary to the directions issued by the Government of
Maharashtra, particularly when such directions are in furtherance of the
implementation of a Government Resolution applicable to all similarly situated
contractual employees. It is contended that in compliance with the aforesaid
Government directives, the Deputy Commissioner (Medical Health) issued a
letter dated 28 January 2026 to the Deputy Commissioner (Legal Department),
thereby initiating the process of conducting the prescribed examination for all
eligible contractual officers/employees, and thus, the decision to conduct the
examination process by the VVMC is in consonance with the said Government
decision providing for the procedure to regularize / absorb the contractual
employees through a transparent and merit-based mechanism.
Orders passed by the Court on the present proceedings
20. Before we proceed to note the submissions of the learned Counsel for the
parties, we may note some of the relevant orders which are passed on the present
proceedings.
21. By an order dated 11 September 2023, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court
recorded a statement made on behalf of the Commissioner of the Corporation,
not to take a coercive action against the petitioners, which was ordered to operate
till the final disposal of this petition. It was observed that the petitions fall broadly
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into two categories, one category relating to the petitioners’ appointment against
the sanctioned posts and the other category relating to the petitioners’
appointment against the non-sanctioned posts. On 1 July 2024, the Court noting
that the petitioners are working with the respondent/VVMC as doctors for
various durations and that many of them had rendered service during the Covid-
19 pandemic period, and considering the services rendered by them during the
difficult period of the Covid-19 pandemic, and on the consideraton that there was
always a need for qualified doctors in public services, and especially since some of
the petitioners were made permanent, and as the interim relief was operating, the
Commissioner of the VVMC was directed to consider the case of the petitioners
sympathetically within the ambit of law. On such backdrop, thereafter on 10 July
2024 the following order came to be passed:-
“ Though we had adjourned the Petitions today primarily emphasizing on
the case of the Doctors, in the group of these Petitions there are Petitioners
other than the Doctors seeking similar relief. In spite of adjournment no clear
instructions are given either to the Office of the Government Pleader or to
the learned Counsel appearing for the Municipal Corporation.
2. The learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioners has tendered a chart
listing the categories and number of the Petitioners vis-a-vis the sanctioned
posts. He states that the number of sanctioned posts listed therein is from the
year 2014 and as per his information the number of sanctioned posts must
have increased in the last decade. Instructions be taken as to the number of
sanctioned posts and vacancies as on today. Also to what is the methodology
that the State and the Municipal Corporation has adopted for regularization
of the employees those who have already regularized. So that there is no
further delay on the ground of lack of instructions, the learned AGP and the
learned Counsel for the Respondent – Corporation state that they will request
the concerned Commissioner and the Secretary/Deputy Secretary to join the
hearing through Video Conferencing on the next date.”
22. On the backdrop of the aforesaid order, on 18 July 2024 a co-ordinate
Bench of this Court recorded in its order that the proposals of various other
municipal corporations for absorption of similarly situated employees had been
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submitted to the State Government, which the State Government had sanctioned
and hence, there was no reason why the VVMC should not also take similar steps.
Such order has also recorded the number of sanctioned posts and the persons
working on a contractual basis. The said order needs to be noted which reads
thus:
“ This group of petitions is filed by the medical officers, paramedical staff
and administrative staff of Vasai Virar Municipal Corporation.
2. The Petitioners are working on different posts on temporary/contractual basis
for period ranging from three years to ten years. By this petition, they seek
direction to regularise or absorb their services. The Petitioners contend that in
respect of various other municipal corporations, they had submitted proposal
for absorption of similarly situated employees which State Government has
sanctioned and there is no reason why the Vasai Virar Municipal Corporation
should not also take similar steps.
3. In our earlier orders, we had expressed that, considering the fact that the
Petitioners are working to provide health services being in medical and
paramedical departments over the years, having acquired expertise and having
assisted the Corporation during the Covid-19 pandemic, require sympathetic
consideration.
4. The Commissioner of Municipal Corporation, Deputy Secretary of
Department of Health are present in the Court. The learned counsel for the
Respondent - Corporation submitted that the Respondent Corporation desires
to consider the case of the Petitioners sympathetically, however, procedural
aspect cannot be overlooked. The learned counsel for the Corporation informs
that as regards medical officers, the sanctioned staff is 132, 31 posts being
occupied and 101 vacant posts. Out of 315 posts of paramedical staff, 21 have
been filled in and 294 posts are vacant. As regards administrative staff, all the 18
posts are vacant. The total, therefore, is 465 sanctioned staff with only 52
permanent and 413 vacant posts. We are informed that the Petitioners are
around 479. These figures i.e. out of 465 sanctioned posts, only 52 working
permanently and 479 working on temporary and contractual basis is a matter of
concern.
5. The learned counsel for the Municipal Corporation submitted that the
Corporation is in process of drawing a proposal providing for scheme of
absorption and submitting it to the State Government.
6. The learned AGP, on instructions, submitted that once such a proposal is
received, the State Government would apply the criteria as such length of
service, manner of appointments and thereafter take necessary decision.
7. We have no doubt that once such proposal is submitted, the State
Government will keep in mind that as regards other municipal corporations, as
pointed out by the Petitioners, that is Sangli Municipal Corporation and Navi
Mumbai Municipal Corporation, similar proposals have been sanctioned by the
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State Government.
8. As submitted, the Municipal Corporation will submit the proposal in respect
of the Petitioners (excluding those who are not in service as on today) and other
employees if the Corporation chooses to do so, to the State Government within
a period of three weeks from today. The State Government will thereafter take a
decision within period of seven weeks from receipt of proposal.
9. Stand over to 1 October 2024 to report compliance/progress under the
caption 'For Directions'.
10. Till the decision is so taken, the services of the Petitioners shall be
continued.”
(emphasis supplied)
(V) Submissions on behalf of the petitioners
23. On the aforesaid backdrop, we have heard learned Counsel for the parties.
Mr. Desai, learned Counsel for the petitioners has made the following
submissions.
24. There are sanctioned posts as observed by the Court in the aforesaid order
and on such sanctioned posts the VVMC cannot keep employees appointed on a
contractual basis for years together, more particularly when the work which is
required to be discharged is of a perennial nature. This more particularly when it
comes to the health department, in which the VVMC was running hospitals,
health centers and dispensaries. As also when the initial appointments were made
by following the selection procedure and following the roster, however, by making
contractual appointments and by giving artificial breaks, the petitioners were
continued in service. It is submitted that the petitioners were discharging
continuous service for 8 to 10 years without a break, as even on the date of the
artificial break, the petitioners reported for duties and discharged their regular
duties. In these circumstances, it was imperative for the VVMC to regularize the
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petitioners’ appointments not only on the posts which are sanctioned, but also by
approaching the State Government for absorption/regularization of the
petitioners on suitable posts, as these appointees have continued to discharge
duties for such large number of years. It is submitted that serious prejudice is
being caused to the petitioners, as the petitioners have already become age barred,
and they cannot avail of any alternate public employment, as there is no scope for
appearing in the examination conducted by the public bodies where they would
otherwise be eligible for appointment to similar posts.
25. It is submitted that it has been a consistent practice followed by several
municipal corporations to approach the State Government for approval of
regularization / permanency, to be granted to such contractual employees and
hence, a different yardstick cannot be applied in respect of the petitioners, namely
those who have continued and those who have not been regularized despite their
long years of service with the VVMC. In fact in respect of VVMC only 33
number of contract employees have been regularized without the requirement of
any test as insisted in the State Government’s communication dated 28 January,
2026.
26. It is submitted that it is also not appropriate for the State Government to
foist the directives as contained in the communication dated 28 January 2026 on
the petitioners who are in service of the VVMC for a very long period, so as to
impose a condition of requiring the petitioners to appear for an examination for
the purpose of regularization. It is submitted that this was in pursuance of the
policy of the General Administration Department (GAD) as contained in the
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Government decision dated 21 November 2022, and it is after such policy was
brought in force, without the contractual employees being subjected to the
examination, regularization has been granted in respect of 33 employees who
worked with the VVMC. It is therefore, submitted that there cannot be a
different yardstick which can be applied to the petitioners and more particularly
when the present proceedings have been pending for more than six years. Thus,
for such reasons, it is submitted that the impugned communication dated 28
January 2026 is bad and illegal. Mr. Desai has placed reliance on the decisions as
noted by us hereinabove to submit that it would be the constitutional right and
legitimate expectation of the petitioners to be regularized in these circumstances,
and which is now well accepted even by the VVMC, the State Government and
different municipal corporations. In support of his contentions, Mr. Desai has
placed reliance on the decisions in State of U.P. & Ors. v. Arvind Kumar
Srivastava & Ors.6; Jaggo Vs. Union of India & Ors. 7; Dharam Singh & Ors. Vs.
State of U.P. & Anr.8 and Sachin Ambadas Dawale Vs. State of Maharashtra &
Ors.9. Mr. Desai would thus submit that this is a fit case where the Court needs to
issue directions to the VVMC as also the State Government to regularize the
petitioners’ services.
(VI ) Submissions on behalf of the Respondents
27. On the other hand, the learned AGP although has opposed these
6
(2015)1 SCC 347
7
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826
8
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1735
9
2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1670
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proceedings, he submits that his contentions are not different from what has been
set out in the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the VVMC, namely that it would be
incumbent upon the VVMC to subject the petitioners to a test as contemplated
by the Government Communication dated 28 January 2026 which is on the basis
of the GAD’s Government Decision dated 21 November 2022.
28. Mr. Patil, learned Counsel for the VVMC has although opposed this
petition, however, he has fairly not disputed that the petitioners are working as
contractual employees for long number of years and that from time to time their
contractual employment was extended. He has also not disputed that the VVMC
has in fact approached the State Government for regularization of their services.
However, he would submit that while undertaking such exercise of regularization,
the VVMC is bound by the directives of the State of Maharashtra as contained in
its impugned communication dated 28 January 2026, and it is for such reason
that the steps were taken by the VVMC to undertake an examination for the
purpose of regularization. Mr. Patil has placed reliance on the reply affidavit filed
on behalf of the VVMC which we have noted hereinabove to oppose this petition.
(VII) Analysis
29. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and having perused the
record, we find substance in the contention as urged on behalf of the petitioners
inasmuch as it is not in dispute that the petitioners are working as contractual
employees in the Health Department of the VVMC in the capacity as doctors as
also in other different capacities. They have been rendering continuous services
in medical centers of the VVMC and most pertinently as observed by the
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Division Bench of this Court, also during the difficult times of the Covid-19
pandemic. It also appears to be an admitted position that the State Government
despite its policy of prescribing a GAD examination, as reflected in the impugned
communication dated 28 January 2026, has taken steps in the year 2023 (vide
orders dated 23 November 2023 & 15 March 2024) to approve regularization of
the services of 33 contractual employees of the VVMC. This apart the State
Government has also taken steps to regularize the services of the contractual
employees of other municipal corporations. If this be so, as rightly contended by
the petitioners, a different yardstick cannot be applied in the petitioners’ case, and
they would also be entitled to be regularized once the other basic conditions of
qualification are fulfilled by them coupled with the long years of service rendered
by them, needs to enure to their benefits, except for the requirement of an
examination being sought to be imposed under the impugned communication
dated 28 January 2026.
30. The petitioners would also be correct in their contention that the plight of
the petitioners is such that having worked for the VVMC for such a long period
which is a period of almost 8 to 10 years, the petitioners today have nowhere to
go, except to continue the employment of the VVMC. In our opinion, the
petitioners in that regard are correct in their contention that the doors of any
other public employment for any similar services or recruitment which may be
undertaken by such organizations, have been closed for them, not only on the
ground that they would be age barred but also on the ground that they would be
subjected to a rigorous selection procedure of an examination, etc. which in the
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present circumstances cannot be sustained on them. Thus, this is a case which
clearly demonstrates that a serious prejudice is being caused to the petitioners by
such inaction on the part of the VVMC in not regularizing the petitioners’
services. In fact, their continuous appointment on contractual posts and the
petitioners discharging the services on such post held by them year after year and
that too for a unduly long period has created a legitimate expectation of the
petitioners being absorbed.
31. In our opinion, in fact, the plight of the employees who were similarly
placed like the petitioners was considered by the State Government, while dealing
with the other municipal corporations, when regularization of their services has
been granted. Also in the case of the VVMC, 33 employees have been granted
regularization as approved by the State Government without they being subjected
to any further selection procedure. The law would be required to be applied
uniformly to all such employees. In our opinion, the law certainly supports the
petitioners’ case as we discuss the principles hereinbelow. In such context, the
petitioners would be correct in relying on the decisions in Sachin Ambadas
Dawale Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.(supra), State of U.P. & Ors. v. Arvind
Kumar Srivastava & Ors.(supra); Jaggo Vs. Union of India & Ors.(supra); and
Dharam Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.(supra).
32. In Sachin Ambadas Dawale & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (supra),
this Court considered whether contractual employees appointed through a public
advertisement and a duly constituted Selection Committee could be denied
regularization by treating them as back-door entrants within the meaning of
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Umadevi (supra). The Court held that where appointments are made after
following the prescribed recruitment procedure through an open selection
process, such appointments cannot be regarded as illegal or back-door entries
merely because they were initially contractual.
33. In the present case, the petitioners were appointed pursuant to public
advertisements, after undergoing selection before a duly constituted Selection
Committee in accordance with the provisions of the Maharashtra Municipal
Corporations Act and the applicable recruitment rules. Their appointments,
therefore, cannot be characterized as illegal.
34. In State of U.P. & Ors. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Ors. (supra), the
issue before the Supreme Court was whether the benefit of a judgment granted to
one set of employees ought to be extended to other identically situated employees
who had not approached the Court. The Supreme Court held that the normal rule
in service jurisprudence, is that when a particular set of employees is granted
relief, all other identically situated employees are also entitled to the same benefit,
and denial thereof would amount to discrimination violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. The Court clarified that this principle is subject to the exceptions of
delay, laches and acquiescence, which would apply only to "fence-sitters", and
further held that where the judgment is in rem, particularly in matters concerning
a scheme of regularization or policy, the authorities are under an obligation to
extend the benefit to all similarly situated employees. In the present case, the
petitioners cannot be regarded as fence-sitters. Moreover, the respondent
Corporation has already regularized 33 similarly situated contractual employees
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who were appointed through the same recruitment process, discharged identical
duties and were governed by the same service conditions. The respondents,
therefore, cannot apply a different yardstick to the petitioners by insisting upon a
fresh examination while extending regularisation to other identically situated
employees. The following principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court in
Arvind Kumar Srivastava (supra) are aptly applicable to the present case:-
“22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid
judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be
summed up as under.
22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief
by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by
extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and
would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle
needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service
jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all
similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal
rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not
approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.
22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the
form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not
challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and
woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts
who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then
such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the
case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated
as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a
valid ground to dismiss their claim.
22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the
judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to
give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the
court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the
authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons.
Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches
upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C.
Sharma v. Union of India [K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721 :
1998 SCC (L&S) 226] ). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was
in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the
parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the
judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the
judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to
them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches
and delays or acquiescence.
35. In a recent decision in Jaggo v. Union of India (supra), the Supreme Court
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considered whether employees engaged on temporary or contractual basis for
long periods while performing perennial duties could be denied regularization by
merely relying upon the nomenclature of their appointments and the decision of
the Supreme Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. Umadevi & Ors.
(supra). The Court held that where the work performed is perennial in nature and
fundamental to the functioning of the establishment, the employer cannot
indefinitely continue such employees on temporary terms and thereafter invoke
the judgment in Umadevi (supra) to defeat their legitimate claim. The Court
reiterated that Umadevi (supra) distinguishes illegal appointments from irregular
appointments and cannot be used to perpetuate exploitative employment
practices. In the present case, the petitioners have continuously performed
indispensable medical and public health functions in the respondent Corporation
for several years after being appointed through a transparent selection process.
Their appointments are not illegal or back-door appointments, and the perennial
nature of their duties clearly demonstrates that the respondents cannot deny
regularization merely on the basis that their appointments were contractual,
moreover by imposing a examination as impugned. The relevant observations of
the Supreme Court read thus:
“13. The claim by the respondents that these were not regular posts lacks
merit, as the nature of the work performed by the appellants was perennial
and fundamental to the functioning of the offices. The recurring nature of
these duties necessitates their classification as regular posts, irrespective of
how their initial engagements were labelled. It is also noteworthy that
subsequent outsourcing of these same tasks to private agencies after the
appellants' termination demonstrates the inherent need for these services.
This act of outsourcing, which effectively replaced one set of workers with
another, further underscores that the work in question was neither temporary
nor occasional.
…
26. While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) sought to curtail the practice
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of backdoor entries and ensure appointments adhered to constitutional
principles, it is regrettable that its principles are often misinterpreted or
misapplied to deny legitimate claims of long-serving employees. This
judgment aimed to distinguish between “illegal” and “irregular”
appointments. It categorically held that employees in irregular appointments,
who were engaged in duly sanctioned posts and had served continuously for
more than ten years, should be considered for regularization as a one-time
measure. However, the laudable intent of the judgment is being subverted
when institutions rely on its dicta to indiscriminately reject the claims of
employees, even in cases where their appointments are not illegal, but merely
lack adherence to procedural formalities. Government departments often cite
the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) to argue that no vested right to
regularization exists for temporary employees, overlooking the judgment's
explicit acknowledgment of cases where regularization is appropriate. This
selective application distorts the judgment's spirit and purpose, effectively
weaponizing it against employees who have rendered indispensable services
over decades.
27. In light of these considerations, in our opinion, it is imperative for
government departments to lead by example in providing fair and stable
employment. Engaging workers on a temporary basis for extended periods,
especially when their roles are integral to the organization's functioning, not
only contravenes international labour standards but also exposes the
organization to legal challenges and undermines employee morale. By
ensuring fair employment practices, government institutions can reduce the
burden of unnecessary litigation, promote job security, and uphold the
principles of justice and fairness that they are meant to embody. This
approach aligns with international standards and sets a positive precedent for
the private sector to follow, thereby contributing to the overall betterment of
labour practices in the country.”
36. In Dharam Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (supra), the Supreme
Court has held that although the creation of posts is primarily an executive
function, the refusal to sanction posts cannot be immune from judicial scrutiny on
arbitrariness, particularly where the employer ignores the functional necessity of
the work and its own longstanding reliance on employees performing regular and
perennial duties. The Supreme Court observed that continuous deployment of
employees to perform duties which are continuous, integral and perennial
demonstrates the permanent nature of the work. It was held that the State cannot
continue extracting such work for years while pleading want of sanctioned
strength. The Court further held that Umadevi (supra) distinguishes between
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illegal appointments and irregular engagements and does not endorse the
perpetuation of precarious employment where the work itself is permanent and
the State has failed, for years, to put its house in order. It reiterated that Umadevi
(supra) cannot be deployed as a shield to justify long-term ad hocism or
exploitative contractual engagements. The relevant observations of the Supreme
Court read thus:
8. The State's refusal of 11.11.1999 cites “financial constraints” and the
subsequent decision of 25.11.2003 (taken after the High Court's direction to
reconsider) adverts to financial crisis and a ban on creation of posts. Neither
decision engages with relevant considerations placed on record, namely, the
Commission's 1991 resolution and repeated proposals, the acknowledged
administrative exigencies of a recruiting body handling large cycles, the
continuous deployment of these very hands for years, and the existence of
attendant work that is primarily perennial rather than sporadic. While
creation of posts is primarily an executive function, the refusal to sanction
posts cannot be immune from judicial scrutiny for arbitrariness. We believe
that a non-speaking rejection on a generic plea of “financial constraints”,
ignoring functional necessity and the employer's own longstanding reliance
on daily wagers to discharge regular duties, does not meet the standard of
reasonableness expected of a model public institution.
9. Moreover, it is undisputed that the nature of work performed by the
appellants, i.e. sorting and scrutiny of applications, dispatch and office
support, and driving, has been continuous and integral to the Commission's
functioning since their engagement between 1989 and 1992. The
Commission itself moved for sanction of fourteen posts and furnished a list of
fourteen daily wagers including the appellants. That consistent internal
demand, coupled with uninterrupted utilisation of the appellants' labour on
regular office hours, fortifies the conclusion that the duties are perennial. To
continue extracting such work for decades while pleading want of sanctioned
strength is a position that cannot be sustained.
…
11. Furthermore, it must be clarified that the reliance placed by the High
Court on Umadevi (Supra) to non-suit the appellants is misplaced. Unlike
Umadevi (Supra), the challenge before us is not an invitation to bypass the
constitutional scheme of public employment. It is a challenge to the State's
arbitrary refusals to sanction posts despite the employer's own
acknowledgement of need and decades of continuous reliance on the very
workforce. On the other hand, Umadevi (Supra) draws a distinction between
illegal appointments and irregular engagements and does not endorse the
perpetuation of precarious employment where the work itself is permanent
and the State has failed, for years, to put its house in order. Recent decisions of
this Court in Jaggo v. Union of India 4 and in Shripal v. Nagar Nigam,
Ghaziabad5 have emphatically cautioned that Umadevi (Supra) cannot be
deployed as a shield to justify exploitation through long-term “ad hocism”, the
use of outsourcing as a proxy, or the denial of basic parity where identical
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duties are exacted over extended periods. The principles articulated therein
apply with full force to the present case. The relevant paras from Shripal
(supra) have been reproduced hereunder:
“14. The Respondent Employer places reliance on Umadevi (supra) 2 to
contend that daily-wage or temporary employees cannot claim permanent
absorption in the absence of statutory rules providing such absorption.
However, as frequently reiterated, Uma Devi itself distinguishes between
appointments that are “illegal” and those that are “irregular,” the latter
being eligible for regularization if they meet certain conditions. More
importantly, Uma Devi cannot serve as a shield to justify exploitative
engagements persisting for years without the Employer undertaking
legitimate recruitment. Given the record which shows no true contractor-
based arrangement and a consistent need for permanent horticultural staff
the alleged asserted ban on fresh recruitment, though real, cannot justify
indefinite daily-wage status or continued unfair practices.
15. It is manifest that the Appellant Workmen continuously rendered
their services over several years, sometimes spanning more than a decade.
Even if certain muster rolls were not produced in full, the Employer's
failure to furnish such records-despite directions to do so-allows an
adverse inference under well-established labour jurisprudence. Indian
labour law strongly disfavors perpetual daily-wage or contractual
engagements in circumstances where the work is permanent in nature.
Morally and legally, workers who fulfill ongoing municipal requirements
year after year cannot be dismissed summarily as dispensable, particularly
in the absence of a genuine contractor agreement. At this juncture, it
would be appropriate to recall the broader critique of indefinite
“temporary” employment practices as done by a recent judgment of this
court in Jaggo v. Union of India3 in the following paragraphs:
“22. The pervasive misuse of temporary employment contracts, as
exemplified in this case, reflects a broader systemic issue that
adversely affects workers' rights and job security. In the private sector,
the rise of the gig economy has led to an increase in precarious
employment arrangements, often characterized by lack of benefits,
job security, and fair treatment. Such practices have been criticized
for exploiting workers and undermining labour standards.
Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the principles of
fairness and justice, bear an even greater responsibility to avoid such
exploitative employment practices. When public sector entities
engage in misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the
detrimental trends observed in the gig economy but also sets a
concerning precedent that can erode public trust in governmental
operations.
………
25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly
in government institutions, often face multifaceted forms of
exploitation. While the foundational purpose of temporary contracts
may have been to address short-term or seasonal needs, they have
increasingly become a mechanism to evade long-term obligations
owed to employees. These practices manifest in several ways:
• Misuse of “Temporary” Labels: Employees engaged for work that is
essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an institution
are often labelled as “temporary” or “contractual,” even when their
roles mirror those of regular employees. Such misclassification
deprives workers of the dignity, security, and benefits that regular
employees are entitled to, despite performing identical tasks.
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• Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are frequently
dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case. This
practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects
workers to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or
duration of their service.
• Lack of Career Progression: Temporary employees often find
themselves excluded from opportunities for skill development,
promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their
roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and their regular
counterparts, despite their contributions being equally significant.
• Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions increasingly resort to
outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees, effectively
replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not
only perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort
to bypass the obligation to offer regular employment.
• Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits: Temporary employees are often
denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident fund, health
insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans decades. This
lack of social security subjects them and their families to undue
hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen
circumstances.
……
13. As we have observed in both Jaggo (Supra) and Shripal (Supra), outsourcing
cannot become a convenient shield to perpetuate precariousness and to sidestep fair
engagement practices where the work is inherently perennial. The Commission's
further contention that the appellants are not “full-time” employees but continue
only by virtue of interim orders also does not advance their case. That interim
protection was granted precisely because of the long history of engagement and the
pendency of the challenge to the State's refusals. It neither creates rights that did not
exist nor erases entitlements that may arise upon a proper adjudication of the legality
of those refusals.
.…
15. Therefore, in view of the foregoing observations, the impugned order of the
High Court cannot be sustained. The State's refusals dated 11.11.1999 and
25.11.2003, in so far as they concern the Commission's proposals for
sanction/creation of Class-III/Class-IV posts to address perennial
ministerial/attendant work, are held unsustainable and stand quashed."
… … ...
17. Before concluding, we think it necessary to recall that the State (here referring to
both the Union and the State governments) is not a mere market participant but a
constitutional employer. It cannot balance budgets on the backs of those who
perform the most basic and recurring public functions. Where work recurs day after
day and year after year, the establishment must reflect that reality in its sanctioned
strength and engagement practices. The long-term extraction of regular labour
under temporary labels corrodes confidence in public administration and offends
the promise of equal protection. Financial stringency certainly has a place in public
policy, but it is not a talisman that overrides fairness, reason and the duty to organise
work on lawful lines.
18. Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that “ad-hocism” thrives where
administration is opaque. The State Departments must keep and produce accurate
establishment registers, muster rolls and outsourcing arrangements, and they must
explain, with evidence, why they prefer precarious engagement over sanctioned
posts where the work is perennial. If “constraint” is invoked, the record should show
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what alternatives were considered, why similarly placed workers were treated
differently, and how the chosen course aligns with Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the
Constitution of India. Sensitivity to the human consequences of prolonged
insecurity is not sentimentality. It is a constitutional discipline that should inform
every decision affecting those who keep public offices running.
37. In the present proceedings, the petitioners have continuously discharged
perennial and indispensable public health duties after being appointed through a
duly constituted selection process, hence, the respondents cannot rely upon the
contractual nature of their appointments to deny consideration for regularization.
The respondents' refusal to regularize the petitioners despite their long and
uninterrupted service; the admitted existence of sanctioned vacancies as also
significantly the regularization of similarly situated employees, is therefore,
arbitrary and illegal, and squarely covered by the principles of law as laid down by
the Supreme Court in Jaggo (supra), Dharam Singh & Ors. (supra).
38. We may also refer to a very significant recent decision of the Supreme
Court in Bhola Nath vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. 10 which succinctly captures
every possible eventuality in regard to the need of regularization as squarely
applicable in the present case. In the said case, the Supreme Court was concerned
with appellants who were appointed as Junior Engineers (Agriculture) on
temporary and contractual basis in the year 2012. The terms and conditions
governing the engagement stipulated that the appointment would be for an initial
period of one year, extendable thereafter subject to satisfactory performance.
Their contractual appointments were extended from time to time upon
completion of their respective annual terms. They sought regularization of their
services in the year 2015. However, the respondent-State continued to grant
10
2026 SCC OnLine SC 129
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them yearly extensions, the last of which was for the period from December 2022
to February 2023, although there existed sanctioned post which were kept vacant,
however, the appellants were continued to be engaged on contractual basis. The
appellants contended that, having rendered long and dedicated service, they
ought to have been regularized. They also invoked the obligation of the State to
act as a model employer. Aggrieved by the persistent inaction on the part of the
respondents, the appellants approached the High Court, inter alia praying for a
writ of mandamus directing the respondent-State to regularize and absorb them
against the vacant sanctioned posts of Junior Engineers (Agriculture). They also
sought a declaration that Office Order dated 28 February 2023, whereby the
stipulation against any further extension of their contractual engagement was
introduced, was illegal, arbitrary and unsustainable in law. The writ petition was
dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The intra-Court appeal preferred by the
appellants against the said order was also dismissed. In these circumstances the
proceedings reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court considered the
question inter alia as to whether the action/inaction of the respondent State in not
recognizing the appellants’ continuous service for the purpose of regularization
whether was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The Supreme Court observed that the High Court has proceeded on a mechanical
application of precedents without engaging with the core Constitutional issues
involved, thereby reducing the dispute to one of acceptance of contractual terms,
divorced from its larger Constitutional context. The Supreme Court observed,
that it was consistently held that the State, being a model employer, is saddled
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with a ‘heightened obligation’ in the discharge of its functions. It was observed
that a model employer is expected to act with high probity, fairness and candour,
and bears a social responsibility to treat its employees in a manner that preserves
their dignity. It was observed that the State cannot be permitted to exploit its
employees or to take advantage of their vulnerability, helplessness or unequal
bargaining position. It was held that the State is required to exercise heightened
caution in its role as an employer, a constitutional mandate casting upon it, a strict
obligation to act as a model employer, an obligation from which no exception can
be countenanced. The Court also observed that the consistent case of the
appellants, that the respondent-State’s, refusal to grant regularization was
arbitrary and therefore warranted judicial interference. In such context, the Court
observed that action of the respondent-State to keep the appellants as contractual
employees was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and that the mere fact
that the appellants’ engagement was governed by contractual terms, could not be
construed as a waiver of their fundamental rights. The Supreme Court also
considered the issue of unconscionable agreements while discussing the legal
position under the heading, “Unconscionable Agreements – Contract between
Lion and Lamb.” Under such heading, referring to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly 11, the
following observations were made:-
“Unconscionable Agreements – Contract between Lion and Lamb:
12. In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly6, this
Court acknowledged the increasing imbalance in the bargaining power of
contracting parties. The Court held thus: -
11
(1986) 3 SCC 156
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“89. . . . We have a Constitution for our country. Our judges are
bound by their oath to “uphold the Constitution and the laws”. The
Constitution was enacted to secure to all the citizens of this country social
and economic justice. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees to all
persons equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws. The
principle deducible from the above discussions on this part of the case is in
consonance with right and reason, intended to secure social and economic
justice and conforms to the mandate of the great equality clause in Article
14. This principle is that the courts will not enforce and will, when called
upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair
and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who are
not equal in bargaining power. It is difficult to give an exhaustive list of all
bargains of this type. No court can visualize the different situations which
can arise in the affairs of men. One can only attempt to give some
illustrations. For instance, the above principle will apply where the
inequality of bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the
economic strength of the contracting parties. It will apply where the
inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the
parties or not. It will apply to situations in which the weaker party is in
aposition in which he can obtain goods or services or means of livelihood
only upon the terms imposed by the stronger party or go without them. It
will also apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice,
but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a
prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract,
however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that contract
or form or rules may be. This principle, however, will not apply where the
bargaining power of the contracting parties is equal or almost equal. This
principle may not apply where both parties are businessmen and the
contract is a commercial transaction. In today’s complex world of giant
corporations with their vast infrastructural organizations and with the State
through its instrumentalities and agencies entering into almost every branch
of industry and commerce, there can be myriad situations which result in
unfair and unreasonable bargains between parties possessing wholly
disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. These cases can neither be
enumerated nor fully illustrated. The court must judge each case on its own
facts and circumstances.”
(emphasis laid)
Therefore, the Court has held that the Constitution obliges courts to
advance social and economic justice and to give effect to the equality
mandate under Article 14. Consequently, courts will neither enforce nor
hesitate to invalidate contracts, or contractual clauses, that are unfair or
unreasonable when entered into between parties with unequal bargaining
power.
12.1. Relying on the aforesaid reasoning, another two-Judge Bench in
Pani Ram v. Union of India7, reiterated that the guarantee of equality under
Article 14 extends even to situations where a person has no meaningful
choice but to accept imposed contractual terms, however unfair or
unreasonable they may be. Applying this principle to the facts before it, the
Court observed thus: -
“23. As held by this Court, a right to equality guaranteed
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India would also apply
to a man who has no choice or rather no meaningful choice, but
to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a
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prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of
the contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable
a clause in that contract or form or rules may be. We find that
the said observations rightly apply to the facts of the present
case. Can it be said that the mighty Union of India and an
ordinary soldier, who having fought for the country and retired
from Regular Army, seeking re-employment in the Territorial
Army, have an equal bargaining power. We are therefore of the
considered view that the reliance placed on the said document
would also be of no assistance to the case of the respondents.”
(emphasis laid)
Therefore, it is clear that Courts are empowered to invalidate
unconscionable elements of a contract where the parties lack the ability to exercise
any real or meaningful choice in negotiating its terms. In the present case, the
appellants were left with no alternative but to accept the conditions unilaterally
prescribed by the respondent-State in order to secure their livelihood and sustain a
source of income. It would be entirely unrealistic to assume that, in such
circumstances, an employee seeking temporary employment could meaningfully
negotiate or assert a position against the overwhelming might of the State
machinery.
12.2. At this juncture, the analogy of apples and oranges serves as a useful
reminder that certain relationships are inherently incapable of being assessed on an
equal plane. A contract between the State and an employee stands on a similar
footing. The State, in such a relationship, assumes the role of a metaphorical lion,
endowed with overwhelming authority, resources and bargaining strength,
whereas the employee, who is yet an aspirant, is reduced to the position of a
metaphorical lamb, possessing little real negotiating power. To suggest parity
between the two, i.e. the lion and the lamb, would be to ignore the stark imbalance
that defines the relationship.
12.3. Therefore, where a lion contracts with a lamb, the inequality is not
incidental but structural, and it is precisely this disproportion that calls for judicial
sensitivity. In such situations, the conscience of Constitutional Courts must
inevitably tilt in favour of protecting the lamb. We have no hesitation in holding
that Constitutional Courts are duty-bound to act to safeguard those who are
vulnerable to exploitation, so that employees are not compelled to meekly submit
to the demands of a vastly dominant contracting party like the State, but are
instead assured that constitutional protections will intervene to prevent such
exploitation.”
37.1 Having made the aforesaid significant observations, the Supreme
Court thereafter proceeded to discuss the issue in regard to the legitimate
expectation of the employees. Under such heading, the Court observed that
where employees have continued to discharge their duties on contractual posts for
a considerable length of time, hence it was but natural that a legitimate
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expectation had arisen that the State would, at some stage, recognize their long
and continuous service. The Court observed that it is in this belief, bolstered by
repeated extensions granted by the Executive, that such employees continued in
service and refrained from seeking alternative employment, notwithstanding the
contractual nature of their engagement. The Court in such context referring to
the decision in Army Welfare Education Society vs. Sunil Kumar Sharma 12, held
that it was not difficult to comprehend the expectation with which such
contractual employees continue in the service of the State. More particularly the
repeated conduct of the employer-State in expressing confidence in their
performance and consistently granting monetary upgrades & tenure extensions
reasonably nurtures an expectation that their long and continuous service would
receive further recognition. The Supreme Court observed thus:-
“Legitimate Expectation of the employees: -
13. Another facet requiring consideration in the case of contractual employees,
such as the present appellants, is the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Where
employees have continued to discharge their duties on contractual posts for a
considerable length of time, as in the present case, it is but natural that a legitimate
expectation arises that the State would, at some stage, recognize their long and
continuous service. It is in this belief, bolstered by repeated extensions granted by the
Executive, that such employees continue in service and refrain from seeking alternative
employment, notwithstanding the contractual nature of their engagement. At this
juncture, it is thus apposite to advert to the principles governing the doctrine of
legitimate expectation as enunciated by this Court in Army Welfare Education Society
v. Sunil Kumar Sharma8, wherein it was held as follows: -
“63. A reading of the aforesaid decisions brings forth the following
features regarding the doctrine of legitimate expectation:
63.1. First, legitimate expectation must be based on a right as
opposed to a mere hope, wish or anticipation;
63.2. Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise either from an express or
implied promise; or a consistent past practice or custom followed by an
authority in its dealings;
.…
63.5.Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in the realm of public law, that
is, a plea of legitimate action can be taken only when a public authority
12
(2024) 16 SCC 598
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breaches a promise or deviates from a consistent past practice, without any
reasonable basis.
.…
64. The aforesaid features, although not exhaustive in nature, are sufficient
to help us in deciding the applicability of the doctrine of legitimate
expectation to the facts of the case at hand. It is clear that legitimate
expectation, jurisprudentially, was a device created in order to maintain a
check on arbitrariness in State action. It does not extend to and cannot
govern the operation of contracts between private parties, wherein the
doctrine of promissory estoppel holds the field.”
(emphasis laid)
It is, therefore, not difficult to comprehend the expectation with which
such contractual employees continue in the service of the State. The
repeated conduct of the employer-State in expressing confidence in their
performance and consistently granting monetary upgrades & tenure
extensions reasonably nurtures an expectation that their long and
continuous service would receive further recognition.
13.1. Another Constitution Bench in State of Karnataka v.
Umadevi9, cautioned that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot
ordinarily be extended to persons whose appointments are temporary,
casual or contractual in nature. The relevant extract of the judgment reads
as follows: -
“47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets
engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is
not based on a proper selection as recognised by the relevant rules
or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment
being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person
cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being
confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be
made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in
cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service
Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot
be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual
employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any
promise while engaging these persons either to continue them
where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot
constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the
theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made
permanent in the post.”
(emphasis laid)
However, this Court in Umadevi (supra) clarified that the bar against invocation
of the doctrine of legitimate expectation applies only to those temporary,
contractual or casual employees whose engagement was not preceded by a
proper selection process in accordance with the extant rules. Consequently,
where such engagement is made after following a due and lawful selection
procedure, there is no absolute bar in law preventing such employees from
invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation.
37.2 The Supreme Court thereafter examined the limits of perpetual
contractual engagements and, in the context of the respondent-State having
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engaged the appellants’ services against sanctioned posts since 2012, held that
such action was not only vitiated by arbitrariness but also constituted a clear
derogation from the equality principles enshrined in Article 14 of the
Constitution. It was observed that the respondent-State initially engaged the
appellants “in their youth” to discharge public duties and functions and having
rendered long and dedicated service, the appellants “cannot now be left to fend
for themselves”, particularly when the employment opportunities that may have
been available to them a decade ago are no longer accessible owing to age
constraints. The observations of the Supreme Court in such context are required
to be noted which read thus:-
“13.3. In our considered opinion, the aforesaid action is not only vitiated by
arbitrariness but is also in clear derogation of the equality principles
enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The respondent-State initially
engaged the appellants in their youth to discharge public duties and
functions. Having rendered long and dedicated service, the appellants
cannot now be left to fend for themselves, particularly when the
employment opportunities that may have been available to them a decade
ago are no longer accessible owing to age constraints.
13.4. We are unable to discern any rational basis for the respondent-State’s
decision to discontinue the appellants after nearly ten years of continuous
service. We are conscious that the symbiotic-relationship between the
appellants and the respondent-State was mutually beneficial, the State
derived the advantage of the appellants’ experience and institutional
familiarity, while the appellants remained in public service. In such
circumstances, any departure from a long-standing practice of renewal,
particularly one that frustrates the legitimate expectation of the employees,
ought to be supported by cogent reasons recorded in a speaking order.
13.5. Such a decision must necessarily be a conscious and reasoned one.
An employee who has satisfactorily discharged his duties over several years
and has been granted repeated extensions cannot, overnight, be treated as
surplus or undesirable. We are unable to accept the justification advanced by
the respondents as the obligation of the State, as a model employer, extends
to fair treatment of its employees irrespective of whether their engagement is
contractual or regular.
13.6. This Court has, on several occasions, deprecated the practice adopted
by States of engaging employees under the nominal labels of “part-time”,
“contractual” or “temporary” in perpetuity and thereby exploiting them by
not regularizing their positions. In Jaggo v. Union of India, this Court
underscored that government-departments must lead by example in
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ensuring fair and stable employment, and evolved the test of examining
whether the duties performed by such temporary employees are integral to
the day-to-day functioning of the organization.
13.7. In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam and Vinod Kumar v. Union of India,12
this Court cautioned against a mechanical and blind reliance on Umadevi
(supra) to deny regularization to temporary employees in the absence of
statutory rules. It was held that Umadevi (supra) cannot be employed as a
shield to legitimise exploitative engagements continued for years without
undertaking regular recruitment. The Court further clarified that Umadevi
itself draws a distinction between appointments that are “illegal” and those
that are merely “irregular”, the latter being amenable to regularization upon
fulfilment of the prescribed conditions.
13.8. In Dharam Singh v. State of U.P., this Court strongly deprecated the
culture of “ad-hocism” adopted by States in their capacity as employers. The
Court criticised the practice of outsourcing or informalizing recruitment as a
means to evade regular employment obligations, observing that such
measures perpetuate precarious working conditions while circumventing fair
and lawful engagement practices.
13.9. The State must remain conscious that part-time employees, such as
the appellants, constitute an integral part of the edifice upon which the
machinery of the State continues to function. They are not merely ancillary
to the system, but form essential components thereof. The equality mandate
of our Constitution, therefore, requires that their service be reciprocated in a
manner free from arbitrariness, ensuring that decisions of the State affecting
the careers and livelihood of such part-time and contractual employees are
guided by fairness and reason.
13.10. In the aforesaid backdrop, we are unable to persuade ourselves to
accept the respondent-State’s contention that the mere contractual
nomenclature of the appellants’ engagement denudes them of constitutional
protection. The State, having availed of the appellants’ services on
sanctioned posts for over a decade pursuant to a due process of selection and
having consistently acknowledged their satisfactory performance, cannot, in
the absence of cogent reasons or a speaking decision, abruptly discontinue
such engagement by taking refuge behind formal contractual clauses. Such
action is manifestly arbitrary, inconsistent with the obligation of the State to
act as a model employer, and fails to withstand scrutiny under Article 14 of
the Constitution.
37.3. Thus, laying down the aforesaid principles of law, the conclusion as
recorded by the Supreme Court in Bhola Nath (supra) is required to be noted
which reads thus:-
“FINAL CONCLUSION:
14. In light of our discussion, in the foregoing paragraphs, we
summarize our conclusions as follows:
I. The respondent-State was not justified in continuing the
appellants on sanctioned vacant posts for over a decade under the
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nomenclature of contractual engagement and thereafter denying
them consideration for regularization.
II. Abrupt discontinuance of such long-standing engagement
solely on the basis of contractual nomenclature, without either
recording cogent reasons or passing a speaking order, is manifestly
arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
III. Contractual stipulations purporting to bar claims for
regularization cannot override constitutional guarantees. Acceptance
of contractual terms does not amount to waiver of fundamental
rights, and contractual stipulations cannot immunize arbitrary State
action from constitutional scrutiny.
IV. The State, as a model employer, cannot rely on contractual
labels or mechanical application of Umadevi (supra) to justify
prolonged ad-hocism or to discard long-serving employees in a
manner inconsistent with fairness, dignity and constitutional
governance.
V. In view of the foregoing discussion, we direct the
respondent-State to forthwith regularize the services of all the
appellants against the sanctioned posts to which they were initially
appointed. The appellants shall be entitled to all consequential
service benefits accruing from the date of this judgment.”
(emphasis supplied)
39. Adverting to the aforesaid principles of law which in our considered
opinion are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, we may observe
that this is a case where the VVMC would not be justified in continuing the
petitioners in contractual employment for such long periods, particularly when
perennial work is available qua the said posts. It was also not appropriate in the
fact circumstances, for the State Government as well as the VVMC, to foist upon
the petitioners, a condition of undergoing an examination as a condition
precedent for the purpose of regularization. This particularly when such approach
was not adopted in respect of many other employees, not only of the VVMC but
also of the other municipal corporations, who came to be regularized without
being subjected to any such examination. A different yardstick cannot be applied
to the petitioners. In any event, no useful purpose would be served by insisting
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upon such an examination, inasmuch as the petitioners have been discharging the
duties of their respective posts for such a long period. They are duly qualified and
were appropriately appointed by following a proper procedure. There is no
dispute whatsoever in regard to the quality and standard of the services rendered
by them in the discharge of their public duties in the medical department of the
VVMC. It is also clear that, having discharged their duties on the said posts for
such a long period, the petitioners have acquired a legitimate expectation that
their long and continuous service would be recognized. Thus, it was incumbent
upon the VVMC to recognize the petitioners long and continuous service. It was
certainly not their expectation that their contractual appointments would
continue as if it is a permanent arrangement. Hence, as held by the Supreme
Court in Bholanath (supra), long and continuous service has created a legitimate
expectation in the petitioners to seek permanency of such employment. The
observations of the Supreme Court in Bholanath (supra) are aptly applicable,
inasmuch as, in the present case also, the petitioners were engaged in their youth
to discharge public duties and functions and have rendered long and dedicated
service. The petitioners cannot be now left to ‘fend for themselves’, particularly
when the employment opportunities which would otherwise have been available
to them a decade ago may no longer be available to them due to age constraints.
40. Thus, looked at from any angle, the petitioners could not have been left in
a state of ad-hocism, as held by the Supreme Court that too when perennial work
is available and all the standards applicable to public employment are met by the
petitioners. In this situation, the State and the VVMC would be acting contrary to
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the constitutional principles and the constitutional protections available to the
petitioners/contractual employees, if they fail to consider their regularization/
absorption.
41. We are, therefore, of the clear opinion that, having regard to the settled
principles of law, the State Government is required to step in and issue a directive
to all the municipal corporations to do away with long-term contractual
appointments and grant regularization in accordance with the principles of law
laid down by the Supreme Court in Jaggo (supra), Dharam Singh & Ors. (supra)
and Bholanath (supra).
42. We may further observe that creation of posts and filling up of vacancies in
the manner contemplated by the applicable rules ought to be the rule, while
contractual appointments for very short durations needs to be an exception.
However, we find that what has infected the system is the cultivation of such ad-
hocism, rather than the creation and maintenance of a robust and permanent
cadre of employees appointed as soon as vacancies arise and through the
prescribed procedure. Such ad-hocism, when maintained and cultivated for years
together by the public bodies/ the State Government/ the municipal corporations,
is, in fact, counterproductive to the smooth discharge of the vital functions
undertaken by such public bodies in achieving the welfare of the public at large. It
creates tremendous uncertainty for such contractual employees, who may
continue for years together in such employment, thereby causing them
considerable personal prejudice.
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43. We also cannot be oblivious to the fact that, in a large country like ours,
unemployment is one of the prime concerns of the State. No fault can be found
with citizens grabbing every possible opportunity of public employment,
including contractual, temporary and all kinds of public employment. If such
large workforce is available and that too possessing the requisite/desired
qualifications, talent and competence, we fail to understand as to what public
purpose would be served by not creating the appropriate sanctioned posts and
making regular appointments on such posts. This requires a robust vision to
assess the work requirements and staffing pattern and to formulate an appropriate
approach for creating permanent posts and filling up such posts, which needs to
be a continuous exercise. These vital functions of any State authority cannot be
entangled in red tape or bureaucratic lethargy. There is also no scope for any
extraneous considerations in such matters.
44. Having so observed, we hope that, in future, the VVMC as well as the
State Government would take appropriate steps to ensure that ad-hocism in
public employment consigned to history, particularly when the jurisprudence in
this regard is guided by the salutary principles of law laid down by the Supreme
Court in its recent decisions, as noted by us hereinabove. The law laid down by
the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India is the law of the
land (Lex terrae) and needs to be adhered to, in letter and spirit, by public
authorities and the State. Employees ought not to be required to knock at the
doors of the Court on account of such causes. A robust and comprehensive
policy, as a one time measure, is required to be adopted by the State Government
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as well as the municipal corporations from time to time. In the event employees
engaged on long-term contractual services fulfill all the essential requirements for
regularization against such posts, appropriate steps ought to be taken in
accordance with law.
(VIII) Concluding Paragraphs:
45. In the light of aforesaid discussion, the lead petition as also, the parties
being ad idem that the companion petitions having raised similar issues can also
be disposed of in terms of the lead petition, all these petitions are being disposed
of by the following order:
ORDER
(I) The impugned communication dated 21 January 2026 of the Urban
Development Department addressed to the Commissioner, Vasai Virar Municipal
Corporation, and the consequent impugned communication dated 28 January
2026 issued by the Deputy Commissioner (Medical Health), Vasai Virar
Municipal Corporation addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Legal
Department, Vasai Virar Municipal Corporaiton are quashed and set aside. As a
consequence thereto, it is held that the petitioners cannot be subjected to written
examination.
(II) The Writ Petitions are allowed by directing respondent No.1 – Vasai Virar
Municipal Corporation to absorb and regularize the petitioners by conferring
them permanency on the posts held by them on contractual basis.
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(III) The regularization orders be issued to the petitioners within a period of
two weeks from today.
46. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. No costs.
(AARTI SATHE, J.) (G. S. KULKARNI, J.)
Signed by: P.V.Rane Page 49 of 49
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 11/09/2026 22:21:00
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