Holding

The respondents’ conduct amounted to criminal contempt as an abuse of process calculated to obstruct the administration of justice.

Issues considered

Whether the respondents’ repeated applications constitute criminal contempt of court.
Whether the contempt application is barred by the one‑year limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Whether an unconditional apology extinguishes liability for contempt.
What constitutes an abuse of process sufficient to amount to contempt.

Legislation cited

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 19, s. 20, s. 2(c)

Subjects

contempt of courtabuse of processlimitation periodcriminal contemptpublic interestjudicial interferenceSection 19Section 20forest lease

Judgment

1172

A ADVOCAIB GENERAL, STAIB OF BIHAR
v.
MADHYA PRADESH KHAIR INDUSTRIES LTD.
March 5, 1980
[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. C!IlNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.] •
B
Criminal Contempt-Section 2(C) of the Contempts of Courts Act, 1971,
Seope of-Statutory Limitation under Section 20 of the Act; computation of.
The respondents were the successful bidd'ers at an auction of forest coupes-
in the State of Bihar. As they defaulted in making the security deposit in 1es-
pect of three coupes, the agreements With them were determined by the Con-
c servator of Forests. The respondents thereupon filed a writ petition in the
Calcutta High Court instead of in the Patna High Court and followed it up with
several applications one after another both in tlie Calcutta and Pain" High
Courts towards the forest department from preventing unauthorised removal of
forest produce by the respondents.
_,
Vexed by the manner in which the respondent was filing repeated applitations- I
I
.D and procuring orders of a learned single judge of the High Court necessitating·
the filing of as many appeals to the Division Bench, the State of Bihar moved an
application for committing the respondents for contempt of court, alleging that,
"
by their conduct the respondents Wt:re obstructing the administration of justice-·
and interfering with the due course of judicial proceedings. The Patna High
Court held that the tespondent's conduct was most unscrupulous and that !here
was gross abuse of the process of the Court, which could in certain circumstances·
E amount to contempt of Court. However, the High Court dismissed the appli·
cation on the ground that it was b•rred by limitation as it was filed beyond the
p'eriod of one year prescribed by section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The-
High Court held, on a reading of the contempt application that the material
allegation in regard to the contempt committed by the respondents was that re·
lating to the filing of the application dated April 7, 1971 before the single judge
of the Ca.lcutta High Court to circumvent and nullify the order dated March 29,
F 1971 of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court. As the contempt appli·
cation dated 18-7-73 in OCM 7 /73 was filed more than a year later, it WM tin1'•
barred. In regard to the allegation relating to the filing of the petftion dated
December 14, 1972, the High Court observed that there was no specific all'8'>"
lion th-at any contempt of court was committed by the filing of this application.
Though the r.espondents tendered an unconditional apology, its acceptance was,
not considered as the application was found to b'e beyond time. Hence the appeal
G under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Allowing the State appeal, the Court
•
HELD : 1. Every abuse of process of the court may not necessarily amount
lo contempt of Court. Abuse of proc'ess of the Court calculated to hamper the-
due course of a judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justi~e is a.
contempt of Court. [1178A-B]
H
2. It may be that c.ertain minor abuses of the process of the court may be
suitably dealt with as between the parties by striking out pleadings under the·
.())VOCATE GENL., BIHAR v. M. P. KHAIR INDUSTRIES 1173

provisions of Order 6, Rule 16 C.P.C. or in some other manner. But on the A
other hand, it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct
Which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends
its pernicious influence beyond the· parties to the action and affects the interest
of the public in the administration of Justice. [ll 78B-CJ
3. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest and a vital istakc,
• in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is
so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court B
has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the administraition of
justice and, so, it is entrusted with th·e power to commit for contempt of Court,
not in order to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury as the
expression "Contempt of Court" may se·em to suggest, but to protect and to
vindicate the right of the public that administration of justice shall not be pre~
vented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. [ll 78C-E]
c
Offutt v. U.S., 348, U.S. p. 11, quoted with approval.

4. It is not necessary that every allegation made should be followed then
and there by the statement that the allegation established a contempt of CourL
Paragraph 29 of the application to commit th'e respondents for Contempt express~
ly referred to the application dated December 14, 1972 an~ paragraph 31 state
that all the facts and circumstances enumerated in the petition established tba.t D
the respondents were obstructing and interfering with the due course of adminis·
tration of justice. [1180F-H]
In the instant oo~e :

(a) the respondents began the "game" by filing an application under o\rt.
l
226 of the Constitution of India in the Calcutta High Court, whereas in the
normal course one would expect such an application to be filed in the Patna
E
High Court within whose jurisdiction the subfect matter of dispute was situate.
A justifiable prim.a facie inference from this circumstance may be that the
application was not bonafide but intended to harass and oppress the opposite
party. [1179C-EJ

(b) Thereafter application after application was filed before the learned
single Judge, everyone of them, designed to circumvent, cfefect or nullify the
effect of the orders of the Division Benches of the Calcutta High Court and
Patna High Court. The order of !lie Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court
directing the respondents to furnish security in a sum of Rs. 1,55,000/- \Vas
never complied with, The order of the Division Bench of the Pa.tna High Court
directing the respondents to furnish security of immovable property in a sum of
Rs. 75,000/- and to deposit in cash or furnish bank guarantee in a sum of
Rq, 50,000/- was also never complied with. Instead, an order was obtained from G
the single Judge of the Calcutta High Court restraining the State of Biha.r from
continuing the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge·, Palamau. When
this order was set aside by the Division Bench, an attempt was m.ade to circum·
vent all earlier orders by obtaining an order of the single Judge that they ma.y
be allowed to deposit a sum of Rs. 60,000/. in cash and permitted to remove
the •tock from the forest Coupes. When the State of Bihar moved the learned
Subordinate Judge, Palamau for a direction to auction the attached stock, the H
respond'ents moved ao application on December 14, 1972, aod obtained an order
from the Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court staying the proceedings in the
1174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R.

A money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamaiu. In considerina the
question whether the filing of the application dated December 14, 1972, amounts
to a Contempt of Court, the Cou1t must take into account the whole course of
the continuing contumacious conduct of the respondents from the beginning of
1he 'game'. Clearly, not a single application mad'e to the Single Judge was bona·
fide. Every application was a daring 'raid' on the Court and each was an abuse

B
of the process of the Court. The applica.tion dated December 14, 1972 praying
that the proc'eedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judze
•
should be stayed was made despite the fact that earlier, on January 10, 1972 the
Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had expressly permitted the proceed-
ings in the money suit to go on. The application of the respondents clearly
showed that they were intent upon obstructing the due course of the proceedings
in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, PaJamau and to obstruct
the administration of justice by abusing the process of the Court. [11790 H,
c llSOA-E]
(c) The application dated December 14, 1972 was an abuse of process of
the Court, calculated to obstruct the due course of a judicial proceeding and the
administration of justice end was therefore, a criminal contempt of Court;
[llSOH, l!81A]
(d) though the respondents had expressed an unconditional apology to the
D Patna High Court, the conduct of the respondents is so reprehensible as to
\Varrant condemnation by the imposition of a sentence. [1181A}
CRIMINAL AI·PELI,ATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 349 of
1974:
From the Judgment and Order dated 24-4-1974 of the Patna High
E Court in Original Cr!. Misc. No. 7/73.
Lal Narayan Sinha, Attorney General, U. P. Singh, B. P. Singh
and S. N. !ha for the Appellant.
Sukumar Ghosh for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ..~

F CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. The Advocate-General of Bihar is the
appellant in this appeal under Section 19 of the Contempts of Comts
Act, 1971. Respondent No. 1, M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair Indus-

,
tries, represented by respondent No. 2, Om Prakash Agrawal, were the
highest bidde.rs at an auction held by the Divisional Forest Officer,
Garhwa South, of four forest coupes iu the State of Bihar. Under
G
the terms of the agreements the respondents were required to deposit
25% of each of the four bids as security. The respondents were,
however, able to make the deposit in respect of one coupe only and
not in respect of the other three coupes. The responde.nts requested
for time. Thereafter, there was a long course of correspondence with
H which we are not now concerned. Finally, on January 28, 1970, th~
Conservator of Forests determined the agreements. On February 28,
1970, respondent No. 1 served a notice on the Divisional FQl'est Offieer
ADVOCATE GENL., BIHAR V. M. P. KHA!R INDUSTRIES 1175
(Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
Garhwa South, intimating him that they had filed au application under A
Article 226 of the Constitution in the Calcutta High Court and that
S. C. Deb, J., had been pleased to issue a rule nisi aud also an injunc-
tion restraining the Govt. of Bihar and the officials of the Forest Depart-
ment of the Govt. of Bihar from giving effect to the proceedings by
• which the leases were. determined and further directing them to all9w
B
M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries to carry on the work of cutting
and felling of trees and removing the material in the, said forest coupes.
Alleging that the Officers of the Forest Department of the Govt. of
13ihar had violated the order of injunction granted against them, the
respondents filed an application to commit the Officers for Contempt
of Court and in that application they prayed for and obtained an interim c
order directing the Officers not to interfere in any way with the activities
of the respondents in removing the produce of the Khair trees. The,
State of·Bihar preferred an appeal to a Division Bench of the Calcutta
High Court aud on September 29, 1970, the Division, Bench passed arr
order allowing the appeal and directing the respondents to furnish;
security in a sum of Rs. 1,55,000 if they desired to remove the forest D
produce. Otherwise, they were restrained from selling the trees aud
extracting the produce. The respondents offered certain property as
security but that was rejected by the Registrar of the Calcutta High
Court as the title was found to be defective.

At this stage on J auuary 8, 1971, the State of Bihar filed money E
suit No. 3 of 1971 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Palam.au
to recover a sum of Rs. 1,93,225 as damages. The State of Bihar
also filed au application under Order 38, Rule 5, Code of Civil Proce-
dure and obtained an order of attachment of the 'Kath' manufactured
by the respondents alongwith. utensils, equipment, etc. The ~espondents
were directed to furnish security in a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs and asked to F
show cause why the interim attachment should not be made absolute.
The attachment was effected on January 10, 1971. The respondents
appeared before the learned Subordinate Judge and requested that the
reduced the amount of security from Rs. 2 lakhs to Rs. 75,000. The
learned Subordinate Judge allowed the ~ayer of the respondents and
G
reduced the amount of security from Rs. 2 lakhs to Rs. 75,ooo. The
State od' Bihar preferred an appeal to the Patna High Court and ail,
interim order was made by the High Court, stayi.ng the operation of
the order of the learned Subordinate Judge but continuing the attach-
ment. On March 29, 1971, after hearing both the parties, the Patna
High Court made an order directing the respondents, to furnish security H
of immovable property in a sum of Rs. 75,000 and to deposit cash or
furnish bank guarantee in a sum of Rs. 50,000. It was directed that
1176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 2 S.C.R.

A on such security being furnished the interim attachment would cease
and the respondents would be allowed to remove the stock, utensils and
equipment.
Without complying with the orde.r of the Patna High Conrt,
Respondent No. 1 then moved the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta
B High Court on April 21, 1971, and obtained an order restraining the
•
State of Bihar from continuing the money suit in the Court of the Sub-
ordinate Judge, Palamau and further directing the State to take steps·
to get the attachment vacated if security was furnished by
the respondents as directed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta
High Court. The State of Bihar filed an appeal against the
c order of the learned Single Judge and the operation of the order was
stayed by an order of January 10, 1972 of the Divisio!\ Bench. It
was directed that the proceedings in the money suit in the Conrt of
the learned Subordinate Judge of Palrunau should proceed. In the·
meanwhile on July 30, 1971, Respondent No. 1 moved another appli-
cation before the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta; High Court
D
offering to deposit Rs. 60,000 in cash and requesting that on such
deposit being made, they might be allowed to remove the stock. This
application was allowed on July 30, 1971, by the learned Single Judge
and the amount was directed to be deposited with the counsel for th~
State of Bihar. The order was later on modified on December 16,
E 1972, and the amount was directed to be deposited with the Registrar
of the High Court.

On November 20, 1972, the State of Bihar filed an application
in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau complaining that the·
respondents had not furnished secnrity as di.reeled by the Patna High·
J!' Court and as the attached stock was deteriorating it might be sold
by auction. Before anything further could be done Respondent. No. I
filed a petition on 14th December, 1972, and obtained an order from
the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court on December 18,
1972, staying the proceedings in the money suit in the Court of the
Subordinate Judge, Palamau until the attached goods we.re released in
G compliance with the orders dated July 30, 1971 and February 16, 1972.
The State of Bihar preferred an appeal against the order of tbe learned
Single Judge and on January 22, 1973, a Division Bench of the Calcutta
•'
I

High Court set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and directed
the proceedings in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Palamau, to go
on.
H
Vexed by the manner in which the 1st Respondent was filing
repeated applications and procuring orders from a learned Single Judge
ADVOCATE GENL. B!llAR V, M· P. KHAIR INDUSTRIES 1177
(Chlnnappa Reddy, J.)
of the High Court, necessitating the filing of as, many appeals to the
Division Bench, the State of Bihar filed an application for committing
the Respondents for Contempt of Court alleging that, by their conduct
the respondents were obstructing the administration of justice and
interfering with the due course of judicial proceedings. The Patna
High Court held that the respondents' conduct was most unscrupulous B
one that there wa5 gross abuse of the process of the Court, which could
in certain circumstances amount to contempt of Court. The High
Court, however, dismissed the application on the ground that it was
barred by limitation as it was filed beyond the period of one year
prescribed by section 20 of the Contempt of Comts Act. The High
Court held, on a: reading of the Contempt application, that the material c
allegation in regard to the contempt committed by the respondents was
that relating to the filing of the application dated April 7, 1971,
before tbe Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court to circumvent and
nullify the order dated March 29, 1971 of the Division Bench of tile
Patna High Court. As the contempt application was filed more than
a year later it was time-barred. In regard to the allegation relating to D
the filing of the petition dated December 14, 1972, the High Court
observed that there was no specific allegation that any Contempt oe
Court was ccmmittcd by the filing of this application. We may also
f
mentioi;i. that the respondents tendered an unconditional apology to the
High Court of Bihar. The question of accepting the apology was Mt E
considered as the application was found to be bey®d time. The
A<lvocate General of Bihar has filed this appeal against the judgment
of the Patna High Court.
I"-- Before we consider the merits of the appeal we may mention here
- that the learned Single Judge who made the several orders in favour
of the respondents was himself compelled in a later order dated AugusG F
13, 1973 to state that the respondents had suppressed material facts
and misled him on various occasions and obtained orders from him.
Section 2 ( c) of the Contempt of- Courts Act defines Criminal
contempt as follows :
r "(c) 'Criminal Contempt' means the publication (whether G
by words, spoken or written, or any signs, or by visible rcprn·
sentations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any
other act whatsoever which-
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends
to lower the authority of any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with,
the due course of any judicial proceeding; or
1I78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R

A (iii) Interferes or tends to interfere with,· or obstructs
or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any
other manner".

While we are conscious that every abuse of the process of the Court
may not necessarily amount to Contempt of Court, abuse of the process
B of the Court calculated to hamper the due course of ai judicial proceed-
ing or the orderly administration of justice, we must say, is a contempt
of Court. It may be that certain minor abuses of the process of the
Court may be suitably dealt with as between the parties, by striking
out pleadings under the provisions of Order 6, Rule 16 or in some
other manner. But, on tlie other hand, it may be necessary to punish
c as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery
of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious infiueoce
beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public
in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abid-
ing and a real i!lterest, and a vital stake in the effective; and orderly
D administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered,
there is the pe.ril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has
the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration
of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for Con-
tempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the, Court against
insult or injury as the expression "Contempt of Court" may seem to
suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that
the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstruct-
ed or interfered with. "It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of
law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage".(!)
"The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy
it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope''.(')
F
In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn-Vol. 9, paragraph 38),
there is a brief discussion of when abuse of the process of the Court
may be a punishable contempt. It is said :
"38. Abuse of process in general. The Court has power
to punish as contempt any misuse of the court's process.
Thus the forging er altering of court documents and other
deceits of like kind are punishable as serious contempts. Simi-
larly, deceiving the court or the court's officers by deliberately
S1'ppressing a fact, or giving false facts, may be1 a punishable
contempt.
(I) Por Frank Further Jin Offutt v. U.S. -34: U.S. p. II.
(2) Per Judge Curtis-Raleigh quoted in Je11nisq11 v. Baker- [1972] I All E. R.
997@ 1006.
ADVOCATE GENL. B!HAR V. M· P. KHAIR INDUSTRIES: 1179
(Chlnnappa Reddy, !.)
Certain acts of a lesser nature may also constitute an
abuse of process as, for instance, initiating or carrying on
proceedings which are wanting in bona {ides or
which are frivolous, vexatious, or oppressive. In
such cases the court has extensive alternative powers to
prevent an abuse of its process by striking ant or staying
procee<lings or by prohibiting the taking of further proceed- B

--
ings without leave. Where the court, by exercising its
statutory powers, its powers under rules of court, or its
inherent jurisdiction, can give an adequate remedy, it will not
in general punish the abuse as a contempt of court. On the
other hand, where an irregularity or misuse of process amounts
to an offence against justice, extending its influence beyond
c
the parties to the action, it may be punished as a contempt".

In the present case, the respondents began 'the game' by filing an
application under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the Calcutta High
Court, whereas in the normal course one would expect such as applica- D
, tion to be filed in the Patna High Court within whose jurisdiction the
subject matter of the dispute was situate. For some mysteriou~

, ·reasons which nobody has been able to explain to us, the writ applica-
tion was filed in the Calcutta High Court. A justifiable prima facie
inference from this circumstance may be that the application was not
bona fide but intended to harass and oppress the opposite parties. We
do not want to say anything more about this aspect of the case as we
are told that this is a failing of the respondents which they shared
E

with several others. Perhaps, as we had occasion to remark during
\
/ the course of the hearing, some parties are unable to reconcile them-
selves to the fact that the Calcutta High Court has long since ceased F
to have jurisdiction over the area comprising the State of Bihar which
it had several decades ago.

The 'game' proceeded further. Application after application was
filed before the learned Single Judge, everyone of them designed to
circumvent, defeat o.r nullify the effect of the orders of the Division
G

r Benches of the Calcutta High Court an.ct the Patna High Court. .The
order of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court directing the
respondents to furnish security in a sum of Rs. 1,55 ,000 was never
complied with. The order of the Division Bench of the Patna High
Court directing the respondents to furnish security of immovable pro- H
perty in a sum of Rs. 75,000 and to deposit cash or furnish bank
guarantee in a sum of Rs. 50,000 was also never complied with.
1180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R

AInstead, an order was obtained from the; Single Judge of the Calcutta
High Court restraining the State of : Bihar from CO'Jltinning
the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau., When
this order was set aside by the Division Bench, an attempn was made
to circumvent all earlier orders by obtaining an order from the Single.
Judge that they may be allowed to deposit Rs. 60,000 in cash and
B permitted to remo'le the stock from the forest coupes. When the State •
o[ Bihar moved the learned Subordinate Judge, Palamau for a direction
to auction the attached stock, the respondents moved an application:
on December 14, 1972, and obtained an order from the Single Judge
of the Calcutta High Court staying the proceedings in the money suit
in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau. In considering the
question whether the filing of the application dated December 14, 1972,
amount to a Contempt of Court, the Court inust take into accoont
the whole course of the continuing contumacious conduct of the respon-
dents from the beginning of the "game". Clearly, not a single applicii-
tion made to the Single Judge was bona fide. Every application was
·D a daring 'raid' on the Court and each was an abuse of the process
of the Court. The application dated December 14, 1972 praying
that the proceedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate
Judge shonld be stayed was made despite the fact that earlier, ori
January 10, 1972, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had
expressly permitted the proceedings in the money suit to go on. The
application of the respondents clearly showed that they were inten~
upon obstructing the due course of the proceedings in the money suit
in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau and to obstruct th~
administration of justice by abusing the process of the Court.

·• The High Court expressed the view that there was no specific allega-
tion that any contempt of Court had been committed by the filing of
the application dated December 14, 1972. We are unable to agree
with the view .of the High Court. Paragraph 29 of the application to
commit the responqents for Contempt expressly refers to the application
dated December 14, 1972 and paragraph 31 states that all the facts
G and circumstances enumerated in the petition; estabiished that the
respondents were obstructing and interfering with the due course and
administration of justice. It was not necessary that every allegation
made should be followed then and there by the statement that the
allegation established a Contempt of Court.

We are satisfied that the filing of the application dated December 14,
1972, was an abuse of the process of the Court, calculated to obstruct
ADVOCATE GENL. BIHAR V. M· P. KHA!R INDUSTRIES. 1181
(Chlnnappa Reddy, !.)
the due course of a judicial proceeding and the administration of A
justice and was, therefore, a Criminal Contempt of Court. The
respondents had expressed an unconditional apology to the Patna High
Court, but we are convinced that the conduct of the respondents is
so reprehensible as to warrant condemnation by the imposition of a
{ sentence. We accordingly allow the appeal and sentence each of the
'•
I respondents to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to undergo simple B
(
imprisonment for a period of two weeks. ·

V.D.K. 11ppeal allowed.

•.