Bombay High Court

DR. GANESH HARIBHAU HOLversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER

Disposal: Disposed Off

Holding

The petition is allowed and the FIR and charge‑sheet are quashed as the prosecution failed to establish the ingredients of Sections 69 and 351(3) of the BNS.

Summary

Dr. Ganesh Haribhau Hol filed a writ petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashment of FIR No. 216 of 2025 and the charge‑sheet filed for alleged offences under Sections 69 and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The petitioner argued that the sexual relationship with the complainant was consensual, that no false promise of marriage was made, and that the delay of more than two years in filing the FIR was unexplained and prejudicial to his case. The respondents contended that the petitioner deceived the complainant by promising marriage, threatened her and her children, and that the delay was justified. The Court examined the chat records, statements under Sections 183 and 180 of the BNSS, and relevant Supreme Court precedents, finding no material to prove deceit or threat and noting the unexplained delay. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution lacked basis to sustain the FIR and charge‑sheet and quashed both, allowing the petition.

Issues considered

Whether the petitioner’s sexual intercourse with the complainant was carried out by deceitful means or a false promise of marriage attracting Section 69 of the BNS.
Whether the petitioner threatened to kill the complainant or her children, thereby attracting Section 351(3) of the BNS.
Whether the delay of more than two years in lodging the FIR is fatal to the prosecution’s case.
Whether the petitioner is entitled to quash the FIR and charge‑sheet under Section 528 of the BNSS.

Legislation cited

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — s. 180, 183, 528
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — s. 351(3), 69

Subjects

false promise of marriage
sexual assault
Section 69 BNS
Section 351(3) BNS
quash FIR
delay in filing FIR
consent
deceit
criminal procedure
Section 528 BNSS

Judgment

901-WP-4523-2025.odt

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 4523 OF 2025

1) Dr. Ganesh Haribhau Hol ]
Age: 45 years, Occupation: Doctor, ]
R/a. Sultanwadi Road, Koregaon, District: ]
Satara. ] … Petitioner
Digitally
signed by
TALLE
TALLE SHUBHAM
SHUBHAM ASHOKRAO VERSUS
ASHOKRAO Date:
2026.09.09
18:02:33
+0530

1) The State of Maharashtra ]
through P. I. Koregaon Police Station, ]
in C. R. No. 727/2025 ]

2) Mrs. ABC ]
Complainant. ]
… Respondents.

...
Mr. Rajvardhan Ghadge, Advocate for Petitioner.

Mrs. Priyanka S. Rane, A.P.P. for Respondent No. 1-State.

Adv. Ramnik Pawar a/w Adv. Parvej N. Nadaf, Adv. Dinesh Sonarlikar and
Adv. Abid Sayyad, Advocate for Respondent No. 2.
...

CORAM : ABHAY J. MANTRI, J.
DATE : SEPTEMBER 4, 2026
ORAL JUDGMENT :

1. The Petitioner has invoked Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “BNSS”) to quash First Information

Report bearing Crime No. 216 of 2025 (dated 23 rd July, 2025) registered with

Shubham Page 1 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

Koregaon Police Station, District Satara, for short, “FIR”) for the offences

punishable under Sections 69 and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,

2023 (for short, “BNS”) and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom

qua the Petitioner.

2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally with the

consent of the learned Advocates for the respective parties. I have perused

the record, and more particularly the F.I.R., the statements of the Victim

under Section 183 of the BNSS, and the record as pointed out by the learned

Advocates for the respective parties.

3. On 23rd July, 2025, Respondent No. 2/Victim lodged the report

against the Petitioner, alleging that, under the false promise of marriage, the

Petitioner had committed repeated sexual assault on her from 17 th January,

2019 to September, 2024. He also threatened to kill her and her children.

4. The husband of Respondent No. 2 died in an accident in 2011.

She had one son, who was studying in the final year of B.E., and a daughter

who was studying in 11th Standard Science at the time of filing of the

Complaint. The Petitioner is married and has a wife and son.

5. The Petitioner as well as Respondent No. 2 are B.A.M.S.

doctors. They have known each other since 2013, when Respondent No. 2

called him to take prasad at the Satyanarayan Puja.

Shubham Page 2 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

6. Since the Satyanarayan Puja, the Petitioner as well as

Respondent No. 2 had been in touch with each other. They made calls,

chatted, and sent messages on their mobile phones. It is further alleged in the

FIR as well as the statement under Section 183 of the BNSS that, on 17th

January, 2019, for the first time, they had sexual relations. Thereafter, the

relationship continued till June, 2023, at various places, such as the house of

the Petitioner, Respondent No. 2, Hotel at Vita, Dist. Sangli, at Agrotourism,

Wathar, Taluka Koregaon, Pickock Hotel, Panchgani, District Satara, etc.

7. It is further alleged that the Petitioner told her that he would

divorce his wife and would marry her, and under the pretext of the same, he

had established a physical relationship with her between January 2019 and

June 2023.

8. Based on the said complaint, an offence came to be registered

vide Crime No. 216 of 2025 at Koregaon Police Station, District Satara.

Being dissatisfied with the same, the Petitioner has invoked the inherent

jurisdiction of this Court to quash and set aside the same.

9. Learned APP, on instructions from the Investigating Officer,

submitted that during the pendency of the Petition, a charge-sheet has been

filed against the Petitioner before the learned Trial Court. Her statement is

accepted.

Shubham Page 3 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

10. Learned Advocate for the Petitioner has vehemently contended

that the physical relationship between the Petitioner and Respondent No. 2

was consensual and, to demonstrate the same, he has taken me through the

FIR, the statement of the Informant recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS

and part of the chats/messages on record (page nos. 197 to 199) and

canvassed that the Petitioner never stated to the Victim that he would divorce

his first wife and marry her. Therefore, the question of establishing a physical

relationship with Respondent No. 2 under the false pretext of marriage does

not arise. As such, he urged that the ingredients of Sections 69 and 351(3) of

the BNS are not attracted against him.

11. He further submitted that since 2001, the Petitioner and

Respondent No. 2 have been known to each other. In support of his

submission, he has shown the photographs of his marriage (page no. 59) and

submitted that she, along with her husband and child, attended his marriage.

In response, the learned Advocate for Respondent No. 2 does not dispute the

said contention but admits it. The said fact itself indicates that, since 2001,

the Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 have known each other, and not for the

first time in 2013, as alleged. Therefore, he urged that the Petitioner has

made out a prima facie case to invoke Section 528 of the BNSS to quash the

FIR and the filing of the charge-sheet pursuant to the said FIR. However, he

has not specifically prayed for quashing and setting aside the charge-sheet.

Shubham Page 4 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

12. Lastly, the learned Advocate for the Petitioner argued that,

according to the allegations in the complaint as well as the statement under

Section 183 of the BNSS, the sexual relationship between Petitioner and

Respondent No. 2 came to an end in June 2023, and thereafter a dispute was

going on between them till September, 2024. However, the FIR was lodged

on 23rd July, 2025, i.e., two years after the end of their relationship and ten

months after the dispute arose between them, and Respondent No. 2 has not

explained the delay in lodging the FIR.

13. To buttress his submissions, he has relied upon the Judgments of

the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:

i) Sheikh Arif vs. The State of Maharashtra1 (for short “Sheikh Arif”)
(para Nos. 7 and 9),
ii) Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. The State of Maharashtra2 (for short
“Pramod”) (para no. 18),
iii) Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi 3 (for short “Prashant”) (para nos.
17 to 19),
iv) Rajnish Singh @ Soni vs. State of U. P. and another 4 (for short
“Rajnish”) (para nos. 25, 26 and 36) and
v) Uday vs. State of Karnataka5 (for short “Uday”) page no. 10 (as no
paragraphs have been numbered).

14. He therefore submitted that the facts in the case in hand and in

those Judgments are identical and, therefore, the dictum laid down in those

1 [2024 INSC 70]
2 [AIR 2019 SC 4010]
3 [2024 INSC 879]
4 [ (2025) 3 S.C.R. 303]
5 [AIR 2003 SC 1639]
Shubham Page 5 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

Judgments is squarely applicable to the case in hand. Moreover, it is

impossible to accept that Respondent No. 2 allowed the physical relationship

to be maintained between 2019 and 2023 on the basis of a false promise to

marry her and, therefore, the ingredients of Sections 69 and 351(3) of the

BNS are not attracted. As such, he urged that the Petition be allowed.

15. Per contra, learned Advocate for Respondent No. 2 and learned

APP for Respondent No. 1-State strenuously oppose the Petition and argue

that the Petitioner had established a physical relationship with Respondent

No. 2 under the false pretext of marriage, and to substantiate their

contentions they took me through the FIR as well as the statement of the

Victim under Section 183 of the BNSS. As such, they advanced their

argument that, in view of the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Anurag Soni vs. State of Chhattisgarh6 (for short “Anurag”), it cannot be said

that the consent given by Respondent No. 2 was on a misconception of facts.

Still, the allegations made in the Complaint attract the ingredients of Sections

69 and 351(3) of the BNS.

16. In support of their submissions, they have relied on the

Judgment of Anurag (supra) and drawn my attention to paragraph Nos. 12, 17

and 19 and submitted that, in view of the law laid down in the above

Judgment, the Petitioner has failed to make out a case to invoke the inherent

jurisdiction of this Court.
6 (2019) 13 SCC 1
Shubham Page 6 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

17. On the point of delay, they have contended that the Petitioner

has categorically explained the cause of delay in filing the FIR belatedly in

the last paragraph of the FIR and, therefore, it cannot be said that there was a

delay in lodging the FIR.

18. Learned Advocate for Respondent No. 2 further submitted that,

assuming that there is a delay, it would not be fatal to the case of the

prosecution on the said ground in a case involving sexual assault and,

therefore, submitted that the delay would not affect the case of the

prosecution.

19. Finally, they submitted that, to ascertain the discrepancy in the

statement of Respondent No. 2 and the available chats/messages on record, a

detailed trial is required, and, at this stage, the said controversy cannot be

determined and, therefore, they urged for dismissal of the Petition.

20. Having heard the rival contentions of the learned Advocates for

the respective parties and gone through the record as pointed out by them, at

the outset, prima facie, it appears that there is a discrepancy in the FIR as

well as the statement of Respondent No. 2 recorded under Section 183 of the

BNSS, as well as in the supplementary statement recorded under Section 180

of the BNSS.

Shubham Page 7 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

21. I would like to reproduce the undisputed facts of the case as

under.

22. The Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 have known and are well

acquainted with each other since 2001. Respondent No. 2 attended the

marriage of the Petitioner in the year 2001 along with her husband and child.

In the year 2011, the husband of Respondent No. 2 died in an accident. In

2013, Respondent No. 2 performed a Satyanarayan Puja at her house and

called doctors in Koregaon City, including the Petitioner.

23. It is also undisputed that after the Satyanarayan Puja, the

Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 were in touch on their mobile phones as

well as through calls, chats and messages till 2019. It also came on record

from the statement recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS of Respondent

No. 2 that they have also performed Abhishek in the Mahadev temple and

celebrated festivals together.

24. On 17th January, 2019, for the first time, they had a sexual

relationship at the house of the Petitioner. Thereafter, the same continued at

various places, as referred to above, till June, 2023. Then their cordial

relationship became strained. Therefore, between June 2023 and September

2024, a dispute arose between them. From September, 2024 till the filing of

the FIR on 23rd July, 2025, they were neither in touch with each other nor did
Shubham Page 8 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

Respondent No. 2 lodge the complaint against the Petitioner immediately

thereafter. However, Respondent No. 2 lodged the report afterwards.

25. The aforesaid facts categorically indicate that the Petitioner and

Respondent No. 2 have known each other since 2001, were in contact from

2013, and developed a close relationship and started meeting with each other

frequently. Then, between 17th January, 2019 and June, 2023, they

established sexual relations multiple times. Nowhere in the statements has

she alleged that the Petitioner forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her,

or that he threatened her or, under fear, pressure, or continued deceit,

committed sexual intercourse with her, but the averment in the FIR as well as

the statement under Section 183 of the BNSS, prima facie, indicates that their

relationship was consensual.

26. Mere allegations in the FIR or the statement under Section 183

of the BNS, without any corroborative material or conversation from the

chats being produced on record along with the charge-sheet, to demonstrate

that the Petitioner, under the false promise of marriage, established a physical

relationship with her.

27. It would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant part of the chat

page nos. 197 to 199 as under:

Shubham Page 9 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

Shubham Page 10 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

Shubham Page 11 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

28. The above chats produced on record indicate that the Petitioner

never stated to her that he would marry her. But they had jointly searched for

a marriage proposal for Respondent No. 2. Similarly, the chat at page no.

199, on a bare perusal thereof, indicates that Respondent No. 2 chatted with

him that he might reside with his wife, but she wanted him.

Shubham Page 12 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

29. It is worth noting that Respondent No. 2 is a B.A.M.S. doctor,

49 years old, and has one son who had completed engineering and one

daughter who was pursuing her education in science. Likewise, the Petitioner

is married and has a wife and son. Respondent No. 2 was aware of the said

fact. Despite the said fact, she had established sexual/physical relations with

him between January, 2019 and June, 2023 for quite a long period, i.e., more

than four years.

30. Though Respondent No. 2 alleged that, under the false promise

of marriage, the Petitioner had established physical relations with her, except

for mere vague words in the FIR and statements, no material or documents

have been produced on record to substantiate her allegations in the FIR.

Therefore, prima facie, her allegations appear to be fallacious.

31. Apart from that, it is pertinent to note that Respondent No. 2 is a

well-educated lady and was a major and was aware of the consequences of

the relationships/act done by her. Despite this, she established a physical

relationship with the Petitioner. In such an eventuality, it cannot be said that

she was not aware of the consequences of establishing a physical relationship

with a married person without marrying him. Therefore, it is unreliable to

accept that Respondent No. 2 allowed the physical relationship to be

maintained with the Petitioner from January, 2019 to June, 2023 under the

pretext of a false promise of marriage.

Shubham Page 13 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

32. Turning to the question of delay regarding the lodging of the

FIR, it is evident from the FIR and statement under Section 183 of the BNSS

that since June, 2023, they had neither a physical relationship nor, from

September, 2024, were they in any contact with each other. However,

between June, 2023 and September, 2024, some dispute arose between them

as alleged therein. Thereafter, until July, 2025, Respondent No. 2 did not file

any complaint against the Petitioner but remained silent. No convincing

reason has been stated in the FIR. In the FIR, though she has alleged that the

Petitioner frequently avoided her and quarrelled with her, he threatened to

kill her and her children and, therefore, the delay occurred in lodging the

FIR. However, she has not filed a single complaint regarding the quarrels

between them from June, 2023 to September, 2024, or regarding the alleged

threat by the Petitioner, until filing this complaint.

33. Had it been the fact that the Petitioner had threatened her, then

certainly she would have filed a complaint in the police station against him,

but the non-filing of the complaint leads to draw an adverse inference against

her and creates a doubt about the allegations made in the FIR in that regard.

Therefore, prima facie, I find substance in the argument advanced by the

learned Advocate for the Petitioner that Respondent No. 2 failed to explain

the delay caused in lodging the FIR.

Shubham Page 14 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

34. In light of the above facts and discussions, a short but crucial

question which arises for consideration is “whether the Petitioner had sexual

intercourse with Respondent No. 2 by employing deceitful means or a false

promise to marry without any intention of fulfilling the same from its very

inception?”

35. While dealing with the aforesaid question, it is relevant to

reproduce Section 69 of BNS as under:-

“69. Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means, etc. -
Whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry
to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, has
sexual intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not
amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.- “deceitful means” shall include
inducement for, or false promise of employment or
promotion, or marrying by suppressing identity.

36. The above section provides that if any person, by deceitful

means or by making a false promise to marry a woman without any intention

of fulfilling the same, including inducement, makes a false promise of

marrying by suppressing identity, and has sexual intercourse with her, it would

constitute an offence under section 69 of the BNS. Section 69 punishes

deceit, and not disappointment.

37. The legislature, considering the change in the scenario of

society, has introduced and incorporated this new section in the BNS, which

Shubham Page 15 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

is an exception carved out to the offence of rape and is distinguished from the

definition of rape. While dealing with this, the Court has to appraise the

following factors:

(a) Whether the promise of marriage was false from its very

inception

(b) Whether objective evidence “chats, messages, photos” supports

the claim of the alleged victim.

38. After considering the above ingredients of Section 69 of BNS, it

would reveal that the object of the legislature is to punish deceit and not

disappointment. Moreover, every romantic failure cannot be painted as

deceit. To prove the guilt of the accused for the offence punishable under

Section 69 of BNS, the prosecution must establish that the promise was false

from the very inception; otherwise, the offence would not be made out. Apart

from this, this Court has to ensure that criminal law remains a shield against

fraud and not a weapon for settling personal disputes over failure of

relationship. If the relationship and acts of the Petitioner and Respondent No.

2 were consensual and voluntary, and showed that they were in a relationship

devoid of any coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation, then no offence under

Section 69 of BNS would be made out.

Shubham Page 16 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

39. To attract the ingredients of Section 69 of the BNS, the material

on record prima facie demonstrates that the man can convince a woman into

having sexual intercourse or he induces a woman to have sexual intercourse

by either making a false promise of marriage which had to take place on a

future date or false promise of marriage by suppressing identity.

40. In the case at hand, no material is produced on record to prima

facie demonstrate that the Petitioner was able to convince Respondent No. 2

into having sexual intercourse by deceitful means, or he induced her to have

sexual intercourse by either making a false promise of marriage since

inception which had to take place on a future date or false promise of

marriage by suppressing identity or as contemplated in Section 69.

41. In addition, I would like to refer to and reproduce paragraph nos.

21 to 26, 28, 31 and 37 of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

in Samadhan S/o Sitaram Manmothe vs. State of Maharashtra and another 7 (for

short “Samadhan”). Paragraph nos. 21 to 26, 28, 31 and 37 read as under:

“21. Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC provides for enhanced
punishment in cases where rape is committed repeatedly
on the same woman. It mandates rigorous imprisonment
for a term of not less than ten years, which may extend to
life imprisonment for the remainder of the person's
natural life. The object of this provision is to address
aggravated instances of sexual assault where the offence
is not a single incident but has occurred repeatedly on the
same victim. The expression “repeatedly” employed in
the provision is of significance. It contemplates more than
one act of sexual assault, committed at different points in
7 2025 INSC 1351
Shubham Page 17 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

time on the same victim. Courts have consistently
interpreted this phrase to mean a series of acts that are
separate in nature and not a continuation of a single
transaction.
22. In genuine cases under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, the
pattern is usually unmistakable; it is an initial act of
sexual assault, followed by multiple acts under fear,
pressure, captivity, or continued deceit, often when the
woman is rendered vulnerable and unable to escape the
situation.
23. In the present case, a bare perusal of the FIR and the
statement on record reveals that respondent No.2 met the
appellant, who is a practising advocate, for the first time
in reference to a case which was instituted by respondent
No.2 against her husband. Thereafter, they exchanged
numbers and kept in touch regularly. Over a passage of
time, respondent No.2 and the appellant developed a
close relationship and started meeting each other
frequently. During this time, they established sexual
relations multiple times between 12.03.2022 to
20.05.2024. The appellant contends that during the
course of their relationship, not once did respondent No.2
file a complaint regarding the alleged non-consensual
sexual relations, and it is inconceivable that the appellant
would force himself upon her for so many years without
there being any protest or complaint from the side of
respondent No.2. Notably, it was only in August of 2024
when the appellant refused to fulfil respondent No.2’s
demand of payment of Rs.1,50,000/- that the instant
criminal case came to be instituted against the appellant.
24. Another question which arises for consideration is whether
the appellant engaged in physical relationship with
respondent No.2 based on a deception or a false promise to
marry.
25. The allegation of rape in the present case hinges entirely on
respondent No.2’s claim that appellant established physical
relations with her on false pretext of marriage. It is alleged
by the appellant that respondent No.2 opposed the idea of
marriage whenever the appellant broached the said idea;
however, the appellant kept on insisting possibly this was
because her first marriage was in subsistence. It is,
however, not clear as to why, despite being opposed to the
Shubham Page 18 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

idea of marriage, respondent No.2 continued to meet the
appellant and indulged in physical relations with him
even though she was already married.

26. The FIR in the present case also states that in September
2022, when respondent No. 2 found out that she was
pregnant with the appellant’s child, she told the appellant,
“You live your life, and I will live my life”. At that time,
the appellant again assured her that they would get
married and asked for some time from respondent No. 2,
to which she refused. However, despite her refusal to be
with the appellant, respondent No.2 continued to meet
him at Hotel Citizen and engaged in physical relations
with him.

xxx

28. We find that the present case is not a case where the
appellant lured respondent No.2 solely for physical
pleasures and then vanished. The relationship continued
for a period of three long years, which is a considerable
period of time. They remained close and emotionally
involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred
during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be
retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape
merely because the relationship failed to culminate in
marriage.

x
xx
xxx

31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in which,
in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage
holds deep social and cultural significance. It is,
therefore, not uncommon for a woman to repose complete
faith in her partner and to consent to physical intimacy on
the assurance that such a relationship would culminate in
a lawful and socially recognised marriage. In such
Shubham Page 19 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

circumstances, the promise of marriage becomes the very
foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather
than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent
may stand vitiated where it is established that the promise
of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no
genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the
woman. The law must remain sensitive to such genuine
cases where trust has been breached, and dignity
violated, lest the protective scope of Section 376 of the
IPC be reduced to a mere formality for those truly
aggrieved. At the same time, the invocation of this
principle must rest upon credible evidence and concrete
facts, and not on unsubstantiated allegations or moral
conjecture.

x
xx
xxx

37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to
appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question itself
reveals that the relationship between the parties was, in fact,
consensual, inasmuch as respondent No. 2 met the appellant
whenever he expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore,
respondent No. 2, being a major and an educated
individual, voluntarily associated with the appellant and
entered into physical intimacy of her own volition. It is
also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the
marriage of respondent No. 2 was subsisting. In light of
the foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of
the material on record, it is manifest that the relationship
between the parties was consensual, and therefore, the
absence of an express statement to that effect in the memo
of application, as emphasised in the impugned order,
cannot be held against the appellant when the same can
be otherwise clearly discerned.

Shubham Page 20 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

42. Bare perusal of the above observations, prima facie, makes it

clear that the facts in the case at hand and in the aforesaid Judgment are

identical and, therefore, the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

the above Judgment is squarely applicable to the case at hand.

43. The next point argued by learned Advocate for Respondent No.

2 and learned APP is that the facts in the case in hand and the facts in Anurag

(supra) are identical and, therefore, the mandate laid down in the said case is

squarely applicable to the case at hand. They have drawn my attention to

paragraph Nos. 12, 17 and 19 of the said Judgment.

44. On perusal of the said Judgment, it reveals that the Petitioner

and Victim therein were unmarried and knew each other. They were in a love

affair. The Petitioner therein was a Junior Doctor in a Government Hospital,

and the Victim was studying Pharmacy in Bhilai. Apart from that, their

family members were also aware of their relationship. In the said case, it was

alleged that the Petitioner or Accused therein allured the Victim with a

promise to marry and had physical relations with her. They had physical

relations thrice between 29th April, 2013 and 30th April, 2013. Then the

Victim informed her family members about the said incident on 6th May,

2013, and then some social functions were scheduled between them till 30 th

May, 2013 and 20th June, 2013 regarding their marriage. Still, the same did

not take place and, therefore, on 21st June, 2013, the Victim lodged the FIR,

Shubham Page 21 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

i.e., immediately after the said incident, and no delay occurred. However, in

the case at hand, both are B.A.M.S. doctors and are married to their

respective spouses. The Victim is 49 years old and has two children.

Similarly, the Petitioner is married and has a wife and son. Respondent No. 2

was aware of these facts since 2001. From June 2023 to 23rd July, 2025, no

complaint was lodged, nor was any delay of more than 24 months explained;

therefore, the facts in Anurag (supra) and the case at hand cannot be said to

be identical; rather, they are quite different. Accordingly, the mandate laid

down therein does not apply to the case at hand.

45. Besides, it is to be noted that in Sheikh Arif (supra), the facts

were that the victim made allegations that, in the year 2012, by giving a false

promise of marriage, the accused therein had sexual intercourse with her on a

number of occasions. The victim was pregnant, so an abortion was done.

Even thereafter, their physical relationship continued. Then engagement took

place between them. Even after the engagement, their physical relationship

continued, and she was pregnant. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after

considering the Judgment in Anurag (supra), in paragraph nos. 7 and 9

categorically held that “it is impossible to accept that the Victim/Respondent

No. 2 therein allowed the physical relationship to be maintained with her

from 2013 to 2017 on the basis of false promise to marry.”

Shubham Page 22 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

46. In the said case, the Accused and Victim therein were in a

physical relationship from February, 2013 to December, 2017. Both were

majors, and after considering the same, the Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed

and set aside the Judgment of the High Court as well as the FIR, and the

filing of the charge-sheet pursuant to the said FIR was also quashed.

47. In view of the above also, the law laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Anurag (supra) is hardly of any assistance to

Respondent No. 2 in support of her contentions.

48. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the above-said judgments,

considered the facts which are a little bit similar to the facts in the case at

hand. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after considering the material before it,

has categorically observed that the relationship between the parties was

consensual in nature. A mere breakup of a relationship between a consenting

couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings.

49. In Pramod (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph no.

18, reads as under:

“18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the
above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to
Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned
deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish
whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of
fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions
must be established. The promise of marriage has been a
false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of
being adhered to at the time it was given. The false
Shubham Page 23 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a
direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the
sexual act.”
50. In Rajnish (supra), after considering the various Judgments of

the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that “it is difficult to hold that sexual

intercourse in the course of a relationship which has continued for eight

years, as “rape”, especially in the face of the complainant’s own allegation

that they lived together as husband and wife, is sufficient to conclude that

there was never an element of force or deceit in the relationship.” The facts

in the case in hand are squarely covered by the dictum laid down in the above

Judgment.

51. In the wake of the above discussion and having gone through the

record, I do not find substance in the argument advanced by the learned

Advocate for Respondent No. 2 and learned APP that, since inception, the

intention of the Petitioner was fraudulent and, therefore, without obtaining

the consent of the Victim or by obtaining her consent under the false pretext

of marriage, he had committed repeated sexual intercourse with her. On the

contrary, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sheikh Arif (supra), it is

impossible to accept that Respondent No. 2 allowed the physical relationship

to be maintained with her between January, 2019 and June, 2023 on the basis

of a false promise to marry. But, as held by the Supreme Court in Samadhan

(supra), from the facts gathered above, it can be inferred that Respondent No.

2, being a 49-year-old lady and educated, voluntarily associated with the
Shubham Page 24 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

Petitioner and entered into physical intimacy of her own volition. It is also

pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the marriage of the Petitioner was

subsisting.

52. In the light of the foregoing circumstances, even upon a perusal

of the material on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the

parties was cordial and also consensual in nature and, therefore, the absence

of the express statement to that effect in the FIR, as emphasised by the

learned Advocate for Respondent No. 2 and learned APP for Respondent No.

1-State, cannot be held against the Petitioner when the same can otherwise be

clearly discerned. That being so, it can be inferred that the physical

relationship between the Petitioner and Respondent No.2 was consensual and

voluntary. The relationship was devoid of any coercion, fraud or

misrepresentation. The prosecution prima facie failed to point out that the

Petitioner, under a false promise to marry, had sexual intercourse with the

Respondent No. 2, or that the false promise of marriage was from its very

inception to deceive the victim. Likewise, objective evidence, i.e., “chats,

messages, photos,” does not support the victim's allegations. As such, I am of

the considered view that the material which has been produced on record

definitely was not to the extent that there was a false promise of marriage or

deceitful means from the side of the present Petitioner to have sexual

intercourse with Respondent No. 2. Hence I answer question in the negative.

Shubham Page 25 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

53. Furthermore, despite granting an opportunity to the learned

Advocate for Respondent No. 2 and learned APP, except for mere allegations

in the FIR and statement under Section 183, they have failed to point out any

other material to support the said allegations which would constitute the

ingredients of Sections 69 and 351(3) of the BNS so as to involve the

Petitioner in the present crime.

54. Though learned APP tried to argue on the observations made in

the medical certificate, in view of the facts as referred above, the medical

certificates are hardly of any assistance to the prosecution, as since June,

2023, the Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 were not in a physical relationship

with each other. Moreover, Respondent No. 2 is a married lady having two

children. Thus, the said medical certificate is not helpful to the prosecution in

support of its case.

55. In regard to constituting an offence under Section 351(3), except

for mere vague and general allegations in the FIR, no material is produced on

record to demonstrate that the Petitioner threatened to kill her and her

children.

A mere breakup of the relationship between them cannot result in the

initiation of criminal proceedings, when she has not filed a single complaint

regarding the alleged threat by the Petitioner until filing this complaint.

Shubham Page 26 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

56. Had it been the fact that the Petitioner had threatened her, then

certainly she would have filed a complaint in the police station against him.

Still, the non-filing of the complaint leads to draw an adverse inference

against her and creates a doubt about the allegations made in the FIR in that

regard. Thus, it cannot be said that the ingredients of Section 351(3) would

be attracted.

57. To sum up, the above discussion reveals that the Petitioner has

made out a case to invoke the inherent powers of this Court under Section

528 of the BNSS to quash the FIR bearing Crime No. 216 of 2025 (dated 23 rd

July, 2025) registered with Koregaon Police Station, District Satara, for the

offences punishable under Sections 69 and 351(3) of the BNS and the filing

of the charge-sheet pursuant to the same in the Trial Court. Thus, in my view,

continuing the prosecution in the present case will be a gross abuse of the

process of Law. Therefore, no purpose will be served by continuing the

prosecution.

58. Consequently, the Petition is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a).

59. Accordingly, I hereby quash and set aside FIR bearing Crime

No. 216 of 2025 (dated 23rd July, 2025) registered with Koregaon Police

Station, District Satara, for the offences punishable under Sections 69 and

351(3) of the BNS, and the filing of Regular Criminal Case No. 204 of 2025

in connection with the said FIR is quashed and set aside.
Shubham Page 27 of 28
901-WP-4523-2025.odt

60. The Rule is made absolute in the above terms. No order as to

costs.

61. Inform the concerned Court accordingly.

(ABHAY J. MANTRI, J.)

Shubham Page 28 of 28

Continue reading with your account

Checking your session…