M/S SAI INNOVATION THROUGH PARTNER SHANKAR JAGTAPversusJOINT DISTRICT REGISTRAR AND COLLECTOR OF STAMPS, PUNE CITY AND ORS

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                      AGK
                                IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                         WRIT PETITION NO.7566 OF 2016

                      Sai Innovation, a partnership firm
                      through Partner Shankar Pandurang Jagtap          … Petitioner

                                               Vs.

                           1. Joint District Registrar and Collector
                              of Stamps, Pune City, Pune
                           2. Inspector General of Registration and
                              Chief Controller of Stamps,
                              Pune Division Pune.
ATUL                       4. The State of Maharashtra,
GANESH                        through Secretary, Revenue & Forest
KULKARNI
Digitally signed by           Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai            … Respondents
ATUL GANESH
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.08.20
11:25:11 +0530
                      Mr. S.M. Gorwadkar with Mr. Mankirat Singh, Mr.
                      Varun Thanawala and Ms. Sonam S. Lande for the
                      petitioner.
                      Mrs. Mamta S. Srivastava, AGP for respondent Nos.1 to
                      3.


                                           CORAM                   : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                                           RESERVED ON             : AUGUST 18, 2026.

                                           PRONOUNCED ON           : AUGUST 20, 2026

                      JUDGMENT:

                      1.      By this writ petition, the Petitioner Partnership Firm is
                      challenging the legality, validity, and correctness of the order dated
                      6 December 2014 passed by Respondent No.1, namely the Joint



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District Registrar and Collector of Stamps, in Case No.118 of 2014.
The Petitioner also challenges the earlier order dated 11 August
2014 passed by Respondent No.2, namely the Deputy Controller of
Stamps, Pune, under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. By these
orders, the authorities refused to grant refund of stamp duty
amounting to Rs.70,12,500/- paid by the Petitioner Firm. The
Petitioner Firm has also prayed for a direction to Respondent Nos.1
and 2 to allow its application dated 7 April 2014 seeking refund of
the said stamp duty. The Petitioner further claims interest at the
rate of 2% per month from 7 April 2014 till the actual payment of
the refund amount.

2.   The facts which have led to filing of the present writ petition,
according to the Petitioner, are as follows. On 15 April 2013, the
Petitioner Firm, acting through its partners, entered into a
Development Agreement with the owners of the property, namely
Balawadkar, for development of approximately 8000 sq. mtrs. of
land bearing Survey No.29/4/2, situated at village Mauje Balewadi
and falling within the limits of the Pune Municipal Corporation.
The said document was registered in the office of the Sub-
Registrar, Haveli No.V, at Serial No.3237 of 2013. At the time of
registration of the said Development Agreement, the Petitioner
Firm paid stamp duty of Rs.70,12,500/-. According to the
Petitioner, the stamp duty was paid under Article 25 of Schedule I
read with Article 5 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act. However,
according to the Petitioner, the owners were not able to obtain
sanction of the building plans from the Planning Authority within a
reasonable period. Disputes, therefore, arose between the parties



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concerning the subject matter of the transaction. In view of these
circumstances, the parties decided to cancel the Development
Agreement dated 15 April 2013. It is also the case of the Petitioner
that the owners of the property returned the consideration amount
received by them to the Petitioner Firm. Thereafter, for the purpose
of cancelling the registered Development Agreement dated 15
April 2013, the Petitioner and the owners, namely Balawadkar,
executed a Cancellation Deed on 18 February 2014. The said
Cancellation Deed was registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar,
Haveli No.V, at Serial No.1455/1/61 of 2014 on 24 February 2014.
Since the Development Agreement, which was registered and on
which proper stamp duty had been paid, came to be cancelled
between the parties on 24 February 2014, the Petitioner Firm
submitted an application on 7 April 2014 in the prescribed form
seeking refund of the stamp duty paid at the time of registration of
the Development Agreement on 15 April 2013. It appears that
Respondent No.2, by his letter dated 11 August 2014, did not
recommend refund of the stamp duty paid by the Petitioner Firm.
The proceedings were thereafter forwarded to Respondent No.1
for taking an appropriate decision. The said proceedings came to
be registered as Case No.118 of 2014.

3.   The Petitioner further states that Respondent No.1 did not
issue any notice or give any opportunity of hearing to the
Petitioner Firm in the said proceedings. Thereafter, by an order
dated 6 December 2014, Respondent No.1 rejected the application
made by the Petitioner seeking refund of the stamp duty. The
application was rejected on the ground that "the said Application



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for refund was not covered by the proviso to Section 48 (i) of the
Bombay Stamp Act, 1958."

4.    Mr.   Gorwadkar,     learned       Advocate    appearing      for   the
Petitioner, submits that the only objection taken by the
Respondents in the impugned order while rejecting the claim for
refund is that the Development Agreement does not fall within the
meaning of “conveyance” under the proviso to Section 48(1) of the
Maharashtra Stamp Act. He submits that when this contention was
answered by relying upon the decision in Writ Petition No.241 of
2015, dated 3 September 2025, in the case of M/s. Satyam
Construction, the Respondents, in their Affidavit-in-Reply, raised
another ground. According to him, such additional ground was not
part of the impugned order and, therefore, cannot be introduced
later for supporting the rejection. It is further submitted that the
Respondents are now relying upon Clause 13 of the Development
Agreement and contending that the developer was given
possession of the subject property. On this basis, it is argued that
the Petitioners are not entitled to refund of stamp duty under
Section 47 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. Mr. Gorwadkar
submits that this objection is based upon reading Clause 13
separately and without considering Clause 11 of the same
Development      Agreement.     According       to    him,    the     entire
Development Agreement has to be read together and all its clauses
have to be understood in a manner which gives effect to the
intention of the parties. He submits that Clause 11 is important for
understanding the nature of possession which was given to the
developer. It specifically records that the Petitioners granted “ izR;{k



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o [kqyk rkck fodklukdfjrk yk;lsUlh Eg.kqu ” to the developer.
According to the learned Advocate, the words “ वि कासनाकवि ता
लायसे न्सी म्हणून" are important. The parties had agreed that the
developer was only permitted to enter the property as a licensee
and only for the purpose of carrying out development. Therefore,
according to him, what was given was not possession in the legal
sense, but only permission or licence to enter upon the property
for development and sale.

5.   He submits that Clause 13 cannot be read separately from
Clause 11. According to him, the words “izR;{k o [kqyk rkck”
appearing in the beginning of Clause 13 have to be understood in
the light of Clause 11. Once Clause 11 describes such possession as
being “yk;lsUlh Eg.kqu”, the word “rkck” appearing in Clause 13
must also be understood in the same manner. He submits that if
Clause 13 is read without considering Clause 11, the qualifying
words “fodklukdfjrk yk;lsUlh Eg.kqu” would become meaningless.
Such interpretation, according to him, is not permissible while
interpreting a contractual document. He further submits that the
remaining part of Clause 13 only permits the developer to carry
out acts necessary for the proposed development. This includes
entering the property, carrying out levelling work, obtaining
surveys, securing sanctioned building plans, making applications
before statutory authorities, using FSI and TDR, carrying out
construction according to law and marketing the constructed
premises. According to him, these rights are connected with a
development arrangement and were given only to enable the
proposed development. They do not show that legal or exclusive



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possession of the property was transferred to the developer. In
support of this submission, reliance is placed on the decisions in
Ravindra C. Khirsara v. State, (2020) 14 SCC 774 and another
decision in Darshana Anand Damle vs Deputy Commissioner of
Income Tax, (2023) SCC OnLine Bom 1909.

6.    He further submits that Clause 11 records that there was no
need to execute a separate possession receipt, namely, (“ े गळी ताबा
पा ती विलहन
          ू दे ण्याची ग ज नाही”). According to him, this cannot be
treated as proof that actual legal possession of the property had
already been transferred. On the contrary, it only shows that the
permission or licence given for development was already
incorporated in the Development Agreement and, therefore, no
separate document was necessary for recording such permission.
He submits that no separate possession receipt was in fact
executed. There was also no separate act or document showing
that legal or exclusive possession of the property was handed over
to the developer.

7.    The learned Advocate further submits that the conduct of the
parties after execution of the Development Agreement also shows
that the licence contemplated under the Agreement was never
acted upon by the developer. The proposed development did not
commence, and no construction activity was carried out. According
to him, no developmental permission was acted upon under the
Agreement and the developer did not create any third-party rights
in respect of the property., the parties mutually executed a
registered Deed of Cancellation, by which the Development
Agreement came to be cancelled before the proposed development



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could take place. Thus, according to the Petitioner, although the
Agreement contemplated a "limited licence" enabling the developer
to carry out development activities, the transaction failed and
never came into effect in the manner intended by the parties. The
Petitioners, according to him, continued to retain ownership and
legal control over the property. The proposed development
remained unimplemented. It is submitted that Section 47 of the
Maharashtra Stamp Act provides relief in cases where a duly
stamped instrument becomes ineffective, incapable of being
completed, or fails to achieve the transaction for which it was
executed. According to the Petitioner, in the present case, disputes
arose between the parties and the Development Agreement
became incapable of achieving its intended purpose. It was,
therefore, cancelled. It is further submitted that the application for
refund was filed within the period prescribed under Section 48 of
the Act.

8.    According to Mr. Gorwadkar, the objection raised by the
Respondents is entirely based upon the assumption that Clause 13
shows      transfer   of   possession.   He   submits   that   such    an
interpretation is contrary to the language of Clause 11, which,
according to him, limits the nature of possession to a licence given
for development. When the Development Agreement is read as a
whole, it does not show any transfer of legal or exclusive
possession. It only gives limited contractual permission to enter the
property for carrying out the proposed development. The proposed
development never took place. It is, therefore, submitted that the
Respondents are not correct in treating the contractual licence



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contemplated under Clause 11 as equal to transfer of legal
possession.   According   to   the   Petitioner,   the   Development
Agreement only gave a limited licence for the purpose of
development. The intended transaction failed, the Agreement was
cancelled, and the Petitioners continued to remain in factual as
well as juridical possession of the property. It is, therefore,
submitted that the Petitioners are entitled to refund of stamp duty
under Section 47 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. It is further
submitted that the ground now sought to be raised by the
Respondents through the Affidavit-in-Reply does not form part of
the impugned order. According to the Petitioner, an order cannot
be supported by adding fresh reasons through an affidavit. In
support of this submission, reliance is placed upon the decision of
the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election
Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405.

9.   Per contra, Smt. Srivastava, learned AGP, submits that the
Petitioner has not complied with the first part of the proviso to
sub-section (1) of Section 48. She submits that the reason stated
for cancellation was that “the possession of property” was not
given within time. Therefore, according to her, the Petitioner
executed the Deed of Cancellation for cancelling and rescinding
the said “Development Agreement”. On this basis, it is submitted
that the Petitioner is not eligible for refund. She further submits
that the application for refund was required to be filed within six
months, namely on or before 14 October 2013, calculated from the
date of the Development Agreement. The stamps were purchased
on 15 April 2013 and the instrument was also executed on the



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same date. However, according to the learned AGP, the application
for refund was filed on 12 April 2014, after expiry of the stipulated
period of six months. It is, therefore, submitted that the present
Petition deserves to be dismissed. She further submits that the
Respondents also object to the claim on the ground that the
Petitioner has failed to show that possession of the subject
property was not given to the developer. According to her,
possession was in fact handed over at the time when the document
was executed. In this regard, reliance is placed upon Clause 13
appearing at page 27 of the Petition, which reads as follows:-

      "13. अविपलार्थीीला दोन्ही आविण ज्याअर्थीी सद वि ळकतीचे वि कसनाका ी
      विलहन
          ू दे णा   यांनी विलहन
                              ू घे णा    यांना iz त्यक्ष   खु ला ताबा विदले ला
      आहे - त्याबाबत   े गळी पा ती विलहन
                                       ू दे ण्याची आ श्यकता नाही- तसे च
      सद वि ळकती ध्ये विलहन
                          ू घे णा विकं ा त्यांचे नावि विनजने iz े श क ण्यास
      वि ळकतीचे ले व्हविलं ग क ण्यास इत्यादी वि कसनाची का े कायान् ीत
      आणण्यास विलहन
                  ू दे णा यांनी त्यांची पु ण विन ं त सं ती विदले ली आहे -"

10.   The learned AGP further submits that the Development
Agreement in the present case is only one step towards effecting a
conveyance under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963.
According to her, an instrument of Development Agreement and a
Conveyance Deed are separate and different kinds of documents. A
Conveyance Deed cannot merely be treated as a subsequent
document flowing from every Development Agreement. In support
of this submission, she relies upon the decision of this Court in
Prasun Developers v. State of Maharashtra, Writ Petition No.9923
of 2014, decided on 30 January 2015. She submits that the
relevant dates in the present case are clear. The Development




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Agreement was executed on 15 April 2013. The Deed of
Cancellation was registered on 24 February 2014. According to the
Respondents, the application for refund was required to be filed on
or before 14 October 2013. However, the application for refund
was filed on 7 May 2014. It is, therefore, submitted that the
application was delayed by about 6 months and 22 days and,
therefore, the Petitioner is not entitled to refund. She further
submits that in respect of several articles under the Stamp Act,
stamp duty is made payable by referring to Article 25. According to
her, this does not mean that every such document falls under
Article 25.

REASONS AND ANALYSIS:

11.   I have considered the submissions made by Mr. Gorwadkar,
learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Petitioner and Smt.
Srivastava, learned AGP appearing for the Respondents. I have also
gone through the Development Agreement dated 15 April 2013,
the Deed of Cancellation, the application made by the Petitioner
for refund of stamp duty, the order dated 11 August 2014 and the
impugned order dated 6 December 2014. I have further considered
the decision of this Court in M/s. Satyam Construction, Writ
Petition No.241 of 2015, decided on 3 September 2025, on which
substantial reliance is placed by the Petitioner. In my view, the
dispute in the present matter is about applicability of Sections 47
and 48 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 to the facts of this
case. The Respondents have raised more than one objection. The
first objection, which is found in the impugned order, is that the
Development Agreement does not come within the proviso to



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Section 48(1). According to the Authority, it is neither an
Agreement for Sale nor a conveyance of the nature contemplated
by the said proviso. Another objection is raised later in the
Affidavit-in-Reply. It is contended that possession of the property
was already given to the developer under Clause 13 of the
Development Agreement and, therefore, the Petitioner does not
satisfy the requirement for claiming refund. Apart from this, the
Respondents have also raised objection regarding limitation.

12.   Before considering these objections, it is necessary to
understand the scheme of Sections 47 and 48. Section 47 provides
for allowance or refund of stamps in different situations. Section
47(c)(5), which is relevant for the present matter, applies where
an instrument:

      "by reason of the refusal of any person to act under the
      same, or to advance any money intended to be thereby
      secured, or by the refusal or non-acceptance of any office
      thereby granted, fails of the intended purpose;"
13.   Thus, the substantive provision giving right to claim refund
is Section 47. Whether a particular transaction has failed in
achieving the purpose for which it was entered into will depend
upon facts of that particular case. Section 48, on the other hand,
provides the period within which an application for such relief is
required to be made. This distinction between the right to claim
refund under Section 47 and the period for making such
application under Section 48 has been considered by this Court in
M/s. Satyam Construction. As seen from paragraphs 10 to 13 of
the said judgment, the proviso to Section 48(1) does not create an




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independent right of refund. The right to claim refund has to be
found under Section 47. The proviso only gives an extended period
of limitation when the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied.
Therefore, the approach adopted by the Authority in the present
case, namely, first deciding whether the instrument is covered by
the proviso and, after answering that question in the negative,
rejecting the refund claim, does not appear to be fully in
accordance with the scheme of the Act.

14.   The first question is whether the Development Agreement in
the present case failed to achieve the purpose for which it was
executed. The Development Agreement was executed on 15 April
2013. According to the Petitioner, the proposed development could
not proceed because the building plans were not sanctioned within
reasonable time and disputes also arose between the parties. It is
further stated that the consideration amount was returned to the
Petitioner Firm. The parties executed a Deed of Cancellation on 18
February 2014, which came to be registered on 24 February 2014.

15.   The Development Agreement was not continued by the
parties. It was cancelled by mutual agreement through a registered
document. There is no material placed before this Court to show
that the proposed development was completed or even carried out
before cancellation of the agreement. On the contrary, the case of
the Petitioner is that the development never commenced, no
construction activity was undertaken, and no third-party rights
were created. These facts are relevant while considering whether
the instrument became incapable of achieving the purpose for
which it was executed.



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16.   The     learned    AGP    submitted     that   the   Development
Agreement was cancelled because “the possession of property” was
not   given    within    time   and,    therefore,   according   to    the
Respondents, the Petitioner cannot claim refund. This submission
requires some examination. Mere cancellation of an agreement
does not automatically mean that refund has to be granted. At the
same time, only because an agreement is cancelled, it also cannot
be said that Section 47 can never apply. What is required to be
seen is whether, on facts of the particular case, the intended
transaction had failed and whether the conditions under the
statute are satisfied.

17.   In the present case, the parties themselves found it necessary
to cancel the Development Agreement. According to the Petitioner,
the building plans could not be sanctioned within reasonable time
and disputes had arisen between the parties. Therefore, the
agreement was not taken to its intended conclusion. The
Development Agreement was executed for development of the
property. If the proposed development could not commence and
thereafter the parties mutually cancelled the agreement, there is
sufficient material to show that the intended transaction did not
fructify. This aspect supports the case of the Petitioner under
Section 47(c)(5).

18.   The next important question is regarding possession of the
property. The learned AGP has relied upon Clause 13 of the
Development Agreement. The relevant part, as reproduced before
this Court, reads as under:




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      "13. अविपलार्थीीला      दोन्ही      आविण      ज्याअर्थीी   सद        वि ळकतीचे
      वि कसनाका ी विलहन
                      ू दे णा          यांनी विलहन
                                                 ू घे णा     यांना iz त्यक्ष     खु ला
      ताबा विदले ला आहे - त्याबाबत       े गळी पा ती विलहन
                                                         ू दे ण्याची आ श्यकता
      नाही- तसे च सद       वि ळकती ध्ये विलहन
                                            ू घे णा         विकं ा त्यांचे नावि विनजने
      iz े श क ण्यास वि ळकतीचे ले व्हविलं ग क ण्यास इत्यादी वि कसनाची का े
      कायान् ीत आणण्यास विलहन
                            ू दे णा              यांनी त्यांची पु ण विन ं त     सं ती
      विदले ली आहे -"

19.   According to the Respondents, the words “iz त्यक्ष                   खु ला ताबा

विदले ला आहे -” show that possession was handed over to the
developer. It is submitted that once possession was given, the
Petitioner cannot claim refund under the statutory provisions.
However, this submission cannot be decided by taking only the
words “iz त्यक्ष        खु ला ताबा” from Clause 13 and reading those

words separately. The Development Agreement has to be read as a
whole. One clause may explain, control or qualify the meaning of
another clause. Therefore, it is necessary to also consider Clause
11 of the same Development Agreement.

20.   According to the Petitioner, Clause 11 specifically records
that the developer was given “iz त्यक्ष                खु ला ताबा वि कासनाकवि ता

लायसे न्सी म्हणून”. The important qualifying words are “वि कासनाकवि ता
लायसे न्सी म्हणून”. These words cannot be simply ignored. The
parties themselves have used the expression “लायसे न्सी म्हणून”,
meaning thereby as a licensee, while describing the right given to
the developer in respect of the property.

21.   The Respondents have not placed any material before the
Court to show that Clause 11 was superseded, changed or made
ineffective by Clause 13. Both clauses form part of the same


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Development Agreement. Therefore, the expression “ iz त्यक्ष       खु ला

ताबा” occurring in Clause 13 has to be understood along with the
description in Clause 11 that such entry or possession was given
“वि कासनाकवि ता लायसे न्सी म्हणून”. If the interpretation suggested by
the Respondents is accepted, the qualifying words “ वि कासनाकवि ता
लायसे न्सी म्हणून” would practically become without any meaning.
Such interpretation would not be proper. As far as possible, every
part of the document has to be given some meaning. On reading
Clauses 11 and 13 together, what appears is that the developer
was permitted to enter upon the property and undertake the acts
necessary for development. The parties themselves have described
such permission as a licence for development. The remaining part
of Clause 13 also supports such reading. The developer and its
nominees were permitted to enter the property, carry out levelling
and undertake other acts necessary for implementation of the
proposed development. These rights are consistent with permission
given for development work. By themselves, they do not
conclusively establish that complete and exclusive legal possession
of the property was transferred to the developer. Clause 13 also
states that no separate receipt for possession was required. The
learned AGP submits that this shows that possession was already
handed over under the Development Agreement. There is some
substance in this submission to the extent that the parties intended
that no separate document concerning possession was necessary.
However, this circumstance by cannot decide the exact legal nature
of the possession. The Development Agreement has to be read for
understanding what kind of right was actually given. When the




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same agreement describes the arrangement as “वि कासनाकवि ता
लायसे न्सी म्हणून”, mere absence of a separate possession receipt
cannot convert such licence into an unconditional transfer of legal
or exclusive possession.

22.   There is also another factual circumstance which is relevant.
According to the Petitioner, the developer never commenced the
development, did not carry out construction and did not create any
third-party rights. The proposed transaction was cancelled. The
Respondents have not pointed out any material showing that, after
execution of the Development Agreement, the developer had
asserted exclusive possession against the owners or dealt with the
property. Therefore, on the material presently available, I am
unable to accept that Clause 13 establishes transfer of exclusive
possession in such manner as to defeat the claim for refund. A
more reasonable reading of the Development Agreement is that
the developer was given a contractual right to enter upon the
property and carry out development activities. Such right was
connected with the proposed development and was in the nature
described by the parties in Clause 11 as a licensee.

23.   The next submission of the Respondents is regarding
limitation. According to the learned AGP, the Development
Agreement was executed on 15 April 2013 and under the ordinary
part of Section 48(1), the application for refund was required to be
made within six months, namely, on or before 14 October 2013.
According to the Respondents, the application was made after
expiry of this period. It is, therefore, submitted that the claim is
barred by limitation. The ordinary period of six months under



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Section 48(1) cannot be disputed. If the matter falls only under
the main provision, the application would be required to be made
within six months from the date of the instrument. However, the
Petitioner is relying upon the provision contained in the proviso to
Section 48(1). Therefore, it is necessary to see whether the present
Development Agreement can get the benefit of the said proviso.

24.   The relevant proviso, as considered in M/s. Satyam
Construction, provides a period where an agreement concerning
immovable property, on which stamp duty is paid under Article 25
of Schedule I, is registered and is thereafter cancelled by a
registered Deed of Cancellation on the grounds specified therein.
Thus, the proviso provides a exception to the ordinary period of six
months. The main objection in the impugned order is that a
Development Agreement is not a “conveyance” or an agreement of
the kind covered by the proviso. In view of the reasoning given by
this Court in M/s. Satyam Construction, this question cannot be
considered in the same manner as it was considered by the
Authority. In paragraph 14 of M/s. Satyam Construction, the
objection raised by the Authority was that stamp duty on the
Development Agreement was not paid under Article 25 but under
Article 5(g-a)(i). In paragraphs 14 and 15, the Court considered
the decision in Sandeep Dwellers Pvt. Ltd. and also considered the
position that though a Development Agreement may specifically
fall under Article 5(g-a)(i), the duty payable on such instrument is
calculated with reference to the duty payable on a conveyance
under Article 25. Paragraph 16 of M/s. Satyam Construction then
refers to the decision in Shweta Infrastructure and Housing (I) Pvt.



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Ltd. In that matter, the issue concerned refund of stamp duty and
the extended period under the proviso to Section 48(1). The Court
held that merely because the document is described as a
Development Agreement or an Agreement for Sale, that by would
not be decisive where the stamp duty payable on such instrument
is the same as the duty payable under Article 25. The conclusion
recorded in paragraph 18 of M/s. Satyam Construction is
important. It is held that:

      “a) Development Agreement can be treated at par with an
      instrument of conveyance for the purpose of applying the
      proviso to Section 48(1), where the stamp duty payable on
      such Development Agreement is calculated as per Article 25
      of Schedule I.”
25.   This reasoning deals with the main ground stated in the
impugned order.

26.   In the present case, it is not disputed that stamp duty of
Rs.70,12,500/- was paid on the Development Agreement. The case
of the Petitioner is that the duty was paid under Article 25 read
with Article 5 of Schedule I. The Respondents have not placed any
factual material to show that the nature of stamp duty paid in the
present matter was such that the reasoning in M/s. Satyam
Construction would not apply. The submission of the learned AGP
that a Development Agreement and a Conveyance Deed are
different documents, and one cannot simply be treated as the
other, is correct as a general proposition. A Development
Agreement does not become a Conveyance Deed merely because
stamp duty is calculated by referring to Article 25. The decision in
Prasun Developers cannot be ignored on this aspect. However, this


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does not finally decide the issue in the present matter. The
question here is not whether the Development Agreement becomes
identical to a Conveyance Deed for all purposes. The limited
question is whether, for applying the proviso to Section 48(1), a
Development Agreement on which stamp duty is payable by
reference to Article 25 can get the benefit of the period. On this
particular issue, the reasoning in M/s. Satyam Construction,
particularly paragraphs 14 to 19, supports the case of the
Petitioner. Therefore, the objection that the document is called a
Development Agreement and is, for that reason alone, outside the
proviso cannot be accepted. For the limited purpose of Section
48(1), what is required to be seen is the nature of the transaction,
the stamp duty payable on the instrument and whether the other
statutory requirements are fulfilled. The mere name or description
of the document cannot decide the matter.

27.   The next question is whether the Deed of Cancellation and
the application for refund were made within the period prescribed
by the applicable proviso. The Development Agreement was
executed on 15 April 2013. The Deed of Cancellation was executed
on 18 February 2014 and registered on 24 February 2014. Thus,
the original transaction was cancelled through a registered
instrument. The Petitioner states that the application for refund
was made on 7 April 2014. The submissions recorded on behalf of
the Respondents refer, at one place, to an application dated 12
April 2014 and, at another place, to 7 May 2014. However, the
case pleaded by the Petitioner and the facts recorded earlier show
that the application was made on 7 April 2014. In absence of any



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clear material showing otherwise, the date of 7 April 2014 will
have to be considered for deciding the present matter. The
registered Deed of Cancellation was executed and registered
within the period applicable to the original instrument. The
application for refund was also made shortly thereafter. Therefore,
once the case is held to fall within the proviso, the objection that
the application was not made within six months from 15 April
2013 cannot survive. The ordinary period of six months cannot be
applied by ignoring the period provided under the proviso.

28.   There is also one further submission made on behalf of the
Petitioner. It is contended that the objection regarding possession
was not a ground forming part of the impugned order and has
been raised later through the Affidavit-in-Reply. Reliance is placed
upon Mohinder Singh Gill. The principle stated in Mohinder Singh
Gill is that an order has to stand or fall on the reasons stated in
that order and, ordinarily, new reasons cannot be added through
an affidavit for improving or supporting the impugned order.
Therefore, if the impugned order was based only on the ground
that the Development Agreement did not fall within the proviso to
Section 48(1), the Respondents cannot change the basis of that
order by later raising a new factual ground concerning possession.
However, since the issue of possession is closely connected with
the statutory requirements and both sides have made submissions
on that issue, I have also examined the said contention on merits.
For the reasons already recorded in paragraphs 23 to 31 above, the
material does not show that the Petitioner had transferred such
legal and exclusive possession of the property which, by, would



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defeat the claim for refund. When the Development Agreement is
read as a whole, it shows a limited permission connected with the
proposed development.

29.     Thus, the overall position which emerges is this. The
Development Agreement was entered into for carrying out
development. The intended development did not proceed. Disputes
arose between the parties. The agreement was thereafter cancelled
by a registered Deed of Cancellation. The Petitioner is claiming
refund of stamp duty on the basis that the transaction failed. The
right for claiming such refund has to be examined under Section
47. The proviso to Section 48(1) only provides the period within
which such right can be exercised, if the necessary conditions are
satisfied.

30.     The main reason given in the impugned order, namely that a
Development Agreement cannot come within the proviso because
it is not a conveyance, cannot be sustained in view of the
reasoning in M/s. Satyam Construction, particularly paragraphs 14
to 19. The objection concerning possession also does not assist the
Respondents when Clauses 11 and 13 are read together. The words
“iz त्यक्ष   खु ला ताबा” cannot be separated from the qualifying

expression “वि कासनाकवि ता लायसे न्सी म्हणून” used by the parties in the
same agreement. The submission of the Respondents regarding the
ordinary period of limitation of six months would have been
relevant if the present case was governed only by the main part of
Section 48(1). Once the instrument is found capable of falling
within the proviso, and the registered Deed of Cancellation and
application for refund are found to have been made within the



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applicable period, the ordinary period cannot be applied.

31.   I am, therefore, of the view that rejection of the Petitioner’s
application on the ground that the Development Agreement does
not fall within the proviso to Section 48(1) is not sustainable. The
further objection concerning possession also does not justify
rejection of the claim on the facts and terms of the present
Development Agreement. The material on record shows that the
proposed transaction failed before the intended development could
be carried into effect and the agreement was thereafter cancelled
through a registered instrument. Consequently, the Petitioner is
entitled to have its claim for refund considered and allowed in
accordance with Section 47 read with the applicable proviso to
Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. The impugned
order dated 6 December 2014, as also the decision refusing to
recommend refund, therefore cannot be sustained. The Petitioner
is entitled to refund of the stamp duty amount of Rs.70,12,500/-,
subject to consequential directions regarding payment and
interest. The question of interest can be determined by applying
the principles recognised in M/s. Satyam Construction and the
applicable statutory and equitable considerations from the date on
which the application for refund was made.

32.   In view of the above discussion, the following order is
passed:-

      (i)    The Writ Petition is allowed;

      (ii)   The order dated 6 December 2014 passed by
      Respondent No.1, the Joint District Registrar and Collector of



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Stamps, in Case No.118 of 2014, and the order dated 11
August 2014 passed by Respondent No.2, the Deputy
Controller of Stamps, Pune, refusing to recommend and
grant refund of stamp duty, are hereby quashed and set
aside;

(iii) The application dated 7 April 2014 made by the
Petitioner for refund of stamp duty is allowed;

(iv) Respondent Nos.1 and 2 shall refund to the Petitioner
the amount of Rs.70,12,500/- towards stamp duty paid in
respect of the Development Agreement dated 15 April 2013;

(v)   The aforesaid amount shall carry simple interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from 7 April 2014, being the date of
the application for refund, till its actual payment;

(vi) The amount of refund together with accrued interest
shall be paid to the Petitioner within a period of six weeks
from the date of uploading of this judgment and order;

(vii) Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms.

(viii) There shall be no order as to costs.


                                        (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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