Bombay High Court
HEMANT PRABHAKAR HINGEversusTHE HONBLE CHAIRMAN, AUND SHIKSHAN MANDAL AND ORS.
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
The dismissal was found to be disproportionate and arbitrary, so the Court quashed the order of dismissal, reinstated the petitioner, and remanded the matter to the management to determine a lesser penalty.
Summary
The petitioner, a permanent laboratory attendant, was dismissed from his college position following a departmental inquiry that found him guilty of multiple charges including absenteeism, insubordination, loss of computer equipment and unauthorised business. He challenged the dismissal before the High Court, arguing that the penalty was disproportionate, the inquiry was procedurally flawed and his explanations were ignored. The respondents contended that the inquiry complied with the applicable Standard Code and Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules and that the court cannot re‑appreciate evidence or alter the disciplinary authority's discretion. The Court held that while the inquiry was not void, the dismissal was excessive and arbitrary, and therefore set aside the punishment, ordering reinstatement without back wages and directing the management to impose a lesser penalty. Execution of the order was suspended for four weeks to allow the management to approach the Apex Court.
Issues considered
- The propriety of dismissing the petitioner for the alleged misconduct
- Whether the High Court may interfere with the quantum of punishment under Articles 226/227
- Whether there was a violation of natural justice or procedural irregularities in the departmental inquiry
- Whether the punishment imposed was disproportionate and arbitrary
- Entitlement of the petitioner to reinstatement and the question of back wages
Subjects
- disciplinary action
- dismissal
- proportionality
- natural justice
- judicial review
- Article 226
- Article 227
- departmental inquiry
- employment law
Judgment
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 7200 OF 2017
Digitally Hemant Prabhakar Hinge
signed by
UDAY UDAY
SHIVAJI
R/at Aundh, Tal. Khatav, Dist. Satara … Petitioner
SHIVAJI JAGTAP
Date:
JAGTAP 2026.08.19 Vs.
14:23:26
+0530
1. Hon’ble Chairman,
Aund Shikshan Mandal, Aund,
Tal. Khatav, Dist. Satara.
2. Hon’ble Principal Rajashripati Rao
Bhagwantrao Mahavidyalaya,
Aundh, Tal, Khatav, Dist. Satara.
3. The Director Board of College and
University Development Shivaji University
Kolhapur.
4. The Director Higher Education,
Rajaram College Campus, … Respondents
Kolhapur. Tal. & Dist. Kolhapur
………….
Dr. Uday P. Warunjikar a/w N.B. Kamble, Neha Deshpande i/b Pravartak
Pathak for the Petitioner.
Mr. Narendra V. Bandiwadekar, Senior Advocate (through VC) a/w Sagar
Mane, rushikesh Jagdale, Neha Farakate for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
Mr. Sanjay D. Rayrikar, AGP for Respondent – State.
………….
CORAM : SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J.
RESERVED ON : 4th AUGUST, 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : 18th AUGUST, 2026.
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JUDGMENT :-
. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith with the consent of the
parties.
2. Heard both sides.
3. The petitioner has assailed judgment and order dated 25.04.2017
passed by Presiding Officer, College Tribunal in Appeal No. 6 of 2015,
thereby confirming his order of dismissal issued on 07.05.2015.
4. The petitioner was appointed on 01.12.1995 as Laboratory
Attendant with the respondent number 2 college. He was permanent
employee. A disciplinary action was taken against him by leveling
charges. One man inquiry committee was appointed to conduct the
inquiry. The report was submitted by the inquiry officer on 15.04.2015.
He was issued show cause notice on 22.04.2015. Thereafter he was
dismissed by order dated 07.05.2015. Being aggrieved he preferred
appeal No.6 of 2015. It was contested by the respondents. By impugned
judgment appeal was dismissed.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner Dr. Mr. Warunjikar submits that
the penalty of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate,
arbitrary and unreasonable considering the nature of charges leveled
against him. It is submitted that the explanation submitted by the
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petitioner for the charges was not taken into consideration. The findings
to the charges are incoherent. The College Tribunal committed an error
of jurisdiction in recording inconsistent findings on the charges. It is
submitted that the documents produced in his defense in respect of
charge No.7 are not taken into account. The findings for charge No.4
regarding loss of computer would show that the same was recovered from
the premises itself. It is contended that no proper procedure was followed
while conducting inquiry and there is violation of principles of natural
justice.
6. Per contra, learned Senior counsel Mr. Bandiwadekar would submit
that no case is made out by the petitioner to cause any interference in the
impugned judgment and order. It is submitted that the judicial review of
disciplinary action has limitations and this Court cannot assume any
powers of Appellate forum. The re-appreciation of evidence is
impermissible which is urged by the petitioner in the writ petition. It is
submitted that due procedure of law has been followed and after
extending opportunity of hearing, major penalty is imposed upon the
petitioner. It is submitted that all the charges are proved and the findings
are based on material produced before the Inquiry Officer. Considering
the habitual tendency of the petitioner major punishment has been
imposed. There are concurrent findings of facts and punishment imposed
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is also found to be reasonable and proper.
7. Both the counsel of the parties have taken me through their
pleadings, impugned judgment and material placed on record. The
petitioner was permanent employee. The disciplinary action was taken
against him as per the Standard Code which is applicable for non-
teaching employees of non-agricultural colleges and institutions. There
is hardly any difference between the procedure contemplated by the
Standard Code and Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal)
Rules, 1979.
8. It is settled legal position that while exercising jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court does not act as a
Appellate Forum and cannot re-appreciate the evidence produced on
record. It is rightly pointed out by learned Senior Counsel Mr.
Bandiwadekar appearing for the respondents that scope of judicial review
in disciplinary matters is laid down by various judgments of the Apex
Court and few of them are cited before this Court namely; B.C.
Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749, Bank of India & Anr. Vs.
Degala Suryanarayana (1999) 5 SSC 762, SBI Bikaner at Jaipur Vs.
Nemichand (2011) 4 SSC 584 and State of Karnataka Vs. N. Gangaraj
(2020) 3 SCC 423. There is no need to burden the judgment by multiple
authorities but it would be suffice to refer to following paragraph of Bank
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of India & Anr. Vs. Degala Suryanarayana (supra) :-
“11. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to
departmental enquiry proceedings. The only requirement of
law is that the allegation against the delinquent officer must be
established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable
person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a
finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against the
delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain
the finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings.
The court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would
not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the
departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of mala
fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a
finding or where a finding is such that no man acting
reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that
finding. The court cannot embark upon reappreciating the
evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. So
long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion
arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be
sustained. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel (AIR 1964) SC 364
the Constitution Bench has held:-
"The High Court can and must enquire whether there is
any evidence at all in support of the impugned
conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence
led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the
conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved
against the respondent? This approach will avoid
weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it
stands and only examine whether on that evidence
legally the impugned conclusion follows or not."”
9. In the present case, articles of charges and statement of allegations
were supplied to the petitioner, who replied them. Mr. Kishor H. Kulkarni
was appointed as Inquiry Officer. The petitioner not engage any
representative for the inquiry proceeding. The management adduced
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evidence of one witness. The petitioner examined himself. The inquiry
report was submitted on 15.04.2015. The petitioner was given show-
cause notice on 22.04.2015. Thereafter, he was dismissed from the
services by order dated 07.05.2015.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner did not bring to the notice of
this Court that there is a violation of mandatory statutory procedure. The
Tribunal also recorded that due procedure of law was followed. The
objection submitted by the petitioner against the Inquiry Officer are dealt
with and overruled. I do not find that there is violation of principles of
natural justice. No prejudice is demonstrated to have been caused to the
petitioner. I do not find any perversity or patent illegality in the
impugned judgment.
11. My attention is adverted by learned counsel for the petitioner to
the articles of the charges and the inquiry report. The Inquiry Officer
mixed up charge no.3 with charge no.5. The statement of allegations
narrated under heading of charge nos. 3 and 5 were distinct. While
assigning reasons for charge no.4, the reasons of charge no.6 regarding
disappearance of computer are recorded. While assigning reasons for
charge no.5, reasons for charge no.7 are recorded.
12. The Inquiry Officer did not sequence the charges and his reasons
properly. But that cannot be the ground to vitiate inquiry proceeding or
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the disciplinary action. That can be treated to be irregularity.
13. The respondent – management produced material in support of the
charges. The oral evidence was also adduced. It cannot be said that the
allegations are totally unfounded. Even, the defence of the petitioner
was taken into account. I find no fault in holding him guilty for the
charges levelled against him.
14. The respondent has relied on the judgment of Shivaji Education
Society Vs. Presiding Officer, Schools Tribunal & Anr. 2001 (supp.)
Bom.C.R. 400. In that case enquiry was conducted and the delinquent
was dismissed from the services. His appeal was allowed by the School
Tribunal. The co-ordinate bench commented upon the jurisdiction
exercised by the Tribunal. However, in the case at hand, the Tribunal
confirmed the disciplinary action. The judgment cited would not enure
to the benefits of the petitioner. Otherwise also, this Court has already
referred to the judgments of the Supreme Court laying down the scope of
judicial review.
15. In this matter, the crucial question is that of proportionality of the
punishment. The Tribunal recorded the finding that punishment is
reasonable and appropriate. The petitioner was held to be habitually
indulging into absenteeism and even submitted apology, previously. It is
necessary to look into the charges levelled against the petitioner.
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16. The following charges were inquired into for dismissing the
services of the petitioner.
(i) Unauthorized absenteeism from 02.10.2014 to 03.12.2014.
(ii) Creating false evidence of his presence and making
misrepresentations to the higher authorities, thereby causing disrepute to
the college and the institution.
(iii) Insubordination and not remaining present despite being contacted
repeatedly from 09-05-2014 onwards to clean and upkeep the
department for a government-level college inspection, scheduled on
14.05.2014. Failing to report for the preparation and appearing only on
the actual day of the inspection. Thus, willfully disobeying the lawful
and proper orders of superiors.
(iv) Insubordination and misconduct by insulting the superiors on
14.07.2014.
(v) Dereliction of duties on 01.10.2014 when function of Dandiya was
arranged and attending it belatedly and that too without wearing
uniform.
(vi) Loss of computer on 21.11.2014.
(vii) To conduct a business of cable operating in the town without
permission.
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17. The charges are held to have been proved by the Inquiry Officer
and confirmed by the Tribunal. The petitioner has his own explanation
for absenteeism from 02.10.2014 to 03.12.2014. He claimed to have been
otherwise terminated as he was not permitted to sign the muster and
attend the duties. Immediately he made representations on 07.10.2014,
08.10.2014 and 11.12.2014 making grievance for having prevented him
from attending the duties. It is not appropriate for this Court to reverse
the findings recorded for charge nos.1 and 2. Those charges are venial in
nature in given circumstances. The employee does not rush to Tribunal
immediately, if he is prevented from signing muster.
18. The findings to the charge nos.3, 4 and 5 are recorded against the
petitioner. Those are mainly insubordination but those also cannot be
said to be serious in nature warranting major penalty. It would have
been reasonable for the Tribunal to impose lesser punishment than
dismissal. The respondents did not indicate the material on record to
show that the petitioner was habitual in remaining absent and indulged
in misconduct. Previously, he was warned for the absenteeism and even
an apology was also tendered. But that is also lacking in material
particulars.
19. The charge for loss of computer was serious apparently but the
Inquiry Officer himself recorded that the computer set was found in
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another room of the same premises. Similarly, the charge of conducting
business without permission is apparently serious one. But the petitioner
tendered documents in his defence to show that his brother Vijay is the
proprietor of Shri. Sai Cable Network. The Registration Certificate dated
22.04.2014 corroborates the defence. No Objection Certificates issued
by Sarpanch on 23.09.2014 and 29.01.2014 are also in the name of his
brother Vijay.
20. The endavour of this Court is not to re-appreciate the evidence and
to substitute the findings to charges. The findings are gone into so as to
examine gravity of the charges.
21. Considering the material placed on record, charges levelled against
the petitioner and findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and the
Tribunal, I am of the considered view that the punishment imposed upon
the petitioner is disproportionate, arbitrary and unreasonable. The
management should have awarded lesser punishment.
22. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment
of Chief Executive Officer, Krishna District Cooperative Central Bank Ltd.
vs. K. Hanumantha Rao and Anr. (2017) 2 SCC 528. Following is the
relevant paragraph, which reads as under :-
“7.3 The impugned order is also faulted for the reason that it
is not the function of the High Court to impose a particular
punishment even in those cases where it was found that
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penalty awarded by the employer is shockingly
disproportionate. In such a case, the matter could, at the best,
be remanded to the disciplinary authority for imposition of
lesser punishment leaving it to such authority to consider as to
which lesser penalty needs to be inflicted upon the delinquent
employee. No doubt, the administrative authority has to
exercise its powers reasonably. However, the doctrine that
powers must be exercised reasonably has to be reconciled with
the doctrine that the Court must not usurp the discretion of the
public authority. The Court must strive to apply an objective
standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range
of choice. In Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra
Singh, this principle is formulated in the following manner:
(SCC pp. 380-81, paras 13-14)
"13. Indubitably, the well-ingrained principle of law is
that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate
authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of
punishment to be given to a delinquent employee
keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct
committed by such an employee. Courts cannot assume
and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority. In
Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra this
principle was explained in the following manner: (SCC
p. 773, para 22)
22. ..... The High Court in our opinion fell in error in
interfering with the punishment, which could be
lawfully imposed by the departmental authorities on the
respondent for his proven misconduct.... The High Court
should not have substituted its own discretion for that of
the authority. What punishment was required to be
imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was
a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the competent authority and did not warrant any
interference by the High Court. The entire approach of
the High Court has been faulty. The impugned order of
the High Court cannot be sustained on this ground
alone.'
14. Yet again, in State of Meghalaya v. Mecken Singh N.
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Marak this Court reiterated the law by stating (SCC pp.
584-85, paras 14 and 17)
14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope of
interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional
cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere
with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot
be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court,
although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider
the question in regard to the quantum of punishment,
but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled
that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article
226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment
unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The
punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the
appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of
the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the
impugned order of the High Court no reasons
whatsoever have been indicated as to why the
punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to
give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere
statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice.
* * *
17. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the
disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the
conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority should be directed
to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The
High Court in this case, has not only interfered with the
punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority in a
routine manner but overstepped its jurisdiction by
directing the appellate authority to impose any other
punishment short of removal. By fettering the discretion
of the appellate authority to impose appropriate
punishment for serious misconducts committed by the
respondent, the High Court totally misdirected itself
while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226. Judged
in this background, the conclusion of the Division Bench
of the High Court cannot be regarded as proper at all.
The High Court has interfered with the punishment
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imposed by the competent authority in a casual manner
and, therefore, the appeal will have to be accepted."”
23. I propose to follow the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in
relegating the matter to the Disciplinary Authority to determine the
punishment.
24. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied on the judgment of
the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka (Supra), which reiterates
the power of judicial review conferred on the constitutional Court. I am
bound by the powers and the scope of judicial review. Hence, I am not
inclined to cause any interference in the disciplinary action taken against
the petitioner. However, for the reasons stated hereinabove, I find that
punishment needs to be interfered with.
25. If the punishment of dismissal is to be quashed then, the petitioner
will have to be reinstated. In that case, the question of payment of back
wages would arise. The appeal memo in Appeal No. 6 of 2015 is silent
regarding the fact as to whether the petitioner remained unemployed
after dismissal. It is with the special knowledge of the petitioner to
incorporate necessary pleadings as to whether he was in gainfully
employed with other entity or not. No submissions are made to that
effect.
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26. For foregoing reasons, I pass following order :-
ORDE R
(i) The impugned judgment and order passed by the Tribunal shall
stand confirmed, save and except, the punishment of dismissal from the
services.
(ii) The order of dismissal dated 07.05.2015 is quashed and set aside
and the petitioner is directed to be reinstated in the services without any
back wages or the auxiliary benefits.
(iii) The Management shall determine the punishment to be imposed
upon the petitioner but shall not impose major penalty of dismissal.
(iv) Rule is made absolute in the above terms.
( SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J. )
27. The learned counsel for the respondents, after pronouncement of
the judgment seeks suspension of its execution so as to enable the party
to approach the Apex Court.
28. The petitioner was dismissed from service on 07.05.2015, and he is
to be reinstated. The Tribunal had dismissed his appeal. In such a
scenario, it would be appropriate to grant time to the respondent-
Management so as to enable it to approach the Apex Court by suspending
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the order.
29. The effect, operation and execution of the order shall stand
suspended for a period of four (4) weeks.
30. Upon the expiration of the said period, the suspension shall stand
revoked.
( SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J. )
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