TUKARAM HARI PATIL.versusTHE COMMISSIONER (REVENUE ) and OTHERS.

2026:BHC-AUG:40056
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                      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                 BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                              WRIT PETITION NO.4685 OF 1996
                            WITH CA/4938/2025 IN WP/4685/1996

                Tukaram Hari Patil
                Adult, Occu. Agri.,
                R/o. Mohide, Taluka Taloda,
                District Dhule                             ..   Petitioner

                           Versus

                1.   The Commissioner (Revenue)
                     Nashik Division, Nashik

                2.   Ramsingh Bula Bhil,
                     Adult, Occu. Agri.,
                     R/o. Gunjali, Taluka Taloda,
                     District Dhule

                3.   Shankar Rajaram Thakare
                     Adule, Occu. Agril.,
                     R/o. Bordhan, Taluka Taloda,
                     District Dhule

                4.   Tanya Soma Taya Bhil,
                     Adult, Occu. Agril.,
                     R/o. Gunjali, Taluka Taloda,
                     District Dhule                        ..   Respondents

                Mr. S. P. Shah, Advocate for Petitioner;
                Mr. P. P. Dawalkar, A.G.P. for Respondent No.1
                Writ petition is dismissed against Respondent No.4


                                          CORAM :        SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.
                                          DATE       :   02-09-2026
                PER COURT:-


                1.   The petitioner has questioned the legality and validity of the

                show-cause notice/order dated 13.08.1996, issued by respondent

                No. 1 - the Commissioner (Revenue), Nashik Division, Nashik.
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2.       The agricultural land in question originally belonged to a

tribal    person    respondent    No.   1's   predecessor-in-title.    On

23.03.1967, in relation to the land, a registered sale deed was

executed in favour of respondent No. 3, who further transferred

the land to the petitioner on 31.03.1969. Thereafter, the petitioner

has effected exchange of the land in favour of respondent No. 4.


3.       Initially, the proceedings were initiated under the provisions

of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act,

1974 (for short, “Act of 1974”). The Collector, in Tribal Case No.

134 of 1976, declined to invalidate the transfer under Section 3 of

the Act. The said decision was further subjected to the revision by

the Divisional Commissioner confirmed the Collector's decision via

an order dated 07.08.1987, endorsing the order of the Collector.


4.       However, respondent No. 1 sought to reopen the concluded

issue invoking suo motu revisional powers under Section 7 of the

Act, issuing the impugned notice dated 13.08.1996, almost nine

years after the initial revisional order.


5.       Mr. Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that

having once suffered adjudication which concluded in the year

1976 same stood confirmed by the Divisional Commissioner in the

year 1987.      As such, it was not open for respondent No. 1 to

review its own order after an inordinate delay of nine years. The

learned counsel emphasis that the proviso to Section 7 of the Act
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prescribes a strict limitation period of three years. Further submits

that this issue is no longer res integra in light of the Division Bench

verdicts of this Court in Writ Petition No. 483 of 2012 and Letters

Patent Appeal No. 22 of 2001.


6.    Addressing the issue of abatement, Mr. Shah, the learned

counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of

this Court in Indu Shiv Verma v. Mahesh Parekh and Others

[2025 SCC OnLine Bom 4247]. He contends that the interest of

the   private    respondents   is    adequately      protected     and   well

represented by the respondent-authorities, who does not have a

conflict interest.


7.    Per contra, the learned Assistant Government Pleader has

supported the action under challenge, contending that since the

transaction violates Section 3 of the Act, the Commissioner was

justified in exercising suo motu powers under Section 7 of the Act.

It is contended that the impugned notice does not suffer from

jurisdictional   overreach.    The       learned   A.G.P.   also   raised    a

preliminary objection that since no steps were taken to bring the

legal representatives of the deceased tribal respondent on record,

the writ petition stands abated, as such, is liable to be dismissed.


8.    Upon hearing the learned counsel for the litigating sides and

perusing the material placed on record, the issue falls for

consideration is, whether respondent No. 1 could exercise suo
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motu revisional jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Act in relation to

reopen an issue of transfer under the provision of Section 3 of the

Act of 1974 after the same is adjudicated by review that had

already attained finality and where the statutory period of three

years had long expired.


9.    The statutory scheme of Section 7 of the Act empowers the

Commissioner to call for the record of any inquiry or proceeding of

a Collector to satisfy himself as to the legality or propriety of the

order. However, the proviso to Section 7 expressly forbids such an

exercise after the expiry of three years from the date of the

Collector's order, unless acting under a specific direction from the

State Government.


10.   In the present case, the Collector adjudicated Tribal Case

No.134 of 1976 on 21.01.1986, and respondent No. 1 had already

evaluated and endorsed that order on 07.08.1987. In the absence

of any overriding direction from the State Government, the

subsequent suo motu exercise initiated in the year 1996 is barred

by the limitation.


11.   Having considered and endorsed it in the light of the

provision of statute, more particularly, Section 7 of the Act which

prescribes the period of three years as contemplated under the

Proviso of Section 7.     As such, it forbids respondent No.2 from

initiating suo moto or a direction of the State Government to call
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for record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any Collector for the

purpose of satisfying the legality or propriety of the order passed

by the Collector.


12.   The legal position that suo motu revisional powers cannot be

exercised beyond a reasonable or statutorily prescribed time

frame to disturb settled rights is well established.


13.   The Division Bench of this Court settled this issue in Bajirao

Jivanrao Patil v. Gulab Supdu Tadavi (Writ Petition No. 483

of 2012, decided on 05.08.2016). The same has been

subsequently followed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 22 of 2001

(Udhav Uttam Patil v. Daga Holkya Bhil).


14.   Consequently, the issue is no longer res integra. As

respondent     No.1   had   already   exercised   these     powers      on

07.08.1987, the subsequent, revision violates the limitation period

prescribed under Section 7 of the Act. Paragraph 16 and 18 of the

judgment in the case of Bajirao Jivanrao Patil (supra) reads as

under;


         “16. Normally, function of proviso is to except
         something out of the enactment or to qualify
         something enacted therein, but for the proviso would
         be within purview of the enactment. Proper
         functioning of the proviso is that it qualifies
         generality of the main enactment by providing
         exception. Reading proviso as appearing in section 7
         of the Act of 1974, it is clear that it is so embedded
         in the section that it forms an integral part of
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       enactment and thus acquires the tenor and colour of
       substantive provision itself. Proviso abrogates the
       power of Commissioner to take up suo motu
       proceeding after three years of the order being
       passed by the Collector. The proviso will have to read
       harmoniously with section. The provision with
       proviso will have to be read as a whole harmoniously
       in a manner that both co-exist and none of it
       becomes a dead letter. The term “at any time” will
       have to be interpreted in a way that within a period
       of three years the Commissioner “at any time” may
       take up suo-motu proceeding after order is passed
       by the Collector. Exception would be in a case, State
       Government issues directions to the Commissioner
       in that case limitation period of three years would
       not arise.”



       “18. As such, it will have to be held that under
       section 7 of the Act of 1974 the Commissioner
       cannot exercise revisional powers suo-motu beyond
       a period of three years of the order being passed by
       the Collector, while exercising powers under section
       3 of the Act of 1974 unless direction is issued by the
       State Government or permission is granted by the
       State Government. In that case only, proceedings
       can be initiated beyond period of three years. After
       permission is granted by the State Government,
       Commissioner should initiate proceeding within a
       reasonable time and as far as possible three years in
       such a case would be a reasonable time.”



15.   Thus, in absence of the direction by the State Government, it

was not open for respondent No.1 to undertake the exercise as has

been taken by the communication which is subject matter of the

challenge.
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16.   So far as the preliminary objection of abatement, this Court

finds merit in the petitioner's reliance on decision in the case of

Indu Shiv Verma (supra).

           “6. Mere absence of interest in representing the
           estate of deceased Defendant No.1 is not a reason
           sufficient for Court not to exercise power under
           Order 22 rule 4A of the Civil Procedure Code. If a
           person sought to be appointed to represent the
           estate of the deceased Defendant is not
           interested, he must also show that he has an
           interest adverse to the interest of the deceased
           Defendant. In the present case, there is nothing
           on record to indicate that the Petitioner has any
           interest adverse to the interest of the deceased
           Defendant. She is the sister of deceased
           Defendant No.1 in respect of his actions.”


17.   Thus, where the state authorities can adequately protect the

statutory objective and do not hold a conflicting interest, mere

absence of private dependent / legal representatives does not

mechanically abate the proceedings meant to test the validity of a

statutory order.


18.   In view of the affirmative findings on the question of

limitation and finality, the impugned notice cannot be sustained.

Respondent     No.   1   committed     jurisdictional    error     while

reconsidering an issue that had attained finality in the year 1987.

The same cannot reopened, much less beyond period of limitation.


19.   Consequently, the writ petition is allowed.
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20.   The impugned notice issued by respondent No. 1 dated

13.08.1996 is quashed and set aside.


21.   Rule is made absolute in the above terms.


22.   Pending application also stands disposed of.


23.   No order as to costs.




                                [SACHIN S. DESHMUKH]
                                        JUDGE

rrd