MAYA GANU KADU (SINCE DECD) THORUGH LRS. AND ORS.versusSHRI. MARUTI BALYA THAKUR AND ORS.

                                                                    4-WP-6834-15+-FM.doc



                                                                             Sayali



                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                 WRIT PETITION NO.6834 OF 2015
SAYALI
DEEPAK             Maya Ganu Kadu Since Deced. Thr. Lrs
UPASANI
                   and Others                           … Petitioners
Digitally signed
by SAYALI
DEEPAK
                              V/s.
UPASANI
Date: 2026.10.05
                   Maruti Balya Thakur and Others       … Respondents
15:44:14 +0530



                                                WITH
                                 WRIT PETITION NO. 6705 OF 2015
                                                WITH
                                 WRIT PETITION NO. 6709 OF 2015
                                                WITH
                                 WRIT PETITION NO. 6707 OF 2015
                                                WITH
                                 WRIT PETITION NO. 6708 OF 2015


                   Mr. Rahul Madam More with Mr. Sumedh S. Gaikwad,
                   for Petitioners in all petitions.
                   Mr. Milind Parab i/b Milind Parab and Associates, for
                   Respondent nos. 1A to 14, for Respondents.


                                             CORAM     : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                                             DATED     : OCTOBER 05, 2026




                                                  1
                                                    4-WP-6834-15+-FM.doc


P.C.:

1.      The challenge in the present petition arises from an order
passed by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal in a proceeding stated
to have been filed under Section 32G of the Bombay Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (“the BTLA Act”).

2.      It is not in dispute that the petitioners are the
representatives of the original applicants. It is also not in dispute
that the original applicants, during their lifetime, did not
challenge the order dated 25 May 1978. The Appeal challenging
the said order was filed by the representatives of the original
applicants only on 21 April 2011. Thus, there is a delay of about
33 years in challenging the order dated 25 May 1978. This delay
is very long and the petitioners were required to give a proper
and acceptable explanation for not taking any steps for such a
long period. The Court has to consider whether the reason given
by the petitioners is sufficient to explain the entire period of
delay and whether the nature of the challenge is such that the
delay can be ignored.

3.      Apart from the reasons stated in the application for
condonation of delay, namely, that the petitioners did not have
knowledge of the impugned order, a issue has also been raised in
the petition. According to the petitioners, the application under
Section 32G could not have been filed for reopening the earlier
proceedings which had concluded under Section 32M. It is
submitted that the order dated 25 May 1978 suffers from



                                  2
                                                    4-WP-6834-15+-FM.doc


material illegality. The submission is that when the earlier
proceedings had reached a final stage and a certificate under
Section 32M had been issued, there was no authority in law to
start another proceeding under Section 32G in respect of the
same land and the same rights. On this basis, it is contended that
the illegality is of such nature that the authorities under the BTLA
Act ought to have interfered with the order even though the
Appeal was filed after a very long period.

4.    It is pointed out that the original landlord had admittedly
died in the year 1966. However, the proceedings which resulted
in the order dated 25 May 1978 were initiated only in the year
1978. Thus, on the date when the proceedings were initiated, the
original landlord was dead. It is also a matter of record that he
was not alive even when those proceedings came to an end. On
this basis, it is submitted that the proceedings were against a
person who was no longer alive and the order dated 25 May
1978 could not have been legally passed. The petitioners
accordingly submit that the order is required to be quashed and
set aside and that the question of delay should not come in the
way because the alleged defect goes to the root of the
proceedings.

5.    Ordinarily, the contention raised by the petitioners would
deserve consideration. The usual proceedings under Section 32G
involve determination of the rights of the tenant and the
landlord. There is normally a contest between the person




                                 3
                                                  4-WP-6834-15+-FM.doc


claiming to be the tenant and the landlord who claims rights in
the agricultural land. Therefore, if the landlord dies before
initiation of such proceedings, or dies during the pendency of the
proceedings and his representatives are not brought on record
where their presence is necessary, the validity of the subsequent
proceedings can become doubtful. In an appropriate case, an
order passed against a dead person may be treated as void and
such a defect can be raised even after considerable time,
depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case.

6.   However, the facts of the present case stand on a different
footing. The Court cannot consider the death of the landlord
separately from the nature of the proceedings which were
actually conducted and the rights which had come to an end
before the Section 32G proceedings were initiated. In the present
case, it is not disputed that the proceedings under Section 32G
and the issuance of the certificate under Section 32M were
concluded between the persons who were stated to be in
possession, as recorded in the order dated 25 May 1978. The
dispute in those proceedings was therefore not a continuing
dispute between the landlord and the tenant in the ordinary
sense. The proceedings were concerned with the rights of the
persons who were in possession and with the question as to in
whose favour such rights were to be recognised.

7.   The position becomes clear from the fact that the rights,
title and interest of the landlord had ceased to exist on issuance




                                4
                                                   4-WP-6834-15+-FM.doc


of the certificate under Section 32M. That event had taken place
much before the initiation of the subsequent proceedings under
Section 32G. Therefore, when the Section 32G proceedings were
initiated, there was no subsisting right of the original landlord
which was being adjudicated in the same manner as in an
ordinary landlord and tenant dispute. The contest was essentially
between the predecessor of the present petitioners and the
predecessor of the contesting respondents. The landlord was not
the person whose surviving proprietary right was being
determined in those proceedings.

8.    For this reason, the mere fact that the original landlord had
died before the initiation or conclusion of the proceedings
cannot, in the facts of the present case, result in the entire
proceedings becoming void. The Court has to see what was the
actual nature of the proceedings and what rights were being
considered in those proceedings. If the petitioners were of the
view that there was any illegality, irregularity or procedural
defect in the proceedings which resulted in the order dated 25
May 1978, such grievance was required to be raised within the
period prescribed under the statute. A party cannot keep such
grievance pending for decades and thereafter seek to reopen the
entire matter merely by describing the order as illegal.

9.    The only explanation given by the petitioners in the
application for condonation of delay is that the representatives of
the original applicants had no knowledge of the order dated 25




                                 5
                                                   4-WP-6834-15+-FM.doc


May 1978. This explanation has to be considered in the
background of the conduct of the original applicants. It is not
disputed that the persons who were parties to the proceedings
during their lifetime did not challenge the order dated 25 May
1978. They had sufficient opportunity during their lifetime to
question the order if they were aggrieved by it. They did not do
so.

10.   The order dated 25 May 1978 also records that the
concerned persons had no objection to the order being passed in
favour of the predecessors of the contesting respondents. This
part of the order remained unchallenged throughout the lifetime
of the original applicants. If the original applicants had disputed
the proceedings or the order passed therein, some material
showing such objection or challenge could reasonably have been
expected. No such material has been brought on record.

11.   In these circumstances, the subsequent representatives
cannot simply state that they were unaware of the order and
thereby explain a delay of 33 years. The rights in the property
and the proceedings relating to those rights do not remain
unknown indefinitely merely because the successors claim that
they personally had no knowledge. The conduct of the
predecessor in title is relevant while considering the conduct of
the successor in title. The knowledge and conduct of the
predecessor cannot be ignored when the successor later seeks to
challenge the same transaction or order.




                                 6
                                                    4-WP-6834-15+-FM.doc


12.   The submission that the representatives had no personal
knowledge cannot explain the entire period of 33 years. The
petitioners have not shown any satisfactory reason as to why the
original applicants did not challenge the order during their
lifetime. The long silence of the original applicants is a material
circumstance which cannot be overlooked while considering the
application for condonation of delay.

13.   In my opinion the authorities under the Act were justified
in rejecting the application for condonation of delay of 33 years
in filing the Appeal. The authorities considered the explanation
offered by the petitioners and did not find it sufficient. The
explanation was essentially based upon alleged lack of
knowledge of the impugned order. In the facts of the present
case, that explanation does not satisfactorily account for the
extraordinary period of delay.

14.   The Court also has to keep in mind that condonation of
delay is not a matter of right. The party seeking such relief has to
show sufficient cause for the delay. The longer the delay, the
greater is the need for a satisfactory explanation covering the
period of delay. Here, the petitioners have not been able to
explain why the order remained unchallenged for about 33 years.
The fact that the original applicants did not challenge the order
during their lifetime is an important circumstance against the
petitioners. The objection concerning the death of the original
landlord also does not change this position. For the reasons




                                 7
                                                    4-WP-6834-15+-FM.doc


discussed, in the peculiar facts of the present case, the death of
the landlord did not make the entire proceedings under Section
32G void. At the highest, the petitioners are alleging an illegality
or procedural defect in the manner in which the proceedings
were conducted. Such a grievance could not have been kept aside
for 33 years and thereafter raised as a ground to overcome the
statutory period of limitation.

15.   In my opinion no interference with the impugned order is
called for. The authorities have considered the material placed
before   them and have rightly         refused to    condone the
extraordinary delay. The petitioners have not established
sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 33 years. They have
also not established that the order dated 25 May 1978 is void in
such a manner that the question of limitation can be ignored.

16.   The challenge to the order dated 25 May 1978 is not
capable of being entertained after such an unexplained and
prolonged period. The conduct of the original applicants, the
nature of the proceedings, the effect of the certificate issued
under Section 32M and the absence of any timely challenge are
all material circumstances which support the conclusion reached
by the authorities.

17.   In view of the above discussion and findings, the petitions
are disposed of. No relief can be granted to the petitioners in
respect of the order dated 25 May 1978.

                                            (AMIT BORKAR, J.)



                                  8