Holding

The Supreme Court held that the acquisition award for the two acres was a nullity, the Housing Board was not the owner, the Special Court lacked jurisdiction to decide adverse possession, and the finding of adverse possession was set aside, granting liberty to the respondents to approach a civil court.

Summary

The Andhra Pradesh Housing Board acquired 45 acres for a housing scheme, but could take possession of only 43 acres; the remaining two acres remained occupied by hut dwellers and compensation was never paid. The land‑owners obtained a writ from the High Court declaring the acquisition award for the two acres a nullity and directing the municipal corporation to sanction layout without a NOC from the Board. In a land‑grabbing suit under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, the Special Court ordered the Board to hand over possession to the land‑owners and held that several private respondents had perfected title by adverse possession, granting them liberty to approach a civil court. The High Court later dismissed all writ petitions, prompting appeals. The Supreme Court held that the acquisition award for the two acres was indeed void, the Board was not the owner, and the Special Court lacked jurisdiction to determine adverse possession, setting aside its finding and allowing the land‑owners’ appeal while dismissing the Board’s and respondent No. 4’s appeals. The Court granted the private respondents liberty to seek title in a civil court.

Issues considered

The acquisition award for the two acres was void and the Housing Board had no title over that land.
Whether the Housing Board can be classified as a 'land grabber' under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982.
Whether the Special Court under the Act has jurisdiction to pass eviction orders against the Housing Board.
Whether the Special Court can determine title by adverse possession in a land‑grabbing proceeding.
Whether the findings of the Special Court on adverse possession are subject to review by the Supreme Court.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982s. 10, s. 14, s. 15, s. 2(d), s. 2(e), s. 7
Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976

Subjects

land acquisitionland grabbingadverse possessionspecial court jurisdictionnullity of awardcompensationNOCHousing BoardAndhra Pradesh

Judgment

--:'
A.P. HOUSING BOARD A
v.
MOHAMMED SADATULLAH AND ORS.

APRIL 13, 2007

[C.K. THAKKERANDLOKESHWARSINGHPANTA,JJ.] B

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982-Sections
2(d), 2(e) & 7-Possession ofa portion of the land acquired in land acquisition
proceeding for Housing Board not taken due to encroachment and thereby
resulting in non-payment of compensation to land-owners-Writ Petition by
c
land-owners, for declaring the land acquisition proceeding as null and void,
was allowed by High Court-Land Grabbing Petition filed by /and-owners
against several respondents and Housing Board-Respondents claiming
ownership of land by purchase through registered sale deeds and perfection
of their title by adverse possession-Housing Board claiming ownership on D
the basis of Award passed in the land acquisition proceeding-Special Court
'
" partly allowing the Petition by directing the Housing Board to hand over
possession to the land-owners; by directing the respondents to establish their
title before a Civil Court; and by holding in favour of some respondents that
they had perfected title by adverse possession-Writ Petitions before High E
Court were dismissed-Correctness of-Held, on facts, Special Court was
right in relying upon the order of the High Court in previous proceeding
which has become final and hence claim by Housing Board is not
maintainable-Setting aside the finding of adverse possession by the Special
Court, liberty granted to the respondents to establish their title before Civil
_)!
Court. F

Land Acquisition proceedings were initiated for acquisition of land
admeasuring 45 acres belonging to land-owners for State Housing Board and
an Award was passed by Land Acquisition Officer. The Housing Board could
take possession of only 43 acres land and the remaining 2 acres petition G
schedule land could not be taken into possession as the land-owners could
~ not hand over vacant possession. The compensation for the petition schedule
land was not paid to the land-owners as a result.

Land-owners, thereafter, submitted an application to City Municipal
107 H
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 5 S.C.R.

A Corporation to sanction layout for sub-division of the petition schedule land 'y
asserting that they continued to remain owners since they had not received
compensation for the petition schedule land. The Municipal Corporation
required the land-owners to furnish 'No Objection Certificate' (NOq from
the Housing Board. The land-owners filed a Writ Petition before High Court
challenging the requirement of NOC from the Housing Board and directing
B the Municipal Corporation to sanction layout without insisting for NOC and
declaring that the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the petition
schedule land had lapsed. The High Court allowed the Writ Petition.

The land-owners filed a Land Grabbing Case before Special Court under
c the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 against several
respondents including the Hol'.sing Board treating them as land grabbers.
The respondents contended that they cannot be treated as land grabbers under
the Act since they have purchased portions of the petition schedule land by
registered sale deeds and constructed buildings on it; that they were in actual
occupation of the petition schedule land for several years; that their possession
D was never objected by the land-owners; and that they have perfected their title
by adverse possession. The Housing Board contended that it cannot be treated
as a land grabber on the ground that it became absolute owner of the petition -'
schedule land after an Award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer ~

under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by granting compensation for the land;
E that the compensation amount could not be paid to the land-owners since its
vacant possession was not handed over to it; and that the order of the High
Court is under challenge in Writ Appeal and that the order had not become
final. The Special Court partly allowed the Land Grabbing Case by directing
the Housing Board to deliver possession of the suit schedule land to the land-
owners; by granting liberty to the respondents to establish their title before
F a Civil Court; and by holding in favour of some respondents that they had
..,_
perfected title by adverse possession.

The land-owners, Housing Board and an aggrieved respondent filed Writ
Petitions before the High Court. The High Court, by a common judgment,
G dismissed all the Writ Petitions.

In appeal to this Court, the Housing Board contended that the expression
'land grabber' in the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 J-
cannot include the Government or any instrumentality of the State; that the
Special Court under the Act does not have jurisdiction to pass an order of
H eviction against the Housing Board; that it cannot be said that it is not the
A.P. HOUSING BOARDv. MOHAMMED SADATULLAH 109
·~·
owner of the petition schedule land when an Award was passed in a land A
acquisition proceeding for acquisition of the petition schedule land.

In appeal to this Court, the aggrieved respondent contended that he is
the owner of the whole of the petition schedule land by adverse possession;
and that both the Courts had erred in recording a finding that he had perfected
title only in respect of a portion of the petition schedule land. B

.... In appeal to this Court, the land-owners contended that they were the
owners of the petition schedule land; that the Special Court under the Act
exceeded its jurisdiction in recording a finding of adverse possession in favour
of some respondents; and that the Housing Board could not claim ownership
of the petition schedule land since it neither could not take possession of the
c
land nor amount of compensation was paid to them.

Allowing the appeal of the land-owners and dismissing other appeals,
the Court

HELD: I.I. The consequence of the decision of the High Court in
D
'. previous proceedings is that in respect of the petition schedule two acres of
>
land, proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were held bad, award a
nullity and the land-owner continued to remain owner of the property with all
rights, title and interest therein. If it is so, neither the Housing Board nor
any other person can have any right over the said land. The Land Grabbing E
Case instituted by the original land-owners in respect of two acres of land
was, therefore, maintainable and the Court was required to decide the case in
accordance with law. It is immaterial that the Housing Board is merely a
juristic person and not a natural person. [Para 34) (127-H; 128-A-B)
..:r 1.2. The Special Court considered the decision of the High Court in F
previous proceeding in its proper perspective and recorded a finding that
Housing Board was not the owner of the petition schedule land as claimed by
it. It was also right in observing that the late father of the land-owners was
held to be pattadar of the petition schedule land and the said finding was not
questioned by the contesting respondents other than the Housing Board at
G
any time. The above finding recorded by the Special Court was confirmed by
....._.
the High Court in the Writ Petition. It held that the writ petition filed by the
Housing Board was not maintainable. There is no infirmity in the said finding.
[Paras 35 and 361 [128-C-DJ

1.3. When the acquisition proceedings and Award in respect of two acres H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 5 S.C.R.
).-
A of land was held bad and nullity by the High Court in previous proceedings, it
was not open to the Special Court or the High Court to ignore the said order.
Moreover, the Special Court was not right in observing that it was not alleged
by the land-owners that the contesting respondents or the Housing Board were
not land grabbers. It was expressly stated by the land-owners that they
continued to remain owners of two acres of land in view of non-delivery of
B possession of the land to Housing Board and non-payment of compensation
thereof. The Writ Petition filed by them in respect of two acres of land had
been allowed by the High Court and the contention of the Housing Board was .....
negatived that it had become owner of the land. It was also not correct to
contend that the land was different. It was not correct to say that the land-
c owners had not asserted that they were the owners of the petition schedule
land nor it can be contended that the land-owners had not alleged that the
respondents were not land grabbers. In the light of peculiar facts and attending
circumstances, it would be appropriate if the finding as to adverse possession
is set aside by granting liberty to all or any of the respondents to take
appropriate proceedings in accordance with law by approaching a competent
D Civil Court if they claim title on the basis of adverse possession.
[Paras 41 and 46] (129-D-F, G; 132-8] ..
"
Kanda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Government of A.P. & Ors. (2002] 3 SCC
258; State ofA.P. v. P. V. Hanumantha Rao (dead) through Lrs. & Anr., (2003)
10 SCC 121: JT (2003) 7 SC 438 and N. Srinivasa Rao v. Special Court under
E
the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act & Ors., [2006] 4 SCC 214, referred
to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3942 of2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.03.2000 of the High Court of '>--
F
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in W.P. No. 23232of1995.

WITH

C.A. Nos. 3943 of2002 & 3989 of2003.
G M.N. Rao, Bhaskar P. Gupta, R. Sundaravardhan and Anoop G.
Chaudhary, P.S. Narasimha, Ejaz Maqbool, Vikash Singh, Taruna Singh, Abhijeet _...
Sinha, Y. Raja Gopala Rao, Y. Ramesh, Y. Vaishni, B.V. Niren, V. Sridhar Reddy,
G. Prasant, Abhij1t Sengupta, B. Sridhar, I. Madhavi, K. Ram Kumar, Manoj
Saxena, Rajnish Kumar Singh, Rahul Shukla, Tripurari Ray, T.V. George, Anil
H Kumar Tandale (NP) and G. Prabhakar (NP), for the appearing parties.
A.P. HOUSING BOARD v. MOHAMMED SADATULLAH [C.K. THAKKER, J.] 111

)
I
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
C.K. THAKKER, J. All these appeals are filed against a common judgment
and order passed by the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at
Hyderabad on March 29, 2000 in various writ petitions. Those writ petitions
were filed by the petitioners (Andhra Pradesh Housing Board, land-owners
and contesting respondents) aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by B
the Special Court established under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing
_.., (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') in Land Grabbing
Case (L.G.C.) No. 137 of 1989 on September 4, 1995.

The litigation has a chequered history and to understand the controversy
raised by the, parties in the present group of appeals, it is necessary to bear c
in mind the facts and circumstances under which this Court is called upon
to resolve the controversy.

One Farhatulla, father of original petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 and husband of
petitioner No.4 before the Special Court, was the owner of land bearing
D
Survey Nos. 45-48, admeasuring 45 acres, ofYousufguda village in the limits
,. of Golkonda Manda!, Hyderabad in the State of Andhra Pradesh. It appears
~
that the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board wanted the land for a public purpose
i.e., for the construction of dwelling units for its employees ('Vengal Rao
'
Nagar Housing Board Colony'). A requisition was, therefore, made for
acquisition of land under Section 22A of the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board E
Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Housing Board Act') for 'Housing
Scheme'. A notification was issued on August 5, 1965 and was published in
Government Gazette on August 26, 1965. Special Deputy Collector was
authorized by the Government by an order dated October 24, 1967 to exercise
power under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Notification under Section 4(1)
-:r F
was issued on March 1, 1968. Notices were also given to the persons interested
in the land and for hearing of objections. An inquiry under Section 5A was
conducted and final notification under Section 6 was issued on December 30,
1968. In the final notification, it was stated that the land admeasuring 45 acres
of Survey Nos. 45 to 48 would be required for public purpose. Notices under
Sections 9 and JO were issued and an Award No.5 was passed on December G
31, 1971 by the Special Deputy Collector, Land Ac.quisition, Housing Board.
The said Award was not challenged by any party and it had become final and
binding. It is also clear from the record that though the acquisition was in
respect of 45 acres of land and the Award was also passed for 45 acres, the
Housing Board could take possession of only 43 acres land. It could not
H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 5 S.C.R.

A acquire possession of two acres of land since it was occupied by hut dwellers.
In the Award itself, a direction was given that an amount of Rs.50,094/- which
was the compensation towards two acres of land which could not be taken
possession of because of existence of huts, should be deposited in the
treasury and such amount should be paid to the land-owners only after they
B evict the hut dwellers and deliver possession of the said land to the Housing
Board. The Land Grabbing Case relates to the said two acres of land which
will hereafter be referred to as the 'petition schedule land'.

The land-owners had not received compensation of Rs.50,094/- in respect
of two acres of land. They, therefore, asserted that they continued to remain
C owners of the land and submitted an application to the Municipal Corporation
of Hyderabad (MCH) to sanction layout for sub-division of two acres of land
of Survey No.45. The MCH, however, asked the land-owners to furnish 'No
Objection Certificate' (NOC) from the Housing Board as also Clearance
Certificate (CC) from the Special Officer and Competent Authority under the
Urban Land (Ceiling .and Regulation) Act, 1976. Since NOC was not granted
D by the Housing Board nor layout sanctioned by MCH, the land-owners filed
a petition being Writ Petition No. 4194 of 1988 challenging the requirement
of NOC by the Housing Board and directing MCH to sanction layout without
insisting for NOC from the Housing Board and declaring that land acquisition
proceedings in respect of the said land had lapsed. The High Court allowed
E the petition and granted the relief by judgment and order dated December 8,
1988. It was held by the High Court that the possession could not be taken
by the Housing Board of two acres of land nor the amount was paid to the
owners and the proceedings lapsed. In view of the findings recorded by the
High Court in the Writ Petition, the petitioners-land-owners filed Land Grabbing
Case (L.G.C.) No. 137 of 1989 in the Special Court under the Act and prayed
F for eviction of unauthorized encroachers in two acres of land owned by late
Farhatulla, father of petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 and husband of petitioner No.4.

A counter was filed by respondent Nos. I to 3, inter alia, contending
that they and their forefathers had been in possession of the land said to
have been encroached by them and they were cultivating it since time
G immemorial. They and their predecessors were in actual occupation of land
and their possession was never objected by the petitioners. The Land
Acquisition Officer who passed the Award also held that huts were found in
existence on the 'petition schedule land' since about forty-five years. Thus,
the respondents had also perfected their title by adverse possession. It was
H further stated that they had filed Original Suit No. 1550 of 1985 in the Court
A.P. HOUSING BOARD"· MOHAMMED SADATULLAH [C.K. THAKKER, J.] 113
of !Vth Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and had obtained A
interim injunction against the petitioners restraining them from interfering with
their possession over the 'petition schedule land'. The respondents applied
for layout from MCH and also constructed houses on the said land. It was
stated that when MCH caused obstruction against such construction, the
respondents filed Writ Petition No. 29886 of 1986 and obtained interim relief. B
Farhatulla admitted in Criminal Case No. 259 of 1974 on the file of the IVth
Metropolitan Magistrate that he had no title deeds in respect of the 'petition
schedule land' and did not personally occupy it at any time except half an
acre. It was further stated that petitioner No.I also made similar statement in
Original Petition No. 258 of 1979 on the file of the 1st Additional Judge, City
Civil Court, Hyderabad. It was asserted that most of the residents in the C
'petition schedule land' were paying land revenue an<! they should be deemed
to be pattadars and in possession of the said land, notwithstanding the
wrong entries made in the Revenue Records. As the petitioners had no title
over the 'petition schedule land' and respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and their
predecessors in title had acquired title by adverse possession over the land,
they could not be treated as 'land grabbers'. D
Respondent No. 4 filed a separate counter, contending that one Raj
Lakshmana Rao, Jagirdar of Yousufguda village granted five acres of land
of Survey No. 45 in the year 1940 as Jnam which inc1uded the 'petition
schedule land' to his father P. Venkaiah for clearing the jungle and for E
removing the boulders found in it. The said P. Venkaiah was regularly paying
land revenue for that five acres of land and was cultivating it by raising dry
crops. Ultimately, the said Jagirdar granted patta in favour of P. Venkaiah. The
father of Respondent No.4 died long back and he found Urdu document with
the Seal of Jagirdar of Yousufguda village. When translated, it was found
-~ to be a patta certificate issued by late Jagirdar Lakshmana Rao in favour of F
father of respondent No.4. Thus, he was the owner and possessor of land of
Survey No. 45 admeasuring five acres and cannot be treated as 'land grabber'.
He had been in occupation of the land being claimed by him since the time
of his father, he is entitled to patta rights under Rule 2 of the Rules regarding
grant of pattadar rights in Khalsa village.
G
Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 filed a common counter. It was their case that
land in Yousufguda village was included in the municipal limits ofMCH long
back. It is now fully developed urban area used for building purposes.
According to them, ifthe 'petition schedule land' belonged to late Farhatulla
as was claimed by the petitioners, it should have been shown in their H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 5 S.C.R.

A declaration under Section 6 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, \.--
1976. But it was not included. According to these respondents, they purchased
1760 sq. yards from the 'petition schedule land' along with structures thereon
which was surrounded by a compound wall. After obtaining necessary
permission from MCH, they had made construction on the property. In the
written submissions filed before this Court, they have stated that they have
B improved the property and have built a four-storey building in 1986 and are
running a college since about two decades. They stated that Yousufguda
village was an ex-Jagir village of Lakshmana Rao, the Jagirdar. Though it
was claimed on behalf of the petitioners that late Farhatulla had purchased
fifty acres of land of Survey Nos. 45 to 48, the sale deed in respect of the
.....
-
c
-
said transaction was not filed. It was further stated that the erstwhile
Government of Hyderabad framed Rules in 1356 Fas Ii regarding the grant of
pattadari rights in non-Khalsa villages (Jagir villages). Under Rule 2, all
persons who held Jagir lands paying land revenue in all the Jagirs were
deemed to be pattadars of the land held by them, notwithstanding any oral
or written agreement between the Jagirdars or any other person and also
D notwithstanding any entry contrary to that effect in the concerned village
records. Rule 3 of the Rules required the Revenue Authorities to record the _,
names of actual occupants. Rule 4 directed that the names of the Jagirdars .::
should not be recorded in the Revenue Records as pattadars of lands, unless
Jagirdars were personally cultivating such lands. Under Rule 5, the Jagir
E ryots were entitled to restoration of possession of the lands that were in their
cultivation even if they were evicted by the Jagirdars. Rule 6 made the rights
accrued to the Jagir ryots heritable. Though the Rules were not implemented
prior to the abolition of Jagirs, the Revenue Officials were directed to implement
them by Circular No.2 of 1949. Late Farhatullah worked as Collector in the
Revenue Department and his services were terminated after a police action.
F In his capacity as the District Collector, he got the entries manipulated in the
Revenue Records in his favour ignoring the existing facts as to occupation
""
of Jagir ryots. Respondent Nos.5, 6 and other respondents, who were alleged
to have grabbed the 'petition schedule land', were in actual occupation of the
lands since more than 50 years. On that ground, possession of the land could
G not be taken over from them. Neither Farhatulla nor the Government could get
the land vacated. Even if it were taken for granted that Farhatullah or the
Government had title over the 'petition schedule land', their rights got
extinguished as respondents had perfected their title over the said land by
'adverse possession'.

H Respondent No. 8 raised contentions that his forefathers had been in
AP. HOUSING BOARD v. MOHAMMED SADATULLAH [C.K. THAKKER, l] 115
-.(
possession of the land and were cultivating it. Respondent No.12 in his reply A
stated that he had purchased 577 square yards of land with a house situated
in Bharat Nagar Colony which was a portion of 'petition schedule land' under
a registered sale deed dated December 14, 1984 from respondent No.8 and he
could not be described as 'land grabber'.

Respondent Nos. 14 and 15, in their common counter, contended that B
they had purchased 279 square yards of land which was the portion of
v 'petition schedule land' under a registered sale deed dated April 11, 1986 from
one Kurupaiah who was the owner of the land. It was further stated that when
Koteswara Rao tried to interfere with their possession, they filed Original Suit

:..
No. 1721 of 1986 in the Court of IXth Assistant Judge, City Civil Court,
Hyderabad and obtained interim injunction. Respondent No.16 in his counter
c
contended that he had purchased 350 square yards of the 'petition schedule
land' under a registered sale deed dated March 4, 1985 from one Chandraiah
who had occupancy rights over the said land. He also contended that he had
perfected his title over it by 'adverse possession'. He was in occupation of
the purchased land since then. Respondent No.18, in his counter, stated that D
he had purchased 279 square yards of land which was a portion of 'petition
::•
' schedule land' along with respondent No.17 under a registered sale deed
dated April 11, 1980 from Kurupaiah who was having occupancy rights over
the land. He stated that he had also perfected his title by 'adverse possession'.
He refers to Original Suit No. 1719 of 1986 on the file of IIIrd Assistant Judge,
E
City Civil Court, Hyderabad against Koteswara Rao who was said to be an
agent of petitioner Nos.3 and 4. He stated that the suit was filed since
Koteswara Rao tried to interfere with their possession.

Respondent No.19 filed a separate counter contending that he had
purchased 234 square yards of land and a portion of the house by a registered F
sale deed dated April 15, 1986 from Kurupaiah and was in possession and
enjoyment of it. Respondent No.35 in his reply contended that he and
respondent No.34 purchased the house of 540 square yards from a portion
of 'petition schedule land' from one P. Francie s/o Papaiah under a registered
sale deed dated April 30, 1985 and were in occupation of the said land since
the date of purchase. According to them, they were residing in their native G
.;.~ village in Guntur District and in their absence, respondent No.22-Housing
Board demolished the existing structures and constructed a compound wall
in the place of fencing in the year 1992 enclosing the site purchased by them.
They could not do anything and they were entitied to get back their property
from Respondent No.22. H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 5 S.C.R.

A Respondent No.36 in the counter contended that he purchased 800
square yards of land with a house which was a portion of the 'petition
schedule land' from one M.P. Jeevaratnam, s/o Pochaiah under a registered
sale deed dated April 30, 1985 and since then he was in occupation thereof.

Respondent No. 22 was A.P. Housing Board (impleaded later on). The
B Board, in its counter, inter alia, contended that it was the absolute owner and
in possession of the land covered by Award dated 31st December, 1971.
Under the Award, compensation in respect of two acres of land of Survey ~

No.45 was to be paid to Farhatullah, the pattadar on his handing over vacant
possession of the said land to A.P. Housing Board. The possession could not
c be given to the Board by the land-owner since there were huts thereon. The
amount in respect of two acres of land, therefore, was ordered to be deposited. ...;.

In the order of the High Court dated December 8, 1988 in Writ Petition No.
4194of1988, it was held that Award to the extent of two acres of land was
illegal and respondent No.22 Board had not acquired any right over the said
land. According to Housing Board, it had preferred a Writ Appeal against the
D said order and hence it could not be said that the order of the High Court
had become final. In the duly sanctioned layout by the Director of Town ...
Planning, it was clearly demarcated that two acres of land was covered by :<.
huts. As per the order passed in Writ Petition No. 1803 of 1991 filed against
Housing Board by Indira Nagar Hut Dwellers Association, Yousufguda, the
High Court directed the Association to approach a Civil Court for appropriate
E
relief. According to the Board, it had erected a fencing, constructed a rest
room and also displayed a board that the land so fenced belonged to the
Board. The area within the fencing was in occupation of the Board under the
Award dated December 31, 1971. Neither the petitioners nor the respondents
had any right to claim the said area covered by the fencing. ,,,__
F
An additional counter was also filed by the Housing Board wherein it
was contended that the land around which the Housing Board fenced, formed
part of 43 acres of land, the possession of which was delivered to the Board
under Award No. 5 of December 31, 1971. According to the Board, the land
claimed by the petitioners was not the one that was not taken possession by
G the Housing Board on the ground that the land was occupied by the hutment-
dwellers, was encroached and huts were in existence. The 'petition schedule -~
land' in Land Grabbing Case and the land in respect of which Writ Petition
No. 4194of1988 was filed, were different. The land for which approval of the
layout was sought from MCH and the land under the Writ Petition were also
different. It was, therefore, submitted that neither the Board can be said to
H
AP. HOUSING BOARD v. MOHAMMED SADATIJLLAH [C.K. THAKKER, J.] 117

...,·; be 'land grabber' nor the petitioners were entitled to any relief. A
On the basis of the pleading of the parties, the Special Court framed
requisite issues, examined witnesses, perused the record, considered the
evidence adduced by the parties and passed final order on September 4, 1995
partly allowing the petition and directing the Revenue Divisional Officer to
take appropriate steps to deliver possession of the 'petition schedule land' B
to the petitioners by evicting the A.P. Housing Board within two months and
report compliance in accordance with law. It, however, held that respondent
y
Nos. 4 to 6 had perfected their title over the land possessed by them by
'adverse possession'. The Court granted liberty to respondent Nos. 14, 16 to
18 and 34 to 36 to establish before a regular Civil Court their title in respect
of land in their possession clarifying that the judgment rendered by it would
c
not affect the rights of those respondents.

In this connection, the Special Court concluded;

On the basis of the evidence on record, we gave finding that the
D
Petition-Schedule site in this LGC is the site shown as ABCDEFGH
in Ex. B-35 plan which is admittedly in occupation of R,4 to R-6 and
• R-22 (A.P. Housing Board). In view of our finding that R-4 to R-6 have
';>

perfected their title over the sites in their occupation which are shown
in Ex. B-35 within the area marked as ABCDEFGH, we find that they
cannot be treated as land grabbers. For want of evidence regarding E
the identity of the site alleged to have been grabbed by other
respondents other than R-22, we find that they cannot be treated as
land grabbers. It is not the contention of the petitioner that R-22 is
a land grabber. Hence, we find that none of the Respondents in the
LGC are land grabbers. As regards title of the site in the Petition-
Schedule land covered by Ex. B-5, B-8, B-9, B-40 and B-41 Sale Deed,
F
the Petitioners and the vendees under the said Sale Deeds are at
liberty to establish their title in the result Civil Courts.

Being aggrieved by the judgment of the Special Court, writ petitions
were filed in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Whereas A.P. Housing Board
G
had grievance against the direction to hand over possession of two acres of
land to the petitioners, original petitioners were aggrieved by the order of the
~-- Court in not allowing their petition in its entirety. Respondent No.4 as also
respondent Nos. 34 to 36 were also not satisfied with the order passed by
the Special Court and they also approached the High Court.
H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 5 S.C.R.

A The High Court, by a common judgment dated March 29, 2000 dismissed
\.....
all the petitions. The aggrieved appellants have challenged the said decision '
in this Court. Leave was granted by this Court and appeals were admitted.
All the appeals have now been placed for final hearing before us.

We have heard the learned advocates for the parties at length.
B
The learned counsel for A.P. Housing Board (C.A. No. 3942 of 2002)
contended that the expression 'land grabber' in the Act cannot include the
'Government' or instrumentality of 'State' and neither the Government nor ...,,_
such instrumentality of'State' can be held to be 'land grabber' under the Act.
According to him, the expression 'person' would contextually mean natural
c person only and not artificial, legal or juristic person. It was also urged that
Special Court established under the Act had no jurisdiction to pass an order
of eviction against the Housing Board. The counsel submitted that the High
Court was not justified in observing that it was open to the parties to
establish their right to the property in any other forum. All questions 'under
D the Act' ought to have been decided by the Special Court keeping in view
the relevant provisions of law. It was urged that when proceedings had been
taken under the Land Acquisition Act and Award was passed for acquisition ,
of 45 acres of land, it could not be held that the Housing Board had not "-
become owner of two acres of land, possession of which could not be
delivered to the Board by the land owners since the land was encroached
E upon by hutment dwellers. The land stood vested in the Housing Board free
from all encumbrances and the land owners thereafter had no right, title or
interest therein. It was admitted that though writ petition filed by the land
owners was allowed by the High Court and the said decision had attained
finality, the land covered by the decision was different. It was also argued that
F once the Special Court recorded a finding that Housing Board could not be
said to be 'land grabber', it had no jurisdiction to issue any direction to the
Revenue Authorities to handover possession of two acres of land to the land
owners from the Housing Board. The only order which could have been
passed by the Special Court was to dismiss the petition. It was, therefore,
submitted that the appeal filed by the Housing Board deserves to be allowed
G by setting aside the order passed by the Special Court as well as by the High
Court.
../-
Civil Appeal No. 3989 of2003 was filed by the respondent No. 4 in Land
Grabbing Case. According to him, the Special Court as well as the High Court
were right in upholding his contention that he was in adverse possession of
H
A.P. HOUSING BOAROv. MOHAMMED SAOATULLAH [C.K. THAKKER,J.) 119

~ the land and had become owner thereof. Both the Courts, however, were A
wrong in recording a finding that he had perfected his title only in respect
of 770.55 square yards of land. According to him, he had perfected his title
for five acres of land and his prayer deserves to be granted by this Court.

Civil Appeal No. 3943 of 2002 was filed by original petitioners-
landowners. Their case is that they were the owners of the suit property and B
neither the Housing Board nor other respondents had any right, title or
interest in the land. It was submitted that the Special Court committed an error
of law in holding that some of the respondents including respondent No. 4
had perfected their title by way of adverse possession. Such a finding could

- not have been recorded by Special Court established under the Act. It was
also submitted that both the Courts were right in holding that out of forty-
five acres of land said to have been acquired by the A.P. Housing Board,
possession of only forty-three acres of land could be obtained by the Board
and amount of compensation was paid for the said land. In respect of two
C

acres of land, neither the possession could be taken by the Board nor amount
of compensation was paid by it. Obviously the Housing Board did not D
become owner of two acres of land. The Housing Board, therefore, could not
claim ownership over that land. The appellants, hence, applied for layout of
two acres of land to MCH. But when MCH insisted for No Objection Certificate
(NOC) from the Housing Board, they were constrained to approach the High
Court and the High Court held that the Board had no right over two acres E
of land and the land owners continued to remain owners of the property. No
appeal had been filed against the said order and it had become final and
binding. In view of the said finding, the Special Court as well as the High
Court were right in ordering handing over possession of the land to them.
According to the appellants, however, the Special Court and the High Court
were wrong in not granting relief against the other respondents. It was also F
contended that the Special Court exceeded its jurisdiction in entering into the
question of adverse possession which was not in the domain of Special
Court. Such a question could be decided only by a Civil Court. The High
Court, in the circumstances, ought to have allowed the writ petition filed by
the land-owners and ought to have set aside the finding as to ownership of G
respondents by adverse possession. It was, therefore, submitted that the
4-. appeal filed by the land-owners deserves to be allowed.

Before we deal with the contentions of the parties, it would be
appropriate if we hurriedly glance the relevant provisions of the Act. The
Preamble of the Act states that the Act has been enacted with a view to H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 5 S.C.R.

A prohibit the activity of land grabbing in the State of Andhra Pradesh which ~
has adversely affected public order and it was, therefore, necessary to arrest
and curb immediately such unlawful activity.

In the statement of objects and reasons, it has been observed;

B Statement of Objects and Reasons

"It has come to the notice of the Government that there are organised
attempts on the part of certain lawless persons operating individually
and in groups to grab either by force, or by deceit or otherwise lands
belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable
c institution or endowment, including a wakf or any other private person.
The land grabbers are forming bogus cooperative housing societies ...
or setting up fictitious claims and including in large scale and
unprecedented and fraudulent sales of land through unscrupulous
real estate dealers or otherwise in favour of certain section of people,
resulting in large scale accumulation of the unaccounted wealth. As
D public order is also adversely affected thereby now and then by such
unlawful activities of land grabbers in the State, particularly in respect
of urban and urbanisable land, it was felt necessary to arrest and curb
such unlawful activities immediately by enacting a special law in that
regard."
E It has been further stated:

"Whereas there are organized attempts on the part of certain lawless
persons operating individually and in groups, to grab, either by force
or by deceit or otherwise, lands (whether belonging to the Government,
a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment,
F
including a wakf, or any other private persons) who are known as
'land grabbers'.

And whereas such land grabbers are forming bogus co-operative
housing societies or setting up fictitious claims and indulging in large
scale and unprecedented and fraudulent sales of lands belonging to
G
the Government, local authority, religious or charitable institutions or
endowments including a wakf or private persons, through unscrupulous
real estate dealers or otherwise in favour of certain sections of the
people resulting in large accumulation of unaccounted wealth and · ·
quick money to land grabbers;
H
A.P. HOUSING BOARD v. MOHAMMED SADATULLAH [C.K. THAKKER,J.] 12 l
And whereas, having regard to the resources and influence of the A
persons by whom, the large scale on which and the manner in which,
the unlawful activity of land grabbing was, has been or is being
organized and carried on in violation of law by them, as land grabbers
in the State of Andhra Pradesh, and particularly in its urban areas, it
is necessary to arrest and curb immediately such unlawful activity of B
land grabbing; ....

And whereas public order is adversely affected by such unlawful
activity of land grabbers"

-that the Act has been enacted.

Section l states that the Act extends to the whole of the State of
c
Andhra Pradesh and applies to the lands specified therein. 'Section 2 is
'legislative dictionary' and defines certain terms. For our purpose, the terms
'land grabber' [clause (d)] and 'land grabbing' [clause (e)] are material and
they may be reproduced;
D
2 (d) "land grabber" means a person or a group of persons who
commits land grabbing and includes any person who gives financial
aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands or for
construction of unauthorized structures thereon, or who collects or
attempts to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation E
and other charges by criminal intimidation, or who abets the doing of
any of the above mentioned acts, and also includes the successors
in interest;

2 (e) "land grabbing" means every activity of grabbing of any land
(whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious F
or charitable institutkm or endowment, including a wakf, or any other
private person) by a person or group of persons, without any lawful
entitlement and with a view to illegally taking possession of such
lands, or enter into or create illegal tenancies or lease and licence
agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands,
or to construct unauthorized structures thereon for sale or hire, or G
give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for
construction, or use and occupation of unauthorized structures; and
~· the term "to grab land" shall be construed accordingly",

3ection 3 declares land grabbing in any form to be unlawful and an
offence punishable under the Act. Section 4 prohibits land grabbing and H
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 5 S.C.R.
.'
A prescribes punishment for committing an offence of land-grabbing. Section 5
is also a provision for other offences in connection with land grabbing and '...-
prescribes penalties. Section 6 does not spare even Companies from the
consequences of conviction and punishment, if they commit an act of land-
grabbing. Section 7 of the Act enables the Government to constitute Special
B Courts for the purpose of providing speedy inquiry into the alleged act of
land grabbing and trial of cases in respect of the ownership and title to, or
lawful possession of the land 'grabbed'. The relevant part of the said section
reads thus;

"7. Constitution of Special Courts:-(!) The Government may, for the
c purpose of providing speedy enquiry into any alleged act of land
grabbing, and trial of cases in respect of the ownership and title to,
or lawful possession of, the land grabbed, by notification, constitute
a Special Court.

(2) A Special Court shall consist of a Chainnan and four other members,
D to be appointed by the Government.

(3) The Chairman shall be a person who is or has been a Judge of a
High Court and of the other four members, two shall be persons who _,
are or have been District Judges (hereinafter referred to as Judicial .(

Members) and the other two members shall be persons who hold or
E have held a post not below the rank of a District Collector (hereinafter
referred to as Revenue Members):

Provided that the appointment of a person who was a Judge of a High
Court as the Chairman of the Special Court shall be made after
consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned;
F
Provided furth..:r that where a sitting Judge of a High Court is to be
~ppointed as Chairman, such appointment shall be made after
nomination by the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned, with the
concurrence of the Chief Justice of India.

G (4) The Government from time to time likewise reconstitute the Special
Court constitJted under sub··section (!) or may, at any time abolish
such Special Court.
•#
(4A) The Chairman or other member shall hold office as such for a
term of two years from the date on which he enters upon his office,
H or until the Special Court is reconstituted or abolished under sub-
A.P. HOUSING BOARD v. MOHAMMED SADA TULLAH [C.K. THAKKER, J.] 123

·-"' section (4), whichever is earlier. A
(4B)(a) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the jurisdiction,
powers and authority of the Special Court may be exercised by benches
thereof one comprising of the Chairman, a judicial member and a
Revenue member and the other comprising of a Judicial Member and
a Revenue Member. B
(b) Where the bench comprises of the Chairman, he shall be the
Presiding Officer of such a bench and where the bench consists of
two members, the Judicial Member shall be the Presiding Officer.

(c) It shall be competent for the Chairman either suo motu or on a
reference made to him to withdraw any case pending before the bench
c
comprising of two members and dispose of the same or to transfer any
case from one bench to another bench in the interest of justice.

(d) Where it is reasonably apprehended that the trial of civil liability
of a person accused of an offence under this Act, is likely to take D
considerable time, it shall be competent for the Chairman to entrust
. the trial of the criminal liability of such offender to another bench in
,, the interest of speedy disposal of the case.

(e) Where a case under this Act is heard by a bench consisting of
two members and the members thereof are divided in opinion, the case E
with their opinions shall be laid before another judicial member_ or the
Chainnan and that member or Chairman, as the case may be, after such
hearing as he thinks fit, shall deliver his opinion and the decision or
order shall follow that opinion.

(5) The quorum to constitute a meeting of any bench of the Special F
Court shall be two .

.... .... .....
(SD) (i). Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure,
I908 (5 of I908), the Special Court may follow its own procedure which
G
shall not be inconsistent with the principles of natural justice and fair
play and subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules
made thereunder while deciding the civil liability.

(ii) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 260 or Section 262
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, I973 (2 of I974) every offence H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 5 S.C.R.

A punishable under this Act shall be tried in a summary way and the
provisions of Sections 263 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code
shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial.

(iii) When a person is convicted of an offence of land grabbing
attended by criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation,
B and it appears to the Special Court that, by such force or show of
force or intimidation the land of any person has been grabbed, the
Special Court may if it thinks fit, order that possession of the same
be restored to that person after evicting by force, if necessary, any
other person who may be in possession of the property.

C (6) No act or proceeding of the Special Court shall be deemed to be
invalid by reason only of the existence of any vacancy among its
members or any defect in the Constitution or re-constitution thereof.

Section 7A allows creation of Special Tribunals and prescribe their
powers. Section 8 deals with powers and procedure of Special Courts. Under
D Section 9, Special Courts have all the powers of Civil Court and the Court of
Session in conducting the cases before it. Section 10 declares law relating to
burden of proof and enacts that where in any proceeding under the Act, a
land is alleged to have been grabbed and Prima facie case is made out, it will
be presumed that the person is a land grabber and burden of proving that
E the land had not been grabbed by him shall be on such person. Whereas
Section 14 protects persons acting in good faith, Section 15 gives overriding
effect to the Act over other laws.

The scheme of the Act is thus clear that it is a special legislation
enacted with a view to deal with and decide cases of land grabbing
F expeditiously. In interpreting the provisions of the Act, the said objective of
the legislature has always to be kept in view.

The provisions of the Act came up for consideration before this Court
in few cases. In Kanda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Government of A.P. & Ors.,
[2002] 3 SCC 258 : JT (2002) 2 SC 253, a decision rendered by Special Court
G under the Act and confirmed by the High Court came to be challenged in this
Court. One of the considerations before this Court was as to whether the
Special Court could entertain a suit when there was bona fide dispute of title ~
by the other side. The Court considered the relevant provisions of law and
held that when the petitioner alleges that the respondent is land grabber,
H Special Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the dispute and it can pass an
A.P. HOUSING BOARD v. MOHAMMED SADATULLAH [CK THAKKER, J.] J25
order and issue direction if it comes to the conclusion that there was 'land A
grabbing' and the respondent is a 'land grabber'. The Court considered the
definition clause and the expressions 'land grabber' and 'land grabbing' and
held that whenever there is land grabbing under the Act, proceedings can be
initiated and the case can be decided by Special Court constituted under the
Act. The Court also held that for the purpose of taking cognizance of a case B
under the Act, existence of an allegation of any act of land grabbing is sine
qua non and not the truth or otherwise of the allegation. But to hold the
person to be a 'land grabber', it is necessary to find that the allegations
satisfying the requirement of land grabbing are proved. To make out a case
under the Act, therefore, the petitioner before the Special Court must plead
and prove two ingredients, namely, possidendi i.e., factual possession and C
animus i.e., intention of the person who is alleged to have grabbed land. If
the two conditions are fulfilled, Special Court has jurisdiction to deal with and
decide the matter and an appropriate order can be passed under the Act. It
was also held that the jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 as also
of this Court under Article I 36 of the Constitution is limited and findings of
the fact arrived at by the Special Court cannot be interfered with in exercise D
of constitutional jurisdiction. The law laid down in Kanda Lakshmana Bapuji
j was reiterated and quoted with approval in State of A.P. v. P. V. Hanumantha
.. Rao (dead) through L.Rs. & Anr., (2003] JO SCC 121: JT (2003) 7 SC 438 by
observing that an order passed by the Special Court can be interfered with
by a High Court in exercise of power of judicial review where (I) there is an E
error manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it
is based on clear misreading or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and
(2) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (See
also Gouni Satya Reddi v. Government of A.P. & Ors., (2004] 7 SCC 398].

So far as the facts of the present proceedings are concerned, forty-five F
acres of land of Survey No. 45 belonged to the land-owners was sought to
be acquired for the purpose of construction of quarters by the A.P. Housing
Board. Forty-three acres of land only could be acquired and possession of
two acres of land could not be obtained by the Board. Amount of
compensation was paid to the land-owners in respect of forty-three acres of G
land only. The land-owners, therefore, applied to MCH for layout for two
acres of land. When MCH insisted for NOC by the Housing Board, the land-
owners filed a writ petition in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh that in view
of the fact that they were not paid compensation for two acres of land and
actual possession of the land had never been received by the Housing Board,
it had no right whatsoever over the said land. MCH, therefore, could not H
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 5 S.C.R.

A insist on obtaining of NOC from Housing Board. The High Court heard both
the parties. It also referred to orders issued by A.P. Housing Board and an
order passed by the Government on March 13, 1979. In paras 4 & 5 of the
order, the Government observed:

"4. The Chairman, A.P. Housing Board has reported that there is a lot
B of litigation involved on the land in question and it is not possible
to take possession of this piece of two acres of land even if houses
are allotted to the satisfaction of the rival groups. The amount of
Rs.50,094/- belonging to the Housing Board is unnecessarily locked
·~
up with the special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) and either the
special Deputy Collector of the Board is not in a position to decide
c whether hut dwellers have got any claim over this land since the
Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) has accepted Sri
Farhatullah is the owner of the land in the award passed by him.
Moreover it is also reported that this piece of land is shown as long
spice in the sanctioned layout of the colony. As such, the Board is
D not interested to have this land for taking up a Scheme. Therefore, the
Chairman has suggested that the Special Deputy Collector (Land
Acquisition) may be instructed to de-notify this land from acquisition
and return the amount deposited with him by the Housing Boitrd.

5. Government ha·.·ing examined the matter carefully accept the
E proposal of the Chairman, A.P. Housing Board and direct the Special
Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition (Hyderabad) to send proposals
for denotification of the land in question from acquisition and return
the amount deposited with him by the A.P. Housing Board."

On the basis of the said order, the High Court observed that no land
F could be acquired without payment of compensation. No provision under the
Act was shown to the Court which obliged the owner to handover vacant
possession of the land and to withhold payment of compensation. It was not
a voluntary sale or purchase. It was a compulsory acquisition. If the acquiring
bodies felt that there was difficulty in getting possession, it was for them to
G make up their mind whether to acquire or not to acquire such land. No
obligation, however, could be imposed upon the owner to handover vacant
possession of land. No order as to payment of compensation could be made
subject to condition of handing over possession by the owner. Such Award _...
could not be said to be an Award contemplated under the Land Acquisition
Act. Though the proceedings started in 1965 and the Award was passed in
H 1971, no compensation was paid till the matter was decided by the High Court
A.P. HOUSING BOARDv. MOHAMMED SADA TULLAH [C.K. THAKKER, J.] J27
in 1988. A
The Court, therefore, stated;

"The acquisition of land without payment of compensation is
wholly without jurisdiction and the Award is a nullity."
B
The Court concluded;

.::,:· "In the instant case, the circumstances do not warrant withholding
of the relief which the petitioners are otherwise entitled. The acquisition
of the land without providing for compensation is wholly illegal. The
payment of compensation was made dependant upon certain conditions C
to be fulfilled by the party which is not envisaged under the Land
Acquisition Act. The lands can be acquired only in accordance with
the provisions of the Act and the award is unreasonable, oppressive
and unfair. The authorities cannot say that they will keep the land
under acquisition without paying the compensation amount.
Compensation was not paid for over 23 years. Such an award is alien D
to the scheme and intendment of the Land Acquisition Act and is
void. The entire acquisition proceedings must be deemed to have
lapsed The petitioners are therefore entitled to ignore the award
and proceed to deal with the land which admittedly belongs to
them."
E
.
(emphasis supplied)

Regarding insistence by MCH for NOC from the Housing Board, the
High Court held that since the Housing Board had no title to the property
and admittedly no possession was received by the Board, requirement of
NOC could not be insisted. Moreover, the Award itself for two acres of land F
could not be said to be legal. MCH was, therefore, directed to consider the
application of the land-owner without insisting for such certificate. The petition
was accordingly allowed.

Though in the appeal filed by the A.P. Housing Board in the present G
proceedings, it was asserted that the decision of the High Court in Writ
Petition No. 4194 of 1988 was not final as appeal was filed against the said
decision, at the time of hearing of the appeal, it was admitted that no such
appeal was filed against the jl)dgment of the High Court and the decision had
attained finality. The consequence of the decision of the High Court in the
circumstances is that in respect of two acres of land, proceedings under the H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 5 S.C.R.

A Land Acquisition Act were held bad, award nullity and the land-owner
continued to remain owner of the property with all rights, title and interest
therein. If it is so, neither the Housing Board nor any other person can have
any right over the said land. The Land Grabbing case instituted by the
original land-owners in respect of two acres of land was, therefore, maintainable
and the Court was required to decide the case in accordance with law. It is
B immaterial that the Housing Board is merely juristic person and not natural
person.

The Special Court, in our opinion, considered the decision of the High
Court in earlier petition in its proper perspective and recorded a finding that
C Housing Board was not the owner of the 'petition schedule land' as claimed
by it. It was also right in observing that late Farhatulla was held to be
pattadar of two acres of 'petition schedule land' and the said finding was
not questioned by the contesting respondents other than respondent No.22
(A.P. Housing Board) at any time.

D The above finding recorded by the Special Court was confirmed by the
High Court in the writ petition. It held that the writ petition filed by the
Housing Board was not maintainable. We see no infirmity in the said finding.

It was no doubt contended by the learned counsel for the Housing
Board that the Special Court acquires jurisdiction to pass an appropriate order
E under the Act only if it comes to the conclusion that there is 'land grabbing'
and the respondent is a land grabber. Once the Court holds that the respondent
is not a 'land grabber', it has no jurisdiction to direct vacating the property
or handing over possession to the petitioner and such action is not known
to law. It was submitted that in the instant case, according to the Special
F Court, Housing Board was not a 'land grabber'.

In this connection, the counsel drew our attention to Issue No.3 framed
by the Special Court. The said issue reads thus:

"Whether the respondent is land grabber within the meaning of
the Act?"
G
On consideration of the evidence on record, the Court held that the
'petition schedule land' was shown to be ABCDEFGH in Exhibit B-35 plan ~+
which was in occupation of respondent Nos. 4 to 6 (private respondents) and
respondent No. 22 (A.P. Housing Board). The Special Court then recorded a
H finding that respondent Nos. 4 to 6 had perfected their title over the land in
A.P. HOUSING BOARD>. MOHAMMED SADATULi.AH [CK THAKKER, l] 129
their occupation which were shown in Ex. B-35 within the area marked as A ·
ABCDEFGH and, therefore, those respondents could not be treated as land
grabbers. The Court then stated; "For want of evidence regarding the identity
of the sites alleged to have been grabbed by other respondents other than
respondent No. 22, we find that they cannot be treated as land grabbers."

While dealing with Issue No. 5 as to relief, however, the Court allowed B
the petition in part holding the title of the petitioners over the 'petition

... schedule land' which was shown as ABCDEFGH in Ex. B-35 excluding the
area in occupation of respondent Nos. 4 to 6 and declaring the petitioners to
be owners thereof and issued direction to Revenue Development Officer to
take steps to deliver possession of the land to the petitioners by evicting C
respondent No. 22 (A.P. Housing Board) within two months from the date of
the receipt of the order and to report compliance. The High Court upheld that
part of the order of the Special Court.

In our opinion, the learned counsel for the land-owners-original
petitioners is right in contending that when the acquisition proceedings and D
Award in respect of two acres of land was held bad and nullity by the High
; Court in previous proceedings, it was not open to the Special Court or the
)
High Court to ignore the said order. Moreover, the Special Court was not right
in observing that it was not alleged by the land-owners that the contesting
respondents (private parties or A.P. Housing Board) were not land grabbers.
It was expressly stated by the land-owners that they continued to remain E
owners of two acres of land in view of non delivery of possession of land
to Housing Board and non payment of compensation thereof. The writ petition
filed by them in respect of two acres of land had been allowed by the High
Court in 1988 and the contention of the Housing Board was negatived that
_...-
it had become owner of the land. It was also not correct to contend that the F
land was different, being ABCDEFGH in Ex.B-35, in possession ofrespondent
Nos. 4 to 6 and respondent No.22. In fact, the operative part of the order
extracted hereinabove in the earlier part of the judgment clearly shows that
petition was partially allowed as to title of the petitioners over the 'petition
schedule land' shown as ABCDEFGH in Ex. B-35 excluding the area in the
occupation of respondent Nos. 4 to 6. It was, therefore, not correct to say G
that the petitioners-land-owners had not asserted that they were the owners
of the 'petition schedule land' nor it can be contended that the land-owners
had not alleged that the respondents were not land grabbers.

The question then relates to claim of appellant before this Court in Civil H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 5 S.C.R.

A Appeal No. 3989 of 2003 instituted by original respondent No.4. As already
adverted earlier, the Special Court has held that respondent Nos. 4 to 6 had
perfected their title by adverse possession and hence they could not be
.termed as 'land grabbers'. According to the Special Court as well as the High
Court, however, they had become owners by adverse possession in respect
of 770 sq. yards of land but according to respondent No. 4-appellant before
B this Court, he has become owner by adverse possession of five acres of land.
The contention of the land-owners, on the other hand, is that a finding as
to ownership by adverse possession could not have been recorded by Special
Court constituted under the Act and the Special Court was in error in recording
't- •
such finding. The land-owners also contended that in case of other
c respondents, the Special Court held that disputed questions of fact were
involved as to whether they had become owners by adverse possession or
not and in the opinion of the Special Court, such question can be decided
only by a competent Civil Court. Liberty was, therefore, granted to those
respondents to approach an appropriate Civil Court if they desired to raise
such issue. It was also contended that even in respect of respondent Nos.
D 4 to 6, the Special Court observed that if their case was that they had become
owners by adverse possession of five acres of land, they could approach a
Civil Court and the decision rendered by Special Court would not come in •._
their way. It was, therefore, submitted by the land-owners that the Special
Court ought not to have recorded any finding as regards adverse possession
E and ought have allowed the contesting respondents by granting liberty to
approach Civil Court to establish their rights over any part of the land by
adverse possession.

In this connection, reference was made to a recent decision of this
Court in N. Srinivasa Rao v. Special Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing
F (Prohibition) Act & Ors., [2006] 4 SCC 214. A two Judge Bench of this Court ..._
in the above case held that the Special Court constituted under the Act has
no jurisdiction to decide question as to acquisition of title by adverse
possession in a proceeding under the Act as the same would fall within the
domain of Civil Court.

G The learned counsel for respondent No.4, on the other hand, relied on
Konda Lakshmana Bapuji and submitted that a three Judge Bench of this
'
~•
Court in the said decision has held that such question can be decided by
Special Court. In paragraph 53 of the decision, this Court observed:

"53. The question of a person perfecting title by adverse possession
H
A.P. HOUSING BOARD v. MOHAMMED SADA TULLAH [CK THAKKER, J.] 131

is a mixed question of law and fact. The principle of law in regard to A
adverse possession is firmly established. It is a well-settled proposition
that mere possession the land, however long it may be, would not ripe
into possessory title unless the possessor has 'animus possidendi'
to hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. It is true that
assertion of title to the land in dispute by the possessor would, in an B
appropriate case, be sufficient indication of the animus possidendi to
hold averse to the title of the true owner. But such an assertion of title
must be clear and unequivocal though it need not be addressed to the
.... ·~ real owner. For reckoning the statutory period to perfect title by
prescription both the possession as well as the animus possidendi
must be shown to exist. Where, however, at the commencement of the c
possession there is no animus possidendi the period for the purpose
of reckoning adverse possession will commence from the date when
both the actual possession and assertion of title by the possessor are
shown to exist. The length of possession to perfect title by adverse
possession as against the Government is 30 years."
D
It was also submitted that in N. Srinivasa Rao, which was decided by
a two Judge Bench, the attention of the Court was not invited to the three
) Judge Bench decision of this Court in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji and, the
:.
subsequent decision is per incurium.

In our opinion, it is not necessary to enter into larger question in the E
light of the factual scenario before us. As we have already observed earlier,
in the instant case, in a petition filed by the land-owners as early as in 1988,
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that land acquisition proceedings for
two acres of land of Survey No. 45 could not be said to be in consonance
with law and the Award was declared null and void. The ownership of the F
original land-holders remained intact. The petition was accordingly allowed
and MCH was directed to take appropriate action on application of the land-
owners to sanction layout without insisting NOC by the A.P. Housing Board.
Even in present proceedings, a contention was raised by almost all respondents
that they had perfected title by remaining in adverse possession. Liberty was
granted by the Special Court to the contesting respondents to establish their G

., right by approaching a competent Civil Court. Even in respect of respondent
No. 4 (Civil Appeal No. 3989 of2003), the Special Court held that if his claim
is that he has become owner by adverse possession in respect of five acres
of land, it would be open to him to approach Civil Court for the said purpose.
Again, the order passed in favour of land-owners in 1988 in Writ Petition No. H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 5 S.C.R.

A 4194 of 1988 had attained finality and is no more under challenge. There is
an additional reason also for taking this view. As observed earlier, there is
some controversy as to identity of land in dispute, which can be resolved by
a Civil Court on the basis of evidence to be led by the parties. In the light
of peculiar facts and attending circumstances, in our opinion, it would be
B appropriate if the finding as to adverse possession is set aside by granting
liberty to all or any of the respondents to take appropriate proceedings in
accordance with law by approaching a competent Civil Court if they claim title

C
on the basis of adverse possession.

For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, the appeals filed by A.P.
Housing Board and respondent No.4 deserve to be dismissed and are
-
accordingly dismissed. The appeal filed by the original petitioners-land-owners
deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed by setting aside the
finding recorded by the Special Court and confirmed by the High Court on
the question of adverse possession, however, by granting liberty to the
contesting parties to take appropriate proceedings by approaching a competent
D Civil Court if they (or any of them) claim title on the basis of adverse
possession. In the facts and circumstances, however, there shall be no order
as to costs.

B.S. Appeal No. 3942 dismissed.

Appeal No. 3943 allowed.

......