ABASAHEB SOPANRAO JACHAKversusSMT. DEVAI SOMNATH MANSUKHE (DECD) THROUGH LRS. SHRI. DATTATRAY SOMNATH MANSUKHE AND ORS

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                        Vivekanand
                                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
           Digitally
           signed by
           VIVEKANAND                    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
VIVEKANAND RAJENDRA
RAJENDRA   BONDE
BONDE      Date:
           2026.08.31
           18:01:34
           +0530
                                           WRIT PETITION NO. 979 OF 2015

                        Abasaheb Sopanrao Jachak                       … Petitioner
                                   V/s.
                        Smt. Devai Somnath Mansukhe
                        (Decd) Through Lrs. Shri.
                        Dattatray Somnath Mansukhe
                        And Ors.                                       … Respondents

                        Mr. Sunil G. Karandikar i/b Mr. Abhijit P. Kulkarni, for
                        the Petitioner.
                        Sr. Adv. Surel Shah a/w Saakshat Relekar, Bhoomi
                        Maheshwar i/b Manisha Devkar, for the Respondent
                        Nos. 1B to 1C.



                                                      CORAM       : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                                                      DATED       : AUGUST 31, 2026
                        P.C.:

                        1.      Challenge in this petition arises out of an application filed by
                        the landlord under Section 32-O read with Section 32-P to declare
                        purchase      by    petitioners/alleged     tenant   ineffective      and
                        consequential order of delivery of possession.

                        2.      In the application filed by the Respondents-Landlord, it is
                        stated in paragraph 2 that one Manikrao Sopanrao Jachak was
                        tenant in his own right on 1 April 1934 and thereafter petitioner
                        was inducted as a tenant. Since the petitioner has failed to exercise
                        his right to purchase, the purchase be declared ineffective under




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Section 32 (O) and order under Section 32 (P) be passed directing
petitioner to deliver possession.

3.    The Petitioner raised a defence contending that Manikrao
was cultivating the land on behalf of joint family and, therefore,
the tenancy of Manikrao was for on behalf of joint family and,
hence, the petitioner is entitled to succeed on the ground that the
petitioner was part of joint family of Manikrao.

4.    All the three authorities disbelieved defense raised by the
Petitioner that on 1 April 1957 Manikrao was in possession of land
in dispute for and on behalf of joint family. This finding of fact
remains unassailable. However, Mr. Sunil Karandikar, learned
Advocate for the Petitioner, submits that once Manikrao is accepted
to be statutory tenant on 1 April 1957, the deeming fiction under
Section 32 (1) and other provisions of BT & AL act would get
triggered, resulting into conferment of ownership on Manikrao in
his individual capacity. Once, Manikrao becomes owner of the
property by virtue of the deeming fiction under the provisions of
BT & AL act no tenancy including creation of tenancy in favour of
petitioner was permissible. He submitted that in the application
filed by respondents, plea of surrender was raised. However, he
submitted that the law in regard to the surrender of tenancy of
agricultural land in settled in view of the judgment in case of
Ramchandra Keshav Adke & Others vs. Govind Joti ChavareVs.
Govind, 1975 (1) SCC 559. He submits that unless such surrender
is verified in the manner prescribed in the Act, the surrender will
have no effect. He, therefore, submits that rights of Manikarao as
deemed purchaser on 1 April1957 stand unaffected.



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5.    Per contra Mr. Surel Shah, Senior Advocate on behalf of
Landlord, submitted that the defence raised by the petitioner
stating that the Manikrao tenancy was on behalf of family has been
disbelieved by all three authorities regarding finding of act. He
submitted that once petitioner accepts that Manikrao was tenant of
the property, petitioner cannot be termed as aggrieved person so as
to enable him to challenge orders passed by the authorities under
the act and therefore petitioner had no locus to challenge the
order passed against him. He, therefore, submitted that once the
facts pleaded in the applications are held to be established by the
authorities under the act by recording concurrent finding of act, no
interference in under which jurisdiction is called.

6.    Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for both sides
and having considered the material placed before the authorities,
in my opinion, the following facts emerge from the record and can
safely be held to be established.

      a)     On 1 April 1957, Manikrao was the statutory tenant in
      respect of the land in dispute. This position is important
      because 1 April 1957 is the Tillers' Day under the Bombay
      Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. The rights of a tenant
      who was in possession on that date are therefore required to
      be examined with reference to the statutory scheme of the
      Act.

      b)     The tenancy in favour of the Petitioner came into
      existence after Tillers' Day. Therefore, the Petitioner's alleged
      tenancy cannot be treated in the same manner as the




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tenancy which was existing on 1 April 1957. The rights
which arose in favour of Manikrao on Tillers' Day have to be
considered first.

c)    The case of the Respondents, when their application is
read as a whole, appears to proceed on the footing that the
tenancy of Manikrao came to an end and thereafter the
Petitioner was inducted as a tenant. In substance, therefore,
the case of the Respondents is based upon the alleged
surrender of the tenancy of Manikrao and creation of a fresh
tenancy in favour of the Petitioner. It is on this basis that the
subsequent tenancy is sought to be brought within the
provisions of Section 32-O of the Bombay Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act.

d)    The Respondents-landlords have accordingly pleaded
in their application that after the Petitioner became a tenant,
he failed to exercise the right to purchase the land within the
period prescribed by law. On that basis, the Respondents
claimed that the purchase had become ineffective and that
the tenancy had come to an end. They therefore sought an
order for delivery of possession under Section 32-P of the
Act. Thus, the relief claimed by the Respondents is
dependent upon the Petitioner's tenancy being a legally valid
tenancy and upon the provisions of Section 32-O being
applicable to such tenancy.

e)    The next question is whether the alleged surrender of
Manikrao's tenancy can be accepted in law. On this issue, the




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     legal position is no longer open to doubt in view of the
     judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramchandra Keshav Adke
     & Others v. Govind Joti Chavare, 1975 (1) SCC 559 . The
     Supreme Court has explained the manner in which surrender
     of an agricultural tenancy is required to be made and
     verified. A tenant cannot be treated as having surrendered
     his tenancy merely because the landlord says that the tenant
     had surrendered it or because another person was put in
     possession. For a valid and effective surrender, the surrender
     must be in writing. It must thereafter be verified before the
     Mamlatdar in the manner required by the Act. The Tehsildar
     or the concerned authority must also satisfy himself that the
     tenant understands the nature and consequences of the
     surrender and that the surrender is being made voluntarily.
     The statutory requirement is therefore intended to protect
     the tenant from losing his valuable tenancy rights by an
     informal   or   doubtful   surrender.   The   requirement       of
     verification is a safeguard provided by the statute. Unless the
     prescribed procedure is followed, the alleged surrender
     cannot be treated as having legally brought the tenancy to an
     end.

7.   In the present case, there is no material shown to this Court
demonstrating that the written surrender of tenancy was made by
Manikrao and that it was verified in the manner required by law.
There is also no material showing the satisfaction or endorsement
of the concerned authority regarding Manikrao's understanding of
the nature and consequences of surrender and the voluntary



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character of such surrender. In absence of compliance with these
statutory requirements, the alleged surrender cannot be accepted
as a valid surrender in the eye of law., the tenancy rights of
Manikrao which existed on 1 April 1957 cannot be treated as
having been lawfully extinguished merely on the basis of the
subsequent possession of the Petitioner.

8.   The next question which therefore arises is whether, after
Manikrao was found to be the tenant in possession on 1 April
1957, a fresh tenancy could legally be created in favour of the
Petitioner. In my opinion, this question has to be answered by
keeping in view the effect of Section 32(1) of the Act. Once it is
established that Manikrao was the tenant in possession on 1 April
1957, the statutory consequences provided by Section 32(1) are
attracted, subject of course to the conditions, exceptions and
provisos contained in the Act. The statute creates a scheme under
which the tenant in possession on Tillers' Day is entitled to become
a deemed purchaser of the land, subject to compliance with the
requirements of the Act. Therefore, the rights flowing from the
tenancy existing on Tillers' Day cannot be defeated merely by an
arrangement between the landlord and the tenant after that date.
If the tenancy of Manikrao continued in law, the mere fact that the
parties put the Petitioner in possession cannot by remove the
statutory rights which had attached to Manikrao.

9.   The Petitioner's case that he was a member of the joint
family of Manikrao has been rejected by all three authorities.
Therefore, the Petitioner cannot claim the benefit of Manikrao's
tenancy on the basis of joint family rights. But this does not mean



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that the Court has to accept the other part of the case of the
Respondents, namely, that Manikrao's tenancy was validly
surrendered and that a fresh tenancy was created in favour of the
Petitioner. These are two separate questions. The finding against
the Petitioner's joint family defence does not establish a valid
surrender of Manikrao's tenancy.

10.      In my opinion, therefore, once Manikrao is held to have been
the tenant in possession on 1 April 1957, the parties could not,
merely by their subsequent act, create a fresh tenancy in favour of
another person in a manner which would defeat the statutory
consequences attached to the tenancy existing on Tillers' Day. The
provisions of the Act have to operate according to the conditions
prescribed by the statute. The rights of the tenant existing on 1
April 1957 cannot be avoided by simply describing the subsequent
possession of another person as a fresh tenancy. If the original
tenancy was required to be surrendered, such surrender had to be
made in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Act.

11.      In the present case, the necessary statutory requirements for
a valid surrender have not been established. Therefore, the
foundation on which the alleged subsequent tenancy of the
Petitioner is sought to be based becomes doubtful. Once the
foundation fails, the subsequent proceedings treating the Petitioner
as a tenant under Section 32-O also require examination on that
basis.

12.      I now turn to the submission of Mr. Shah that the Petitioner
cannot be treated as a person aggrieved. According to the




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Respondents, since the Petitioner had himself taken the position
that Manikrao was the original tenant, the Petitioner had no
independent right to challenge the orders passed by the authorities
under the Act. I am unable to accept this submission in the facts of
the present case. The expression "person aggrieved" cannot be
given such a narrow meaning that a person who is actually in
possession and against whom an order for delivery of possession is
passed is prevented from challenging that order. The question of
locus has to be considered with reference to the nature of the
order and the effect which such order produces upon the person
challenging it.

13.   The Supreme Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan
Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed, (1976) 1 SCC 67, has explained the
distinction between a person aggrieved, a stranger and a busybody.
The Supreme Court observed in paragraph 37 as follows:

      "37. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to
      apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall
      in any of these categories: (i) “person aggrieved”; (ii)
      “stranger”; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons
      in the last category are easily distinguishable from those
      coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere
      in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as
      crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro
      bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or
      even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of
      meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or
      from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire
      to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior
      intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more
      than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court



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      should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies
      at the threshold."
14.   The Supreme Court explained in paragraph 38 that the
distinction between a person aggrieved and a stranger is not
always capable of being drawn by one fixed rule. It observed:

      "38. The distinction between the first and second categories
      of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated.
      The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a
      solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of
      lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an
      outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling
      within the central zone are those whose legal rights have
      been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the
      category of “persons aggrieved”. In the grey outer circle the
      bounds which separate the first category from the second,
      intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal
      direction. All persons in this outer zone may not be “persons
      aggrieved”."
15.   In paragraph 39, the Supreme Court also laid down the
broad considerations which may be applied for deciding whether a
person is aggrieved. It observed:

      "39. To distinguish such applicants from “strangers”, among
      them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus
      made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their
      efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case,
      including the statutory context in which the matter falls to
      be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person
      whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal
      wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised by
      law, has been prejudicially and affected by the act or
      omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who
      has suffered a legal grievance, a person “against whom a



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      decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully
      deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him
      something, or wrongfully affected his title to something?”"
16.   The above principles, when applied to the present case,
make it difficult to accept that the Petitioner is a stranger or a
busybody. The proceedings initiated by the Respondents were
directed against the Petitioner. The Petitioner is stated to be in
possession of the land. The authorities have passed orders
affecting that possession and directing delivery of possession. The
Respondents themselves proceeded against the Petitioner on the
basis that he was in possession as a tenant. Therefore, the
Petitioner has a direct and substantial interest in the order under
challenge. It is true that the Petitioner's defence that Manikrao was
a tenant on behalf of the joint family has not been accepted. That
finding is binding upon the Petitioner in the present proceedings.
But rejection of that particular defence does not take away his
right to question whether the statutory provisions invoked against
him were applicable at all. His possession is affected by the
impugned orders. He therefore falls within the category of a
person aggrieved and cannot be denied a hearing on the ground of
want of locus.

17.   The question, which then remains is whether the application
filed by the Respondents under Section 32-O was maintainable on
the facts of the present case. The foundation of the application
under Section 32-O is that the person against whom the
proceedings are initiated is a tenant whose purchase has become
ineffective because of failure to exercise the statutory right to




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purchase. Therefore, before granting relief under Section 32-O
read with Section 32-P, the authority was required to be satisfied
that the Petitioner had a recognised tenancy to which Section 32-
O could apply.

18.   In the present case, the original tenant on Tillers' Day was
Manikrao. The alleged subsequent tenancy of the Petitioner is
based upon the case that Manikrao had surrendered his tenancy.
As held above, there is no material showing that the alleged
surrender was made and verified in the manner required by law.
Therefore, the legal foundation for treating the Petitioner as a
tenant under a fresh tenancy created after Tillers' Day is not
established. If the Petitioner is not legally a tenant in respect of the
land for the purpose of Section 32-O, the consequence under
Section 32-O cannot be imposed upon him merely because he was
found in possession. The provisions of Section 32-O read with
Section 32-P cannot be used for creating a tenancy where the
statutory requirements for such tenancy are not established.

19.   This, however, does not mean that the Respondents-
landlords are without any remedy. If the Petitioner is in possession
of the land without any valid tenancy or other legal authority, the
Respondents may adopt such proceedings as are permissible in law
for obtaining possession from a person who has no lawful right to
remain in possession. The Court is not expressing any final opinion
on what other remedy may be available to the Respondents. That
question will have to be decided in appropriate proceedings and in
accordance with the provisions applicable to such proceedings.




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20.      What cannot be sustained is the particular course adopted in
the present case, namely, treating the Petitioner as a tenant for the
purpose of Section 32-O and thereafter passing an order under
Section 32-P on the footing that his purchase had become
ineffective. The necessary legal basis for invoking those provisions
against the Petitioner has not been established.

21.      For these reasons, the impugned orders passed by the
authorities under the Act, insofar as they exercise jurisdiction
under Section 32-O read with Section 32-P against the Petitioner
and direct delivery of possession on that basis, cannot be
sustained. The impugned orders are therefore required to be set
aside.

22.      The Respondents-landlords shall, however, be at liberty to
adopt such appropriate proceedings against the Petitioner as may
be permissible in law and available to them under the provisions of
the Act or any other applicable law. No finding in this judgment
shall be understood as preventing the Respondents from pursuing
such remedy.

23.      All the contentions of both parties, except to the extent
decided above, are kept open. The findings recorded in this
judgment shall operate only for deciding the validity of the
proceedings under Section 32-O read with Section 32-P which are
impugned in the present Petition.


                                              (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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