Bombay High Court

VAISHALI DINESH MENEversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS

Decided: 7 October 2026
Disposal: Disposed Off

Holding

The Court held that the petitioner, being a woman offender, must be placed in Category 1(b) of the 2010 guidelines, entitling her to release after 20 years, and set aside the impugned order.

Summary

The petitioner, Vaishali Dinesh Mene, challenged an order that placed her in Category 2(c) of the 2010 Government Resolution, which prescribed a 26‑year term including remission for crimes against women. She argued that, as a woman offender, she should fall under the special Category 1(b) that provides a maximum of 20 years imprisonment. The Court examined the categorisation scheme, noting that Category 1 is a special provision for women offenders and overrides general categories. Relying on the Division Bench decision in Usha Munna Upadhyay v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held that the special category must apply and the more beneficial provision should be used. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside and the petitioner, having served over 25 years, was ordered to be released forthwith.

Issues considered

Whether a woman convicted of murder and offences under Section 498A IPC should be placed in Category 1(b) of the 2010 Government Resolution rather than Category 2(c).
Whether the special provision for women offenders under Category 1 overrides the general categorisation provisions.
Whether the petitioner is entitled to premature release after serving the period prescribed in the more beneficial category.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code — s. 302, 34, 498A

Subjects

women offenders
categorisation
premature release
government guidelines
Indian Penal Code
Section 302
Section 498A
special provision

Judgment

SUPRIYA
PRAMOD
JAWARE

Digitally signed
by SUPRIYA
PRAMOD
supriya 1 of 6 11-WP-4512-2026
JAWARE
Date:
2026.10.09
17:03:55 +0530

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 4512 OF 2026

Vaishali Dinesh Mene ..Petitioner
Versus
State Of Maharashtra and Ors. ..Respondents
__________

Ms. Ankita Naik for the Petitioner.
Ms. Gauri Rao, APP for the Respondent-State.
__________

CORAM : SARANG V. KOTWAL &
RANJITSINHA RAJA BHONSALE, JJ.

DATE : 7th OCTOBER 2026
PC :

1. Heard, Ms. Ankita Naik, learned Counsel for the

Petitioner and Ms. Gauri Rao, learned APP for the Respondent-

State.

2. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith, by consent of

the parties.

3. The Petitioner has challenged the Order dated 30 th July

2026 passed by the Respondent No.3-Home Department,

Mantralaya, Mumbai. Vide the impugned Order, the Petitioner was
2 of 6 11-WP-4512-2026

placed in Category 2(c) of Annexure I of the Government

Resolution dated 15th March 2010. According to that Category, she

has to complete 26 years of imprisonment, including remission.

4. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner

is that the Petitioner is wrongly placed in Category 2(c). In fact,

there is a separate Category for offences relating to crimes by

women in Category 1. At the highest, the case would fall within

Category 1(b) which provides for imprisonment of 20 years,

including remission. The learned Counsel relied on the Order

passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Writ Petition

No. 3701 of 2012 in the case of Usha Munna Upadhyay Vs. The

State of Maharashtra.

5. Learned APP, on the other hand, submitted that the

manner in which the offence was committed would invite Category

2(c) and the impugned Order is correct. Category 2(c) imposes

punishment of 26 years with remission.

6. We have considered these submissions. The

categorisation is given in Annexure I in the Government Resolution
3 of 6 11-WP-4512-2026

dated 15th March 2010. There is a separate category for offences

relating to crimes by women as Category (1). Category 1(b)

mentions that where the convict has committed the murder with

premeditation or by gang the period provided is 20 years.

7. The authorities have applied Category 2(c) which is

relating to offences of crime against women and minors. Category

2(c) lays down that where the crime is committed with exceptional

violence and/or with brutality, or death of victim due to burns

where the period of imprisonment is given as 26 years.

8. In the present case, the Petitioner was convicted by the

Additional Session Judge, Pune, in Special Case No. 676 of 2009

for commission of the offences punishable under Section 302 read

with 34 of IPC and under Section 498A of IPC. The allegations

were that the deceased was wife of the Petitioner’s husband’s

brother and, hence, she was the sister-in-law of the Petitioner. The

Petitioner and her mother-in-law committed murder of the

deceased and, therefore, both were convicted.

9. In this context, the observations of the Division Bench in
4 of 6 11-WP-4512-2026

the case of Usha Munna Upadyay are important. Paragraphs 17 to

21 reads thus :

17 The categorization in the guidelines is to be
harmoniously constructed. Assuming that the offence
committed by the petitioner falls in Category 6(a) of the
2010 guidelines because of the nature of the offence, still,
considering that the petitioner is a woman, the offence
committed by her, falls within Category 1 of the 2010
guidelines. The only question is what should prevail.
18 We find that the Category 1 is a special Category
relating to 'Crime by Women' which is divided in two sub
categories (a) and (b). The other categories are based on
the classification of offences, and not on the classification
of the offenders on the basis of gender. Thus, the provision
with respect to the offences committed by woman, is a
special Category and the other categories are general.
19 The categorization as 'Crime by Women' in Category 1,
indicates that so far as women offenders are concerned, the
applicability of other categories is ruled out. It is a settled
principle of interpretation of statutes and instruments,
that if a special provision is made on a certain matter,
that matter is excluded from general provision. This
principle is expressed in the maxims Generalia specialibus
non derogant, and Generalia specialibus derogant. Since, in
this case, a special provision has been made with respect
to the offences or crimes by women, the applicability of the
other provisions of a general nature to women offenders,
is excluded.
20 It is not possible to take any other view of the matter,
inasmuch as, if women offenders are attempted to be fitted in
other categories, the Category 1 would be rendered totally
and wholly redundant. For instance, the women offenders
falling under Category 1(a) can fall also in categories 2(a)
and 3(a) and the Women Offenders falling under Category
1(b) can fall in categories 2(b) and 3(b) etc. also. If women
offenders were to be placed in other categories, the separate
Category of women need not have been created at all.
21 In our opinion, Category 1 of the 2010 guidelines which
5 of 6 11-WP-4512-2026

is exclusively for women offenders must cover all the cases
of women offenders, and the women offenders can be
fitted only in that Category. Because of the creation of a
special Category of women offenders, the other categories
which are of a general nature, classified on the basis of
nature of offences, would not apply to women offenders.
Consequently, we hold that the order dated 4 September 2012
passed by the Government of Maharashtra placing the
petitioner in Category 5(b) of the 1992 guidelines and
Category 6(a) of the 2010 guidelines, is not proper and
that the petitioner may be placed in Category 1(b) of the
2010 guidelines for considering her premature release.

10. We are in respectful agreement with those observations

and, therefore, the Petitioner’s case would fall within Category

1(b). In any case, the more beneficial provision has to be applied

while placing a convict in a particular Category. Therefore, we find

substance in the submission of the learned Counsel for the

Petitioner that the Petitioner was required to be placed in Category

1(b) for which the period of imprisonment is given as 20 years

including remission.

11. The learned APP states that as on 30 th September 2026,

the Petitioner has completed 25 years, 8 months and 29 days of

imprisonment. In this view of the matter, the Petitioner will have

to be released forthwith. Hence, the following Order :
6 of 6 11-WP-4512-2026

ORDER

(i) The impugned Order dated 30th July 2026 passed by

Respondent No.3 is set aside.

(ii) The Petitioner be released forthwith, if not required

in any other case.

(iii) The Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms.

(RANJITSINHA RAJA BHONSALE, J.) (SARANG V. KOTWAL, J.)

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