Holding

Section 313(1)(a) does not permit permission for a permanent tea‑stall structure, making any such permission illegal, and the suit is not barred by limitation.

Summary

The appellant, A.L. Ranjane, operated a tea stall on a permanent structure embedded in a public street adjacent to the building of respondent R.J. Sethna. The respondent sued for declaration, mandatory and permanent injunctions to remove the structure, alleging encroachment, nuisance, fire and health hazards, and interference with his property rights. The central issue was whether the Municipal Commissioner could lawfully grant permission for such a structure under Section 313(1)(a) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, and whether the suit was barred by the limitation provisions of Section 527 of the same Act. The Supreme Court held that the items listed in Section 313(1)(a) are of a temporary nature and that a permanent tea‑stall with water, electricity, and a tank is not ejusdem generis with those items; consequently, any permission granted was illegal. The Court also found no merit in the limitation defence, as the limitation period applies to suits against the Corporation, not to the injunction sought against the appellant. The appeals were dismissed, and the appellant was given a deadline to remove the structure.

Issues considered

Whether Section 313(1)(a) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 authorises the Commissioner to permit a permanent tea‑stall structure on a public street.
Whether the permission obtained by the appellant was vitiated by mis‑representation of material facts.
Whether the suit for removal of the structure is barred by the limitation provisions of Section 527 of the Act.

Legislation cited

Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888s. 313, s. 527

Subjects

Section 313Bombay Municipal Corporation Acttea stallencroachmentpublic nuisancelimitationmunicipal permissionejusdem generisinjunctionproperty rights

Judgment

A.L. RANJANE A
v.
RA VIND RA ISHW ARD AS SETHNA AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 22, 2002

B
[S.N. VARlA VA AND ARUN KUMAR, JJ. ]

Municipalities:

Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888--Section 313-/nterpretation C
of-Section bars putting up a structure or stall on street which is not similar
Jo items mentioned in Section 313(/)(a) viz. any stall, chair, bench, box, table,
ladder, bale-On facts, structure put up is tea stall embedded on road, having
water and electricity connection with permanent water tank ,and shutters
enabling locking of stall, which is not akin to items mentioned in clause (a)-
Thus no permission could be granted by Commissioner for such structure- D
Hence High Court's holding that tea stall set up not permissible under the
section, calls for no interference.

Appellant set up a tea stall on the street abutting the building owned
by respondent No. I. Respondent No 1 filed a suit for removal of structure.
Trial Court decreed the suit. Even on appeal after the remand of the E
matter to trial court suit was decreed in favour of respondent No.I.
Appellant and the Corporation then filed appeals against the decree. Single
Judge of High Court allowing the appeals dismissed the suit. However,
Division Bench of High Court allowed the letter patent appeals filed by
respondent No 1 and decreed the suit. Hence the present appeal.
F
Appellant contended that the structure in question was duly
authorized by the City Corporation, and, therefore, respondent No 1 could
not object to the existence of the structure and the business being carried
on by appellant; and also that the suit of respondent No.I was barred by
limitation.
G
Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD I.I. Under Section 313(l)(a) of the Bombay Municipal
Corporation Act, 1888 the Commissioner can grant permission for placing
or depositing on any street etc. etc. any stall, chair, bench, box, ladder, bale.
325 H
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A The structure has to be similar to items mentioned in the clause. Permission
'-
has to be for something which can be read as ejusdem generis with the items
mentioned in clause (a). The items mentioned in clause (a) indicate that they
are ofa temporary nature and are easily removable as and when required.
In the instant case the structure of the tea stall is of a size which even if not
permanently embedded on road, cannot be said to be akin to items
B mentioned in clause (a). The structure is embedded on the road; its four
poles are embedded in the concrete paving on the road; it has water and
electricity connections and permanent water tank meant to store water and
ensure permanent supply of water to the stall which is installed on the side
of the structure and also has shutters which enable locking of stall. No
C permission can be granted by the Commissioner for setting up such a
structure under Section 313 of the Act. Section 313 totally bars any stall or
structure of the type put up by the appellant. Therefore permission, if any,
granted by Commissioner is violative of the statute and, is, therefore, illegal.
[330-H; 331-A-D]

D 1.2. High Court rightly held that permission of the Commissioner
for the tea stall was obtained by mis-representation of vital facts. High
Court further rightly found that the appellant's right to repair and
maintain hi.s building, particularly the portion where the tea stall abuts,
has been seriously affected: the kerosene pressure stove being used for
E preparation of tea and coffee in the stall was a fire hazard. Structure was
causing nuisance for the occupants of the building as well as it was a
hindrance in the free flow of traffic and movement of pedestrian and also
that not only the structure was not permissible under the provision of
Section 313 of the Act but it has also prejudicially affected the rights of
respondent No I qua enjoyment of his property. [331-D-FJ
F
2. There is no substance in the contention that the suit is barred by
limitation in view of the provision in Section 51.7 of the Act. Section 527
contains a provision regarding notice to be served on the Corporation
before tiling of such a suit against it and it also prescribes a limitation
period for a suit being filed against the Corporation. The issue of limitation
G can be disposed of simply on the basis of the fact that the Corporation
and its Commissioner in the suit could raise the question of limitation, if
at all. The bar of limitation does not get attracted so far as the prayer
regarding mandatory injunction against appellant regarding removal of
the structure. Mandatory injunction granted under the decree passed by
H High Court regarding removal. of the structure provides complete relief
A.L. RANJANE v. R.J. SETHNA [ARUN KUMAR, J.) 327
to respondent No. 1. [331-G, H; 332-A, BJ A
3. In view of the request by appellant that the tea stall was being
run by him for a long time and it was the only source of livelihood for his
family, appellant is granted time to remove the structure in question
subject to his filing an undertaking. (332-C, DJ
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8994 of
1994.

From the Judgment and Order dated 10.10.1994 of the Mumbai
High Court in LP.A. No. 110 of 1993.
WITH
c
C.A. No. 4423 of 1995.

V.N. Ganpule, Shivaji M. Jadhav, Ashok K. Singh, Ms. Punam Kumari,
Satish K. Agnihotri, Rohit K. Singh, Anil K. Pandey, Pallav Shishodia D
and D.N. Mishra, Heman! for Mis. JBD & Co. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARUN KUMAR, J. These appeals are directed against a judgment and
decree passed by the High Court in Letters Patent Appeals No.110 of 1993, E
111 of 1993 and 112 of 1993. So far as the legal aspect of the case is
concerned it relates to interpretation of Section 313 of the Bombay Municipal
Corporation Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). Rest of the matter
relates to findings of fact arrived at by the High Court which do not call for
interference in these Civil Appeals.
F
Briefly, the facts are that the appellant is running a tea-stall for which
he has put up a structure on the street at the junction of Kalbadevi Road and
Jambulwadi Lane. Respondent No. I is the owner of the building on that
corner. The tea stall set up by the appellant on the street abuts the toilding
owned by Respondent No. I. Respondent No. I tiled a suit for declaration,
mandatory injunction and permanent injunction with the following prayers: G
"(a) For a Declaration that the suit structure put up by the 3rd defendant
is an unauthorized structure and.also an encroachment on the plaintiffs
rights and property.

(b) For a Mandatory Order and Injunction that the defendants do H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A forthwith remove the suit structure along with the paraphernalia,
including illegal electric and water connections and the things and
articles inside and around the suit structure, including those that are
affixed, annexed and attached to the said property.

(c) For a permanent Injunction restraining the defendant Nos. I & 2
B from allowing the suit structures to continue to remain in the vicinity
of the Plaintiffs said properties.

(d) For a permanent Injunction restraining the defendant Nos. I and
2 from permitting or sanctioning and allowing any Shed or Stall
structure to be put up and to remain in the vicinity of the plaintiffs
c said properties."

The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and its Commissioner
were impleaded as Defendant Nos. I & 2 while Defendant No.3 in the suit is
appellant herein who is running the disputed tea stall. It has come in evidence
of the appellant himself that the size of the structure is about I 0 ft. x 9 ft.
D having a height of IO ft. It has a pucca flooring of paved tiles. It has rolling
shutters on two sides. It has tin roof. On the side of the roof of the structure
is installed a water storage tank. The structure has water and electricity
connections. It has provision for drainage. The- four sides of the structure are
embedded in the concrete flooring on the road. It is also admitted that
E customers enjoy the facilities provided by the tea stall while standing/sitting
on the road. Washing of the utensils tak~s place on the road. The workers of
the tea stall bathe and wash their clothes on the road itself in front of the
house of Respondent No. I. The objected structure occupies about one-third
of the width of Jambulwadi lane. Rain water falling on the roof of the structure
F splashes on the wall of the building of Respondent No. I which damages the
wall as well as the paint on the wall of the building. Respondent No. I is also
aggrieved by the fact that he cannot repair his building from the side where
the structure in question exists because no scaffolding can be put there.
Besides this Respondent No. I-plaintiff alleged that the stall is a health and
fire hazard because kerosene pressure stove is being used in the stall for
G making tea and coffee.

After framing issues and recording evidence of the parties the trial
Court vi de judgment dated 30th August, 1988, decreed the suit of the plaintiff-
respondent No. I. In an appeal filed against the said judgment, the matter was
remanded back to the trial Court. The trial court again passed a decree in
H favour of the plaintiff on 9th September, 1994. Two appeals were filed against
A.L. RANJANE v. R.I. SETHNA [ARUN KUMAR. J.] 329
the decree passed by the trial Court--0ne by the present appellant i.e. the A
owner of the tea stall while the other was filed by the Municipal Corporation
of Greater Bombay and the Con1111issioner of the Corporation. A learned
Single Judge of the High Court vide judgment. dated 23rd/26th April, 1993
accepted the appeals and dismissed the suit. Respondent-plaintiff filed Letters
Patent Appeals against the decision of the learned Single Judge. These appeals B
were allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court resulting in the suit
of Respondent-plaintiff being decreed. The present appeals arise from the
judgment dated I 0.10.1994 of the Division Bench of the High Court.

The learned Counsel for the appellant argued that the structure in question
was duly authorized by the city Corporation, and therefore, the plaintiff could C
not object to the existence of the structure and the business being carried on
therein by the appellant. In this connection it is to be noted that the appellant
was initially allowed to put up a sugarcane crusher on the street as a "tolerated
structure". The appellant thereafter sought permission for a tea stall in place
of the sugarcane crusher in November, 1981. The sugarcane crusher occupied
space of 1mtr. x 1 mtr. The Ward Officer put up a note to the Superintendent D
of Licences stating that the appellant was allowed a "tolerated" sugarcane
crusher and had asked for permission to put up electric power motor which
request was not permissible, therefore, the appellant wanted to convert the
sugarcane juice stall into a tea stall. The Ward Officer thereafter put up a
note supporting the case of the appellant . The Superintendent of Licences E
submitted his remarks to the Municipal Commissioner stating that permission
for tea stall for an area of lmtr. x I mtr. be considered as a special case and
not to be treated as precedent for any other case in view of the "tolerated"
sugarcane crusher allowed to the appellant. On 10th December, 1981, the
Municipal commissioner passed an order that a tea stall Iicence may be given
as a very special case and not to be treated as a precedent. Thus what was F
permitted was a tea stall of the size of I mtr. x I mtr. which was of the same
size as the "tolerated" sugarcane crusher. It appears that the Ward Officer
kept on twisting facts in favour of the appellant. In a further note he
recommended that the appellant be allowed an area of 2 mtrs.x 3 mtrs. for
a tea stall. It was reported by the Ward Officer that the stall would be put up G
on a footpath and it would be at the dead end of the lane. Both these statements
were untrue in as much as neither the stall was on the footpath nor it was at
the dead end of the lane. The structure is at the junction of Jambulwadi road
with Kalbadevi lane whereas the dead end of the Jambulwadi road is at some
distance. There is no footpath at the Jambulwadi lane. Proceeding on the
basis of this mis-representation, the Municipal Commissioner sanctioned the H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A request contained in the note of the Ward Officer vide letter dated 17.2.1982.
Further on 27.4.1982 it is recorded that the Municipal Commissioner has
directed the Ward Officer to remove water and electricity connections in the
tea stall. It was also ordered that the stall has been allowed temporarily as a
removable structure and it cannot be allowed to be permanently embedded on
the road. If there was permanent embedding, the same was directed to be
B removed. The appellant continued to pursue the matter regarding water and
electricity connections.

The fact of the matter is that the size of the tea stall is 2.5 mtrs. x 3 .28
mtrs and it is located at the entrance of the Jambulwadi lane. The stall is
C about 2 ft. away from the building of the respondent -plaintiff. The water
tank which supplies water to the stall is supported on iron angles. The High
Court noticed that in addition to the place occupied by the stall, considerable
space outside the stall would always be occupied by people coming to drink
tea as also by other articles which are generally dumped outside such tea
stalls on the road. Thus it is obvious that the tea stall is a nuisance on the road
D besides causing hindrance in the free flow of traffic on the road. It is a source
of nuisance for the plaintiff-respondent No. I so far his right to enjoy his
property is concerned.
' I
Coming to the legal aspect regarding interpretation of Article 313 of
the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act we would like to first quote the
E relevant portion:

"313 .(1) No person· shall, except with the written permission of the
Commissioner

(a) place or deposit upon any street or upon any open channel, drain
F or wall in any street (or in ay public place) any stall, chair,
bench, box, ladder, bale or other thing so as to form an obstruction
thereto or encroachment thereon;
(b) project, at a height of less than twelve foot from the surface of
the street, any board, or shelf, beyond the line of the plinth of
G any building, over any street, or over any open channel, drain,
well or tank in any street;

(c) attach to, or suspend from, any wall or portion of a building
abutting on a street, at a less height than aforesaid, anything
whatever."
H A bare perusal of the provision contained in clause (a) of sub-section
A.L. RANJANE v. R.I. SETHNA [ARUN KUMAR. J.] 331

(I) of Section 313 of the Act shows that the Commissioner can grant A
permission for placing or depositing on any street etc. etc. any stall, chair,
bench, box, ladder, bale. This provision nowhere authorises the Commissioner
to grant permission with respect to a stall/structure of the type described
hereinbefore set up by the appellant. The structure for which permission can
be granted by the Commissioner has to be similar to items mentioned in the B
clause. Permission has to be for something which can be read as ejusden1
generis with the items 1nentioned in clause (a). The items mentioned in
clause (a) indicate that they are of a temporary nature and are easily removable
as and when required. The structure in the present case is of a size which
even if not permanently embedded on road, cannot be said to be akin to items
mentioned in clause (a). In the present case the structure is embedded on the C
road. Its four poles are embedded in the concrete paving on the road. Moreover,
the structure has water and electricity connections and permanent water tank
meant to store water and ensure permanent supply of water to the stall, is
installed on the side of the structure. It has shutters which enable locking of
the stall whenever required. No permission can be granted by the
Commissioner for setting up such a structure under Section 313 of the Act. D
Section 313 totally bars any stall or structure of the type put up by the
appellant. So permission, if any, granted by the Commissioner is violative of
the statute and is, therefore, illegal.

We also agree with the High Court that permission of the Commissioner E
for the tea stall in the present case was obtained by mis-representation of
vital facts. The same is vitiated. It is of no avail. The High Court further
found in its impugned judgment that the appellant's right to repair and maintain
his building, particularly the portion where the stall in question abuts, has
been seriously affected. The kerosene pressure stove being used for preparation
of tea and coffee in the stall has been found to be a fire hazard. The structure F
was also found to be causing nuisance for the occupants of the building as
well as it was a hindrance in the free flow of traffic and movement of
pedestrians. According to the High Court not only the structure was not
permissible under the provision of Section 313 of the Act but also it has
prejudicially affected the rights of the respondent No. I qua enjoyment of his G
property. We fully agree with the findings of the High Court in this respect.

The learned counsel for the appellant meekly argued that the suit of
Plaintiff-Respondent No. I was barred by limitation prescribed under Section
·527 (I) (b) of the Act. This Section contains a provision regarding notice to
be served on the Corporation before filing of such a suit against it and it also H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A prescribes a limitation period for a suit being filed agai'nst the Corporation.
The issue of limitation raised by the learned counsel for the appellant can be
disposed of simply on the basis of the fact that the question of limitation, if
at all could be raised by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and
its Commissioner i.e. Defendants No. I and 2 in the suit. So far as the prayer
B regarding mandatory injunction against Defendant No.3 i.e. the appellant
regarding removal of the structure in question, the bar of limitation does not
get attracted. The mandatory injunction granted under the decree passed by
the Hi.gh Court regarding removal of the structure provides complete relief
to the plaintiff/respondent No.I. Therefore, we find no substance in the
contention that the suit is barred by limitation in view of the provision
C contained in Section 527 of the Act. The result is that these appeals fail and
they are dismissed.

The learned Counsel for the appellant made a request that the tea stall
was being run by the appellant for a long time and it was the only source of
livelihood for the family of the appellant. Therefore, he prayed that some
D time be granted to the appellant to enable him to find some other place to run
his business. In view of this request, the appellant is granted time to remove
the structure in question by or before 31st January, 2003 subject to his filing
the usual undertaking in this behalf within three weeks.

NJ. Appeals dismissed.