AB. BHASKARA RAOversusINSPECTOR OF POLICE, CBI VISAKHAPATNAM

                       [2011] 12 S.C.R. 718

A                     AB. BHASKARA RAO
                                 v.
        INSPECTOR OF POLICE, CBI VISAKHAPATNAM
              (Criminal Appeal No. 650 of 2008)
                      SEPTEMBER 23, 2011
B
        [P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]

       Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988- ss. 7, 13(1)(d)(ii) rl
  w s. 13(2) - Demand and acceptance of a meager amount
C as illegal gratification by a public servant - Conviction of
  accused-appellant u/s. 7 with rigorous imprisonment for six
  months and uls. 13(1)(d)(ii) with rigorous imprisonment for one
  year - Upheld by the High Court - Appeal before Supreme
  Court - Issuance of notice limited to question of sentence only
o -  Held: When notice is issued confining to particular aspect!
  sentence, arguments would be heard only to that extent
  unless some extraordinary circumstance/material i$ shown to
  the Court - When the statute prescribes minimum sentence,
  long delay in disposal of appeal is not a ground for reduction
E of sentence - That amount received by accused is meager
  as also that he lost his job after conviction, not a mitigating
  circumstance for reduction of sentence - Imposing lesser
  sentence than the minimum prescribed in the Statute is not
  permissible under Article 142 - Substantive provisions of a
F Statute cannot be ignored ...:. Thus, the order passed by the
  trial judge as affirmed by the High Court is upheld -
  Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 142 - Sentence/
  Sentencing.

        Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 142 - Exercise of
G power under- Held: Power under Article 142 is a constitutional
    power and not restricted by statutory enactments - However,
    no order would be passed which would amount to supplant the
    substantive Jaw applicable or ignoring statutory provisions
    dealing with the subject - Powers under Article 142 are not
H                              718
 A.B. BHASKARA RAO v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,              719
            CBI VISAKHAPATNAM
meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly A
in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in statute
dealing expressly with the subject - Exercise of power under
Article 142 depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case - Supreme Court under Article 142 would not ordinarily
direct quashing of a case involving crime against the society B
particularly, when courts below found that the charge leveled
against the accused under the Act was made out and proved
by the prosecution by placing acceptable evidence.

     Appellant, working as a Head Clerk in the Railway,       C
demanded and accepted a sum of Rs.200/- as illegal
gratification. Charge sheet was filed against the
appellant-accused for an offence punishable under
Sections 7, 13(1 )(d)(ii) read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by the Special Judge.
The appellant was convicted under Section 7 of the Act        D
and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
period of six months and fine of Rs.500/- and, in default,
simple~imprisonment for one month. He was also
convicted for the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) read
with Section 13(2) of the Act and sentenced to undergo        E
rigorous imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs.500/-,
in default, simple imprisonment for one month. Both the
sentences of imprisonment were to run concurrently. The
High Court upheld the order of conviction and sentence.
Therefore, the appellant filed the instant appeal.            F

    This Court issued notice in the instant matter
confining to the quantum of sentence only.
    Dismissing the appeal, the Court
                                                              G
     HELD: 1. The provisions of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 alone are applicable since the
incident occurred on 14.11.1997 i.e. subsequent to the
Act. Section 7 of the Act relates to public servant taking
gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of     H
   720      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A an official act. If the said offence/charge is proved, the
  court has no other option but to impose sentence of
  imprisonment which shall be not less than six months but
  which may extend to five years and also liable to fine.
  Section 13 deals with criminal misconduct by a public
B servant. As per sub-section (2) if any public servant
  commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with
  Imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one
  year but which may extend to seven years and shall also
  be liable to fine. The relaxation in the form of a proviso
c to sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Prevention of
  Corruption Act, 1947 which gives power to the court that
  for any special reasons to be recorded in writing, impose
  a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year, has
  been done away with in the 1988 Act. To put it clear, in
  the 1988 Act, if an offence under Section 7 is proved, the
0
  same is punishable with imprisonment which shall be not
  less than six months and in the case of Section 13, it shall
  not be less than one year. No other interpretation is
  permissible. [Paras 7, 8 and 9) [729-H; 730-A-F-G; 732-D-
E G]
         Bechaarbhai S. Prajapati vs. State of Gujarat (2008) 11
   sec 163 - distinguished.
      2.1 Inasmuch as both the courts have thoroughly
F discussed the oral and documentary evidence with
  reference to the charges leveled against the appellant
  and in view of the limited order dated 28.01.2008 by this
  Court issuing notice confining to quantum of sentence
  only and even applying the analogy enunciated in
G *Yomeshbhai's case it is not a case of such nature that the
  appellant should be heard on all points, consequently,
  the request of the counsel appearing for the appellant to
  be heard on all the points is rejected. [Para 5) [729-B-D]

     2·.2 It was submitted that inasmuch as the incident
H had occurred on 14.11.1997 and the trial court has
 A.B. BHASKARA RAO v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 721
             CBI VISAKHAPATNAM
convicted him on 19.03.2001 which was affirmed by the            A
High Court on 03.10.2007, at this juncture, i.e., after a gap
of 14 years, there is no need to retain the same sentence
and the Court is not justified in directing the appellant to
serve the remaining period after such a long time. There
is no dispute as regards the date of occurrence and the          B
date of conviction passed by the trial court and affirmed
by the High Court. Inasmuch as the conviction on both
counts have been confirmed by this Court, as regards
sentence, in view of the minimum sentence prescribed
under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, though long delay            c
may be a ground for reduction of sentence in other cases,
the same may not be applicable to the case on hand
when the statute prescribes minimum sentence and the
submission is rejected. It was also submitted that the
amount alleged to have been received by the appellant            D
accused is only Rs.200/- and he also lost his job after
conviction by the trial court. Though, these grounds may
be attractive in respect of other offences where minimum
sentence is not prescribed, in view of the aforesaid
reasonings, the same cannot be applied to the instant            E
case. [Paras 11 and 12] [733-F-H; 734-A-C]

    3. Though the jurisdiction of this Court, under Article
142 of the Constitution of India is not in dispute, it is made
clear that exercise of such power would, however,
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The          F
High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction, under Section
482 Cr.P.C. and this Court, under Article 142 of the
Constitution, would not ordinarily direct quashing of a
case involving crime against the society particularly,
when both the trial court as also the High Court have            G
found that the charge leveled against the appellant under
the Act has been made out and proved by the
prosecution by placing acceptable evidence. [Para 17]
[741-F-G]
                                                                 H
     722      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A        4. From the analysis of the said decision and the
     provision, the following principles emerge:

           (a) When the Court issues notice confining to
           particular aspecUsentence, arguments will be heard
           only to that extent unless some extraordinary
B
           circumstance/material is shown to the Court for
           arguing the matter on all aspects.

           (b) Long delay in disposal of appeal or any other
           factor may not be a ground for reduction of sentence,
c          particularly, when the statute prescribes minimum
           sentence. In other cases where no such minimum
           sentence is prescribed, it is open to the Court to
           consider the delay and its effect and the ultimate
           decision.
D
           (c) In a case of corruption by public servant, quantum
           of amount is immaterial. Ultimately it depends upon
           the conduct of the delinquent and the proof regarding
           demand and a·cceptance established by the
           prosecution.
E
           (d) Merely because the delinquent lost his job due to
           conviction under the Act may not be a mitigating
           circumstance for reduction of sentence, particularly,
           when the Statute prescribes minimum sentence.
F
           (e) Though Article 142 of the Constitution gives wider
           power to this Court, waiver of certain period as
           prescribed in the Statute imposing lesser sentence
           than the minimum prescribed is not permissible.
G          (f) An order, which this Court can make in order to
           do complete justice between the parties, must not
           only be consistent' with the'fiJn'damental rights
           guaranteed by the Constitution, but also it cannot
I'
           even be inconsistent with the substantive provisions
n          of the relevant Statute. In other words, this Court
 A.B. BHASl<ARA RAO v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,            723
             CBI VISAKHAPATNAM

    cannot altogether ignore the substantive provisions       A
    of a Statute.

    (g) In exercise of the power under Article 142 of the
    Constitution, this Court generally does not pass an
    order in contravention of or ignoring the statutory       8
    provisions nor is the power exercised merely on
    sympathy.

    (h) The power under A.rticle 142 of the Constitution
    is a constitutional power and not restricted by
    statutory enactments. However, this Court would not       C
    pass any order under Article 142 which would
    amount to supplant the substantive law applicable or
    ignoring statutory provisions dealing with the
    subject. In other words, acting under Article 142, this
    Court cannot pass an order or grant relief which is       D
    totally inconsistent or goes against the substantive
    or statutory enactments pertaining to the case.

    (i) The powers under Article 142 are not meant to be
    exercised when their exercise may come directly in        E
    conflict with what has been expressly provided for
    in statute dealing expressly with the subject.

     The conclusion arrived at by the trial judge as
affirmed by the High Court is concurred with. [Paras 19
and 20] [742-C-H; 743-A-H]                                    F

    Bechaarbhai S. Prajapati vs. State of Gujarat (2008) 11
SCC 163: 2008 (3) SCR 634 - distinguished.
     "Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt vs. State of Gujarat       G
(2011) 6 SCC 312; State of M.P. vs. Shambhu Dayal Nagar
(2006) 8 SCC 693: 2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 319; Manish Goel
vs. Rohini Goel (2010) 4 SCC 393: 2010 (2 ) SCR 414; Ani/
Kumar Jain vs. Maya Jain (2009) 10 SCC 415: 2009 (14 )
SCR 90; Mota Ram vs. State of Haryana (2009) 12 SCC 727;
                                                              H
    724       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A Academy of Nutrition Improvement and Ors. vs. Union of India
  JT 2011 (8) SC 16 - referred to.
                         Case Law Reference:
          (2011) s sec 312       Referred to           Para 4
B
          2008 (3) SCR 634       Distinguished         Para 10
          2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 319 Referred to          Para 13
          2010 (2 ) SCR 414      Referred to           Para 14
c         2009 (14) SCR 90       Referred to           Para 14
          (2009) 12 sec 121      Referred to           Para 15
          JT 2011 (8) SC 16      Referred to           Para 16
D       CRIMlt'lAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 650 of 2008.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 03.10.2007 of the
  High Court of Judicature Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in
E Criminal Appeal No. 436 of 2001.

          ATM Ranga Ramanujan, S. Ashok Kumar, Anu Gupta,
    Prakhar Sharma, Sanjeev Kumar Sharma and Rani Jethmalani
    for the Appellant.

F       Harish Chandra, P.K. Dey, A.K. Sharma and B. Krishna
    Prasad for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        P. SATHASIVAM, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the
G final judgment and order dated 03.10.2007 passed by the High
  Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal
  Appeal No. 436 of 2001 whereby the High Court dismissed the
  appeal filed by the appellant herein and confirmed the judgment
  dated 19.03.2001 passed by the Special Judge, C.B.I. Cases,
H Visakhapatnam in C.C. No.2 of 1998.
 A.B. BHASKARA RAO v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,                  725
     CBl VISAKHAPATNAM [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
    2. Brief facts:                                                A
      (a) The appellant-accused was working as a Head Clerk
in the Traffic Cadre Section in the Office of the· Senior
Divisional Personnel Officer, South Central Railway,
Vijayawada during the period from April, 1992 to November, B
1997. The nature of duties of the appellant-accused included
dealing with and processing of the matters like promotions,.
transfers, seniority list, roster list, pay fixation on promotions,
retirements, resignations etc. of the personnel.

     (b) One K. Rama Rao-the Complainant, who was                  C
examined as PW-1, was posted as Yard Points Man, Grade
'A' under Station Superintendent, South Central Railway,
Tanuku from December, 1995 to June, 1997. In June, 1997,
due to excess staff at Tanuku, he was instructed to report at
Head Quarters, Vijayawada and accordingly, when he reported        D
there, he was asked to go back to Tanuku. Thereafter, he went
back to Tanuku from where he was subsequently transferred
to Rajahmundry. Tbereafter, PW-1 made a representation tq
his senior officer requesting him for posting at Vijayawada,
Cheerala; Vetapalam or·Tenali. Later, PW-1 was transferred         E
to Vijayawada:

      (c) As the appellant-accused was dealing with the
transfers, the complainant (PW-1) met him on 05.11.1997 at
his office to pursue about the issuance of the said transfer       F
order. The appellant-accused asked him to come on
10.11.1997. When he met him on 10.11.1997, the appellant
asked him to come on the next day as he was busy in pay-
fixation work. On 11.11.1997, again he went to the office of the
appellant but he could not find him on his seat. Again a day
after i.e. on 13.11.1997, when he met the appellant-accused,       G
he informed him that his request for transfer has been
processed and the order is ready and the same has been
placed before the A.P.O. for signature and asked him to come
on the next day, i.e., on 14.11.1997, and demanded Rs.200/-
for releasing the said office order.                               H
    726      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A         (d) On the same day, (PW-1) reported the matter in writing
    to the Inspector of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation (in
    short 'the CBI), Vijayawada. On 14.11.1997, a trap was laid by
    the CBI officials along with panchas and when the accused
    demanded and accepted a sum of Rs.200/- as illegal
B   gratification, he was caught red handed along with the money
    which was recovered from the right hand side pocket of his pant.

         (e) On 15.11.1997, at 7.30 a.m., an FIR was registered
    by the Inspector, CBI, Visakhapatnam Branch in Crime No. RC
    20(A)/97-VSP. After recording the statements of the witnesses,
C   Inspector of Police, CBI, Visakhapatnam filed charge sheet
    being No. 2/98-YTR dated 29.04.1998 against the appellant-
    accused for an offence punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(ii)
    read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
    1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") in the Court of
D   Special Judge for CBI Cases at Visakhapatnam.

          (f) The Special Judge, CBI, by order dated 19.03.2001,
    convicted the appellant and sentenced him to undergo rigorous
    imprisonment fOr a period of six months and to pay a fine of
E   Rs.500/- and, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one
    month for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act and
    one year rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.500/- and, in
    default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the
    offence punishable under Sections 13(1 )(d)(ii) read with Section
F   13(2) of the Act.

         (g) Against the said order, the appellant-accused filed
    Criminal Appeal No. 436 of 2001 before the High Court of
    Andhra Pradesh. The High Court, by impugned judgment dated
    03.10.2007 dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant-
G   accused and confirmed the conviction passed by the trial Court.
    Hence, the appellant,accused has preferred this appeal by way
    of special leave petition before this Court.

        3. Heard Mr. ATM Rangaramanujam, learned senior .
H   cou11sel for the appellant and Mr. Harish Chandra, learned
  A.B. BHASKARA RAO v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,                    727
      CBI VISAKHAPATNAM [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
 senior counsel for the respondent.                                    A
 Notice only on quantum of sentence-hearing on all
 aspects-Permissibility:

       4. On 28.01.2008, this Court consisting of three Hon'ble
  Judges issued notice in this matter confining to the quantum         B
  of sentence only. In pursuance of the same, we permitted Mr.
  Rangaramanujam, learned senior counsel for the appellant to
  address his arguments confining to quantum of sentence
  imposed on the appellant-accused. As stated in the narration
  of facts, the appellant was convicted under Section 7 of the Act     C
  for which he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
  for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, simple
  imprisonment for one month. He was also convicted for the
  offence under Section 13( 1)(d)(ii) read with Section 13(2) of
  the Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for           o
  one year and fine of Rs.500/-, in default, simple imprisonment
  for one month. The trial Court ordered that both the sentences
  of imprisonment shall run concurrently. The said conviction and
  sentence was affirmed by the High Court. If we confine ourselves
  to the limited extent of notice dated 28.01.2008, we have to         E
  hear both sides only on the quantum of sentence. However, Mr.
  Rangaramanujam, learned senior counsel for the appellant by
  drawing our attention to the recent judgment of this Court in
  Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt vs. State of Gujarat, (2011)
. 6 sec 312, submitted that in spite of limited notice, this Court,
                                                                       F
: while exercising jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
  Constitution, in order to do complete justice while hearing the
  matter finally can go into the merits of the orders passed by
  the trial Court and the High Court. In the reported case, the
  appeal was against the concurrent finding of both the courts
  convicting the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentencing        G
  him to suffer imprisonment for life. At the SLP stage, this Court,
  by order dated 27.07.2009, issued notice confined only to the
  question as to whether the petitioner was guilty of commission
  of an offence under any of the parts of Section 304 Indian Penal
  Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC') and not under Section 302 IPC.           H
        728       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2011] 12 S.C.R.


    A Similar request was made before the Bench that the appellant
      was entitled to urge all the questions including his right to urge
1     that he should have been acquitted in the facts and
      circumstances of the case. This Court, referred to the Supreme
      Court Rules, 1966 which have been framed under Article 145
    B of the Constitution and also considered scope of its power
      under Article 142 as well as Order 47 Rule 6 of the Code of
      Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'the Code). While deciding the
      said question, the Bench has also considered the scope of
      Section 100 of the Code for entertaining the second appeal. It
    c further shows that the Court considered the plea of the appellant
      therein for acquittal despite the fact that the notice was limited
      in terms of the order dated 27.07.2009. It is relevant to point
      out that the Bench in para 15, clarified the position and
      reopened the case in its entirety even though notice was issued
      confining to a particular aspect. After permitting the appellant
    0
      therein to argue the case for acquittal on merits, it observed:

              "15 ........ We, however, make it clear that this cannot be
              a universal practice in all cases. The question whether the
              Court will enlarge the scope of its inquiry at the time of final
    E         hearing depends on the facts and circumstances of the
              case. Since in the facts of this case, we find that the
              appellant should be heard on all points, we have come to
              the aforesaid conclusion."

    F                                                 (Emphasis supplied)

      It is clear that the Bench itself has clarified that they are not
      laying down the law that in spite of issuing notice confining to
      a particular aspect (in the case on hand - "quantum of
      sentence") the parties are entitled to urge all points and re-open
    G the case as if they are free to do the same without any restriction.
      As a matter of fact, the last sentence in para 15 makes it clear
      that in the facts and circumstances of that case, they permitted
      the appellants to urge all points on merits.

    H         5. In the case on hand, it is to be noted that on
  AB. BHASKARA RAO v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,                         729
     CBI VISAKHAPATNAM [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
· appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the              A
  prosecution and the defence and on appreciation of entire
  materials, the court of first instance i.e.' the trial Court convicted
  the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned above. The High
  Court, a$ an appellate Court, once again analysed all the
  material, discussed the oral and documentary evidence and                B
  finding that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the accused
  beyond reasonable doubt concurred with the conclusion arrived
  at by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal of the appellant.
  Inasmuch as both the courts have thoroughly discussed the oral
  and documentary evidence with reference to the charges                   c
  leveled against the appellant and in view of the limited order
  dated 28.01.2008 by this Court issuing notice confining to
  quantum of sentence only and even applying the analogy
  enunciated in Yomeshbhai (supra), we feel that it is not a case
  of such nature that the appellant should be heard on all points,
                                                                           0
  consequently, we reject the request ofthe learned senior
  counsel appearing for the appellant.

 Quantum of sentence/Whether requires any reduction:

      6. Mr. Rangaramanujam, learned senior counsel for the                E
 appellant submitted that inasmuch as the alleged incident took
 place on 14.11.1997 and 14 years have elapsed since then,
 the amount of Rs. 200/- said to have been received by the
 appellant is trivial in nature and also of the fact that due to the
 said conviction and sentence he lost his job, leniency may be             F
 shown and sentence be reduced to the period already
 undergone. He fairly admitted that out of the maximum period
 of one year, the appellant had served only 52 days in prison.
 With this factual position, let us consider whether the request
 of the learned senior counsel for the appellant is to be accepted         G
 and sentence be reduced to the period already undergone. .

      7. It is not in dispute that the provisions of the Prevention
 of Corruption Act, 1988 alone are applicable since the incident
 occurred on 14.11.1997 i.e. subsequent to the Act. Section 7
 of the Act relates to public servant taking gratification other than      H
    730      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A legal remuneration in respect of an official act. If the said
  offence/charge is proved, the court has no other option but to
    impose sentence of imprisonment which shall be not less than
    six months but which may extend to five years and also liable
    to fine. The said section reads as under:-
B
          "7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal
          remuneration in respect of an official act.- Whoever,
          being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or
          obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any
          person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification
c         whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or
          reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for
          showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official
          functions, favour or disfavor to any person or for rendering
          or attempting to render any service or disservice to any
D         person, with the Central Government or any State
          Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State
          or with any local authority, corporation or Government
          compaoy referred to in Clause (c) of Section 2, or with any
          public servant, whether named or otherwise shall, be
E         punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less
          than six months but which may extend to five years and
          shall also be liable to fine.   "

                                               (Emphasis supplied)
F      8. Section 13 .deals with criminal misconduct by a public
  servant. As per sub-section (2) if any public servant commits
  criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for
  a term which shall be not less than one year but which may
  extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. For clarity,
G we reproduce the said section hereunder:

          "13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.- (1) A
          public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal
          misconduct,
H
     A.B. BHASKARA RAO v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,                    731
         CBI VISAKHAPATNAM [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
       (a) If he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept       A
       or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any
       other person any gratification other than legal remuneration
       as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Section 7;
       or
                                                                         B
       (b) If he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept
       or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person,
       any valuabl-e thing without consideration or for a
       consideration which he knows to be inadequate from any
       person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be
       likely to he concerned in any proceeding or business
                                                                         c
       transacted or about to be transacted by him or having any
       connection with the official functions of himself or of any
       public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any,
       person whom he knows to be interests in or related to the
       person so concerned; or                                           D

       (c) If he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or
       otherwise converts for his ()Wn use any property entrusted
       to him or under his control as a public servant or allows
       any other person so to do; or                                     E

       (d) If he, -

       (i) By corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for
       any other person any valuable thing or Pecuniary
       advantage; or                                                     F

       (ii) By abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for
       himself or for any other person any valuable thing or
       pecuniary advantage; or
                                                                         G
       (iii) While holding office as a public servant, obtains for any
I~
       person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without
       any public interest; or

       (e) If he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or
       has, at any time during the Period of his office, been in         H
    732       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A         possession for which the public servant cannot
          satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property
          disproportionate to his known sources of income.

          Explanation. -For the purposes of this section "known
          sources of income" means income received from any
B
          lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in
          accordance, with the provisions of any law, rules or orders
          for the time being applicable to public servant.

          (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct
c         shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
          shall be not less than one year but which may extend to
          seven years and shall also be liable to fine."

                                             (Emphasis supplied)
D        9. It is useful to refer that in the Prevention of Corruption
    Act, 1947 the same "criminal misconduct" which is available
    in Section 13 of the 1988 Act had been dealt with in Section 5
    of the 1947 Act. Section 5(2) of the 1947 Act mandates that
    any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be
E punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
    than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall
    also. be liable to fine. However, proviso to sub-section (2) of
    Section 5 gives power to the court that for any special reasons
    to be recorded in writing, impose a sentence of imprisonment
F of less than one year. Such relaxation in the form of a proviso
  . has been done away with in the 1988 Act. To put it clear, in the
    1988 Act, if an offence under Section 7 is proved, the same is
    punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than six
    months and in the case of Section 13, it shall not be less than
G one year. No other interpretation is permissible .
    .Other circumstances pleaded for reduction of sentence:

       10. In order to substantiate the claim with the regard to the
  above, learned senior counsel for the appellant has relied on
H the decision of this Court in Bechaarbhai S. Prajapati vs. State
 A.B. BHASKARA RAO v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 733
     CBI VISAKHAPATNAM [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
of Gujarat, (2008) 11 sec 163 and based on the same                    A
requested this Court to modify the sentence to the extent of
period already undergone. We have gone through the facts in
that case. It is true that even in the cited decision, the appellant
accused demanded only Rs. 250/- and it was paid and
accepted. Finally, the Special Judge framed charges for offence        B
punishable unde·r Sections 7, 12, 13(1)(d) read with Section
13(2) of the Act. The appellant therein was convicted for offence.
under Section 7(2) of the Act and appeal before the High Court
was also dismissed. Thereafter, the same was challenged
before this Court. This Court, after holding that the conclusion       C
of the trial Court and High Court does not suffer from any
infirmity considered the alternative submission which related to
harshness of sentence. In that case, taking note of the fact that
the occurrence took place nearly seven years back and also
of the fact tha~ the appellant had suffered custody for more than
six months, considering all these aspects, while maintaining the       D
conviction, this Court reduced the sentence to the period
already undergone. Since the appellant therein was convicted
only under Section 7 and Section 161 Cr.PC., the minimum
sentence being six months and of the fact that he had suffered
custody for more than six months, the course adopted by this           E
Court is perfectly in order and the same cannot be applied to
the case on hand, wherein the appellant had undergone only
52 days when the minimum sentence was six months under
Section 7 and one year under Section 13.                    ·
                                                                       F
     11. Learned senior counsel for the appellant further
submitted that inasmuch as the incident had occurred on
14.11.1997 and the trial Court has convicted him on 19.03.2001
which was affirmed by the High Court on 03.10.2007, at this
juncture, i.e., after a gap of 14 years, there is no need to retain    G
the same sentence and the Court is not justified in directing the
appellant to serve the remaining period after such a long time.
There is no dispute as regards the date of occurrence and the
date of conviction passed by the.trial court and affirmed by the
High Court._ Inasmuch as the conviction on both counts have            H
    734      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A been confirmed by this Court and we are confined to sentence
  part alone and in view of the minimum sentence prescribed
  under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, we are of the view that
  though long delay may be a ground for reduction of sentence
  in other cases, the same may not be applicable to the case on
8 hand when the statute prescribes minimum sentence.
  Accordingly, we reject the said contention.

       12. It was further contended that the amount alleged to have
  been received by the appellant accused is only Rs.200/- and
  he also lost his job after conviction by the trial court. Though,
C these grounds may be attractive in respect of other offences
  where minimum sentence is not prescribed, in view of our
  reasonings in the earlier paras, the same cannot be applied
  to the case on hand.

D        13. About the request based on delay that the appellant
    has lost his job, undergone the ordeal all along etc. a lenient
    view be taken in this case, it is useful to refer decision of this
    Court in State of MP. vs. Shambhu Dayal Nagar, (2006) 8
    sec 693 wherein it was held that:
E         "32. It is difficult to accept the prayer of the respondent that
          a lenient view be taken in this case. The corruption by
          public servants has become a gigantic problem. It has
          spread everywhere. No facet of public activity has been
          left unaffected by the stink of corruption. It has deep and
F         pervasive impact on the functioning of the entire country.
          Large-scale corruption retards the nation-building activities
          and everyone has to suffer on that count. As has been aptly
          observed in Swatantar Singh v. State of Haryana, (1997)
          4 sec 14, corruption is corroding, like cancerous lymph
G         nodes, the vital veins of the body politics, social fabric of
          efficiency in the public service and demoralising the honest
          officers. The efficiency in public service would improve only
          when the public servant devotes his sincere attention and
          does the duty diligently, truthfully, honestly and devotes
H         himself assiduously to the performance of the duties of his
  A.B. BHASKARA RAO v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,. 735
      CBI VISAKHAPATNAM [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
     post. .The reputation of corrupt would gather thick and          A
     unchaseable clouds around the conduct of the officer and
     gain notoriety much faster than the smoke.

Article 142 and its applicability

       14 By drawing our attention to Article 142 of the              B
  Constitution of India, learned senior counsel for the appellant
  vehemently submitted that in order to do complete justice, this
  Court has ample power to reduce the sentence even to the
  extent of period already undergone or any other order which
  would be beneficial to the parties approaching this Court.          C
  Similar claim based on Article 142 has been negatived in
  several decisions by this Court, we need to refer only the latest
  decision of this Court in Manish Goel vs. Rohini Goel, (2010)
  4 SCC 393. The facts in that case are that the. parties by
  persuasion of the family members and friends, entered into a        D
  compromise and prepared a memorandum of understanding
. dated 13.11.2009, in the proceedings pending before the
  Mediation Centre, Delhi, by which they agreed on terms and
  conditions incorporated therein, to settle all their disputes and
  also for dissolution of their marriage. The parties filed an        E
  application under Section 13-8(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
  1955 before the Family Court, Delhi seeking divorce by mutual
  consent. The said HMA No. 456 of 2009 came before the court
  and it recorded the statement of parties on 16.11.2009. The
  parties moved another HMA No. 457 of 2009 to waive the              F
  statutory period of .six months in filing the second petition.
  However, the court rejected the said application vide order
  dated 01.12.2009 observing that the court was not competent
  to waive the required statutory period of six months under the
  Act and such a waiver was permissible only under the                G
  directions of the Supreme Court as held by this Court in Anil
  Kumar Jain vs. Maya Jain, (2009) 10 SCC 415. Hence the
  parties have approached this Court for appropriate relief.
  Speaking for the Bench one of us - (Dr. Justice B.S. Chauhan)
  referred to more than fifty decisions including the Constitution    H
    736       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A Bench judgments. The relevant paras, which are useful, may be
  quoted:

          "11. We are fully alive of the fact that this Court has been
          exercising the power under Article 142 of the Constitution
          for dissolution of marriage where the Court finds that
B
          marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond
          salvage and has broken down irretrievably, even if the
          facts of the case do not provide a ground in law on which
          the divorce could be granted. Decree of divorce has been
          granted to put quietus to all litigations between the parties
c         and to save them from further agony, as it is evident from
          the judgments in Romesh Chander v. Savitri (1995) 2
          SCC 7, Kanchan Devi v. Promod Kumar Mittal (1996) 8
          SCC 90, Anita Sabharwal v. Anil Sabharwal (1997) 11
          SCC 490, Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri (1997) 4
D         SCC 226, Kiran v. Sharad Dutt (2000) 10 SCC 243, Swati
          Verma v. Rajan Verma (2004) 1 SCC 123, Harpit Singh
          Anand v. State of W.B. (2004) 10 SCC 505, Jimmy
          Sudarshan Purohit v. Sudarshan Sharad Purohit (2005)
          13 SCC 410, Durga Prasanna Tripathy v. Arundhati
E         Tripathy (2005) 7 SCC 353, Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli
          (2006) 4 SCC 558, Sanghamitra Ghosh v. Kaja/ Kumar
          Ghosh (2007) 2 SCC 220, Rishikesh Sharma v. Saroj
          Sharma (2007) 2 SCC 263, Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh
          (2007) 4 SCC 511 and Satish Sitole v. Ganga (2008) 7
F         sec  734. However, these are the cases, where this Court
          came to rescue the parties on the ground for divorce not
          provided for by the legislature in the statute.
        12. In Anjana Kishore v. Puneet Kishore (2002) 10 SCC
        194, this Court while allowing a transfer petition directed
G
      . the court concerned to decide the case of divorce by
        mutual consent, ignoring the statutory requirement of
        moving the motion after expiry of the period of six months
        under Section 13-8(2) of the Act. In Anil Kumar Jain, this
        Court held that an order of waiving the statutory
H
        requirements can be passed only by this Court in exercise
A.B. BHASKARA RAO v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,                 737
    CBI VISAKHAPATNAM [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
  of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. The       A
  said power is not vested with any other court.

  13. However, we have also noticed various judgments of
  this Court taking a contrary view to the effect that in case
  the legal ground for grant of divorce is missing, exercising   B
  such power tantamounts to legislation and thus
  transgression of the powers of the legislature, which is not
  permissible in law (vide Chetan Dass v. Kam/a Devi
  (2001) 4 SCC 250 and Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Manju
  Sharma (2009) 6 SCC 379).
                                                                 c
  14. Generally, no court has competence to issue a direction
  contrary to law nor can the court direct an authority to act
  in contravention of the statutory provisions. The courts are
  meant to enforce the rule of law and not to pass the orders
  or directions which are contrary to what has bee.n injected    o
  by law. (Vide State of Punjab v. Renuka Sing/a (1996) 8
  SCC 90, State of UP. v. Harish Chandra (1996) 9 SCC
  309, Union of India v. Kir/oskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd (1996)
  4 SCC 453., University of Allahabad v. Dr. Anand
  Prakash Mishra (1997) 10 SCC 264 and Karnataka                 E
  SRTC v. Ashrafulla Khan (2002) 2 SCC 560.)

  15. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Prem Chand
  Garg v. Excise Commr. AIR 1963 SC 996 held as under:
  (AIR p. 1002, para 12)
                                                                 F
  "12 . ... An order which this Court can make in order to do
  complete justice between the parties, must not only be
  consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
  Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the
  substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws."        G
                                        (emphasis supplied)

  The Constitution Benches of this Court in Supreme Court
  Bar Assn. v. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409 and E.S.P.
  Rajaram v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 186 held that           H
    738       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2011] 12 S.C.R.


A         under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court cannot
          altogether ignore the substantive provisions of a statute
          and pass orders concerning an issue which can be settled
          only through a mechanism prescribed in another statute.
          It is not to be exercised in a case where there is no basis
B         in law which can form an edifice for building up a
          superstructure.

          16. Similar view has been reiterated in AR. Antulay v.
          R. S. Na yak (1988) 2 SCC 602, Bonkya v. State of
          Maharashtra (1995) 6 SCC 447, Common Cause v.
c         Union of India (1999) 6 SCC 667, M.S. Ahlawat v. State
          of Haryana (2000) 1 SCC 278, M. C. Mehta v. Kamal
          Nath (2000) 6 SCC 213, State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal
          (2002) 8 SCC 158, Govt. of WB. v. Tarun K. Roy (2004)
          1 SCC 347, Textile Labour Assn. v. Official Liquidator
D         (2004) 9 SCC 741, State of Karnataka v. Ameerbi (2007)
          11 SCC 681, Union of India v. Shardindu (2007) 6 SCC
          276 and Bharat Sewa Sansthan v. U.P. Electronics
          Corpn. Ltd. (2007) 7 SCC 737.

E         17. In Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. UT, Chandigarh (2004)
          2 SCC 130 this Court held as under: (SCC p. 144, para
          36)

          "36. ... sympathy or sentiment by itself cannot be a ground
          for passing an order in relation whereto the appellants
F         miserably fail to establish a legal right. ... despite an
          extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction contained in Article
          142 of the Constitution of India, this Court ordinarily would
          not pass an order which would be in contravention of a
          statutory provision."
G
          18. In Laxmidas Morarji v. Behrose Darab Madan (2009)
          10 SCC 425, while dealing with the provisions of Article
          142 of the Constitution, this Court has held as under: (SCC
          p. 433, para 25)
H
 A.B. BHASKARA RAO v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,                     739
     CBI VISAKHAPATNAM [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
     "25 .... The power under Article 142 of the Constitution is      A
     a constitutional power and hence, not restricted by statutory
     enactments. Though the Supreme Court would not pass
     any order under Article 142 of the Constitution which would
     amount to supplanting substantive law applicable or
     ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with the           B
     subject, at the same time these constitutional powers
     cannot in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions.
     However, it is to be made clear that this power cannot be
     used to supplant the law applicable to the case. This
     means that acting under Article 142, the Supreme Court           c
     cannot pass an order or grant relief which is totally
     inconsistent or goes against the substantive or statutory
     enactments pertaining to the case. The power is to be
     used sparingly in cases which cannot be effectively and
     appropriately tackled by the existing provisions of law or       0
     when the existing provisions of law cannot bring about
     complete justice between the parties."

                                             (Emphasis added)

After elaborately discussing almost all the case laws on this         E
subject about jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142, in para
19, summarised the same in the following words:

     19. Therefore, the law in this regard can be summarised
     to the effect that in exercise of the power under Article 142
                                                                      F
     of the Constitution, this Court generally does not pass an
     order in contravention of or ignoring the statutory provisions
     nor is the power exercised merely on sympathy.
After saying so, the Court rejected the request of the parties to
waive the statutory period of six months under the Act.               G
     15. In Mota Ram vs. State of Haryana, (2009) 12 SCC
727, this Court, while reiterating the above principles has
concluded that Article 142 cannot be exercised to negate the
statutory provisions.                                                 H
    740       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A       16. In Academy of Nutrition Improvement and Others vs.
    Union of India, JT 2011 (8) SC 16, the following conclusion
    about the applicability of Article 142 is relevant:

          28. The question is having held that Rule 441 to be invalid,
B         whether we can permit the continuation of the ban on sale
          of non-iodised salt for human consumption for any period.
          Article 142 of the Constitution vests unfettered independent
          jurisdiction to pass any order in public interest to do
          complete justice, if exercise of such jurisdiction is not be
          contrary to any express prpvision of law. In Supreme Court
c         Bar Association v. Union of India: 1998 (4) SCC 409, this
          Court observed:

          The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under •
          Article 142 has the power to make such order as is
D         necessary for doing complete justice "between the parties
          in any cause or matter pending before it". The very nature
          of the power must lead the court to set limits for itself
          within which to exercise those powers and ordinarily it
          cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject,
E         except perhaps to balance the equities between the
          conflicting claims of the litigating parties by "ironing out the
          creases" in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court
          is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute
          settling. It is well recognised and established that this
F         Court has always been a law maker and its role travels
          beyond merely dispute settling. It is a "problem solver in
          the nebulous areas". (See. K. Veeraswami v. Union of
          India : 1991 (3) SCC 655, but the substantive statutory
          provisions dealing with the subject matter of a given case,
          cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while making
G
          an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional
          powers can not, in any way, be controlled by any statutory
          provisions but at the same time these powers are not
          meant to be exercised when their exercise may come
          directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided
H
A.B. BHASKARA"RAO v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,                    741
    CBI VISAKHAPATNAM [P. SATHASIVAM, J.)
    for in statute dealing expressly with the subject.               A

    In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan : 2005 (3)
    SCC 284, this Court after reiterating that this Court in
    exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
    Constitution would not pass any order which would amount         8
    to supplanting substantive law applicable to the case or
    ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with the
    subject, observed as f91lows:

     It may therefore be understood that.the plenary powers of
     this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent   C
     in the Court and are complementary to those powers
     which are specifically conferred on the Court by various
     statutes though are not limited by those statutes. These
     powers also exist independent of the statutes with a view
     to do complete justice between the parties ... and are in the   D
     nature of supplementary powers ... [and] may be put on a
     different and perhaps even wider footing than ordinary
     inherent powers of a court to prevent injustice. The
   · advantage that is derived from a constitutional provision
     couched in such a wide compass is that it prevents              E
     'clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice. See:
     Supreme Court Bar Association (supra)

    17. Though the jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 142
of the Constitution of India is not in dispute, we make it clear
                                                                     F
that exercise of such power would, however, depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court, in
exercise of its jurisdiction, under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code and this Court, under Article 142 of the
Constitution, would not ordinarily direct quashing of a case
involving crime against the society particularly, when both the      G
trial Court as also the High Court have found that the charge
leveled against the appellant under the Act has been made out
and proved by the prosecution by placing acceptable evidence.

    18. Finally, learned senior counsel for the appellant has        H
    742      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 12 S.C.R.

A cited certain orders of this Court wherein this Court has reduced
  the period of sentence already undergone while upholding the
  conviction. We have perused those orders. The orders do not
  disclose any factual details and the relevant provisions under
  which the accused was charged/convicted and minimum
B sentence, if any, as available in the Act as well as the period
  already undergone. In the absence of such details, we are
  unable to rely on those orders.

       19. From the analysis of the ·above decisions and the
C concerned provisions with which we are concerned, the
  following principles emerge:

          (a) When the Court issues notice confining to particular
          aspecUsentence, arguments will be heard only to that extent
          unless some extraordinary circumstance/material is shown
D         to the Court for arguing the matter on all aspects.

          (b) Long delay in disposal of appeal or any other factor
          may not be a ground for reduction of sentence, particularly,
          when the statute prescribes minimum sentence. In other
          cases where no such minimum sentence is prescribed, it
E
          is open to the Court to consider the delay and its effect
          and the ultimate decision.

          (c) In a case of corruption by public servant, quantum of
          amount is immaterial. Ultimately it depends upon the
F         conduct of the delinquent and the proof regarding demand
          and acceptance established by the prosecution.

          (d) Merely because the delinquent lost his job due to
          conviction under the Act may not be a mitigating
G         circumstance for reduction of sentence, particularly, when
          the Statute prescribes minimum sentence.

          (e) Though Article 142 of the Constitution gives wider
          power to this Court, waiver of certain period as prescribed
          in the Statute imposing lesser sentence than the minimum
H         prescribed is not permissible.
  A.B. BHASKARA RAO v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,                      743
      CBI VISAKHAPATNAM [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
       (f) An order, which this Court can make in order to do           A
       complete justice between the parties, must not only be
       consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
       Constitution, but also it cannot even be inconsistent with
       the substantive provisions of the relevant Statute. In other
       words, this Court cannot altogether ignore the substantive       B
       provisions of a Statute.

       (g) In exercise of the power under Article 142 of the
       Constitution, this Court generally does not pass an order
       in contravention of or ignoring the statutory provisions nor
       is the power exercised merely on sympathy.                       C

       (h) The power under Article 142 of the Constitution is a
       constitutional power and not restricted by statutory
       enactments. However, this Court would not pass any order
       under Article 142 which would amount to supplant the             o
       substantive law applicable or ignoring statutory provisions
       dealing with the subject. In other words, acting under Article
       142, this Court cannot pass an order or grant relief which
       is totally inconsistent or goes against the substantive or
       statutory enactments pertaining to the case.                     E
       (i) The powers under Article 142 are not meant to be
       exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict
       with what has been expressly provided for in statute
       dealing expressly with the subject.
                                                                        F
       20. In the light of the above discussion, we are unable to
accept any of the contentions raised by the learned senior
counsel for the appellant, on the other hand, we are in entire
agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the trial Judge as
affirmed by the High Court. Consequently, the appeal fails and
the same is dismissed. Since the appellant is on bail, the bail         G
bonds executed by him stand cancelled. The trial Judge is
directed to secure his presence for serving the remaining
period of sentence.

N.J.                                           Appeal dismissed.        H