Bombay High Court
PADMAKAR DAYAKARAM BHAMREversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA THR ITS SECRETARY THR ITS SECRETARY AND ORS
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
Pension and related benefits cannot be withheld on the ground of a pending or invalidated caste‑validity certificate once the employee has retired from a reserved post; the petitioner is entitled to the pension, gratuity and interest.
Summary
The petitioner, a Scheduled Tribe employee appointed as a driver in 1982, retired on 31‑05‑2017 after 35 years of service but was denied pension and gratuity because he had not submitted a caste‑validity certificate, which was still pending before the Caste Scrutiny Committee. The High Court had earlier ordered the Committee to verify his claim, and later quashed its adverse order, remanding the matter for fresh consideration. Despite this, the respondent authority refused to process his pension, citing the lack of a court order. Relying on Supreme Court precedents and the Court’s own decisions, the judges held that pension is a vested right and property under Article 300A and cannot be withheld on the basis of a pending or invalidated caste certificate, especially where the employee had retired from a reserved post. The Court also noted the humanitarian government resolution of 27‑12‑2019 protecting long‑serving ST employees. Consequently, the petition was allowed and the respondent was directed to release the arrears of pension and gratuity with interest.
Issues considered
- Whether pension and ancillary benefits can be lawfully withheld pending submission of a caste‑validity certificate.
- Whether denial of pension violates the petitioner’s right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution.
- Whether Section 10 of the applicable Act can be invoked to cancel pension benefits in the absence of a formal discharge.
- Whether the Government Resolution dated 27‑12‑2019 creates a statutory exception protecting long‑serving ST employees.
- Whether the petitioner, as the legal heir, is entitled to family pension and gratuity.
Subjects
- pension
- caste validity certificate
- scheduled tribe
- Article 226
- Article 300A
- family pension
- superannuation
- government resolution
- caste scrutiny committee
- right to property
- humanitarian measure
Judgment
909-WP-8598-2026.DOC
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 8598 OF 2026
Padmakar Dayakaram Bhamre ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of Maharashtra & Anr. ...Respondents
_______
Mr. Umesh Gite (through V.C.) for Petitioner.
Mr. P. P. Kakade, AGP a/w Mr. V. G. Badgujar, AGP for Respondent-State.
Ms. Chaitrali Deshmukh for Respondent No.2.
_______
CORAM: G. S. KULKARNI &
DR. NEELA GOKHALE, JJ.
DATE: 02nd SEPTEMBER 2026
P.C.
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally, by consent of the
learned counsel appearing for the parties.
2. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed seeking
a direction to Respondent No.2 to grant and release the pension and other ancillary
benefits in favour of the Petitioner expeditiously from the date of his
superannuation, i.e. 31.05.2017, without insisting on submission of the Caste
Validity Certificate. The only substantive prayer made in the petition is required to
be noted, which reads thus:
“A) Issue Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ or Order
in the like nature thereby direct the respondent no. 2 to forthwith grant and
release the pension and other ancillary benefits in favour of petitioner
expeditiously from the date of superannuation from 31.05.2017, without
insisting for submits the Validity Certificate.”
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3. The facts lie in a narrow compass. The Petitioner belongs to the “Thakur”
Scheduled Tribe and, to that effect, was issued a Caste Certificate dated 05.05.1982
by the Competent Authority. On 18.06.1982, about 35 years prior to his
superannuation, the Petitioner was appointed by Respondent No.2, Zilla Parishad,
Nashik, on the post of “Driver” against a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribe
category. The services of the Petitioner were subsequently regularized with effect
from 04.04.1985, when he was made permanent.
4. It is the Petitioner’s case that, after about 29 years of his service i.e., on
20.12.2011, his tribe claim was forwarded to the Scheduled Tribe Caste Scrutiny
Committee, Nashik, for verification. On 31.05.2017, the Petitioner superannuated.
He was however not granted the pensionary benefits as also the gratuity, on the
ground that he had not submitted a Caste Validity Certificate. This when the
Petitioner was in continuous service for a period of 35 years from the year 1982 till
his superannuation on 31.05.2017. The caste validity claim was pending
consideration before the Caste Scrutiny Committee.
5. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Petitioner approached this Court by
filing Writ Petition No.9596 of 2017. By an Order dated 12.10.2017, this Court
directed the Caste Scrutiny Committee, Nashik, to scrutinize and verify the claim
of the Petitioner in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible. Admittedly,
such Order was passed after the Petitioner had superannuated. In the meantime, it
also transpired that on 20.12.2017, the Respondents issued an order in favour of
the Petitioner, whereby sanction was granted for release provisional pension of Rs.
8,000/- for the period of 01.06.2017 to 31.11.2017.
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6. In pursuance of the Orders passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.9596
of 2017, the Caste Scrutiny Committee passed an Order dated 01.02.2019,
whereby the claim of the Petitioner was invalidated. The Petitioner again
approached this Court by filing a second Writ Petition, being Writ Petition
No.2171 of 2019, challenging the Orders passed by the Caste Scrutiny Committee.
On such proceedings, this Court passed an Order dated 17.10.2025, whereby the
Committee’s Order dated 01.02.2019 was quashed and set aside and the matter was
remanded to the Caste Scrutiny Committee for fresh consideration. The
proceedings are still pending before the Caste Scrutiny Committee, Nashik.
7. In the meantime, on 17.11.2025, the Petitioner made an application before
Respondent No.2 for grant of pensionary benefits. In response to such application,
Respondent No.2 addressed a communication dated 11.02.2026 to the Petitioner,
referring to the Order dated 17.10.2025 passed by this Court and observing that as
no order were passed by the High Court directing grant of pension to the
Petitioner, the Petitioner’s representation/application cannot be considered and was
liable to be rejected. It is in these circumstances, the present Writ Petition has been
filed.
8. The learned counsel for the Respondents have opposed the petition and
justified the action taken by the Respondents. However, we are not persuaded to
accept such submissions advanced on behalf of the Respondents.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and, with their assistance,
have also perused the record.
10. At the outset, we find substance in all contentions as urged on behalf of the
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Petitioner that the Petitioner could not have been deprived of his pensionary
benefits in these circumstances, more particularly, when he had joined service in
the year 1982 on a reserved post and in the regular course of his service was
permitted to superannuate on 31.05.2017, after rendering about 35 years of service.
Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Jharkhand v.
Jintendrakumar Shrivastav1, the Petitioner is correct in his contention that
pensionary benefits as well as gratuity cannot be withheld and the same would be
violative of the Petitioner's right under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.
11. We find that the contentions as canvassed on behalf of the Petitioner are no
more res integra in view of the recent decision of this Bench in Ratnamala
Anilkumar Swami v. State of Maharashtra and Another, wherein, in similar
circumstances, and also taking into consideration the policy of the State
Government in regard to employees belonging to Scheduled Tribes who did not
have Caste Validity Certificates. It was held by this Court that once the Petitioner
was permitted to discharge his duties and was allowed to retire on attaining the age
of superannuation, the pension cannot be withheld. Such policy of the State
Government was contained in Government Resolution dated 27.12.2019, which
made a specific provision, as a humanitarian measure, for long years of service
rendered by such employees belonging to Scheduled Tribe category. In the said
decision, this Court considered the settled principles of law laid down by the
Supreme Court in a catena of decisions on the jurisprudential principles governing
entitlement to and grant of pension, when the Court held that it is by now well
1 AIR 2013 SC 3383
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settled that pension is neither a charity, nor a gratuitous payment, nor a bounty to
be distributed at the sweet will of the executive. It was also held that there is no
discretionary power to arbitrarily withhold, delay or modify pension and that any
culpable delay in payment of retirement benefits attracts interest penalty as a
matter of statutory right.
12. The relevant observations made by this Court in Ratnamala Anilkumar
Swami (supra) are required to be noted, which reads thus:
“10. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. We have also perused the
record and also the policy decisions which are in the form of Government
Resolutions as also the decisions of the Court placed for our consideration.
11. We may at the outset, observe that the undisputed facts are that the
Petitioner’s deceased husband had joined services of Respondent No.2 in the year
1995 and after a period of 17 long years of service, he was called upon to submit
validity of the Caste Certificate, issued to him by the Tahsildar / Executive
Magistrate, Mangalvedha, certifying that he belonged to the Scheduled Caste
category. Accordingly, he had approached the Caste Scrutiny Committee which
passed an order on 06.06.2019 invalidating the Caste Certificate. This was after
almost 24 years of service with Respondent No.2. Consequent to the invalidity of
the Caste Certificate, as set out in the reply Affidavit, in the normal course, Section
10 of the said Act could have been invoked, which provides that in the event Caste
Scrutiny Committee cancels the Caste Certificate of a person, he would be liable to
be discharged from the employment forthwith and any other benefits enjoyed or
derived by virtue of his appointment shall be withdrawn forthwith. Section 10 and
more particularly, sub-section (1) thereof of the said Act, is required to be noted,
which reads thus:
“10. (1) Whoever not being a person belonging to any of the Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic
Tribes, Other Backward Classes or Special Backward Category secures
admission in any educational institution against a seat reserved for such
Castes, Tribes or Classes, or secures any appointment in the Government,
local authority or in any other Company or Corporation, owned or controlled
by the Government or in any Government aided institution or Co-operative
Society against a post reserved for such Castes, Tribes or Classes by producing
a false Caste Certificate shall, on cancellation of the Caste Certificate by the
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Scrutiny Committee, be liable to be debarred from the concerned educational
institution, or as the case may be, discharged from the said employment
forthwith and any other benefits enjoyed or derived by virtue of such
admission or appointment by such person as aforesaid shall be withdrawn
forthwith.”
[emphasis supplied]
12. It is not the Respondents’ case that Respondent No. 2 in any manner had
invoked the provisions of Section 10 to take any action against the Petitioner’s
husband, on the basis of order dated 06.06.2019 passed by the Caste Scrutiny
Committee so as to discharge him from the service. In fact, the Petitioner’s deceased
husband was continued in the employment, without any action being taken, till he
expired in harness on 08.09.2020. Even if we consider that such action was not
taken by the Respondents, by virtue of the protection as granted by this Court vide
order dated 27.09.2013 passed in Writ Petition No.9133 of 2013, the fact remains
that he was continued in the service. Thus, the legal status as enjoyed by the
Petitioner’s husband qua the employment in question was that he remained in
service till he expired on 08.09.2020. He clearly died in harness.
13. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Court cannot be
oblivious to the fact, that no action was taken by the Respondents under Section 10
of the said Act during his lifetime. In the event any action against him under the said
provision was to be resorted, the husband could have approached this Court to
challenge the orders passed by the Caste Scrutiny Committee. All these
circumstances, in our opinion, has certainly brought about a situation, which is not
governed under the provisions of Section 10 and more particularly, when the
Petitioner was granted provisional family pension by an order dated 27.01.2021 and
the same was abruptly halted after a period of six months. We also find that the State
Government, in regard to the candidates who belonged to the Scheduled Tribe
(reserved category) has taken a policy decision to protect their employment in such
circumstances on invalidity of the Caste Certificate, as a humanitarian measure, for
the long years of service rendered by such employees. Our attention to that effect is
drawn to the Government Resolution dated 27.12.2019, more particularly Paragraph
Nos.4.1 and 4.2, which read thus:
“4.1 On account of non-submission of the Scheduled Tribe Caste Validity
Certificate, all Administrative Departments concerned shall, pursuant to this
Government Resolution, create supernumerary posts in the cadre of the posts
currently held by such Officers and Employees, equivalent to the number of
Officers and Employees whose services are being transferred to
supernumerary posts and all the Administrative Departments concerned, on
humanitarian grounds and to obviate administrative exigencies, shall appoint
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such Officers and Employees to the said supernumerary posts on a purely
temporary basis for a period of 11 (eleven) months or until the date on which
they would have retired, if they had continued in service, whichever is earlier.
4.2 As regards those Officers and Employees who were discharged from
service prior to the issuance of this Government Resolution, all
Administrative Departments concerned shall create supernumerary posts in
the cadre of the post held by such Officers and Employees prior to their
termination from the service and shall, on humanitarian grounds and to
obviate administrative exigencies, appoint them to the said supernumerary
posts on a purely temporary basis for a period of 11 (eleven) months, or until
the date on which they would have retired if they had continued in service,
whichever is earlier.”
[emphasis supplied]
14. Thus, it appears that the State Government was concerned, when long
years of service was rendered by the employees and a situation of such nature of
Caste Validity Certificate being not furnished or invalidated had arisen; such
employees, considering their long service, would be protected by creating
supernumerary posts.
15. Further from the decisions cited at the Bar, it is clear that such issues had
reached the Courts. We find that a Division Bench of this Court in the case Prakash
s/ Fulchand Barwal (supra), considered a similar situation, wherein the petitioner
therein who belonged to the Scheduled Tribe category, had expired. He was
appointed as a peon in the year 1988 against a post reserved for Scheduled Tribes.
His Caste Certificate was referred for verification to the Caste Scrutiny Committee,
which invalidated his claim vide order dated 30.09.1989. Consequent thereto, his
services came to be terminated vide order dated 10.12.1989. The appeal preferred
against the said order was also dismissed. He expired during the pendency of the said
petition. It is in these circumstances, the Court recognized the entitlement of the
legal heirs for grant of family pension. The relevant observations read thus:
“2] The original petitioner was appointed as Peon by the respondent no.4 by
the order dated 11.7.1988. The petitioner's appointment was against a post
reserved for scheduled tribe. As such the claim of the petitioner was referred
to the scheduled tribe caste verification committee. The said committee
invalidated the claim of the petitioner vide order dated 30.9.1989. On the
ground of invalidation, the petitioner's services came to be terminated vide
order dated 10.12.1989. The appeal preferred by the petitioner against the
order of the caste verification committee was dismissed on 27.10.1993. Being
aggrieved thereby, the present petition was filed.
3] While granting Rule, this Court had granted interim relief in terms of
prayer clause (B). As such in pursuance to the interim order, the petitioner
was to work as a Peon with the respondent no.4. Subsequently, Civil
Application No. 5571/1994 was filed by the respondent no.4 for vacating the
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interim relief. The same came to be rejected.
4] During pendency of the writ petition, the original petitioner has died and
his legal heirs are brought on record. Since the original petitioner has already
died, the question regarding his claim of belonging to scheduled tribe does
not arise. The legal heirs of the original petitioner have restricted the claim in
the present petition only for grant of family pension.
5] The petitioner was originally appointed on 18.7.1988. By virtue of interim
order passed in the year 1994, the petitioner was directed to be reinstated.
The original petitioner has died on 5.12.2003. Considering the date of
appointment of the original petitioner to be 11/18.7.1988, the original
petitioner has rendered the service of more than 15 years. As such the
petitioner's widow would be entitled to the family pension. We accordingly
extend the benefit of family pension to the widow of the original petitioner
i.e. present petitioner no.1 - Smt. Shobhabai w/o Prakash Barwal.
6] We, therefore, dispose of the writ petition by directing the respondents to
give the benefits of family pension to the widow of the original petitioner
from the date of his death i.e. 5.12.2003. The said benefit be extended to the
widow of the petitioner namely Smt. Shobhabai w/o Prakash Barwal within a
period of six months from today along with the arrears. No order as to costs.”
[emphasis supplied]
16. The aforesaid decision in Prakash s/o Fulchand Barwal (supra), was
followed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Saraswati w/o
Nagnath Mupde (supra), in which the husband of the Petitioner therein was
working as a teacher and appointed on the post reserved for the Scheduled Tribe
category. His Caste Certificate was invalidated by the Caste Scrutiny Committee.
Considering the decisions in case of Prakash s/o Fulchand Barwal (supra), the Court
made the following observations:
“5. It was held in Prakash Barwal (supra), that the LR’s were entitled for
the pensionary benefits since the bread earner had passed away while in
service. Family pension was, therefore, directed to be paid to the widow from
the date of his death. In Sunita W/o Late Pradip Thakar Vs. The State of
Maharashtra and Others. 2022 (1) Mh.L.J. 219 , this Court dealt with the
claim of a widow and following the law laid down in Prakash Barwal (supra),
this Court also granted the pensionary benefits. The Petitioner's case is
practically identical to both reported judgments.
6. We are informed that the Petitioner was receiving provisional pension,
which was subsequently discontinued.
7. In view of the above, this Writ Petition is partly allowed with the
following directions:
A) Respondent No. 3/Headmaster would forward the proposal of the
Petitioner, as a widow, for receiving the pension, to Respondent
No.4/Education Officer (Primary), within 30 day from today.
B) the said proposal would be dealt with by the appropriate Authorities and
considering the order of this Court in Prakash Barwal (supra) and Sunita
Thakur (supra), the Petitioner shall be entitled for pension from the date of
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the demise of her husband.
C) The arrears be calculated and be paid to the Petitioner on or before
30.11.2024, if not already paid, and the commencement of payment of
pension shall be from the month of June, 2024. In the meanwhile, the
provisional pension shall continue and such amounts received by way of
provisional pension would be adjusted as against the arrears of pension.
D) Rule is made partly absolute in above terms.”
[emphasis supplied]
17. In a recent decision in the case of Manda w/o Prakash Sonawane (supra),
the deceased husband of the petitioner therein was the only bread earner. He was
selected and appointed on the post, which was reserved for the backward category.
He retired on 30.06.2020 and passed away on 18.07.2022. There was no dispute in
regard to pensionary and entitlement of retiral benefits. The employer, however,
took a stand that the same would not be payable to the legal representatives of the
petitioner, since the deceased employee did not tender the Caste Validity Certificate,
and since the employee’s claim of belonging to the reserved category was not
validated, the petitioner would not be entitled for grant of family pension. It is in
these circumstances, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manda w/o
Prakash Sonawane (supra), relying on the decision of this Court in the matter of
Kamlabai w/o Shaphadu Salve Vs. the State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2, and also the
Supreme Court in the matter of Chairman and Managing Director, Food
Corporation of India and Ors. Vs. Jagdish Balaram Bahira and Ors. 3, recognized the
entitlement for family pension and other reliefs and made following observations:
“8. In similar set of facts, this Court (Coram: Ravindra V. Ghuge and S.G.
Mehare, JJ.) delivered a Judgment on 20th July, 2021 in Writ Petition
No.6485 of 2020 at Aurangabad (Sunita w/o Late Pradip Thakar Vs. State of
Maharashtra and Ors.) and by placing reliance on a Judgment of this Court,
dated 12th August, 2010 delivered in Writ Petition No.3718 of 1994 (Prakash
Fulchand Barwal since deceased through his Legal Heirs Smt. Shobhabai
Barwal and others Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.), allowed the claim
of Sunita and directed the payment of family pension and all retiral benefits as
would have been admissible to the deceased employee had he normally
superannuated from service. For similar reasons, this Court has delivered
several Judgments which are annexed to the Petition paper-book.
9. In the light of the above, this Writ Petition is allowed in terms of prayer
clause (A). Necessary papers for releasing the family pension payable to the
eligible Legal Representatives of the deceased Employee, shall be moved by
the Employer within 30 days and it shall be the duty of the Employer, as well
as the Authorities concerned, to ensure that the arrears of pension are paid to
2 Writ Petition No.4624 of 2021 decided on 01.10.2021.
3 2017 (8) SCC 670
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the eligible Legal Representatives, within a period of 90 days from today.
Gratuity amount shall also be paid within a period of 60 days with admissible
statutory interest @ 12% per annum in the light of the Government
Notification dated 5th October, 1999 issued by the Government of India,
Ministry of Personnel, P.G. & Pensions, Department of Pension & Pensioners'
Welfare. Needless to state, that the LRs of the deceased would co-operate with
the authorities, if the preparation of the papers.
10. It is made clear that if any of the eligible Legal Representatives of the
deceased Employee, desire to seek compassionate employment, the law laid
down by the Full Bench of this Court in Om Bhagwanrao Anjanwad vs. State
of Maharashtra and Anr., (Full Bench), 2022 (4) Mh.L.J. 723, would be
squarely applicable.”
18. Considering the aforesaid consistent view, we are of the opinion that the
Respondents in the present case would not be correct in their contention that in the
facts and circumstances of the case, the Petitioner should be deprived of family
pension. We cannot accept the contention that as in Prakash S/o Fulchand Barwal
(supra) and in Saraswati w/o Nagnath Mupde (supra), the Petitioners belonged to
the Scheduled Tribe, and as in the present case the Petitioner’s deceased husband
belonged to the Scheduled Caste category, different view needs to be taken to hold
that the Petitioner is not entitled for the family pension. Such view would be per se
discriminatory when the consideration is entitlement to pension. The reason being
that undoubtedly the Petitioner’s deceased husband continued in service for a very
long period i.e., about 25 years, till he expired. The provisions of Section 10 were
not invoked, inasmuch as, no action was taken to discharge the service of the
Petitioner’s deceased husband, on the ground that the validity was not awarded to
his Caste Certificate, moreover, he was continued in service till he expired. In these
circumstances, we do not find any warrant in law, and more particularly when the
Respondent in the reply Affidavit has confined their opposition only referring to
Section 10 of the said Act to disentitle the Petitioner for grant of family pension. It is
significant that even the Respondent did not seek vacating the interim protection,
which was granted to the Petitioner’s husband in the proceedings in Writ Petition
No.9133 of 2013 (supra). Thus, the clear legal and unimpeachable status of the
Petitioner’s deceased husband, on the day he expired, cannot be overlooked so as to
refuse the benefit and entitlement of family pension to the Petitioner, who is the wife
of the deceased employee. Denying family pension to her in such circumstances
would amount to a travesty of justice.
19. Further, we cannot be oblivious to the jurisprudence surrounding
entitlement and grant of pension which by now is firmly established. It is well
settled that pension is neither a charity, nor a gratuitous payment, nor a bounty to be
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distributed at the sweet will of the executive. It has been conceptualized as an
enforceable legal right, grounded in constitutional and socio-economic principles.
Pension is also regarded as a deferred wages compensation earned by an employee
through long, continuous and faithful service rather than paying the full value of
labour during active employment. It has been held that the right to receive pension
constitutes ‘property’, earlier under Article 31(1), which was a fundamental right and
after its repeal, a constitutional protection guaranteed under Article 300A.
Consequently, a pensionary entitlement, once vested in an employee, cannot be
taken away merely by an executive order or administrative action. Deprivation of
such property must have the authority of law, and therefore requires express
statutory sanction or other valid legal authority. From a social welfare perspective in
relation to pension, it is held that three main socio-economic objectives are met,
namely, to ensure economic independence and dignity in old age, when physical
capacity to earn diminishes. It protects the employee against economic insecurity
and post-retirement destitution as also it serves as a reward for past unblemished
service. Pension is hence held to be a legal right flowing from statutory service rules,
and not an act of grace. The government has no discretionary power to arbitrarily
withhold, delay or modify it. Any culpable delay in paying retirement benefits
attracts an interest penalty as a matter of statutory right.
20. In the aforesaid context, we may usefully refer to the following decisions:-
20.1 In Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar 4, the Supreme Court was
confronted with the question as to whether the right to receive pension could be
withheld by the State in the absence of statutory authority. The Court held that the
right to receive pension flows from the applicable service rules and does not depend
upon any order granting such pension. It further held that the right to pension
constitutes “property” and cannot be taken away by a mere executive order. The
relevant observations read thus:
“15. The questions that arise for consideration are whether the orders,
dated August 5, 1966 and June 12, 1968, are legal and valid. Before we
consider that aspect, it is necessary to state that in order to sustain this
petition under Article 32, the petitioner will have to establish that either
the order, dated August 5, 1966 or June 12, 1968, or both of them affect
his fundamental rights guaranteed to him. The order of August 5, 1966,
according to the petitioner, is one removing him from service and it has
been passed in violation of Article 311. That the said order is one removing
the petitioner from service is also admitted by the respondents in para 11
of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf by the Assistant Director of
Education. Assuming that the said order has been passed in violation of
Article 311, the said circumstance will not give a right to the petitioner to
4 (1971) 2 SCC 330
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approach this Court under Article 32. The stand taken by the petitioner is
that his right to get pension is property and it does not cease to be property
on the mere denial or cancellation by the respondents. The order, dated
June 12, 1968, is one withholding the payment of pension or at any rate
amounts to a denial by the respondents to his right to get pension. Either
way, his rights to property are affected under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of
the Constitution. His right to pension cannot be taken away by an
executive order. In the counter-affidavit, the respondents do not dispute
the rights of the petitioner to get pension, but they take the stand that the
order, dated June 12, 1968, is justified by Rule 46 of the Pension Rules.
This aspect will be dealt with by us later. There is only a bald averment in
the counter-affidavit that there is no question of any fundamental right
and therefore this petition is not maintainable. As to on what basis this
plea is taken, has not been further clarified in the counter-affidavit. But
before us Mr B.P. Jha, learned Counsel for the respondents, urged that by
withholding the payment of pension by the State, no fundamental rights of
the petitioner have been affected.
16. We are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr Jha that no
fundamental rights of the petitioner are affected by passing the order,
dated June 12, 1968. We will in due course refer to the relevant Pension
Rules bearing on the matter also certain decisions. In our opinion, the right
to get pension is “property” and by withholding the same, the petitioner’s
fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) are
affected. As the matter is being discussed more fully in the latter part of the
judgment, it is enough to state at this stage that the writ petition is
maintainable. Even according to the respondents the order, dated June 12,
1968, has no independent existence and that order has been passed on the
basis of the earlier order, dated August 5, 1966. In our opinion, if the
order, dated August 5, 1966, cannot be sustained, it will follow that the
order, dated June 12, 1968, will also fall to the ground. Hence we will deal,
in the first instance, with the validity of the order, dated August 5, 1966.
The full text of the order, dated August 5, 1966, passed by the Director of
Public Instruction, Bihar, is as follows:
.…
28. According to the petitioner the right to receive pension is property and
the respondents by an executive order, dated June 12, 1968, have
wrongfully withheld his pension. That order affects his fundamental rights
under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. The respondents, as
we have already indicated, do not dispute the right of the petitioner to get
pension, but for the order passed on August 5, 1966. There is only a bald
averment in the counter-affidavit that no question of any fundamental
right arises for consideration. Mr Jha, learned Counsel for the respondents,
was not prepared to take up the position that the right to receive pension
cannot be considered to be property under any circumstances. According
to him, in this case, no order has been passed by the State granting
pension. We understood the learned Counsel to urge that if the State had
passed an order granting pension and later on resiles from that order, the
latter order may be considered to affect the petitioner’s right regarding
property so as to attract Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution.
29. We are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for
the respondents. By a reference to the material provisions in the Pension
Rules, we have already indicated that the grant of pension does not depend
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upon an order being passed by the authorities to that effect. It may be that
for the purposes of qualifying the amount having regard to the period of
service and other allied matters, it may be necessary for the authorities to
pass an order to that effect, but the right to receive pension flows to an
officer not because of the said order but by virtue of the Rules. The Rules,
we have already pointed out, clearly recognise the right of persons like the
petitioners to receive pension under the circumstances mentioned therein.
****
33. Having due regard to the above decisions, we are of the opinion that
the right of the petitioner to receive pension is property under Article
31(1) and by a mere executive order the State had no power to withhold
the same. Similarly, the said claim is also property under Article 19(1)(f)
and it is not saved by sub-article (5) of Article 19. Therefore, it follows that
the order, dated June 12, 1968, denying the petitioner right to receive
pension affects the fundamental right of the petitioner under Articles
19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution, and as such the writ petition under
Article 32 is maintainable. It may be that under the Pension Act (Act 23 of
1871) there is a bar against a civil court entertaining any suit relating to the
matters mentioned therein. That does not stand in the way of writ of
mandamus being issued to the State to properly consider the claim of the
petitioner for payment of pension according to law.”
[emphasis supplied]
20.2 In D.S. Nakara v. Union of India5, the Supreme Court dealt with an issue,
as to the nature and significance of pension payable to a retired employee. The Court
held that pension is not merely compensation for past service, but is also a measure
of socio-economic justice intended to provide economic security in old age,
particularly when the physical and mental capacity to earn diminishes, and
represents deferred compensation for the service rendered. The relevant observations
read thus:
“20. The antequated notion of pension being a bounty, a gratuitous
payment depending upon the sweet will or grace of the employer not
claimable as a right and, therefore, no right to pension can be enforced
through Court has been swept under the carpet by the decision of the
Constitution Bench in Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar wherein this
Court authoritatively ruled that pension is a right and the payment of it
does not depend upon the discretion of the Government but is governed
by the rules and a government servant coming within those rules is
entitled to claim pension. It was further held that the grant of pension does
not depend upon anyone’s discretion. It is only for the purpose of
quantifying the amount having regard to service and other allied matters
that it may be necessary for the authority to pass an order to that effect but
the right to receive pension flows to the officer not because of any such
order but by virtue of the rules. This view was reaffirmed in State of
Punjab v. Iqbal Singh.
…..
29. Summing up it can be said with confidence that pension is not only
5 (1983) 1 SCC 305
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compensation for loyal service rendered in the past, but pension also has a
broader significance, in that it is a measure of socio-economic justice which
inheres economic security in the fall of life when physical and mental
prowess is ebbing corresponding to aging process and, therefore, one is
required to fall back on savings. One such saving in kind is when you give
your best in the hey-day of life to your employer, in days of invalidity,
economic security by way of periodical payment is assured. The term has
been judicially defined as a stated allowance or stipend made in
consideration of past service or a surrender of rights or emoluments to one
retired from service. Thus the pension payable to a government employee
is earned by rendering long and efficient service and therefore can be said
to be a deferred portion of the compensation or for service rendered. In
one sentence one can say that the most practical raison d’etre for pension is
the inability to provide for oneself due to old age. One may live and avoid
unemployment but not senility and penury if there is nothing to fall back
upon.
30. The discernible purpose thus underlying pension scheme or a statute
introducing the pension scheme must inform interpretative process and
accordingly it should receive a liberal construction and the courts may not
so interpret such statute as to render them inane (see American
Jurisprudence, 2d, 881).
31. From the discussion three things emerge: (i) that pension is neither a
bounty nor a matter of grace depending upon the sweet will of the
employer and that it creates a vested right subject to 1972 Rules which are
statutory in character because they are enacted in exercise of powers
conferred by the proviso to Article 309 and clause (5) of Article 148 of the
Constitution; (ii) that the pension is not an ex gratia payment but it is a
payment for the past service rendered; and (iii) it is a social welfare
measure rendering socio-economic justice to those who in the hey-day of
their life ceaselessly toiled for the employer on an assurance that in their
old age they would not be left in lurch. It must also be noticed that the
quantum of pension is a certain percentage correlated to the average
emoluments drawn during last three years of service reduced to 10 months
under liberalised pension scheme. Its payment is dependent upon an
additional condition of impeccable behaviour even subsequent to
retirement, that is, since the cessation of the contract of service and that it
can be reduced or withdrawn as a disciplinary measure.”
[emphasis supplied]
20.3 Similarly, in State of Kerala v. M. Padmanabhan Nair 6, the Supreme Court
was confronted with the issue of delay in the settlement and disbursement of
pensionary and other retiral benefits. The Court held that pension and gratuity are
valuable rights and property in the hands of the employee and that any culpable
delay in their settlement and disbursement must be visited with the payment of
interest at the current market rate. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court
read thus:
“1. Pension and gratuity are no longer any bounty to be distributed by the
Government to its employees on their retirement but have become, under
6 (1985) 1 SCC 429
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the decisions of this Court, valuable rights and property in their hands and
any culpable delay in settlement and disbursement thereof must be visited
with the penalty of payment of interest at the current market rate till actual
payment.
2. Usually the delay occurs by reason of non-production of the L.P.C. (last
pay certificate) and the N.L.C. (no liability certificate) from the concerned
Departments but both these documents pertain to matters, records whereof
would be with the concerned Government Departments. Since the date of
retirement of every Government servant is very much known in advance
we fail to appreciate why the process of collecting the requisite information
and issuance of these two documents should not be completed at least a
week before the date of retirement so that the payment of gratuity amount
could be made to the Government servant on the date he retires or on the
following day and pension at the expiry of the following month. The
necessity for prompt payment of the retirement dues to a Government
servant immediately after his retirement cannot be over-emphasised and it
would not be unreasonable to direct that the liability to pay penal interest
on these dues at the current market rate should commence at the expiry of
two months from the date of retirement.”
20.4 Further, in State of Jharkhand v. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava 7, the Supreme
Court was confronted with the issue as to whether pension and gratuity could be
withheld during the pendency of departmental or criminal proceedings in the
absence of any provision in the applicable Pension Rules. The Court, while holding
that pension and gratuity constitute “property” within the meaning of Article 300A
of the Constitution, observed thus:
“8. It is an accepted position that gratuity and pension are not bounties. An
employee earns these benefits by dint of his long, continuous, faithful and
unblemished service. Conceptually it is so lucidly described in D.S. Nakara v.
Union of India by D.A. Desai, J. who spoke for the Bench, in his inimitable
style, in the following words: (SCC pp.319-20, paras 18-20)
“18. The approach of the respondents raises a vital and none too easy of
answer, question as to why pension is paid. And why was it required to
be liberalised? Is the employer, which expression will include even the
State, bound to pay pension? Is there any obligation on the employer to
provide for the erstwhile employee even after the contract of
employment has come to an end and the employee has ceased to render
service?
19. What is a pension? What are the goals of pension? What public
interest or purpose, if any, it seeks to serve? If it does seek to serve some
public purpose, is it thwarted by such artificial division of retirement
pre and post a certain date? We need seek answer to these and
incidental questions so as to render just justice between parties to this
petition.
20. The antiquated notion of pension being a bounty a gratuitous
payment depending upon the sweet will or grace of the employer not
claimable as a right and, therefore, no right to pension can be enforced
through court has been swept under the carpet by the decision of the
7 (2013) 12 SCC 210
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Constitution Bench in Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar [(1971) 2
SCC 330 : 1971 Supp SCR 634] wherein this Court authoritatively
ruled that pension is a right and the payment of it does not depend
upon the discretion of the Government but is governed by the rules
and a government servant coming within those rules is entitled to claim
pension. It was further held that the grant of pension does not depend
upon anyone’s discretion. It is only for the purpose of quantifying the
amount having regard to service and other allied matters that it may be
necessary for the authority to pass an order to that effect but the right
to receive pension flows to the officer not because of any such order but
by virtue of the rules. This view was reaffirmed in State of Punjab v.
Iqbal Singh.”
It is thus a hard earned benefit which accrues to an employee and is in the
nature of “property”. This right to property cannot be taken away without the
due process of law as per the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution
of India.
……
15. In State of W.B. v. Haresh C. Banerjee this Court recognised that
even when, after the repeal of Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31(1) of the
Constitution vide Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978
w.e.f. 20-6-1979, the right to property no longer remained a
fundamental right, it was still a constitutional right, as provided in
Article 300-A of the Constitution. Right to receive pension was treated
as right to property. Otherwise, challenge in that case was to the vires
of Rule 10(1) of the West Bengal Services (Death-cum-Retirement
Benefit) Rules, 1971 which conferred the right upon the Governor to
withhold or withdraw a pension or any part thereof under certain
circumstances and the said challenge was repelled by this Court.
16. The fact remains that there is an imprimatur to the legal principle
that the right to receive pension is recognised as a right in “property”.
Article 300-A of the Constitution of India reads as under:
“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property
save by authority of law.—No person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law.”
Once we proceed on that premise, the answer to the question posed
by us in the beginning of this judgment becomes too obvious. A
person cannot be deprived of this pension without the authority of law,
which is the constitutional mandate enshrined in Article 300-A of the
Constitution. It follows that attempt of the appellant to take away a
part of pension or gratuity or even leave encashment without any
statutory provision and under the umbrage of administrative
instruction cannot be countenanced.”
[emphasis supplied]”
13. We are thus in complete agreement with the learned counsel for the
Petitioner that the issue raised in this petition stands squarely covered by the
decision of this Court in Ratnamala Anilkumar Swami (supra) and that the pension
payable to the Petitioner could not have been withheld.
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14. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the present petition would be
required to be allowed. It is accordingly allowed in terms of prayer clause (A). We
direct that the arrears of pension and gratuity be released in favour of the Petitioner
within a period of four weeks from the date on which a copy of this order is made
available to the Respondents, along with interest thereon at the rate of 8% per
annum.
15. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. No costs.
(DR. NEELA GOKHALE, J) (G. S. KULKARNI, J.)
Digitally
signed by
AJIT
AJIT RAMESH
RAMESH PATHRIKAR
PATHRIKAR Date:
2026.09.05
16:08:37
+0530
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