A.P. SAREEN AND ORS.versusSTATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
- Citation
- 1997 INSC 18
- Decided
- 13 January 1997
- Disposal
- Disposed off
Holding
Urgency continues despite procedural delays, so the declaration under Section 6 remains valid and no inquiry under Section 5‑A is required.
Summary
The appellants challenged the validity of a land acquisition proceeding where the government, invoking urgency, issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 27 July 1995 and later dispensed with the inquiry required under Section 5‑A by exercising power under Section 17(1). The declaration under Section 6 was delayed until 18 April 1996, and possession was only taken on 10 December 1996 after a writ petition was disposed. The appellants argued that the delay destroyed the claim of urgency and that the declaration should be quashed and an inquiry ordered. The Supreme Court held that urgency persists as long as the development scheme is not yet implemented, and bureaucratic delay does not negate it; consequently the declaration stands and no inquiry is required. The Court directed the landowners to harvest standing crops and remove structures within specified timeframes, and dismissed the appeal without costs.
Issues considered
- Whether a delay between the issuance of the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 defeats the claim of urgency and invalidates the power exercised under Section 17(1) to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5‑A.
- Whether the declaration under Section 6 can be quashed and an inquiry under Section 5‑A be ordered on the ground of procedural delay.
- What directions, if any, should be given regarding standing crops and structures on the acquired land before possession can be taken.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 16, s. 17(1), s. 17(2), s. 17(4), s. 4(1), s. 5-A, s. 6
Subjects
Judgment
A A.P. SAREEN AND ORS.
v.
STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
JANUARY 13, 1997.
B [K. RAMASWAMY AND G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.].
Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Sections 4(1), 5-A, 6 and 17(1)-Land 'f
acquisitio1i-Urgency-Dispensing with enquily-Procedure f ol"-Delay in pub-
lication of dec/aration-IJ!fect of-Notification under Section 4(1) published
C on July 27, 1995-Thereafter notification published in local
newspapers-Thereafter personal notices issued to landowners-After comple-
tion of this process, proceedings were put up before the Government for pub-
lication of the dec/aratio11 under Section 6 which came to be made 011 April
18, 1996-Appellant filed the writ petition on July 19, 1996 and coruequently
D possession· co11ld not be taken-After the writ petition was disposed of, pos-
session was taken on December 10, 1996-Held : In the circumstances the
need of urgent possession was dissipated by beaurocratic inadve11ance and
the urgency did not cease-Urgency can be said.to exist when iand proposed
to be acquired is needed for planned development of the city/town etc.-Ur-
gency contin11es as long as the scheme is not initiated, actinn taken and process
E completed-Direction to landowners to ha/Vest the standing crop and remove
· the structures-Liberty to respondents to proceed with canying out of the
planned development activities.
Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Jan Kalyan Samiti, Sheopuri,
F Ghaziabad & Anr., [1996) 2 SCC 365, held inapplicable. (
Shri Mohan Singh & Ors. Etc. v. International Airpolt Authority of India
& Ors. JT 1996(10) 311, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 168 of
G 1997.
'
Froin the Judgment and Order-dated 9.12.96 of the Allahabad High
Court in W.P. No. 23997 of 1996.
P.P. Rao, Prag P. Tripatbi for Mis. L.P. Aggarwalla & Co. for the
H Appellants.
210
)
SAREEN v. STATE 211
Altaf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General and Ravinder Kumar for A
the Respondents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
Heard learned counsel on both sides. Leave granted.
B
This appeal arises from the judgment of the Division Bench of
Allahabad High Court, made on December 9, 1996 in CMWP No. 23997
of 1996. The notification under Sections 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (for short, the 'Act') was published on July 27, 1995 and the Govern-
ment had in exercise of the power under Section 17(1) of the Act dispensed C
with inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. Shri P.P. Rao, learned counsel
for the appellant, contended that since declaration was not published
immediately, the exercise of power under Section 17(1) dispensing with the
inquiry \lnder Section 5-A, is bad in law as it indicates that there was no
real urg::::icy. The view of the High Court that possession of land is deemed D
to have been taken under Section 17(4) is not correct on the facts of this
case. The ratio of the judgment of this Court in Ghaziabad Development
Authority v. Jan Kalyan Samiti, Sheopuri, Ghaziabad & Anr., (1996) 2 SCC
365 has no application to the facts of this case. Though we are in agreement
with the learned counsel in this behalf, we do not find substance in the
other contentions. As regards the delay in issuing the said declaration we E
find that the authorities appear to have mis-construed the steps to be taken
under the Act. It is well-settled legal position that urgency can be said to
exist when land proposed to be acquired is needed for planned develop·
ment of the city/town etc. In Shri Mohan Singh & Ors. Etc. v. lntemational
Airport Authority of India & Ors., JT (1996) 10 311, this Court considered p
the scope of exercise of the power by the Government under Section 17(1)
of the Act and the procedure to be followed in that behalf. When the
Government forms an opinion that the lands are urgently needed for a
public purpose, notification under Section 4(1) could be issued and pub-
lished in the Gazette while dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A.
Giving a gap of one day, the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act G
could be published in the Gazette. Notice under Section (1) should be
given and on the expiry of 15 days thereafter, possession could be taken.
The land stands vested in the State under Section 17(2) read with Section
16 free from all encumbrances~ Since inquiry under Section 5-A has been
dispensed with, as provided under the Act, 80% of the compensation was H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 1 S.C.R.
A required to be given to the claimants. In this case, instead of adopting the
said procedure, after pub\ication of the notification under Section 4(1),
they published the notification in the local newspapers in Engllih as well
as Hindi and also substance thereof in the locality and thereafter personal
notices appear to have been issued to the owners of the lands. After
B completion of this process, proceedings were put up before the Govern-
ment for publication of the declaration under Section 6 which came to be
made on April 18, 1996. The appellant filed the writ petition on July 19,
1996 <;1nd consequently possession could not be taken. After the writ
petition was disposed of, possession was taken .on December 10, 1996. In
this backdrop, the. need of urgent possession was dissipated by boa\lrocratic
.C inadvertence and the urgency did not cease. Urgency continues as long as
the scheme is not initiated, action taken and process completed.
It is true that the petitioners would have raised, at an enquiry under'
Section 5-A, objections for the acquisition. One ofth6 objections.raised in
D the writ petition was that some of the khasra numbers notified under
Section 4(1) had been deleted from the acquisition proceedings due to
interference by some persons and that showed that there was no bona fide
in the acquisition proceedings. In that behalf, in th'!: counter-affidavit filed
in the High Court, it was stated that the notification was withdrawn in
respect thereof since those lands were required to be taken possession of
E under the Land Ceiling Act and, therefore, there Was no need to acquire
those lands. Accordingly, the khasra numbers were deleted by a separate
notification.
0
Another objection raised was that the lands wb-e sought to be given
(
p to the private company and, therefore, the procedure prescribed in Chap-
ter VII was required to be adopted. The acquisition notification under
Section 4(1) without compliance of the provisions under Chapter VII is
bad in law. In the counter-affidavit filed in the High Court, it was stated
that the acquisition was only for the public purpose, viz., for the planned
development as per the plans prepared and submitted to the Government
G by the Ghaziabad Development Authority and, therefore, the objeetion
raised was. not tenable. In view of this stand taken by the Government, the
direction to conduct an enquiry under Section SA of the Act is of no
material consequence on the facts of this case. Under those circumstances,
we think that there is no justification to quash the declaration under
H Section 6 and to give direction to conduct an inquiry under Section 5A.
)
SAREENv. STATE 213
Instead, it is contended by Shri Rao that the standing crops and the A
structures are required to be removed and that the appellants are prepared
to cut and carry away the standing crops after they are harvested. Shri Rao
states that at least one month's tiille would be required. Shri Rao under-
takes to give the Khasra numbers and the extent of the land iil which there
are standing crops. The affidavit be filed within two days. To that extent, B
the respondents are directed not to destroy the standing crops. The appel-
lants are directed to cut and harvest the standing crop and thereafter the
respondents are at liberty to carry on the. building operations. For removal
of the standing structures, the learned counsel st!tes that four week's time
is enough. Accordingly, the appellants are directed to remove the struc-
tures within four weeks from today. With regard to the standing crops, the · ·c
Land Acquisition Officer is directed to depute one of his officers to assess
the time required for harvesting the crop and on the basis of the report
submitted to the Land Acquisition Officer, he is directed to give them time
to cut and harvest the crop and thereafter, the respondents are at liberty
to proceed with the carrying out of the planned development activities. D
Therefore, we do not find any justification warranting interference.
The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.
T.N.A. . Appeal disposed of.
)
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