RUSHIKESH BHATTversusAMDG COLLECTIVE LLP REP THR ITS DESIGNATED PARTNER

2026:BHC-GOA:1994
                                          901-WPCR-428-2026




                Rushikesh Bhatt                                   … Petitioner
                                 Versus
                AMDG Collective LLP rep. its designated
                Partner.                                          …Respondents

                Mr Chaitanya Padgaonkar, Advocate with Ms Anushri Naik
                Dessai, Advocate for the Petitioner.

                Mr Jay Mathew, Advocate for Respondent.




                    ORDER.:


                1.     The Petitioner impugns Order dated 01.09.2026 passed by

                Judicial Magistrate First Class ‘A’ Court, Bicholim, below Exhibit

                D-32 in OA 431/2025/A thereby rejecting Petitioner’s application

                filed under Section 145(2) of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

                (The parties are hereinafter referred to as per their original status

                in the original complaint).


                2.     The complaint states that the Accused is sole proprietor of

                the entity, A.R. Chemical and Aksh Chemical, which deals as

                trader and exporter of Citric Acid Anhydrous. The Complainant
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was appointed by Alliance Chemical Group, a United States of

America based company, to assist them in sourcing Citric Acid

Anhydrous of Indian origin. The Complainant had a Broker and

Procurement Services Agreement with them. The dispute arose

owing to substandard and defective nature of consignment

supplied by the Accused. The parties entered into Memorandum

of Understanding dated 25.02.2025 to resolve the dispute,

wherein the Accused admitted his liability arising out of defective

consignment and agreed to pay the sum of USD 231.600 and also

issued a Cheque in favour of Complainant dated 05.03.2025

drawn on ICICI Bank, Ankleshwar Branch, for Rs.2,00,97,000/-

(Rupees Two Crores Ninety-Seven Thousand only). However, on

presentation of said Cheque, it was dishonoured. The Accused was

served with Demand Notice but he failed to act upon the same. On

complaint under Section 138 of N.I.Act, Learned Magistrate

issued process against Accused.       On his appearance, he filed

Application under Section 145(2) of the N.I. Act, which came to be

rejected by impugned Order dated 01.09.2026.


3.   Mr. Padgaonkar, Learned Advocate appearing for the

Accused, would submit that Accused has specifically denied his


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signature on the Cheque in question. Even the Cheque Return

Memo shows a signature mismatch. The Accused disputed legally

enforceable debt. However, trial Court rejected the Application,

holding that the Accused did not explain why said Cheque was

given to the Complainant, and he failed to reply to the statutory

notice. As such, no specific defence is available to him, enabling

grant of permission to cross-examine the Complainant.



4.   Per contra, Mr. Jay Mathew, Learned Advocate appearing

for Respondent supports the impugned Order. He takes this Court

through the Memorandum of Understanding wherein the Accused

has accepted the liability and provided an undated cheque for an

amount of Rs.2,00,97,000/- (Rupees Two Crores Ninety-Seven

Thousand only) towards security. He would invite attention of

this Court to the very Cheque which is the subject matter of

dispute, being part of the Memorandum of Understanding. He

would further invite attention of this Court to the email

communication dated 18.06.2025 made by the Accused to the

Complainant and others accepting liability towards the amount.




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5.    In support of his contention, he relied upon the observations

of this Court in case of Apolonius Francisco Luis v/s.

Sahajanand Investments Pvt. Ltd rep. by its Director,

Rasiklal Mohanilal Gangani1.


6.    Having considered submissions by Learned Advocate

appearing for respective parties. The only issue that requires

consideration in the present case is as to whether the Accused

made out a case for grant of the Application under Section 145(2)

of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1988 for cross-examination of the

Complainant and witnesses. In this backdrop, it is apposite to

refer to certain observations of the Supreme Court and this Court

in the case of Kamal Nilkanth Naik v/s. VPK Urban Co-

operative Credit Society2, on the point in issue.


      “8. In case of Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v/s.
      Nimesh B. Thakore3, Supreme Court observed in
      paragraph no.16 as under:

            Section 143 makes it possible for the complaints
            under Section 138 of the Act to be tried in the
            summary manner, except, of course, for the
            relatively small number of cases where the


1 WPCR/   838/2021 decided on 12.09.2022
2 WPCR/61/2025 decided on 11.09.2026

3 AIR 2010 Supreme Court 1402

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            Magistrate feels that the nature of the case is such
            that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding
            one year may have to be passed or that it is, for any
            other reason, undesirable to try the case summarily.
            It is, however, significant that the procedure of
            summary trials is adopted under Section 143 subject
            to the qualification “as far as possible”, thus, leaving
            sufficient flexibility so as not to affect the quick flow
            of the trial process. Even while following the
            procedure of summary trials, the non-obstante
            clause and the expression “as far as possible” used in
            Section 143 coupled with the non-obstante clause in
            Section 145 allows for the evidence of the
            complainant to be given on affidavit, that is, in the
            absence of the accused. This would have been
            impermissible (even in a summary trial under the
            Code of Criminal Procedure) in view of Section 251
            and 254 and especially Section 273 of the Code. The
            accused, however, is fully protected, as under
            Sub-section (2) of Section 145 he has the
            absolute and unqualified right to have the
            complainant and any or all of his witnesses
            summoned for cross-examination.”

       9. Similarly, in case of Rakesh Singh v/s. Anil
       Madanmohan Gulati & Anr4., this Court while
       elaborating exposition of law laid down by Supreme Court in
       case of Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. (supra) further
       observed that:
          “The trial Court, in my opinion, committed error in
          observing that the petitioner is silent on the specific
          ground of defence or point on which he wishes to cross
          examine the complainant. It may be that the petitioner
          has an opportunity to lead defence evidence and rebut
          the presumption if any, however, that does not mean
          that the valuable right of the petitioner to cross
          examine the complainant which he is entitled to under

4 Criminal Writ Petitions No.34 and 35 decided on 09.05.2023

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           Section 145(2) of the NI Act can be lightly brushed
           aside.”

        10. Thereafter in case of Narayan Shivdas Kadam s/o
        Shivdas Kadam Vs. Shriram Transport Finance
        Company Limited5, this Court observed that accused has
        an absolute and unqualified right to have complainant and
        his witness summoned for cross-examination. It is not
        necessary for Court to delve deep into merits of defence
        which is set up by accused. The purpose of disclosing defence
        is not to find out whether any details are given or to reject it
        at the threshold thereby curtailing such right of accused. In
        paragraph no.34, it has been observed that main intention of
        legislature incorporated under Section 145(2) of N.I. Act is to
        grant an opportunity to accused, in desirable cases, wherein
        he shows or demonstrates before the Magistrate that there is
        probable defence which he wants to produce before Court by
        way of cross-examination of complainant. Such opportunity
        cannot be taken away from accused if he satisfies Magistrate
        about probable defence.

        11. In case of K. Narsimulu V/s. Naguesh C. Dandi6, this
        Court in reference to law down in case of Mandvi
        Cooperative Bank Ltd. (supra) observed that Section
        145(2) of N.I. Act protects right of accused to have
        complainant and his witnesses cross-examine and he has
        absolute and unqualified right to have complainant and any
        or all of his witnesses summoned for cross-examination.

        12. In case of Apolonius Francisco Luis Vs.
        Sahajanand Investments Pvt. Ltd7. , this Court found
        that cryptic and casual defence was employed in application
        filed by accused and, therefore, he was declined opportunity
        to cross-examination”.




5 2024 (2) Mh.L.J.147

6 2010 Mh.L.J. (4) 220

7   Criminal Writ Petition No.838/2021 decided on 12.09.2022
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7.     In light of aforesaid exposition, there cannot be contest that

Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act cannot be

interpreted as an absolute bar forfeiting right of the Accused to

cross-examine. Once accused demonstrates triable defence, he is

entitled to leave to cross-examine Complainant and his witnesses.

It is well settled that while deciding Application under Section

145(2) of the N.I. Act, Magistrate need not delve deep into

probable defence put forth by accused. The Magistrate has to,

prima facie, satisfy himself that defence is not evasive and capable

to put for trial.


8.    In light of the aforesaid position, if the facts of present case

are examined, it is clear that the accused has raised candid defence

of absence of his signature on the subject Cheque. Such defence

goes to the root of matter. The Cheque cannot be termed as

negotiable instrument in absence of signature of drawer. In this

backdrop, although there is sufficient material to demonstrate

transaction between accused and Complainant, supported by

Memorandum of Understanding, the accused needs to be given

sufficient     opportunity    to       establish   that   negotiable

instrument/Cheque in question sans his signature. Prima facie,

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                           Bank Return Memo supports defence of the accused and endorse

                           signature on Cheque does not match with signature of Accused. In

                           this backdrop, this Court finds that the impugned Order

                           foreclosing right of accused to establish a probable defence cannot

                           be countenanced. In result, the Writ Petition deserves to be

                           allowed in the following terms:


                                  (a)   Impugned Order dated 01.09.2026 passed by Judicial
                                        Magistrate First Class ‘A’ Court, Bicholim, below
                                        Exhibit D-32 in OA 431/2025/A is quashed and set
                                        aside.
                                  (b)   The Petitioner’s Application below Exhibit D-32 is
                                        partly allowed.
                                  (c)   The Applicant is permitted to cross-examine the
                                        Complainant and his witnesses so far as his defence as
                                        to absence of signature on the Cheque.
                                  (d)   The Trial Court shall endeavour to decide the
                                        Complaint within a period of nine months from the
                                        date of this Order.


                           9.     Writ Petition stands disposed of in aforesaid terms.




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Signed by: MARIA SUZANA REBELLO
Designation: Personal Assistant
Date: 08/10/2026 15:27:40