Bombay High Court
GRANT MEDICAL FOUNDATION(RUBY HALL CLINIC) THR. AUTHORISEDversusBHAUSAHEB BHIVAJI DAKE
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
The Enquiry Officer’s findings were not perverse and were supported by some evidence, so the Industrial Court’s order setting aside the Labour Court’s findings was erroneous and is set aside.
Summary
The petitioner, Grant Medical Foundation, challenged the Industrial Court’s order that set aside the Labour Court’s findings on preliminary issues, alleging that the Enquiry Officer’s findings were perverse and unsupported. The charge‑sheet primarily implicated Mr. Karad, with the respondent only accused of being present in a drunken state and accompanying Mr. Karad after duty hours. The Court examined the evidence, noting that departmental inquiries admit hearsay and are decided on a pre‑ponderance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt. Citing several Supreme Court precedents, the Court held that some evidence on record sufficed to sustain the findings and that the Industrial Court erred in deeming them perverse. Consequently, the Industrial Court’s order was set aside and the Labour Court was directed to decide the remaining issues within six months.
Issues considered
- Whether the Enquiry Officer’s findings in the departmental inquiry are perverse or lack any evidence.
- Whether the standard of proof in disciplinary enquiries is pre‑ponderance of probabilities and permits hearsay evidence.
- Whether the Industrial Court erred in setting aside the Labour Court’s order on preliminary issues.
- Whether the respondent’s alleged conduct constitutes misconduct warranting termination.
Subjects
- disciplinary enquiry
- preponderance of probability
- hearsay evidence
- industrial court
- labour court
- natural justice
- misconduct
- departmental inquiry
- proof standard
Judgment
2026:BHC-AS:36490
Megha 1_wp_5509_2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.5509 OF 2024
Grant Medical Foundation (Ruby Hall
Clinic), Pune ...Petitioner
V/s.
Bhausaheb Bhivaji Dake ...Respondent
________________
Mr. S.R. Nargolkar with Mr. Chetan A. Alai, Mr. Varun R. Joshi, Mr. S.S.
Nargolkar and Mr. Rishabh Chaurasia for the Petitioner.
Mr. Prashant Kshirsagar with Mr. Aniruddha Sanap i/b. Mr. Sarvadnya
Legal Associates for the Respondent.
________________
CORAM: SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
DATED: 2 SEPTEMBER 2026.
P.C.:
1) Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Since pleadings in the
Petition are complete, the same is taken up for final hearing with the
consent of the learned counsel appearing for parties.
2) By this Petition, the Petitioner-employer has challenged order
dated 1 April 2022 passed by the learned Member, Industrial Court, Pune,
by which the order of the Labour Court on preliminary issues dated 18
Page No.1 of 10
2 September 2026
Megha 1_wp_5509_2024
December 2019 is partly set aside and it is held that findings of the
Enquiry Officer are not based on evidence.
3) I have heard Mr. Nargolkar, the learned counsel appearing for the
Petitioner and Mr. Kshirsagar, the learned counsel appearing for the
Respondent and have considered the submissions canvassed by them. I
have gone through the findings recorded by the Industrial Court and
perused the records of the case filed alongwith the Petition.
4) Perusal of the charge-sheet dated 25 December 2011 indicates
that following charge was levelled against the Respondent:-
असे असूनही दि .२३/१२/२०११ रोजी तुम्ही सकाळी ०९:३० ते ०५:३० या पाळीत
कामात होता. रात्री अंदाजे ०८:३० वा . रुग्णालयातील म्हसोबा मंदिर जवळील गेट मधून
रिक्षा न. एम एच १२-५२४७ मधून श्री अरुण कराड यांच्या बरोबर दोघेही मद्यपानाच्या नशेत
आत आलात तेव्हा टोल बूथ वरील श्री उत्तम राऊत यांनी रिक्षा थांबवण्यासाठी हाताने
खुणावले. त्यांचे न ऐकता तशीच रिक्षा २-३ वेळा बूम बारियर वर जाणूनबुजून धडकावली.
त्यामुळे बूम बॅरियर वर गेले व श्री कराड यांनी रिक्षा आत आणली. श्री राऊत बूथ मधून बाहेर
आले व त्यांनी बूम बॅरियर खाली केले . त्यावेळी श्री कराड यांनी पुढे जाऊन रिक्षा थांबवून पुन्हा
बूथ कडे आले व हाताने जोरात बूम बॅरियर ओढू न ते तोडले. त्यानंतर श्री कराड यांनी श्री
राऊत याना बोलावले व धमकावले. त्यांची गचुंडी धरून जोरात हात पिरगाळला. तसेच
गुडघ्याने पाठीत लाथ मारली व तेथे उभी असलेल्या रिक्षावर त्यांना ढकलून दिले. हे सर्व घडत
असताना तुम्ही श्री कराड यांच्या बरोबर उपस्थित होता. बूम बॅरियर मोडल्याने आपल्या
रुग्णालयातील पार्किंग व्यवस्था विस्कळीत झाली. हे सर्व घडत असताना सिक्युरिटी
विभागातील श्री राजू भट्ट हे हि मेन गेट वर उपस्थित होते . अशी वागणूक तुमच्या कडू न अपेक्षित
नाही.
5) Thus, almost all allegations in the charge-sheet are against Mr.
Karad. The only allegation against the Respondent is about his presence
alongwith Mr. Karad, which is clear from statement in the charge ‘हे सर्व
घडत असताना तुम्ही श्री कराड यांच्या बरोबर उपस्थित होता' ’. It is also alleged in the
charge-sheet that the Respondent entered the hospital in the Riksha
driven by Mr. Karad in a drunken state. Thus, the only charge levelled
against the Respondent in the charge-sheet is entry in the hospital
Page No.2 of 10
2 September 2026
Megha 1_wp_5509_2024
premises in a drunken state and being in company of Mr. Karad when he
indulged into misbehaviour. Admittedly, the alleged incident has
occurred after duty hours of the Respondent.
6) After going through the evidence on record, it is seen that the
Petitioner-Management examined two witnesses viz. Mr. Arun Karad and
Mr. Sonawane (Security Officer). Mr. Karad was a direct eye witness since
he himself had indulged into misconduct. Mr. Sonawane led evidence on
the report made to him by the Security Guard- Mr. Raut. In a
Departmental Enquiry there is no allergy to hearsay evidence. Strict rules
of evidence do not apply in departmental inquiries. So long as there is
some evidence on record, the charges can be held to be proved. The test
is not proof beyond doubt but only preponderance of probabilities. In
Divisional Controller, Maharashtra State Road Transport Corpn. V/s.
Ravindra Adhar Gosavi 1 this Court has held in paragraphs 15 to 21 as
under:-
15. It is trite that the charge in the departmental enquiry is to be
proved on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The charge
is not required to be proved on the principle of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. It would be appropriate to discuss some of the
Judgments of the Apex Court on the issue of proof of misconduct in
the domestic enquiry.
16. In State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491, the Apex
Court had held that even hearsay evidence is admissible in domestic
enquiry. It is held:
4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and
sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act
may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a
prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay
evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is
1 2023 II CLR 241
Page No.3 of 10
2 September 2026
Megha 1_wp_5509_2024
true that departmental authorities and Administrative
Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and
should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant
under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not
necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have
been taken through case-law and other authorities by counsel
on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity,
exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and
observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the
basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of
independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached,
such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be
held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves,
perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and
gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal
before a valid finding could be recorded. The ‘residuum’ rule to
which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain
passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that
extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid
requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or
was there no evidence — not in the sense of the technical rules
governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense
way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept.
Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the
finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of
any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for
the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law
apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence
of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence
which has relevance to the charge levelled against the
respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is
invalid on that ground. (emphasis supplied)
17. In Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10, it is held
that even some evidence on record would be sufficient for saving the
fandings recorded in departmental enquires from falling fowl of
perversity. It is held:
10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained
between the decisions which are perverse and those which are
not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which
is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act
upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some
evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be
relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the
conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings
would not be interfered with. (emphasis supplied)
Page No.4 of 10
2 September 2026
Megha 1_wp_5509_2024
18. More recently, the Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Umesh,
(2022) 6 SCC 563 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 655 has reiterated the principles
that govern the disciplinary enquiry and criminal trial. It is held:
16. The principles which govern a disciplinary enquiry are
distinct from those which apply to a criminal trial. In a
prosecution for an offence punishable under the criminal law,
the burden lies on the prosecution to establish the ingredients
of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled
to a presumption of innocence. The purpose of a disciplinary
proceeding by an employer is to enquire into an allegation of
misconduct by an employee which results in a violation of the
service rules governing the relationship of employment. Unlike
a criminal prosecution where the charge has to be established
beyond reasonable doubt, in a disciplinary proceeding, a charge
of misconduct has to be established on a preponderance of
probabilities. The rules of evidence which apply to a criminal
trial are distinct from those which govern a disciplinary
enquiry. The acquittal of the accused in a criminal case does
not debar the employer from proceeding in the exercise of
disciplinary jurisdiction.
22. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act as
an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary
authority. The court does not reappreciate the evidence on the
basis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at in
the course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the exercise of
judicial review must restrict its review to determine whether:
(i) the rules of natural justice have been complied with;
(ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence;
(iii) the statutory rules governing the conduct of the
disciplinary
enquiry have been observed; and
(iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority
suffer from
perversity; and
(v) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven
misconduct. [State
of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423 : (2020) 1
SCC (L&S) 547; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997)
7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806; B.C. Chaturvedi v.
Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80;
R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab, (1999) 8 SCC 90 : 1999 SCC
(L&S) 1424 and CISF v. Abrar Ali, (2017) 4 SCC 507 :
(2018) 1 SCC (L&S) 310]
(emphasis supplied)
Page No.5 of 10
2 September 2026
Megha 1_wp_5509_2024
19. In M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das, (2020)
1 SCC 1 Constitution Bench has expounded the concept of
preponderance of probability:
The standard of proof
720. The court in a civil trial applies a standard of proof
governed by a preponderance of probabilities. This
standard is also described sometimes as a balance of
probability or the preponderance of the evidence. Phipson
on Evidence formulates the standard succinctly : If
therefore, the evidence is such that the court can say “we
think it more probable than not”, the burden is discharged,
but if the probabilities are equal, it is not. [Phipson on
Evidence.] In Miller v. Ministerof Pensions [Miller v.
Minister of Pensions, (1947) 2 All ER 372] , Lord Denning, J.
(as the Master of Rolls then was) defined the doctrine of
the balance or preponderance of probabilities in the
following terms : (All ER p. 373 H)
“(1) … It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a
high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of
doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if
it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course
of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man
as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour
which can be dismissed with the sentence, “of course
it is possible, but not in the least probable” the case is
proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of
that will suffice.”
721. The law recognises that within the standard of
preponderance of probabilities, there could be different
degrees of probability. This was succinctly summarised by
Denning, L.J. in Bater v. Bater [Bater v. Bater, 1951 P 35 (CA)] ,
where he formulated the principle thus : (p. 37)
“… So also in civil cases, the case must be proved by a
preponderance of probability, but there may be degrees
of probability within that standard. The degree depends
on the subject-matter.”
20. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Heem Singh 2020 SCC OnLine SC 886, the
Apex Court has held as under:
33 In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there
are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of
restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible.
The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review.
Page No.6 of 10
2 September 2026
Megha 1_wp_5509_2024
This is for a valid reason. The determination of whether a
misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the
domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge does not
assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the
judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of
fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea
that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient
conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide
by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by
strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings.
The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which
governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but
a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities.
Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying
approaches based on context and subject. The first end of the
spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy – deference
to the position of the disciplinary authority as a fact finding
authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining
discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other end of the
spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to
interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no
evidence or when they suffer from perversity. A failure to
consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards
as a perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an
entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Ser vice jurisprudence
has recognized it for long years in allowing for the authority of
the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are
disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or misconduct.
Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between the
banks of these two shores which have been termed as the two
ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation
of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To
determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is
based on some evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny
is undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court
that there is some evidence to support the charge of
misconduct and to guard against perversity. But this does not
allow the court to re-appreciate evidentiary findings in a
disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to
the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the
first principle which has been outlined above. The ultimate
guide is the exercise of robust common sense without which
the judges’ craft is in vain.
(emphasis supplied)
21. Thus in domestic inquiry, strict rules of evidence are not
applicable. Even hearsay evidence is admissible. On perusal of
evidence, if a person of ordinary prudence reaches a conclusion that
Page No.7 of 10
2 September 2026
Megha 1_wp_5509_2024
the occurrence of an event alleged is probable, such evidence is
sufficient to prove misconduct in domestic inquiry. This is the test of
preponderance of probability. On the other hand, in a criminal trial,
the charge has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and any
contradiction or lacunae in evidence casting doubt about occurrence
of an event would entitle the accused to a benefit of doubt, resulting
in an acquittal.
(Emphasis supplied)
7) In President Secretary Uttar Bhartiya Education Society and Anr.
Vs. Naresh Tejas Thakur and Anr.2 this Court has reiterated the principles
and has held in paragraph 34 as under:-
34. Thus in domestic inquiry, strict rules of evidence are not
applicable. Even hearsay evidence is admissible. On perusal of
evidence, if a person of ordinary prudence reaches a conclusion that
the occurrence of an event alleged is probable, such evidence is
sufficient to prove misconduct in domestic inquiry. This is the test of
preponderance of probability. On the other hand, in a criminal trial,
the charge has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and any
contradiction or lacunae in evidence casting doubt about occurrence
of an event would entitle the accused to a benefit of doubt, resulting
in an acquittal. In my view, applying the above test, it cannot be held
that the finding of guilt recorded against the Respondent No.1 suffers
from vice of perversity. There is sufficient evidence on record to hold
the Respondent No.1 guilty of charges levelled against him.
(Emphasis supplied)
8) It cannot be contended in the facts of the present case that there
is total absence of evidence. Merely because Mr. Karad is a co-accused,
the same cannot be a reason for completely discarding his evidence.
Similarly, Mr. Sonawane has led evidence of what is reported to him by
Mr. Raut. There is no reason to discard his evidence altogether. Few
discrepancies in the statements cannot be a reason to discard the
evidence. Ultimately, the person accompanying the Respondent has led
evidence of the incident. The witness, who made a report of the incident
is also examined. It therefore cannot be held that there is total absence
2 Writ Petition No.4232 of 2022 decided on 5 December 2023.
Page No.8 of 10
2 September 2026
Megha 1_wp_5509_2024
of evidence. The quantity of alcohol consumed is irrelevant so long as
Mr. Karad has deposed that the duo had consumed alcohol before
returning to the hospital. In my view, therefore, there is some evidence
to prove twin allegations of entering the hospital premises in a drunken
state and being in company of Mr. Karad at the time of the incident. In
my view therefore, the Industrial Court has grossly erred in holding that
there is perversity in the findings of the Enquiry Officer.
9) As observed above, the main allegation in the charge-sheet was
against Mr. Karad. Allegations qua the Respondent are levelled only to
twin aspects viz. entry into the hospital in a drunken state and being in
company with Mr. Karad. The Respondent was admittedly not on duty
when he consumed alcohol with Mr. Karad. Whether these acts on the
part of the Respondent amounts to misconduct or not is something
which the Labour Court would decide while answering remaining issues.
If Labour Court arrives at a conclusion that the acts proved against the
Respondent do not constitute misconduct, appropriate relief can be
granted in favour of the Respondent. If on the other hand, the Labour
Court arrives at a conclusion that acts committed by the Respondent
amount to some misconduct, what is the gravity of such misconduct and
whether punishment of termination is warranted for such misconduct
would also be decided by the Labour Court. The Labour Court will
obviously keep in mind the fact that Mr. Karad, against whom the main
allegations were levelled, is retained in service by accepting his apology.
It is too early at this stage to record any finding in that regard. However,
it is not necessary for the Petitioner-Management to lead fresh evidence
before the Labour Court since findings of the Enquiry Officer cannot be
Page No.9 of 10
2 September 2026
Megha 1_wp_5509_2024
termed as perverse. Evidence on record proves that the Respondent had
consumed alcohol with Mr. Karad and was in his company when the duo
had entered the hospital premises.
10) The Petition accordingly succeeds. Judgment and order dated 1
April 2022 passed by the Industrial Court is set aside. The Labour Court
shall proceed to decide the remaining issues in an expeditious manner by
strictly limiting its consideration to the acts alleged by the Petitioner
against the Respondent in the charge-sheet dated 24 December 2011.
The Complaint shall be decided by the Labour Court in an expeditious
manner, preferably within a period of six months. All rights and
contentions of the parties on merits are expressly kept open.
11) With the above directions the Writ Petition is allowed and
disposed of. Rule is made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs.
[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]
Signed by: Megha S. Parab
Page No.10 of 10
Designation: PA To Honourable Judge 2 September 2026
Date: 07/09/2026 11:18:22
Checking your session…