MARATHON PANVEL INFRASTRUCTURES PVT LTDversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS

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                                                             Sayali
        IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                 WRIT PETITION NO. 9090 OF 2026

Marathon Panvel Infrastructures Pvt Ltd     … Petitioner
           V/s.
State of Maharashtra and Others             … Respondents

Mr. Girish Godbole, Senior Advocate with Prathamesh
Ayare i/b Vivek Kakade, for Petitioner.
Ms. Mamta S. Shrivastava, AGP for State- Respondent
Nos. 1 to 4.
Mr. Surel S. Shah, Senior Advocate i/b Mr. Aniket
Ranade, for Respondent nos. 14 to 16.


                             CORAM     : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                             DATED     : OCTOBER 05, 2026
P.C.:

1.      The present Petition arises from the proceedings started by
Respondent No.5, namely Saga Builders Private Limited,
challenging various mutation entries dated 23 February 1989, 12
April 2006, 17 June 2008 and 01 April 2010.

2.      Facts and circumstances as stated petitioner are as follows.
Respondent No.7, namely the Original Owner, was the owner of
agricultural land bearing Survey No.57/3/1. The land measures
1,34,275.87 square metres and is situated at Mauje Pali Budruk,
Taluka Panvel, District Raigad. This land is referred to hereafter
as the “Subject Property”. On 22 September 1988, the Original



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Owner entered into a registered Agreement for Sale with
Respondent Nos.10 to 13, who are referred to as the 1989
Purchasers. The Agreement was in respect of the Subject
Property. The agreed consideration was Rs.8,55,000/-. On 6
January 1989, the Original Owner executed a registered Sale
Deed in favour of the 1989 Purchasers in respect of the Subject
Property. The consideration mentioned in the Sale Deed was
Rs.8,58,000/-. This document is referred to as the “1989 Sale
Deed”. On 23 February 1989, after the execution of the 1989 Sale
Deed, Mutation Entry No.1008 was made in the revenue record.
On 20 February 1993, the 1989 Purchasers executed a Release
Deed amongst themselves. By this document, Respondent Nos.12
and 13 released their rights in the Subject Property in favour of
Respondent Nos.10 and 11. On 9 March 1987, Mutation Entry
No.1098 was made recording the names of Respondent Nos.12
and 13. On 23 December 2005, Respondent Nos.12 and 13
executed a registered Sale Deed in respect of the Subject Property
in favour of the 2005 Purchasers. The consideration mentioned in
the Sale Deed was Rs.36,91,325/-. This document is referred to
as the “2005 Sale Deed”. On 12 April 2006, Mutation Entry
No.1322 was made in the revenue record on the basis of the
2005 Sale Deed.

3.   On 16 January 2006, the Petitioner made an application
under Section 63-1A of the MTAL Act for setting up a multi-
product Special Economic Zone in 20 villages of Panvel. Pali
Budruk was one of the villages included in the proposal. The



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Subject Property was part of the land proposed for the said
project. On 12 September 2006, the Development Commissioner,
Industries, granted permission in favour of the Petitioner under
Section 63-1A of the MTAL Act. On 12 January 2007, the 2005
Purchasers executed a registered Sale Deed in favour of the
Petitioner in respect of the Subject Property. The consideration
mentioned in the Sale Deed was Rs.75,50,435/-. This document
is referred to as the “2007 Sale Deed”. On 1 April 2010, Mutation
Entry No.1488 was made in the revenue record on the basis of
the 2007 Sale Deed.

4.   On 8 August 1988, Saga claims to have purchased the
Subject Property, along with Survey No.57/13, from the POA
Holder of the Original Owner by a registered Sale Deed. This
document is referred to as the “Saga Sale Deed”. According to the
Petitioner, the Saga Sale Deed has several serious defects. First,
the Saga Sale Deed is stated to have been executed on 8 August
1988. However, the registration appears to have taken place only
after an endorsement made by the Sub-Registrar on 31 July
2003. Second, the entire Sale Deed is typed. However, the second
page, on which the name of Saga is mentioned, is handwritten on
a separate page. Third, Saga is a private limited company.
According to the Petitioner, the Saga Sale Deed was executed
without obtaining the necessary permission under Section 63 of
the MTAL Act. Fourth, the consideration shown in the Saga Sale
Deed is only Rs.37,000/-. According to the Petitioner, this amount
is very small when compared with the consideration of



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Rs.8,58,000/- mentioned in the 1989 Sale Deed executed in
favour of the Petitioner's predecessor. Fifth, according to the
Petitioner, the Saga Sale Deed does not contain the signature of
any authorised signatory of Saga.

5.   On 25 February 2011, Saga filed Appeal No.72 of 2011
before the SDO. By this Appeal, Saga challenged Mutation Entries
Nos.1008, 1322, 1393 and 1488. The Petitioner points out that
Saga did not file any application seeking condonation of delay in
challenging Mutation Entry No.1008. This Mutation Entry was
made on 23 February 1989. The Petitioner points out that, in
paragraph 4 of its Appeal, Saga stated that after execution of the
Saga Sale Deed, it had orally informed the Talathi about its
purchase of the land. According to Saga, the revenue officer had
committed a mistake by continuing to show the name of the
Original Owner in the revenue record.

6.   On 28 July 2011, the Petitioner had filed its Written Reply
on 24 March 2011. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed an Additional
Written Say. In paragraph 7 of the Additional Written Say, the
Petitioner raised an objection that Saga had not filed any
application for condonation of the delay of about 22 years in
challenging the concerned Mutation Entry. On 9 January 2012,
the SDO allowed Appeal No.72 of 2011 filed by Saga. The SDO
cancelled and set aside Mutation Entries Nos.1008, 1322 and
1488. The SDO directed that action be taken on the basis of the
Saga Sale Deed.




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7.    On 8 March 2012, following the SDO Order, Mutation Entry
No.1577 was made in favour of Saga. However, the Circle Officer
made a remark in the 7/12 extract that the agricultural status of
Saga was required to be verified. On 19 June 2012, the office of
the Tehsildar, Phaltan, issued a certificate stating that one Mr.
Keval Duggal owned agricultural land at Phaltan and was an
agriculturist. The Petitioner contends that Saga is a private
limited company and is a separate legal entity. Therefore,
according to the Petitioner, merely because Mr. Duggal was an
agriculturist, Saga could not be treated as an agriculturist. On 19
July 2012, the Tehsildar, Gulbarga, Karnataka, addressed a letter
seeking verification and confirmation regarding the agriculturist
status of Mr. Duggal. On 25 July 2012, a reply was received from
the Tehsildar, Gulbarga.

8.    On 14 May 2013, on an application made by Saga, the
Revenue Minister directed that, in view of Section 88(1)(b) of the
MTAL Act, Sections 1 to 87 of the said Act would not apply to the
Subject Property. According to the Petitioner, this order had the
effect of giving permission after the purchase had been made.
The Petitioner contends that Saga was a non-agriculturist and
could not have purchased the Subject Property without the
required permission.

9.    On 22 July 2013, Saga executed a registered Sale Deed in
favour of Respondent Nos.14 to 16, who are referred to as the
Purchasers from Saga. Under the said Sale Deed, the Subject




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Property was sold for a total consideration of Rs.3,20,00,000/-.

10.   On 28 April 2012, being aggrieved by the SDO Order, the
Petitioner filed Appeal No.97 of 2012 before the Collector. On 11
December 2012, the Collector dismissed Appeal No.97 of 2012
filed by the Petitioner and confirmed the SDO Order. On 29
January 2013, being aggrieved by the Collector Order, the
Petitioner filed Revision Application No.35 of 2013 before the
Commissioner. On 24 May 2013, the Commissioner dismissed the
Revision Application filed by the Petitioner. On 25 July 2013,
being aggrieved by the Commissioner Revision Order, the
Petitioner filed Review Application No.422 of 2013 before the
Commissioner. On 18 July 2014, the Commissioner dismissed the
Review Application filed by the Petitioner. On 21 July 2016, the
Petitioner filed Special Civil Suit No.294 of 2016 before the Civil
Judge, Senior Division, Panvel. In the said Suit, the Petitioner
sought a declaration that the 2007 Sale Deed was valid, binding
and continued to remain in force. The Petitioner challenged the
Saga Sale Deed and the Saga Second Sale Deed. It sought a
declaration that both these documents were void ab initio and
had no legal effect. The said Suit is still pending.

11.   On 21 July 2016, being aggrieved by the Commissioner
Review Order, the Petitioner filed a Revision Application before
the Revenue Minister. In paragraphs 4.14 to 4.16 of the Revision
Application, the Petitioner stated that the proceedings initiated by
Saga were barred by limitation. On 14 August 2025, the Revenue




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Minister dismissed the Revision Application filed by the
Petitioner.

12.   Mr. Godbole, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
Petitioner, submitted that there was no decision by the appellate
authority on whether there was sufficient reason for the long
delay in filing the Appeal. According to him, this was important
because, unless the delay was first considered and condoned, the
appellate authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the Appeal
after such a long period. He submitted that the authorities under
the Act could not have proceeded to hear and decide the Appeal
without first condoning the delay. He submitted that deletion of
Respondent No.7 and the other respondents would not make the
present Petition not maintainable. According to him, Respondent
No.7 had transferred his entire ownership in favour of the other
respondents. He submitted that the original Appeal before the
SDO was filed only by Respondent No.5 and Respondent No.5
continues to remain a respondent in the present Petition.

13.   On the other hand, Mr. Shah, the learned Senior Advocate
appearing for Respondent Nos.14 to 16, submitted that deletion
of Respondent Nos.6, 7, 9 and 11 to 19 had resulted in orders
which were inconsistent with each other and which operated
against the Petitioner. He submitted that the delay in filing the
Appeal had been explained in paragraph 8 of the Appeal Memo.
Therefore, according to him, there was no requirement to file a
separate application for condonation of delay. In support of this




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submission, Mr. Shah relied upon the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Sesh Nath Singh and Another Vs. Baidyabati
Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Limited and Another, (2021) 7
SCC 313. The learned Advocate appearing for the Petitioner, at
the time when notice was issued, had stated in paragraph 4 of
the order that the orders passed in the RTS proceedings would
remain subject to the decision of the Civil Court in the pending
Civil Suit and the Interim Applications filed therein. He
submitted that, if this Court interferes in the present Petition, it
would result in reviving an order which, according to the
Petitioner, was illegal. On this ground, he submitted that no
interference was called for in the present Petition.

      REASONS AND FINDINGS

14.   I have considered the Petition, the orders passed by the
authorities and the submissions made by Mr. Godbole, learned
Senior Advocate for the Petitioner, and Mr. Shah, learned Senior
Advocate for Respondent Nos.14 to 16.

15.   The main question before this Court is whether the
authorities could have entertained and decided the Appeal filed
by Respondent No.5 after such a long period, without first
considering whether the delay in filing the Appeal was required
to be condoned.

16.   The facts regarding the delay are important. Mutation
Entry No.1008 was made on 23 February 1989. Respondent No.5
filed Appeal No.72 of 2011 before the SDO only on 25 February



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2011. Thus, the challenge to Mutation Entry No.1008 was made
after about 22 years. The Petitioner had brought this fact to the
notice of the SDO. In paragraph 7 of its Additional Written Say,
the Petitioner had objected that Respondent No.5 had not filed
any application for condonation of the delay of about 22 years.
Thus, this objection was before the authority. It was not
something which had not come to the notice of the authority. The
authority was required to consider the same and give its decision.

17.   There is one more fact which is relevant. Respondent No.5
stated that after execution of the alleged Sale Deed in its favour,
it had orally informed the Talathi about its purchase of the land.
Its case was that the revenue officer had made a mistake by
continuing to show the name of the Original Owner in the
revenue record. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no
explanation at all before the SDO regarding the delay. But merely
giving some explanation was not enough. The authority was
required to    consider whether the explanation          given     by
Respondent No.5 was sufficient for not challenging Mutation
Entry No.1008 from 23 February 1989 till 25 February 2011. The
authority had to consider the period of about 22 years. It was
required to consider why Respondent No.5 did not take steps
during this long period. The authority was required to consider
the revenue entries which continued in the names of persons
claiming through the Original Owner and the rights which had
come into existence during this period. There is no such
consideration or finding in the order.



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18.   Mr. Godbole, learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioner,
submitted that when the authority had not decided whether there
was sufficient cause for the delay, it could not have exercised its
appellate jurisdiction after such a long period. To this extent, I
find substance in the submission. However, I do not accept the
submission that a separate application for condonation of delay
must in every case be filed as an absolute requirement. Such a
proposition cannot be accepted in view of the judgment relied
upon by Mr. Shah.

19.   Mr. Shah relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Sesh Nath Singh and Another. The Supreme Court has held in
paragraph 63 that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not
require a separate application and that there is no bar on the
Court or Tribunal considering condonation of delay even where a
formal application has not been filed. The Supreme Court has
observed that filing a formal application is the normal practice
because it helps the Court or Tribunal to consider whether the
cause shown for the delay is sufficient. Therefore, the submission
of Mr. Shah that the Appeal could not have been entertained only
because no separate application for condonation of delay was
filed cannot be accepted in such an absolute manner.

20.   But the judgment in Sesh Nath Singh does not mean that a
delay of many years can be ignored. The Supreme Court has
made it clear that there must be sufficient cause before delay can
be condoned. Whether the explanation amounts to sufficient




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cause will depend upon the facts of each case. Therefore, the real
question is not only whether a separate application was filed. The
real question is whether the appellate authority considered the
delay and came to a finding that there was sufficient cause for
such delay before entertaining the Appeal. That exercise is absent
in the present case.

21.   The law may not require a particular form of application in
every case. But the authority is still required to apply its mind to
the delay. If the appellant has given the reasons for the delay in
the Appeal Memo, the authority can consider those reasons. It
can then decide whether those reasons amount to sufficient cause
and, if satisfied, condone the delay. Only thereafter can it proceed
to hear the Appeal on merits. But the authority cannot proceed as
if the Appeal was filed within time and decide the main dispute
without first deciding the question of delay.

22.   The SDO, while allowing Appeal No.72 of 2011, cancelled
and set aside Mutation Entries Nos.1008, 1322 and 1488 and
directed action on the basis of the Saga Sale Deed. The SDO
Order directly affected the revenue record and affected the claim
of the Petitioner arising from the earlier transactions. Before
taking such action, the SDO was required to consider the
preliminary objection of the Petitioner regarding the long delay in
challenging Mutation Entry No.1008. The Petitioner had raised
this objection. The Mutation Entry, its date and the period of
delay were pointed out. Even then, there is no finding as to




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whether Respondent No.5 had sufficient cause for the delay.

23.   Condonation of delay and deciding the Appeal on merits
are two different things. Condonation of delay cannot be treated
as only a formality. The authority has to consider the explanation
for the delay and the circumstances placed before it. In the
present case, Respondent No.5 was seeking to challenge an entry
which had remained in the revenue record from 23 February
1989. During these years, several transactions had taken place.
The record shows that the 1989 Purchasers had acquired the
property under the registered Sale Deed dated 6 January 1989
for Rs.8,58,000/-. Thereafter, Respondent Nos.12 and 13
executed a registered Sale Deed dated 23 December 2005 in
favour of the 2005 Purchasers for Rs.36,91,325/-. Thereafter, the
2005 Purchasers executed a registered Sale Deed dated 12
January 2007 in favour of the Petitioner for Rs.75,50,435/-.
Mutation Entry No.1488 was thereafter made on 1 April 2010.
Thus, when Respondent No.5 filed its Appeal on 25 February
2011, the position had considerably changed from what it was
when Mutation Entry No.1008 was made in 1989. Several
transactions and revenue entries had taken place in the
meantime.

24.   Therefore, it cannot be said that the question of delay was
of no importance. The delay was about 22 years. During this
period, the property had been dealt with under several registered
transactions and the Petitioner had acquired the property under a




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registered Sale Deed. The authority was required to consider this
whole position before allowing Respondent No.5 to reopen the
old revenue entry.

25.   I have considered the submission of Mr. Shah that the delay
had been explained in paragraph 8 of the Appeal Memo and
there was no need for a separate application for condonation of
delay. As stated, a separate formal application is not in every case
compulsory. To that limited extent, the submission is correct. But
this does not answer the main issue. Even if paragraph 8 of the
Appeal Memo contained an explanation, the authority had to
examine that explanation. It had to decide whether the
explanation was sufficient. It had to record a finding on that
question. A statement made by the appellant explaining the delay
does not mean that the delay has been condoned. The authority
having jurisdiction has to take that decision. The judgment in
Sesh Nath Singh does not help Respondent Nos.14 to 16 in the
manner suggested. There must be sufficient cause and the
authority has to consider the explanation in the facts of the case.
The Supreme Court has recognised that limitation gives a
valuable right to the opposite party and such right should not be
taken away casually. At the same time, where sufficient cause is
shown, the Court should not take an unnecessarily strict and
technical approach. Both sides have to be considered.

26.   In the present case, however, there was no such
consideration. The question whether sufficient cause existed was




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not decided.

27.   I have considered the submission of Mr. Shah regarding
deletion of Respondent Nos.6, 7, 9 and 11 to 19. It is true that
some of the original parties have been deleted from the
proceedings. However, the original Appeal before the SDO was
filed by Respondent No.5 and Respondent No.5 continues to be a
party before this Court. The grievance in the present Petition
relates to the proceedings started by Respondent No.5 and the
orders passed in those proceedings. The Petitioner has pointed
out that Respondent No.7 had transferred his entire ownership in
favour of other persons. In these circumstances, deletion of some
parties does not prevent this Court from deciding the Petition,
particularly when the person who had initiated the original
proceedings continues to be before the Court.

28.   I have considered the submission that deletion of some
respondents resulted in inconsistent orders against the Petitioner.
It is not necessary to decide this issue in detail for deciding the
present Petition. The Petition can be decided on the basic defect
in the manner in which the Appeal was entertained and decided.
The issue of delay arose in the original proceedings themselves. It
does not depend upon all the subsequent purchasers being
parties to the present proceedings.

29.   There is one more submission which requires consideration.
It was submitted that, at the time of issuance of notice, the
Petitioner had stated that the orders passed in the RTS



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proceedings would be subject to the decision of the Civil Court in
the pending Civil Suit and the Interim Applications filed therein.
This submission does not prevent this Court from examining
whether the impugned order was passed.

30.    The statement that the RTS proceedings would remain
subject to the Civil Court's decision only means that the revenue
proceedings will not decide the civil rights of the parties. It
cannot mean that the statutory authorities were free to ignore the
requirements of law while deciding the revenue proceedings. In
that Suit, the Petitioner has sought a declaration that the 2007
Sale Deed is valid and binding. The Petitioner has challenged the
Saga Sale Deed and the Saga Second Sale Deed and has sought a
declaration that they are void ab initio and have no legal effect.
These questions will be decided by the Civil Court in accordance
with law. This Court is not deciding the final question of title
between the parties in the present Petition. The finding in this
Petition is limited to the legality of the revenue proceedings and
particularly to the failure of the appellate authority to consider
the delay before entertaining the Appeal.

31.   The events which took place after the SDO Order show why
the question of delay could not have been treated as a mere
formality. After the SDO Order, Mutation Entry No.1577 was
made in favour of Saga on 8 March 2012. However, even then,
the Circle Officer made a remark in the 7/12 extract that the
agricultural status of Saga was required to be verified. Thereafter,




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proceedings regarding the agriculturist status of Saga continued.
On 19 June 2012, the office of the Tehsildar, Phaltan issued a
certificate regarding the agriculturist status of Mr. Keval Duggal.
The Petitioner contended that the status of an individual could
not be treated as the status of Saga, which was a private limited
company. These issues may be decided in the appropriate
proceedings. I am not deciding them here. But they show that the
matter had several disputed aspects and the authority could not
have ignored the preliminary question of delay.

32.     I have considered the objections raised by the Petitioner
regarding the Saga Sale Deed. The Petitioner has pointed out that
the document is stated to have been executed on 8 August 1988,
whereas its registration appears to have taken place after an
endorsement made by the Sub-Registrar on 31 July 2003. The
Petitioner has pointed out that the second page mentioning the
name of Saga is handwritten, that Saga is a private limited
company and that the consideration shown in the document is
only Rs.37,000/-. The Petitioner has contended that the
document does not bear the signature of an authorised signatory
of Saga. These objections raise questions about the validity and
effect of the Saga Sale Deed. Those questions are connected with
the title dispute which is pending before the Civil Court. They are
not required to be decided in this Petition. I accordingly do not
record any final finding regarding the validity of the Saga Sale
Deed.




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33.   At the same time, the existence of these disputed questions
could not be a reason to ignore the delay in the statutory Appeal.
The authority was first required to decide whether the Appeal
could be entertained after such a long period. The order of
consideration was important. First, the authority had to consider
the delay. Second, it had to decide whether sufficient cause was
shown. Only after that could it proceed to examine the challenge
to the mutation entries on merits. That course was not followed.

34.   I am conscious that mutation entries by themselves do not
decide the title to an immovable property. The parties have
approached the Civil Court. Their final rights in the property will
depend upon the decision of the competent Civil Court. But that
does not make the defect found in the present proceedings
unimportant. A statutory authority has to exercise its power in
the manner required by law. When an Appeal is filed after an
extraordinary delay and the opposite party objects to that delay,
the authority has to decide that objection. It cannot proceed to
the merits of the Appeal without deciding the delay.

35.   In my opinion, absence of such adjudication affects the
validity of the orders which followed. The SDO could not have
cancelled Mutation Entry No.1008, which had remained in the
revenue record from 23 February 1989, without first considering
whether Respondent No.5 had sufficient cause for approaching
the appellate authority only on 25 February 2011. The
subsequent orders of the Collector and the Commissioner




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proceeded on the basis of the SDO Order. The Commissioner
dismissed the Review Application. Thereafter, the Revenue
Minister dismissed the Revision Application on 14 August 2025.
Once the basic defect of entertaining the Appeal without deciding
the delay is found, the subsequent orders confirming the earlier
decision cannot independently remain.

36.   The Petition succeeds on this ground. It is not necessary for
this Court to decide the rival claims of title of the Petitioner and
Respondent Nos.14 to 16. Those questions are pending before the
Civil Court. Setting aside the impugned order will operate only
upon the revenue proceedings. It will not amount to a declaration
of title in favour of either party.

37.   I have considered what consequential relief should be
granted. Respondent Nos.14 to 16 claim through Saga and have
acquired the property under the registered Sale Deed dated 22
July 2013. Therefore, merely because the impugned revenue
order is being set aside, they cannot be prevented from taking
such steps as are available to them in law for entering their
names in the record of rights. If Respondent Nos.14 to 16 file an
application under Section 149 for entering their names in the
record of rights, the competent authority shall consider and
decide the same independently and in accordance with law. Such
decision shall remain subject to the rights and contentions of the
parties in the pending Civil Suit and to the decision which may
ultimately be given by the competent Civil Court.




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38.   For the reasons stated above, I am satisfied that the
impugned order dated 14 August 2025 cannot be sustained. The
orders confirmed by that order cannot continue to operate.

39.   The Petition is accordingly allowed in terms of the
following order.

40.   In view of the foregoing discussion, and upon overall
assessment of the material record, the following order is passed:

      (i) The impugned order dated 14 August 2025 passed by
      the authority under the Act, confirming the orders passed
      by Respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4, is hereby quashed and set
      aside.

      (ii) It is clarified that setting aside of the impugned order
      shall not prevent Respondent Nos.14 to 16 from filing an
      appropriate application under Section 149 of the Act for
      entering their names in the record of rights. If such an
      application is filed, the concerned authority under the Act
      shall consider and decide the same in accordance with law.

      (iii) The Petition is accordingly allowed in the above terms
      and stands disposed of.



                                           (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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