Bombay High Court

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE, AKKALKOTversusMADIVALPPA GUNIGAPPA BADOLE AND ANR

Disposal: Dismissed

Holding

The Director of Marketing was within his statutory authority under Sections 41A and 52B to set aside the APMC's resolutions and uphold the appeal, and the writ petition was dismissed.

Summary

The Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) of Akkalkot suspended its Secretary, Madivalppa Gunigappa Badole, and formed an inquiry committee to investigate alleged malpractices. Badole appealed the suspension and the formation of the committee to the Director of Marketing under Section 52B of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 1963. The Director set aside the APMC's resolutions and allowed the appeal, finding procedural violations, lack of reasons for suspension, and non‑compliance with Rules 100(6) and 102 of the 1967 Rules. The APMC challenged this order by filing a writ petition, arguing that the Director lacked jurisdiction and that an alternative remedy of appeal to the State Government was available. The High Court examined the statutory powers under Sections 41A and 52B and concluded that the Director was empowered to prohibit the resolutions and that the appeal was maintainable. It held that the Director correctly identified violations of natural justice and the Rules, and therefore found no ground for interference. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

The jurisdiction of the Director of Marketing to set aside APMC resolutions under Section 41A of the Act
Whether the appeal filed by the Secretary under Section 52B is maintainable
Whether the APMC had an alternative remedy of appeal to the State Government, precluding the writ petition
Whether the suspension of the Secretary complied with the procedural requirements of the 1967 Rules

Legislation cited

Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 1963 — s. 41A, 52B
Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Rules, 1967 — s. Rule 100(6), Rule 102

Subjects

suspension
inquiry committee
director's powers
Section 41A
Section 52B
alternative remedy
natural justice
APMC
writ petition
public interest

Judgment

WP-7060-2022(J) C2.doc

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Digitally signed CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR
by
HUSENBASHA
HUSENBASHA RAHAMAN CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
RAHAMAN NADAF
NADAF Date:
2026.08.31
16:23:42 +0530
WRIT PETITION NO. 7060 OF 2022

Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Akkalkot
A ‘local authority' established under the provisions
of MAPMC, Act
Having its Registered address at :
Market Yard, Akkalkot
Duly represented by its authorised representative
Mr Sanjiv Sidramappa Patil
Age: Adult, Occupation: Agriculturist,
Having address at:
Market Yard, Akkalkot … Petitioner

Versus

1. Madivalppa Gunigappa Badole
Age: 48 yrs, Occupation : Service
Residing at :
Ratnadip Niwas, Jangi Plot No 55, By-pass Road,
Akkalkote, Solapur

2. Director of Marketing, Pune
Central Building, Pune … Respondents

***
Mr. Abhijit Dilip Kulkarni (Through V.C.) a/w. Balkrishna Patil for the
Petitioner.
Mr. Sachin Hande (Through V.C.) for Respondent No.1.
Mr. Sanjay D. Rayarikar AGP for the State.
***

CORAM : M.M. SATHAYE, J.
RESERVED ON : 10th APRIL, 2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 31st AUGUST, 2026
(THROUGH VIDEO CONFERENCING)

Husen 1
WP-7060-2022(J) C2.doc

JUDGMENT :

1. Invoking Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the
Petitioner-Agricultural Produce Market Committee (‘APMC’ for short)
is challenging Order dated 14.01.2022 passed by Respondent No. 2
(Director of Marketing, Pune) in Appeal No. 73 of 2021, allowing the
appeal of its secretary Respondent No. 1, thereby setting aside the
Order dated 18.09.2021 passed by the Petitioner and also
canceling/setting aside the resolutions dated 06.09.2021 and
18.09.2021 passed by the Petitioner.

BACKGROUND

2. The case of the Petitioner, in short, is as follows.

The Petitioner-APMC is a local authority established under
provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing
(Development and Regulation) Act of 1963 (‘the said Act’, for short).
Respondent No.1 was appointed as ‘Secretary’ of the Petitioner-APMC
on 17.03.1997. On 06.09.2021, a meeting of Petitioner’s Managing
Committee was held where issues pertaining to malpractices and
mal-administration of Respondent No. 1 were raised and it was
decided to discuss the same at length in the next meeting. On
18.09.2021, Managing Committee meeting took place and it was
decided to formulate 3 member inquiry committee of independent
persons who are expert in the field of law as well as administration of
APMC. In order to keep Respondent No. 1 away from records of
APMC and from junior officers who may be witnesses, Respondent
No. 1 was suspended with immediate effect by a letter dated

Husen 2
WP-7060-2022(J) C2.doc

18.09.2021, which is received and acknowledged by Respondent
No. 1 without any protest. On 04.10.2021, the inquiry committee
issued show cause notice to Respondent No. 1 and on 13.10.2021 the
period of suspension was extended, which is not challenged by
Respondent No. 1.

3. Respondent No. 1 filed appeal before Respondent No. 2 under
Section 52B of the the said Act, challenging the alleged decision to
conduct inquiry and his suspension order. The Petitioner-APMC filed
its say to the appeal. Respondent No.2 granted interim stay in favour
of Respondent No. 1 by order dated 28.10.2021 thereby temporarily
staying order dated 18.09.2021, but directing that inquiry be
conducted by the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies,
Akkalkot, instead of three member committee.

4. The Petitioner-APMC challenged the said interim order by
filing appeal before the Minister of State for Marketing, who, by
order dated 15.12.2021 set aside the above interim order.

5. The Respondent No. 1 challenged the said order of Minister by
filing Writ Petition No. 9427 of 2021 making grievance that no
opportunity of hearing was given.

6. This Court by an order 22.12.2021 disposed of the writ petition
by setting aside order of Minister and by directing Respondent No. 2
to decide the pending appeal on merits in a time-bound manner. This
Court continued the interim order dated 28.10.2021 passed by
Respondent No.2.

Husen 3
WP-7060-2022(J) C2.doc

7. That Respondent No. 2 after considering the material on
record, has passed impugned order dated 14.01.2022. The Petitioner
again suspended Respondent No.1 by order dated 18.01.2022.

8. In these circumstances the Petitioner-APMC has filed a present
petition.

9. Affidavit-in-reply dated 01.04.2026 has been filed by an
authorised person by Respondent No. 2, contending as under :

That under Section 41A of the said Act, the Director may
prohibit execution of any resolution passed by the Market Committee.
That as per Section 52B of the said Act, any person aggrieved by a
decision taken or order passed under any provisions of the said Act,
may prefer an appeal. That in the appeal, neither party has produced
alleged resolutions dated 06.09.2021 and 18.09.2021 and therefore
Respondent No. 2 has rightly proceeded with appeal. That since
Respondent No. 1 made a grievance that he was suspended from the
post of Secretary ex-parte and without giving any opportunity of
being heard. That since alleged resolutions are not produced on
record, the appeal has been allowed. That as per statutory audit
report and statutory inquiry, no specific allegations were made or
observations were found against Respondent No. 1 in respect of any
malpractice or illegality.

SUBMISSIONS

10. The learned counsel Mr. Kulkarni, appearing for the Petitioner
submitted an under.

Husen 4
WP-7060-2022(J) C2.doc

10.1. That Respondent No. 2-Director of Marketing has passed the
impugned order without jurisdiction or without holding any lawful
authority. That Respondent No. 2-Director of Marketing not only
failed to maintain separation of powers but has protected Respondent
No. 1 from the process of inquiry about malpractices.

10.2. That Resolution passed by the Petitioner-APMC cannot be
suspended without any finding as to how the resolution is prejudicial
to the interest of the APMC or how the resolution is against public
interest or how the resolution is likely to hinder efficient running of
the business.

10.3. That Respondent No. 2-Director of Marketing has no authority
under Section 52B of the said Act to interfere at the stage of inquiry,
which is necessary for fact finding.

10.4. That not only the resolution dated 18.09.2021 (appointing
inquiry committee) but the entire resolution where issues pertaining
to malpractices of Respondent No. 1 were raised and discussed, has
been quashed.

10.5. That the order dated 13.10.2021 granting extension of
suspension has not been challenged by Respondent No. 1 and since
the resolution to suspend Respondent No. 1 stood merged with the
order of 13.10.2021, no cause of action was available because the
order of competent authority is not appealable under Section 52B of
the said Act.

10.6. That once the competent authority invokes power and takes

Husen 5
WP-7060-2022(J) C2.doc

over the resolution of APMC, then the proceedings before Respondent
No. 2 become infructuous.

11. On the other hand, Mr. Hande, learned counsel for Respondent
No. 1 submitted that Petitioner has an alternative remedy and writ
petition may not be entertained. He submitted that the Petitioner
APMC wanted to dismiss Respondent No.1 by whatever means
possible. That Respondent No. 1 is already retired. That appeal filed
by Respondent No. 1 is very much maintainable under Section
52B(1)(a) of the said Act. That Assistant Registrar had no power to
extend suspension period. That harsh penalty of suspension could not
have been imposed with immediate effect without any inquiry and
opportunity of being heard given to Respondent No. 1. He has prayed
for dismissal of petition.

12. Learned AGP has supported the impugned order by relying on
affidavit in reply dated 01.04.2026.

REASONS AND CONCLUSION

13. I have considered the rival submission and perused the record.

14. At the outset, there is merit in the submission of learned
counsel for the Respondent No.1 that the Petitioner-APMC apparently
has an alternative remedy available to challenge the impugned order,
by preferring an appeal to State Government under Section 52B(1)
(b) of the said Act. In fact, the Petitioner-APMC had adopted the said
route while challenging the interim order passed by the Respondent
No.2-Director, when the concerned Minister had interfered by passing

Husen 6
WP-7060-2022(J) C2.doc

order dated 15.12.2021. Therefore, it is rightly pointed out by
learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 that if the Petitioner-APMC
can file appeal against interim order of Director, there was no reason
to file present Writ Petition directly without following the alternative
remedy of appeal before the State Government. Be that as it may.
Rule of not entertaining writ petition if alternative remedy is
available, is a rule of self-restrain. The Petition has been pending
since 2022. Reply was permitted to be filed. Affidavit in reply has
been filed on behalf of Respondent No. 2.

15. At the outset, it is necessary to consider the submission about
jurisdiction/power of Respondent No.2 under Section 52B of the said
Act reads as under:

“52B. Appeal. -(1) Save as otherwise provided elsewhere in this
Act, any person aggrieved by a decision taken or order passed
under any of the provisions of this Act may prefer an appeal-

(a) to the Director where such decision is taken or order is passed
by the Market committee, its Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary
or any other officer empowered to exercise the powers of the
Director,

(b) to the State Government, where such decision is taken or order
is passed by the Director.

(2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be made within a period
thirty days from the date of the decision or order appealed against.

(3) The order passed in the appeal by the Director or the State
Government as the case may be shall be final.”

Husen 7
WP-7060-2022(J) C2.doc

(emphasis supplied)

16. It is therefore clear that any person aggrieved by a decision
taken or order passed under any of the provisions of the said Act can
prefer appeal. In the present case, ‘decision was taken’ by the
Petitioner-APMC to conduct inquiry of Respondent No.1 and suspend
him with immediate effect by alleged resolutions dated 06.09.2021
and 18.09.2021 and order dated 18.09.2021, the said 'decision taken'
and order passed can be challenged in appeal before Director under
Section 52B(1)(a) of the said Act. In that view of the matter, appeal
by Respondent No. 1 is maintainable under Section 52B(1)(a) to
Respondent No.2-Director.

17. The next contention is that the power of Director to prohibit
execution of resolution or order made by the Committee are
restricted only if the Director is of the opinion that such resolution or
order is prejudicial to the public interest or is likely to hinder efficient
running of the business, cannot be accepted. Section 41A of the said
Act is as under:

“41A. Powers of the Director to prohibit execution of resolution
passed or order made by Committee, etc.- (1) The Director may, on
his own motion, or on report or complaint received by him, by order,
prohibit the execution of a resolution passed or order made by the
Committee or its Chairman or Vice-Chairman or any of its officer or
servants of the Market Committee, if he is of the opinion that such
resolution or order is prejudicial to the public interest or is likely to
hinder efficient running of the business in any market area, principal
market yard or sub-market yard or is against the provision of this

Husen 8
WP-7060-2022(J) C2.doc

Act or the rules or bye-laws made thereunder.

(2) Where the execution or further execution of a resolution or
order is prohibited by an order made under sub-section (1) and
continuing in force, it shall be the duty of the Committee, if so
required by the Director, to take any action which the Market
Committee would have been entitled to take, if the resolution or
order had never been passed or made and which is necessary for
preventing the Chairman or Vice-Chairman or any of its officers or
servants from doing or continuing to do anything under such
resolution or order.”
(emphasis supplied)

18. It is therefore clear that even if the Director is of the opinion
that the resolution passed and order made by the Committee is
against the provisions of the said Act or Rules or bye-laws made
thereunder, the power can be exercised.

19. Perusal of the impugned order shows that the Director found
that alleged resolutions dated 06.09.2021 and 18.09.2021 are not
produced on record and therefore obviously it was found that there is
no resolution to take immediate action of suspension of Respondent
No.1. The Director also found that in the Order/Communication
dated 18.09.2021, reasons for immediate suspension of Respondent
No.1 are not mentioned. The Director has found that under Rule 102
of the The Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing
(Development and Regulation) Rules, 1967 (‘the said Rules’ for
short), suspension is a penalty and the Market Committee has not
given appropriate and sufficient reasons while imposing such penalty.

Husen 9
WP-7060-2022(J) C2.doc

He also found that while imposing penalty, necessary procedure by
giving appropriate opportunity to the concerned person has not been
followed.

20. Three months’ extension of suspension period secured by the
Petitioner-APMC was also found to be against Rule 100(6) of the said
Rules, in as much as such, extension is found to be given by the
Assistant Registrar, when such right is available with the District
Deputy Registrar (Co-operative Societies) under circular dated
18.09.1981.

21. The Director also found that in the agenda for meeting dated
06.09.2021, the subject of suspension of Respondent No.1 was not
included.

22. The Director has also held that since this Court under order
dated 22.12.2021 in Writ Petition No. 9427 of 2021 has directed him
to hear the pending appeal, it is found appropriate to pass order on
merits. The Director on finding that major penalty has been imposed
by not observing said Rules and by violating principles of natural
justice, hence the appeal has been allowed.

23. In view of the aforesaid findings, it cannot be said that
situation did not exist to exercise powers under Section 41A of the
said Act.

24. Though photocopies of alleged Resolutions dated 06.09.2021
and 18.09.2021 (partly in handwritten form and partly in typed
version) are tendered in this Court by the learned counsel for the

Husen 10
WP-7060-2022(J) C2.doc

Petitioner, since its copies were not produced before the Respondent
No.2-Director, the same cannot be considered for the first time in writ
jurisdiction. Their existence appears doubtful. The conclusion drawn
by the Director that there was no such resolution for initiating harsh
action of suspension and inquiry of Respondent No.1 cannot be
faulted.

25. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances and for reasons
indicated above, no perversity is found on the impugned order. No
case for interference is made out.

26. Writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.

27. All concerned to act on duly authenticated or digitally signed
QR verifiable copy of this order.

(M.M. SATHAYE, J.)

Husen 11

Continue reading with your account

Checking your session…