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Bombay High Court

NIRMALA RUPCHANDRA GHATAWAT AND ORSversusCOLLECTOR OF PALGHAR AND ORS

Decided
Disposal
Disposed Off

Holding

The order dated 3 February 2026 passed by the Tahsildar is valid, and the writ petition is dismissed.

Summary

The petitioners, a group of women, purchased a former Gram Panchayat house and, relying on a No‑Objection Certificate from the village panchayat, erected 54 tin sheds. The Tahsildar of Palghar issued a notice and an order on 3 February 2026 directing removal of the sheds, alleging lack of permission from the Planning Authority. The petitioners sought a temporary injunction, which was rejected by the trial court and the appeal was dismissed. They filed a writ petition under Article 227 challenging the Tahsildar’s jurisdiction, arguing that the delegation of powers from the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) to the Collector and then to the Tahsildar was invalid. The High Court held that the delegation under Section 151(3) of the MRTP Act and the Collector’s power under Section 18(1)(iii) validly empowered the Tahsildar, and that the structures were unauthorized and could not be protected by equity. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

  • The Tahsildar’s authority to issue an order under Sections 52‑54 of the MRTP Act after delegation by the Collector and MMRDA.
  • Whether the delegation of powers from the Special Planning Authority (MMRDA) to the Collector and subsequently to the Tahsildar is valid under Section 151 of the MRTP Act.
  • Whether the petitioners are entitled to a temporary injunction to restrain demolition of unauthorized structures.
  • Whether the writ jurisdiction under Article 227 can be invoked to set aside the Tahsildar’s order despite its procedural validity.

Legislation cited

Subjects

  • unauthorised construction
  • MRTP Act
  • delegation of powers
  • temporary injunction
  • writ petition
  • Article 227
  • planning authority
  • special planning authority
  • demolition
  • Section 18
  • Section 151
  • Section 143
  • Section 149

Judgment

                                                            WP-9692-2026.DOC

                           IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                 WRIT PETITION NO. 9692 OF 2026


                   1. Smt. Nirmala Rupchandra Ghatawat
                      Age 59 years, Occ.: Household,
                      R/o. Flat No.101/102, Rooprajat
                      Vihar, in front of Govt. Hospital,
SAINATH
SANJAY                Navapur Road, Boisar Taluka,
BODKHE                District Palghar.
Digitally signed
by SAINATH
SANJAY BODKHE
Date: 2026.09.01
22:13:00 +0530
                   2. Smt. Manju Chandan Solanki
                      Age 57 years, Occ.: Household,
                      R/o. Roop Solanki Palace,
                      Bunglow No.1, Rooprajat,
                      Near CIDCO Colony, Tarapur Road,
                      Taluka, District Palghar.

                   3. Smt. Meena Gautam Solanki
                      Age 51 years, Occ. Household
                      R/o. Roop Solanki Palace,
                      Bunglor No.2, Rooprajat,
                      Near CIDCO Colony, Tarapur Road,
                      Taluka, District Palghar.

                   4. Smt. Reena Ajay Ghatawat
                      Age 41 years, Occ.: Household,
                      R/o. Flat No. 101/102, Rooprajat
                      Vihar, in front of Govt. Hospital,
                      Navapur Road, Boisar Taluka,
                      District Palghar.

                   5. Smt. Sangita Mahavir Solanki
                      Age 49 years, Occ.: Household,
                      R/o. Second Floor, Olampus Building
                      Tarapur Road, SBI Bank,
                      Khodaram Bagh, Boisar,
                      Taluka, District Palghar.

                   6. Smt. Heena Deepak Ghatawat
                      Age 35 years, Occ.: Household,
                      R/o. Flat No.101/102, Rooprajat

                   SAINATH, PA                      1/29
                                              WP-9692-2026.DOC

    Vihar, in front of Govt. Hospital,
    Navapur Road, Boisar Taluka,
    District Palghar.
    Through Power of Attorney Holder
    Shri. Ajay Roopchand Ghatawat
    Age 41 years, Occ.: Business,
    R/o. Room Nirmal, Bunglow No.4,
    Pushkar Park, Near CIDCO Colony,
    Tarapur Road, Taluka, District Palghar.      ...Petitioners


        Versus

1. Collector of Palghar
   Collector office, Palghar,
   Taluka District Palghar

2. Tahsildar of Palghar
   Tahsildar office, Palghar,
   Taluka, District Palghar.

3. Circle Officer of Boisar
   Circle office, Boisar,
   Taluka District Palghar

4. Mumbai Metropolitan Regional
   Development Authority (MMRDA)
   through Authorized Representative
   having office at MMRDA, BKC,
   Bandra Kurla Complex, E-Block,
   Mumbai - 400051                             …Respondents
_____________ _______ ____                    _________

Mr. Girish Godbole, Senior Advocate, a/w Mr. Devashish
     Godbole, Mr. Mayank Gandhi, Mr. Dipak Bobade, Mr.
     Prithviraj Kharat, for the Petitioners.

Smt. Mamta S Srivastava, AGP for Respondent Nos. 1 – 3.

Mr. Akshay Shinde, for Respondent No.4 - MMRDA.

_____________________________________


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                  CORAM                    :     N. J. JAMADAR, J.
                  RESERVED ON             :      18th AUGUST 2026
                  PRONOUNCED ON :                01st SEPTEMBER 2026


JUDGMENT:


1.      Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith, and, with the

consent of learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.


2.      By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India, the petitioners take exception to a judgment and order

dated 23rd July, 2026 passed by the learned District Judge-1,

Palghar in Miscellaneous Appeal No.09/2026 whereby the

appeal preferred by the petitioners - plaintiffs against an order

dated 10th June, 2026 in RCS No.10/2026 passed by the trial

Court         thereby   rejecting   the        application    for   temporary

injunction filed by the plaintiffs to restrain the defendants from

taking action pursuant to an order passed by the Tahsildar,

Palghar (D-2), came to be dismissed by affirming the said order

passed by the trial Court.


3.      The background facts, leading to this petition, can be

summarized as under :-




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3.1     On 22nd June, 2023, under a registered sale deed, the

plaintiffs purchased old Gram Panchayat House Nos.460 to 462

situated on Gat No.100 at village Boisar (“suit property”).


3.2     On 07th October, 2024, the Village Panchayat, Boisar

issued a No Objection Certificate for erecting construction over

the suit property. Armed with the said NOC, the petitioners

erected tin sheds over the suit property.


3.3     On 17th July, 2025, the Tahsildar, Palghar (D-2) issued a

notice to the petitioners alleging that, without obtaining the

permission of the District Collector, Palghar, the petitioners

had unauthorizedly erected 54 sheds admeasuring 6 x 3.05 sq.

mtrs. each, and the petitioners were called to appear for

hearing before the Tahsildar on 24th July, 2025.



3.4     The petitioners filed a reply contending, inter alia, that,

the Gram Panchayat, Boisar had granted NOC on 27 th October,

2024, the development was carried out in conformity with the

building potential and the petitioners had already filed an

application on 21st August, 2025, before the District Collector,

Palghar, seeking regularization of the said development under




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Section 143 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning

Act, 1966 (“MRTP Act, 1966”).


3.5     After hearing the parties, on 03rd February, 2026, the

Tahsildar passed an order directing the petitioners to remove

the unauthorized development in an area admeasuring 21.25

sq.    mtrs.   within   seven   days,      lest,   those   unauthorized

structures would be demolished.


3.6     The petitioners instituted a suit before the Civil Judge,

Senior Division, Palghar seeking a declaration that, the said

order dated 03rd February, 2026 was a nullity and the

consequential relief of restraining the authorities from acting

on the said order dated 03rd February, 2026.


3.7     In the said suit, the plaintiffs took out an application for

temporary injunction. By an order dated 10 th June, 2026, the

learned Civil Judge, Palghar was persuaded to reject the

application    observing    inter   alia     that,   prima   facie,   the

construction was carried out sans permission of the Planning

Authority, and the plaintiffs were provided an efficacious

opportunity of hearing and the order dated 03 rd February, 2026

was passed by the Defendant No.2 after following due process

of law.
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3.8     Being aggrieved, the petitioners preferred an appeal

before the District Court. By the impugned judgment and

order, the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal

founding no reason to interfere with the exercise of the

discretion by the trial Court as the structures erected by the

plaintiffs were completely unauthorized and illegal. It was

further observed that, in view of the bar contained in Section

149 of the MRTP Act, 1966, the suit assailing the order passed

thereunder, was not tenable. There was nothing to indicate

that, the order dated 03 rd February, 2026, was nullity as it was

passed in conformity with the provisions of the governing

statute and by observing fundamental principles of judicial

process.


3.9     Being further aggrieved, the plaintiffs have invoked the

writ jurisdiction of this Court.


4.      I have heard Mr. Girish Godbole, the learned Senior

Advocate for the petitioners, Smt. Mamta Srivastava, the

learned AGP for Respondent Nos.1 to 3 – State and Mr. Akshay

Shinde, the learned Counsel for Respondent No.4 – MMRDA,

which came to be impleaded in this petition. With the



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assistance of learned Counsel for the parties, I have also

perused the material on record.


5.      Mr. Godbole, the learned Senior Advocate for the

petitioners, would submit that, the Courts below have not

examined the core issue of the authority of Tahsildar, Palghar

(D-2) to initiate action under the provisions of MRTP Act, 1966.

The competence of Tahsildar, Palghar (D-2) to issue notice

alleging unauthorized development, hear the parties and

thereafter pass the order, by invoking the powers contained in

Sections 52, 53 and 54 of the MRTP Act, 1966, goes to the root

of the matter.


6.      Amplifying this submission, Mr. Godbole submitted that,

the Courts have not applied their mind to the consequences

that ensued the notification dated 09th July, 2024 extending

the Mumbai Metropolitan Regions Area and appointment of the

Mumbai        Metropolitan   Region      Development   Authority

(“MMRDA”) as Special Planning Authority under Section 40(1)

of the MRTP Act, 1966. By the said notification the area

specified in Schedules - II, III and IV appended thereto,

including the lands situated at village Boisar, were notified as

MMR’s extended notified area and the MMRDA came to be


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appointed as the Special Planning Authority, withdrawing the

appointment      of   the    City   and    Industrial   Development

Corporation (“CIDCO”) as a Special Planning Authority for the

villages described in the Schedule-I appended thereto.


7.      Though by a subsequent order dated 03rd January, 2025,

the MMRDA has delegated its powers as the Special Planning

Authority to the District Collector, yet, the Tahsildar, Palghar

(D-2) could not have exercised the powers delegated by the

District Collector vide order dated 31st March, 2022. Laying

emphasis on the provisions contained in Section 151 of the

MRTP Act, 1966 which provides for delegation of the power,

inter alia, by the State Government, any Regional Board,

Planning Authority, or the Development Authority, Mr. Godbole

would submit that, none of the provisions which permit the

delegation of powers could be lawfully invoked in the instant

case.


8.      At any rate, the Authority to whom the State Government

or    Regional   Board,     Development    Authority    or   Planning

Authority has delegated the power, could not have further

delegated the said power to a subordinate authority. On this

count alone, Mr. Godbole would urge, the order dated 03 rd

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                                                WP-9692-2026.DOC

February, 2026, becomes null and void. The Courts below

were, thus, in error in rejecting the application for temporary

injunction when the challenge was to the jurisdictional

competence of the Tahsildar, Palghar (D-2) to pass the order

dated 03rd February, 2026.


9.      Mr. Godbole fairly submitted that, the petitioners cannot

run away from the fact that structures have been erected

without obtaining permission of the Planning Authority and

even the application for regularization under Section 143 of the

MRTP Act, 1966, has been rejected. Nonetheless, since the

order dated 03rd February, 2026 passed by the Tahsildar,

Palghar (D-2) is sans legal authority, no action can be taken on

the basis of such order.


10.     Smt. Srivastava, the learned AGP for Respondent Nos.1 to

3, forcefully countered the submissions on behalf of the

petitioners. Smt. Srivastava urged that, the central issue was of

unauthorized construction. Indisputably, the petitioners had

not obtained permission for erection of as many as 54

structures over the suit property. Thus, the petitioners do not

deserve any equitable relief, despite having brazenly erected the

structures sans permission of the Planning Authority.


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                                                       WP-9692-2026.DOC



11.     Smt. Srivastava, would urge that, the initial reliance on

the purported NOC granted by the Village Panchayat, Boisar is

of no assistance to the petitioners. The Village Panchayat,

Boisar is not a Planning Authority and, thus, on the basis of

NOC issued by the said panchayat, the construction could not

have      been     erected.   To   buttress    this   submission,    Smt.

Srivastava placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of

this Court in the case of Om Sai Builders and Developers Vs.

Assistant        Controller   (A.B.)   Mumbai     Metropolitan      Region

Development Authority Sub-Regional Office & ors1.


12.     Smt. Srivastava further submitted that, since the Courts

below have concurrently declined to exercise the discretion in

favour of the petitioners and the facts of the case are so gross

that the petitioners cannot claim any equity, this Court need

not interfere with the impugned orders.



13.     Mr. Shinde, the learned Counsel for the Respondent No.4

– MMRDA also supported the impugned action. It was urged

that, there was neither a challenge to the Notification dated

09th July, 2024 nor to the delegation of power by the MMRDA,

vide letter dated 03rd January, 2025. Under the said delegation
1       WP/10429/2010 dt. 13/03/2012
SAINATH, PA                            10/29
                                                            WP-9692-2026.DOC

dated         03rd   January,   2025,     the    District   Collectors   were

empowered to exercise the powers of the Planning Authority in

accordance with the prevailing operating procedure in the

matter of discharging the functions of the Planning Authority.

The District Collectors were empowered to exercise the powers

and perform the duties under MRTP Act, 1966 by following the

prevalent operating procedure at their level. Therefore, the

exercise of the power by the Tahsildar under the delegated

authority, cannot be questioned.


14.     Mr. Godbole joined the issue by canvassing a submission

that, before the Special Planning Authority came to be

appointed the Collector could have exercised the powers of

Planning Authority and even delegated his powers to an Officer

not below the rank of Tahsildar under Section 18 of the MRTP

Act,     1966.       However,    after     CIDCO     and     MMRDA       were

successively appointed           as      the    Planning Authorities,     the

Collector could not have delegated the powers to the Tahsildar;

the former being a delegate of the Special Planning Authorities.

Therefore, the support sought to be drawn from the letter dated

03rd January, 2025 whereunder the powers of MMRDA were

delegated to the District Collector, cannot be countenanced.



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15.     To start with, it is necessary to note that, the fact that

the petitioners have erected structures over the suit property

sans      permission   of   any   Planning   Authority   is   rather

incontrovertible. Though initially an endeavor was made by the

plaintiffs before the Courts below that the Village Panchayat,

Boisar had granted the NOC, yet, the said case was not

pursued further. It is indubitable that, the Village Panchayat is

not a Planning Authority within the meaning of MRTP Act,

1966. It is also not in dispute that, an application preferred by

the petitioners before the District Collector under Section 143

of the MRTP Act, 1966, came to be rejected. The situation

which, thus, emerges is that, the structures erected by the

plaintiffs are completely unauthorized and illegal. The only

question that merits consideration is whether the petitioners

are entitled to protect the unauthorizedly erected structures on

the premise that, the order dated 03 rd February, 2026, passed

by the Tahsildar (D-2), is without any authority.


16.     As the controversy revolves around the question as to

whether the impugned action was taken in pursuance of the

authority delegated by the Planning Authority, it may be

appropriate to note the definition of the various authorities

envisaged by MRTP Act, 1966.
SAINATH, PA                        12/29
                                                          WP-9692-2026.DOC



17.     Under sub-section (19) of Section 2 of the MRTP Act,

1966, ‘Planning Authority’ means a local authority; and

includes, -

              (a) Special Planning Authority constituted            or
              appointed or deemed to have been appointed under
              section 40;
              (b)     in respect of the slum rehabilitation area
              declared under section 3C of the Maharashtra
              Slum    Areas       (Improvement,      Clearance     and
              Redevelopment) Act, 1971, the Slum Rehabilitation
              Authority appointed under section 3A of the said
              Act;


18.     Sub-section         (8)   of   Section   2   defines     ‘Development

Authority’ to mean a New Town Development Authority

constituted or declared under section 113. Under sub-section

(24) of Section 2, ‘Regional Board’ or ‘Board’ means the

Regional Planning Board constituted under Section 4 of the

MRTP Act, 1966. Sub-section (31) of Section 2 defines ‘Town

Planning Officer’ as the Officer appointed for the time being to

be the Town Planning Officer for all or any of the provisions of

that Act.


19.     Section 40 of MRTP               Act, 1966 empowers the State

Government to appoint a Special Planning Authority for


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                                                      WP-9692-2026.DOC

developing the notified area.            Under Section 160, the State

Government is empowered to dissolve the Special Planning

Authority or declare that the Planning Authority shall cease to

function as the Planning Authority in relation to specified area.


20.     Since in the facts of this case, there is no challenge to the

power of the Planning Authority to invoke the powers under

Sections 52, 53 and 54 of the MRTP Act, 1966, it would be

superfluous to note the import of those provisions. It would be

appropriate to straightway notice the provisions contained in

Section 151 of the MRTP Act, 1966. It reads as under :

               “151. Power to delegate

         (1)     The State Government may, by a notification in the
         Official Gazette delegate any power exercisable by it
         under this Act, or rules thereunder to any officer of the
         State Government [in such case and subject to such
         conditions, if any, as may be specified in such
         notification] .
         (2)     The Director of Town Planning may, by an order in
         writing, delegate any power exercisable by him under
         this Act or rules thereunder to any officer subordinate to
         him in such case and subject to such conditions, if any,
         or may be specified therein.
         (3)     Any   Regional   Board,   Planning   Authority   or
         Development Authority may, by a resolution, direct that
         any power exercisable by it under this Act, rules or
         regulations thereunder (except the power to prepare any


SAINATH, PA                           14/29
                                                   WP-9692-2026.DOC

         Regional plan, Development Plan, town planning scheme
         or the plan of the New Town or to make regulations) may
         also be exercised by any officer of the State Government
         with the previous consent of the State Government, the
         Regional Board, Planning Authority or local authority or
         Development Authority as may be mentioned therein,
         such cases and subject to such conditions, if any, as
         may be specified therein.
         (4)   The Town Planning Officer of any Regional Board,
         Planning Authority or Development Authority may, by
         an order in writing, delegate any power exercisable by
         him under this Act, or rules or regulations thereunder
         to any officer of the Regional Board, Planning Authority
         or local authority or Development Authority in such
         cases and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be
         specified therein.”


21.     Sub-section (1) of Section 151 envisages the delegation by

the State Government of the powers exercisable by it under the

MRTP Act, 1966, to any Officer of the State Government. Sub-

section (3) of Section 151 enables the delegation of the power

exercisable by any Regional Board, Planning Authority or

Development Duthority to an Officer of the State Government,

albeit with the previous consent of the State Government,

subject to such conditions as may be specified therein. The

State Government and the Authorities referred to therein are

thus empowered to delegate the powers exercisable under the


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                                                WP-9692-2026.DOC

MRTP Act, 1966 by prescribing the contours of the delegated

authority. The term subject to such conditions appears to be

elastic enough to include in its fold the manner of exercise of

the delegated powers by the Officers of the State Government.


22.     As a matter of fact, there is no dispute over the

appointment of CIDCO as a Special Planning Authority vide

Notification dated 4 March 2024.       The Notification dated 9th

July, 2024, indicates that the State Government in exercise of

its powers under Section 160 of the MRTP Act, 1966 and all

enabling provisions : (i) withdrew the appointment of CIDCO as

Special Planning Authority for the villages described in

Schedule I appended to the said Notification, including Village

Boisar, (ii) notified the area specified in Schedule II, III and IV

appended thereto, as the Mumbai Metropolitan Region’s

Extended Notified Area and (iii) appointed MMRDA to be the

Special Planning Authority for the said notified area, excluding

the area of Planning Authority, Special Planning Authority and

Development Authority in the said notified area.


23.     MMRDA, in turn, vide letter dated 3 January 2025,

delegated its power as the special planning authority in relation

to the MMR’s extended notified area to the District Collectors


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                                                WP-9692-2026.DOC

Palghar and Raigad in exercise of the powers under Section

151(3) of the MRTP Act, 1966.


24.     In light of aforesaid nature of the enabling provision to

delegate the power exercisable under the MRTP Act, 1966, if

the letter dated 3 June 2025 delegating the powers of the

MMRDA as a Special Planning Authority in relation to MMR’s

extended notified area is considered, the sanction of the State

Government for the delegation of the authority becomes evident

from the said letter. It becomes abundantly clear that the

Collector was empowered to exercise the power in accordance

with the prevailing operating procedure. In a sense, delegation

of the authority to perform functions and discharge the duties

under the MRTP Act, 1966 in accordance with the prevailing

operating procedure resurrects the order passed by the

Collector delegating the power to the Tahsildar.


25.     If the order passed by the Tahsildar is perused, the

Tahsildar has drawn support from the delegation of the

authority by the Collector vide order dated 31 March 2022.

Pertinently, this order pre-dates the appointment of CIDCO as

the special planning authority, which was pursuant to the

notification dated 4 March 2024, and the appointment of the


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MMRDA as the special planning authority.


26.     The question whether a prior order or notification would

survive the appointment of the Special Planning Authority

subsequently, may warrant consideration.                   The provisions

contained in Section 18(1) (iii), especially the proviso appended

thereto, in the considered view of this Court, deserves to be

read in conjunction with the delegation of the power by the

Special        Planning    Authority    to    the   Collector   under      the

provisions of Section 151(3) of the MRTP Act, 1966.



27.     Section 18 of the MRTP Act, 1966, provides restrictions

on change of user of land or development thereof. Sub-section

(1)    of     Section    18   is   relevant   for   the   purpose     of   the

determination of the controversy at hand. It reads as under :

              “18.Restriction on change of user of land or
              development thereof (1) No person shall, on or after
              the publication of the notice that the draft Regional
              plan has been prepared or the draft Regional plan
              has been approved, institute or change the user of
              any land for any purpose other than agriculture or
              carry out any development in respect of any land
              without the Previous permission,-
              (i) in case the land is situated in the limits of a
              Municipal Corporation or a Municipal Council, or a
              Nagar Panchayat or a Special Planning Authority or


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              any other planning authority, of such Municipal
              Corporation or Municipal Council, Nagar Panchayat
              or Special Authority or other planning authority, as
              the case may be, or
              (ii) in case the land is situated in the gaothan,
              within the meaning of clause (10) of section 2 of the
              Maharashtra Land rEvenue Code, 1966, of the
              village panchayat concerned, or
              (iii) in case the land is situated in areas other than
              those mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) above, of the
              Collector of the District :
              Provided that, the Collector may delegate his powers
              under this clause to an officer not below the rank of
              Tahsildar.
              Explanation. - For the removal of doubt, it is hereby
              declared that, no such permission of the Collector
              shall be required in the gaothan area of a revenue
              village within the meaning of clause (10) of section 2
              of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.”


28.     Section 18 (1) (iii) proscribes the change of user of the

land or any development thereof without previous permission

of the Collector of the District, in case the land is situated in

areas other than those mentioned in clause (i) and (ii).               The

proviso to clause (iii) empowers the Collector to delegate his

powers under the said clause to an officer not below the rank of

Tahsildar. The rationale of enabling the delegation of the power

of the Collector to Tahsildar in the matter of enforcement of the


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provisions of the MRTP Act, 1966 is required to be appreciated

in the light of the necessity of such delegation. It would be

impracticable to enforce the provisions of MRTP Act, 1966 in

letter and spirit, if a view is taken that every action envisaged

by the MRTP Act, 1966, must be taken by the Collector.


29.     Under the principles of legislation, the continuation of re-

enacted notifications and orders passed under a repealed

enactment which are not inconsistent with the reenacted

provisions is the well recognized. The provisions contained in

Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, and Section 25 of the

Maharashtra      General   Clauses    Act,   1904,    recognize   this

principle.    Lest, the operation of the new legal regime would

come to a standstill for want of appointment, notification or

order under the new regime.


30.     This analogy can be applied to a situation of the present

nature, where under Section 18 of the Act, 1966, the Collector

is specifically empowered to delegate his authority to Tahsildar

and the Special Planning Authority is also empowered to

delegate its power to the Collector, subject to such conditions

as may be prescribed. A direction for the exercise of the said

power in conformity with the prevalent operating procedure,


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would subsume in its fold the delegation of the powers by the

Collector to Tahsildar.


31.     For the foregoing reasons, I am not persuaded to agree

with the submissions of Mr. Godbole that, in the facts of the

case, Tahsildar could not have exercised the powers under

Sections 52, 53 and 54 of the MRTP Act, 1966, as the delegate

of the District Collector, pursuant to the order dated 31 st

March, 2022.


32.     Even if this Court were to take a view that, there can be a

duality of opinion on the aspect as to whether the order of the

District Collector dated 31st March, 2022 delegating the power

to the Tahsildar survives after the appointment of the Special

Planning Authority, and that may bear upon the validity of the

order passed by the Tahsildar dated 03 rd February, 2026, yet,

that, by itself, may not be a sufficient ground to exercise the

writ jurisdiction. This Court cannot be oblivious to the facts

which stare in the face and the stark reality of the situation.

Thus, merely questioning the validity of the order passed by the

Tahsildar on the premise of cessation of the delegated authority

would not furnish a justifiable ground to exercise the writ

jurisdiction. It would be incumbent upon the petitioners to


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demonstrate that, the issue of writ would ensure justice and

that justice lies on the side of the petitioners.


33.     A profitable reference, in this context, can be made to a

Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of State of

Bombay Vs. Morarji Cooverji2, wherein the aforesaid principle

was expounded as under :-

              “41.   But it is not sufficient that a party should
              come to this Court and make out a case that a
              particular requisition order is not valid. In order to
              get that relief from the Court on a writ petition, not
              only must he come with clean hands, not only must
              he not suppress any material facts, not only must he
              show the utmost good faith, but he must also satisfy
              the Court that the making of the order will do
              justice and that justice lies on his side. …….”
                                                (emphasis supplied)


34.     The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India is essentially corrective in nature. This

Court may decline to interfere with the order, even if some legal

infirmity is noticed therein, if the justice of the case does not lie

in favour of the party assailing such order. If the final order

appears to be broadly in consonance with the dictate of justice,




2       1958 SCC OnLine Bom 188
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the     writ   Court     may   justifiably     decline     to   exercise   its

jurisdiction.


35.     A useful reference, in this context, can be made to a

judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Garment Craft

Vs. Prakash Chand Goel3, wherein the following observations

were made :-

         “15. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction
         does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate,
         reweigh   the    evidence     or   facts   upon    which    the
         determination under challenge is based. Supervisory
         jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a
         legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be
         supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own
         decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior
         court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the
         nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave
         dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of
         fundamental principles of law or justice. The power
         under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate
         cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or
         the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can
         possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or
         tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such
         discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is
         no miscarriage of justice.”




3       (2022) 4 SCC 181
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36.     On the merits of the matter, the fact that the erection of

the structure was completely unauthorized, and even an

endeavor on the part of the petitioners to obtain an order of

regularization under Section 143 of the MRTP Act, 1966, has

not succeeded, renders the prayer for interim relief in the

nature of restraining the authorities from demolishing the

unauthorizedly erected structures singularly unsustainable. It

is not a case where the petitioners have obtained the

permission and carried out the development in excess of the

permission, marginally.


37.     Smt. Srivastava, the learned AGP, was justified in

canvassing a submission that, there was brazen erection of as

many as 54 tin sheds which have been put to commercial use,

with impunity. The development carried out by the petitioner

was wholly illegal.


38.     The unauthorized development cannot be tolerated by the

Courts as an act of judicial generosity. Nor can regularization

of the illegal constructions by the State and its instrumentality

be a policy of governance. The Supreme Court has repeatedly

emphasized that, the illegality in erecting structures throwing


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the Building Control Rules to the wind must be dealt with

sternly and with iron hands. The Courts ought not to show

misplaced sympathy.


39.     A profitable reference, in this context, can be made to a

judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra Kumar

Barjatya & anr. Vs. U. P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad & ors. 4 The

observations in Paragraph Nos. 19 and 20 delineate the

approach to be adopted by the Courts in terse terms. They read

as under :-

              “19.     In a catena of decisions, this Court has
              categorically held that illegally of unauthorized
              construction     cannot     be    perpetuated.     If    the
              construction is made in contravention of the Acts /
              Rules,    it   would   be   construed   as    illegal    and
              unauthorized      construction,    which     has    to    be
              necessarily demolished. It cannot be legitimized or
              protected solely under the ruse of the passage of time
              or citing inaction of the authorities or by taking
              recourse to the excuse that substantial money has
              been spent on the said construction. The following
              decisions are of relevance and hence cited herein
              below to drive home the point that unauthorized
              constructions must be dealt with, with an iron hand
              and not kid gloves.
              …….



4       2024 SCC OnLine SC 3767
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              20.   In the ultimate analysis, we are of the opinion
              that construction(s) put up in violation of or deviation
              from the building plan approved by the local authority
              and the constructions which are audaciously put up
              without any building planning approval, cannot be
              encouraged. Each and every construction must be
              made scrupulously following and strictly adhering to
              the Rules. In the event of any violation being brought
              to the notice of the Courts, it has to be curtailed with
              iron hands and any lenience afforded to them would
              amount to showing misplaced sympathy. Delay in
              directing rectification of illegalities, administrative
              failure, regulatory inefficiency, cost of construction
              and investment, negligence and laxity on the part of
              the   authorities    concerned   in     performing   their
              obligation(s) under the Act, cannot be used as a shield
              to     defend       action     taken       against    the
              illegal/unauthorized constructions.”
                                                     (emphasis supplied)


40.     In the case of Kaniz Ahmed Vs. Sabuddin & ors. 5, after

referring to the directions issued in the case of Rajendra

Kumar Barjatya (supra), the Supreme Court again reminded

the Courts that they must adopt strict approach while dealing

with the illegal constructions and should not readily engage

themselves in judicial regularization of buildings erected

without requisite permission of the Competent Authority. The



5       2025 SCC OnLine SC 995
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observations in Paragraphs No. 6 and 7 are material and,

hence, extracted below :-

              “6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
              would submit that her client be given one chance to
              pray   for   regularisation   of   the   unauthorised
              construction. We do not find any merit in such
              submission. A person who has no regards for the law
              cannot be permitted to pray for regularisation after
              putting up unauthorised construction of two floors.
              This has something to do with the rule of law.
              Unauthorised construction has to be demolished.
              There is no way out. Judicial discretion would be
              guided by expediency. Courts are not free from
              statutory fetters. Justice is to be rendered in
              accordance with law. We are at pains to observe that
              the aforesaid aspect has not been kept in mind by
              many     State     Governments      while     enacting
              Regularisation of Unauthorized Development Act
              based on payment of impact fees.


              7. Thus, the Courts must adopt a strict approach
              while dealing with cases of illegal construction and
              should not readily engage themselves in judicial
              regularisation of buildings erected without requisite
              permissions of the competent authority. The need for
              maintaining such a firm stance emanates not only
              from inviolable duty cast upon the Courts to uphold
              the rule of law, rather such judicial restraint gains
              more force in order to facilitate the well-being of all
              concerned. The law ought not to come to rescue of
              those who flout its rigours as allowing the same


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                                                        WP-9692-2026.DOC

              might result in flourishing the culture of impunity.
              Put otherwise, if the law were to protect the ones who
              endeavour to disregard it, the same would lead to
              undermine the deterrent effect of laws, which is the
              cornerstone of a just and orderly society. [See : Ashok
              Malhotra v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, W.P. (c)
              No. 10233 of 2024 (Delhi High Court)]”

                                                (emphasis supplied)


41.     On the aforesaid touchstone, if the facts of the case at

hand are appreciated, the Courts below cannot be said to have

committed any error in declining to grant equitable relief in

favour of the petitioners. Any other view, in the circumstances

of the case, would undermine the efficacy of rule of law.


42.     Resultantly, the petition deserves to be dismissed. Hence,

the following order:-


                                   ::ORDER::


                   The Writ Petition stands dismissed.

                   Rule discharged.

                       No costs.


                                                [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]




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                                                WP-9692-2026.DOC

        At this stage, Mr. Godbole, the learned Senior Advocate

for the petitioners, sought continuation of the ad-interim relief

for a reasonable period.

        In the light of the view this Court has been persuaded to

take and the peculiar facts of the case, the prayer for

continuation of ad-interim relief is wholly unjustifiable.

        Thus, the oral application for continuation of ad-interim

relief stands rejected.



                                             [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]




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