Holding

The Agricultural Produce Market Committee is an "industry" under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and its employees are workmen covered by that Act.

Summary

The Agricultural Produce Market Committee, created under the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966, terminated several temporary employees, prompting the Labour Court to order their reinstatement. The Committee challenged the Labour Court’s jurisdiction, arguing that it was not an "industry" under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 because its functions were sovereign and inalienable. The High Court rejected this claim, holding the Committee to be an industry, a decision appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court examined the nature of the Committee’s functions, distinguishing sovereign functions (e.g., defence, law administration) from welfare activities that can be performed by private entities, and applied the dominant‑object test. It concluded that the Committee’s activities—regulating agricultural markets, levying fees, and providing services—are not sovereign and therefore fall within the definition of "industry" under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Consequently, the employees are "workmen" entitled to the protections of the Central Act, and the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the Agricultural Produce Market Committee established under the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966 qualifies as an "industry" within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Whether the functions of the Committee constitute "sovereign" or inalienable functions that would exempt it from the ambit of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Whether Section 59(3) of the Karnataka Act excludes the application of the Industrial Disputes Act to the Committee’s employees.

Legislation cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 20, s. 2(a), s. 2(j)

Subjects

industry definitionsovereign functionIndustrial Disputes Actstatutory corporationagricultural market regulationlabour court jurisdictionsection 59dominant object testemployment termination

Judgment

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE A
v.
SHRI ASHOK HARIKUNI AND ANR. ETC.

SEPTEMBER 22, 2000

[A.P. MISRA AND Y.K. SABHARWAL, JJ.) B

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-S.20)

"Industry" -Determination of-Agricultural Produce Marketing
Committee-Statutory Corporation engaged in regulating marketing and C
trading of agricultural produce-None of the functions were "sovereign" or
inalienable-Most of the fanctions .capable of being performed by private
persons or bodies-Held, falls within the ambit of "industry "-Karnataka
Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966.

"Sovereignfanctions" ofState-What are-Held, exclusively inalienable, D
not amenable to jurisdiction of ordinarily Civil Court and not capable of
being undertaken by any private person or body.

Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966-
S. 59(3)-Applicability of l.D. Act under-Exclusion of-Held, is limited to E
the extent specified-Thus, by necessary implication applicable to other
fields-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Interpretation of Statutes

"Industry"-Ascertainment of-Doctrine of Pith and Substance- F
Applicability of.

Words & Phrases

"Industry"; "Sovereign function "-Meaning of in the context of S.20)
of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
G
"Appropriate Government"-Meaning of in the context of S.2(a) of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The issue involved in the present appeal was whether the appellant-
Agricultural Produce Market Committee established under the Karnataka
379 H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966 (State Act) was an
"industry" under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (Central Act).
Respondents, temporary employees working with appellant-Marketing
Committee were terminated from service. Labour Court set aside the
termination order and directed reinstatement of respondents. Aggrieved,
B appellant-Marketing Committee filed a writ petition before the High Court
contending that it was not an "industry" within the meaning of the Central
Act and thus Labour Court had no jurisdiction to try the cases of its
employees. Rejecting the said contention the writ petition as well as the writ
appeal were dismissed by High Court. Hence the present appeal.

C On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the nature of functions
of the marketing committee were "sovereign" functions of the State and
thus, it could not be considered to be an "industry" under the Central Act;
the power of appointment of various employees under the State Act was only
with the State Government and once a person was appointed under the State
Act his services would not be governed by the Central Act; that the functions
D of the Market Committee was to safeguard the interest of the agriculturalist
and not for making any profit.

HELD : 1. Appellant-Agricultural Produce Market Committee
established under the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing
(Regulation) Act, 1966 is an "industry" within the meaning ofS.2(j) of the
E Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Thus, both the Labour Court and High Court
were justified in holding the respondent-employees were "Workmen" under
the Central Act. [402-A-B]

2.1. Every governmental function need not be "sovereign". State activities
are multifarious. From the primal sovereign power, which exclusively
F inalienably could be exercised by the Sovereign alone, which is not subject
to challenge in any civil court to all the welfare activities, which would be
undertaken by any private person. So merely one is employee of statutory
bodies would not take it outside the Central Act. Even if a statute confers
on any statutory body, any function which could be construed to be "sovereign"
G in nature would not mean every other functions under the same statute to
be also sovereign. The Court should examine the statute to severe one from
the other by comprehensively examining various provisions of that statute.
Thus, in interpreting any statute to find if it is "industry" or not the court
has to find its pith and substance. [395-C, D, E]

H Bangalore Water-Supply & Sewerage Board etc. v. R. Rajappa and
AGRICULTURAL PRO DUCE MARKET COMMITTEE'" ASHOK HARIKUNI 381

Ors., [1978] 3 SCR 207 and Chief Conservator of Forests and Anr. v. A
Jagannath Maruti Kondhare and Ors., [1996] 2 SCC 293, relied on.

N. Nagendra Rao and Co. v. State of A.P., [1994) 6 SCC 205 and Des
Raj and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors., [1988] 2 SCC 537, referred to.

2.2. Merely an enterprise being statutory corporation, creature under B
a statute, would not take it outside the ambit of "industry' as defined under
the Central Act. It is true that various functionaries under the State Act are
creature of statute. But creation as such, by itself, cannot confer it the status
of performing inalienable function of the StatP.. In fact, all Governmental
functions cannot be construed either primary or inalienable sovereign C
functions. Hence, even if some of the functionaries under the State Act could
be said to be performing sovereign functions of the State Government that
by itself would not make the dominant object to be sovereign in nature or
take the Act out of the purview of the Central Act. The dichotomy between
sove,reign and non-sovereign function could be found by finding which of the
functions of the State could be undertaken by any private person or body. The D
one which could be undertaken cannot be sovereign function. Absence of
profit making or mere quid pro qua would also not make an enterprise to
be outside the ambit of"industry". [399-F-D-E; 401-C-D]

The Corporation of the city of Nagpur v. Its Employees, [1960) 2 SCR E
942; D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee & Ors., [1953] SCR 302 and State of
Bombay & Ors. v. The Hospital Mazdoor &!bha & Ors., [1960] 2 SCR 866,
relied on.

2.3. In the instant case, appellant is an undertaking performing its
duties in a systematic and organised manner, regulating the marketing and F
trading of agricultural produce, rendering services to the community etc.
On scanning the whole State Act and perusing the preamble and Statement
of Objects and Reasons of the Act, it reveals that the said Act deals with
various facets of regulating activities within the market area with respect
to the trading in agricultural produce. It includes establishment ofvarious G
committees including charging of fees for service rendered to the traders
of agricultural produce. Any enactment, scheme or project which sponsors
and helps in the tr.ading activity is one of the State's essential functions
towards welfare activities for the benefit of its subject. Such activities can
be undertaken even by any non-governmental organisation or a private person,
corporate or company. Thus, none of the functions of the appellant-market H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A committee could be construed to be "sovereign" in nature or inalienable in
character. [398-B, H; 399-A-C]

3. The Central Act is enacted to maintain harmony between employer
and employee which brings peace and amity in its functioning. It is to the
' benefit of both, employer and employee. Misuse of rights and obligations by
B either or stretching it beyond permissible limits have to be dealt with within
the framework of the law but endeavour should not be in all circumstances
to exclude any enterprise from its ambit. That is why courts have been defining
"industry" in the widest permissible limits and "sovereign" functioning within
its limited orbit. Section 2(a) of the Central Act defines 'Appropriate
C Government' in relation to any industrial disputes concerning any industry
carried on by or under the authority of Central Government, or railway
company etc. and refers to large number of corporations and corporate bodies
which falls in the category of "industry. This indicates even Legislature
intends a very large arms of "industry", to include large number of
enterprises to be industry to confer benefit to the employees working under
D it. In fact, several corporations conferred with statutory powers also curtails
individual rights but still they were "industries". Thus, it cannot be accepted
that curtailment of right of an individual could only be by the exercise of
sovereign power. [395-E-F; 400-B-D]

E Encyclopedia of the American Constitution; Words and Phrases,
.........
Permanent Edition, Volume 39A, referred to.

4. S.59(3) of the State Act indicates that exclusion of the Central Act
is limited to the sphere as specified under the sub-section, namely, payment
of compensation to the officers or servants of the transferred e~ployees.
F Thus, by necessary implication, other field under the Central Act is made
applicable. Thus, it cannot be accepted that in view of S.59(3) of the State Act,
the application of Central Act is fully excluded to the employees of State Act.
[401-G]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 5235-
G 5241 of 2000.

From the Judgment and Order dated 10.8.98 of the Kamataka High Court
in W.A. Nos. 1078-83 of 1998. :--

G.V. Chandrasekhar and P.P. Singh for the Appellant.
H S.R. Bhat and Ms. K. Sarada Devi for the Respondents.
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE v. ASHOKHARIKUNI [MISRA, J.] 383
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
MISRA, J. Leave granted.

The question raised in this appeal is drawing attention of this Court
since very inception when Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was enacted and
even after the passage of more than so years, issue remains in the fertile field B
of it yielding fresh crops time and again because of wide vaporous definition
of the word "industry" under the said Act. We shall be referring about some
of these cases in the later part of our judgment. This wide definition has given
an opportunity to both employer and employee for raising issues, one trying
to pull out of this definition, to be out of the clutches of the said Act, other
bringing within it, to receive benefit under it. Because of width of the periphery C
of the word "industry" there is tug of war repeatedly between the two, in spite
of various decisions of this Court. This situation has led this Court, in
Bangalore Water-Supply & Sewerage Board, Etc. v. R. Rajappa & Others,
[ 1978] 3 SCR 207 to record with anxiety and suggesting Legislature for bringing
a comprehensive Bill to clear the fog. It records : D
"In view of the difficulty experienced by all of us in defining the true
denotation of the term "industry" and divergence of opinion in regard
thereto-as has been the case with this bench also- we think, it is high
time that the Legislature steps in with a comprehensive bill to clear
up the fog and remove the doubts and set at rest once for all the E
controversy which crops up from time to time in relation to the
meaning of the aforesaid term rendering it necessary for larger benches
of this Court to be constituted which are driven to the necessity of
evolving a working formula to cover particular cases." •

This led the Legislature to amend the definition of the word "industry" F
in Section 2(j) of the aforesaid Act, through amending Act in 1982 but left
the said amendment to be given effect from the date to be notified by the
Government. Since thereafter with the passage of 18 years in spite of
observations of this Court in some cases· during this inter magnum, the said
amendment has not seen the light of the day leaving the situation in doldrum G
for the Courts to continue to give its shape. Inter-linked with it is also the
·~

word "sovereign" which is equally fluid as the word "industry". The word
"sovereign" changes its complexion with the type of sovereignty a country
is structured also with the change of political structure in view of changing
socio-cultural heritage of any country. So defining what is sovereign, the
Courts not only of this country but other countries as well have been battling H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A to comprehend it since 19th century. This has gained importance in the
industrial law as what constitute to be a sovereign function excludes within
its ambit "industry" hence industrial law would have no application over it.

The question raised in this Appeal is : a) Whe~her the appellant, an
Agricultural Produce Market Committee (hereinafter referred to as ''the Market
B Committee"), established under the Kamataka Agricultural Produce Marketing
(Regulation) Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as "the State Act") is an
"industry" as contemplated under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter
referred to as "the Central Act") ? If yes, Will not employee under the State
Act would be governed by the Central Act?
c
(b) Will not the State Act over-ride the Central Act for the reason, the
State Act received the assent of the President of India, hence the Central Act
would be inapplicable to the employees governed by the State Act?

To properly appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to give short
D essential matrix of facts. The appellant is an Agricultural Produce Market
Committee established under the ·State Act. It regulates the marketing of
agricultural produce for the benefit of the agriculturist: This market committee
is not intended to make any profit and the whole object is only to regulate
the agricultural produce both foi protecting the interest of agriculturist and
E interest of public at large. The submission for the appellant is, this committee
is not an "industry" as contemplated under the Central Act. It exercises
.sovereign function under the Act. It is a body corporate which has perpetual
succession and a common seal. The committee has no power either to appoint
or ,regularise the services of its employees which vests with the State
Government. Its employees are civil servants and provisions of the Karnataka
F Civil Service (Conduct Rules), 1966 and the Karnataka Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 are applicable. This committee
is established under Section 9 of the Act and is subject to the restrictions
imposed under it and is competent to contract, to acquire, hold, lease, sell or
otherwise transfer any property and do all other things necessary for the
G purpose ~or which it is established. Section 58 confers power to appoint
Secretary and technical staff to the market committee. It stipulates, every such
committee shall have a Government servant as the Secretary and also an
Additional Secretary or Assistant Secretary who will also be a Government
servant. Under sub-section (1) of Section 59 the officers and servants of
market committee holding the classes of posts specified in sub-sections (I),
H (2) and (3) of Section 58, on the date immediately prior to the date of
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE v. ASHOKHARIKUNI [MISRA, J.] 385
commencement of that Act, shall, with effect from the date of such A
commencement become officers and servants of the State Government. Sub-
section (1-A) provides, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in
any other law for the time being in force, officers and servants of the market
committee holding such classes of posts on such dates as may be specified
by the State Government become officers and servants of the State Government
with effect from the date so notified. Sub-section (2) confers right on the B
officers and servants of the market committee after becoming servants of the
State Government under sub- section (I) or sub-section (1-A) to have the
same tenure, the same remuneration, same terms and conditions of service,
with the same rights and privileges as to pension, gratuity, provident fund etc.
as they would have received the same under the market committee concerned C
and shall ccntinue to receive so until their remuneration, terms and conditions
of service including the privileges are altered by rules or other provisions
made under Article 309 of the Constitution. Sub-section (3) starts with non
obstante clause, notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 or in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract,
in case of transfer of any officer or servant of a market committee by virtue D
of sub-section (I) and (1-A) shall not entitle any such officer or such servant
to any compensation or payment under that Act or other law or contract.
Learned counsel for the appellant strongly relies on this sub-section to
interpret that the Central Act is excluded from the purview of employees
under the State Act. E
Section 59 of the State Act is reproduced below:

"Absorption of staff ofmarket committees in Government service-{ 1)
Officers and servants of market committees (by whatever name called)
holding the classes of posts specified in sub- sections (1 ), (2) and (3) F
of Section 58 on the date immediately prior to the date of commencement
of that Act, shall, with effect from the date of such commencement
become officers and servants of the State Government.

Explanation - The State Government shall determine the
designations of the officers and servants of the market committees G
who shall become officers and servants of the State Government
under this sub-section.

[(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any
other law for the time being in force, officers and servants oi market
committees holding such classes of posts on such dates as may be H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A specified by the State Government shall, with effect from such date
become officers and servants of the State Government and they shall
draw their salary and allowances from the Consolidated Fund of the
State.
-
(2) The officers and servants of market committees who become officers
B and servants of the State Government under sub-section (1) [or sub-
section (l-A)] shall hold their office by the same tenure, at the same
remuneration and upon the same terms and conditions of service and
with the same rights and privileges as to pension, gratuity, provident
fund and such matters as they would have held the same under the
market committee concerned and shall continue to do so until their
c remuneration, terms and conditions of service including the privileges
as to pension, provident fund and gratuity are altered by rules or
other provisions made [under the Karnataka State Civil Services Act,
1978], and any such alteration shall have effect, notwithstanding
anything contained in any contract or law for the time being in force.
D
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (Central Act 14of1947), or in any other law for the time
being in force or in any contract the transfer of the services of any
officer or servant of a market committee by virtue of sub-section (1)
[or sub-section (1-A)] shall not entitle any such officer or servant to
E any compensation or payment under that Act or other law or contract,
and no such claim shall be entertained by any Court, tribunal or other
authority." .

Section 61 refers to the appointment of other staff, other than those
who falls under Section 58. Section 62 refers to the Karnataka State Marketing
F Service. The State Government is empowered to constitute any class of
officers or servants to bring it into marketing service to be designated as the
Karnataka State Marketing Service through issue of notification. Under its
proviso, the State Government could carve out and constitute the officers and
servants falling under sub-section ( 1-A) of Section 59 into a separate service
G for the State to be designated as Karnataka State Market Committee Services.
Under sub-section (2) the State Government could amalgamate both the
Kamataka State Marketing Service and the Kamataka State Market Committee
Services into one single service.

The submission for the appellant is that market committee is not conferred
H with the power of appointment, though under Section 61(3) it could create
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE''- ASHOKHARIKUNI (MISRA, J.] 387
temporary posts and appoint temporary employees for not more than 180 A
days with the prior approw-ofthe Director of Agricultural Marketing. Learned
• counsel for the appellant, Mr. Chandrasekhar has taken us to the various
provisions of the Act, namely, Sections 9 (3), 58,59,63,65,66,67,69,72,73 and 83
of the State Act to show that the scheme of the Act is to provide for the
better regulation of marketing of agricultural produce and establishment and
control of market for agricultural produce within the State. He emphasised, B
these provisions indicate that the function of the market committee is sovereign
in nature hence it could not constitute to be an industry to make its employees
as workmen under the Central Act. Section 9(3) confers status on every
market committee to be a local authority. Section 61 deals with appointments
from among the officers and servants of the Karnataka State Market Committee C
Service or Karnataka State Market Service other officers, servants of a market
committee. Section 63 deals with the powers and duties of the market committee.
Section 65 authorises the market committee to levy market fees. Section 66
empowers any officers or servant of the State Government to require any
person carrying on business of agricultural produce to produce before him
the accounts, other documents, furnish any information relating to the stock D
of such agricultural produce, or purchases, sales, deliveries of such produce
and is also empowered to seize the accounts, register or documents. Section
67 authorises such authorities to stop any vehicle, vessel or other conveyance
which is shown to be taking out of the market committee or moving in the
market area for examining the contents in the vehicle, vessel or other E
conveyance. Section 69 confers power to acquire the land and hold it. Section
71 confers right on the market committee to issue licence for the regulation
of trading under Section 72 and Section 73 confers right of such authority to
cancel or suspend such licence. Section 83 deals with the production of
account books etc. The question raised is that these functions are sovereign
in nature. F

Seven persons serving under the market committee raised dispute,
following termination of their services before the Labour Court. First is Shri
A.G. Harakuni, who was appointed as an Assistant Engineer on 3rd March,
1987 on daily wage for looking after the construction work and he worked as G
such till 16th May, 1989 when his services were terminated. Next is Shri G.
Nagaraj, who was appointed on 27th April, 1978 as a market fee collector on
temporary basis and his services were terminated on 31st March, 1982. Third
is Shri Shivakumar, who was appointed as maistry on 25th November, 1981
on daily wages though he was paid salary once in a month and his services
were terminated on 31st October, 1986. Next is Shri Nirvanappa. He was H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A appointed as a peon on 18th March, 1964 whose appointment was approved
on 26th March, 1969. His service was terminated on 3rd August, 1971. Next
is Umesh Hegde. He was appointed as work inspector on daily wages vide
appointment order dated 28th December, 1984 and his service was terminated
on 3rd April, 1987. Next is Siddappa Rudrappa Chickamani who was appointed .
as watchman on 8th April, 1982 and his service was terminated on 13th
B September, 1989 and finally Shri M.M. Satyannavar. He was appointed as an
Assistant Engineer on 25th May, 1984 on daily wage basis for looking after
development work and his service was terminated on 15th May, 1989. Each
of these seven persons are respondents in this case. The Labour Court
allowed their applications by setting aside their order of termination and
C directed their reinstatement. The appellant aggrieved filed writ petition
challenging these orders, among other grounds, one is challenge to the
jurisdiction of the Labour Courts to try the cases of these seven respondents
as the appellant is not an "industry" within the meaning of the Central Act,
hence the Labour Courts have no jurisdiction to try their claims. Learned
D single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the
appellant-market committee is an "industry" and hence Labour Courts, have
the jurisdiction to decide their cases. Feeling aggrieved the appellants preferred
writ appeal and the Division Bench similarly dismissed the same upholding
that appellant-committee is an "industry" within the meaning of the Central
Act.
E
Learned counsel for the appellant challenges these concurrent findings
by submitting that functions of the appellant committee being sovereign in
nature and inalienable in character cannot be construed an "industry". The
power of appointment of the various employees under the Act is only with
the State Government, only limited power vests on the appellate-committee,
F to appoint person temporarily for a period not exceeding 180 days. Under
Section 61(3) such person cannot get any lien over any post. He has no right
to seek regularisation. Once a person is appointed under the State Act his
services would not be governed by the Central Act. The claimants being
appointed under the State Act which received assent of the President of India
G on 19th August, 1966 it will prevail over the Central Act. The functions of
market committee are for the regulation of trade in notified agricultural produces
in order to safeguard the interest of the agriculturist and public at large. This
was to ensure legitimate price of the agricultural produce to be sold in the
market area. This committee is not constituted for making any profit but only
to serve the cause of the agriculturist so that they may receive fair price of
H their produce. The submission is, persons appointed to work under this
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE 1•. ASHOKHARIKUNI [MISRA,J.] 389

market committee are government s~rvants, and they are appointed in A
accordance with the cadre and their wages are paid out of the consolidated
fund. The temporary employees appointed by the market committee are paid
salaries out of the fund known as rriarket fund. Hence there is no relationship
of employer and employee of those serving under it. It may be stated here,
in the present case the subject matter relates only of those employees who B
were temporarily appointed and have yet not become government servant.
Another submission is that the High Court erred in not bringing the market
committee within the exception clause referred in the decision of Bangalore
Water-Supply case (supra).

On the other hand, learned counsel Shri Ravindra Bhat appearing on C
behalf of the respondents, submits that in view of the decisions of this Court,
especially with reference to Bangalore Water-Supply case (supra), the market
committee is an "industry" within the meaning of the Central Act. The
submission is, only strictly "sovereign functions" as held in Bangalore Water-
Supply case (supra) which is explained in f:hief Conservator of Forests &
Anr. v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare & Ors., [1996] 2 SCC 293, could be D
exempted from the provisions of the Central Act. Hence, neither all
governmental functions could be construed to be sovereign nor all statutory
services could either be termed as sovereign or to exclude it from the purview
of the Central Act.
E
The main thrust of submission for either side is, one trying to bring the
functions of the appellant-committee within sovereign functions and the other
stretching it out of it. The submission for the appellant is the power of the
government and functions of the committee, namely, notifying the intention
of the government to regulate the marketing of specified agricultural produce
within specified area under Section 3, declaration of market area under Section F
4, establishment of market under Section 7, payment of Secretary and technical
staff under Section 58, absorption of staff of market committee in government
services under Section 59, appointment of other staff under Section 61, levy
of market fees under Section 65, grant of license under Section 72, de-
notification of market area under Section 143, and amalgamation of market G
committees under Section 144 are all sovereign in nature and hence it could
not be construed to be an industry. On the other hand, learned counsel for
the respondent submits sovereign functions are restricted to legislative,
maintenance of law and order, administration of law and legal system. Hence,
other functions, to which the appellant case falls, cannot be construed to be
a sovereign function. H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A We now proceed to consider as to what would be the test to find an
enterprise to be an "industry". As we have said, the matter has been under
consideration by various courts in various parts of this country, including
this Court. Some of which we are proceeding to refer hereunder. In The
Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Its Employees, [1960] 2 SCR 942, the
B question raised was, whether and to what extent the municipal activities of
the Corporation of Nagpur City fell within the term "industry" as defined by
Section 2 (14) of the C.P. & Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947.
Applying the decision of this Court in D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee & Ors.,
[ 1953] SCR 302, this Court held:

c "It is not necessary that an activity of the Corporation must share the
common characteristics of an industry before it can come within the
section. The words of s. 2(14) of the Act are clear and unambiguous
and the maxim noscitur a sociis can have no application. The history
of industrial disputes and the legislation, however, recognises the

D
basic concept that the activity must be an organised one and not one
that pertains to private or personal employment."
...•
With reference to State of Bombay & Ors. v. The Hospital Mazdoor
Sabha & Ors., [1960] 2 SCR 866, this Court held:

"But the definition, however, wide, cannot include the regal primary
E and inalienable functions of the State, though statutory delegated to
a Corporation and the ambit of such functions cannot be extended so
as to include the activities of a modem State and must be confined
to legislative power, administration of law and judicial power."

This case further records:
F
"Before considering the positive aspects of the definition, what is not
an industry may be considered. However, wide the definition of
"industry" may be, it cannot include the regal or sovereign functions
of State. This is the agreed basis of the arguments at the Bar, though
the learned counsel differed on the ambit of such functions. While the
G
learned counsel for the Corporation would like to enlarge the scope
of these functions so as to comprehend all the welfare. activities of a .
modem State, the learned counsel for the respondents would seek to
confine them to what are aptly termed "the primary and inalienable
functions of a constitutional government .... Lord Watson, in Coomber
H v. Justices of Berks, describes the functions Sl!Ch as administration of
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE 1•. ASHOK HARIKUNI [MISRA,J.) 391
justice, maintenance of order and repression of crime, as among the A
primary and inalienable functions of a constitutional Government.
Isaacs, J. in his dissenting judgment in The Federated State School
Teachers' Association ofAustralia v. The State of Victoria, concisely
states thus at p. 585:

"Regal functions are inescapable and inalienable. Such are the B
legislative power, the administration of laws, the exercise of the judicial
power. Non-regal functions may be assumed by means of the legislative
power. But when they are assumed the State acts simply as a huge
corporation, with its legislation as the charter. Its action under the
legislation, so far as it is not regal execution of the law is merely C
analogous to what of a private company similarly authorised.
Supreme Court of America in Verisimo Vasquez Vilas v. City of
Manila expounded the dual character of a municipal corporation thus:
"They exercise powers which are governmental and powers which
are of a private or business character. In the one character a municipal D
corporation is a governmental sub-division, and for that purpose
exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the State. In the
other character it is a mere legal entity or juristic person. In the latter
character it stands for the community in the administration of local
affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purpose:> for which its
governmental powers are conferred. E·
Isaacs and Rich, JJ., in The Federated Municipal and Shire
Council Employees' Union ofAustralia v. Melbourne Corporation in
the context of the dual functions of State say much to the same effect
at p. 530:
F
"Here we have the discrimen of Crown exemption. If a municipality
either (I) is legally empowered to perform and does perform any
function whatever for the Crown, or (2) is lawfully empowered to
perform and does perform any function which constitutionally is
inalienable a Crown function - as, for instance, the administration of
justice - the municipality is in law presumed to represent the Crown, G
and the exemption applies. Otherwise, it is outside that exemption,
and, if impliedly exempted at all, some other principle must be resorted
to. The making and maintenance of streets in the municipality is not
within either proposition."

A corporation may, therefore, discharge a dual function: it may be H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A statutorily entrusted with regal functions strictly so-called, such as
making of laws, disposal of certain cases judicially etc., and also with
other welfare activities. The former, being delegated regal functions,
must be excluded from the ambit of the definition of "industry".

Finally the definition of "industry" is summarised:
B
"The result of the discussion may be summarised thus : (1) The
definition of "industry" in the Act is very comprehensive. It is in two
parts: one part defines it from the standpoint of the employer and the
other from the standpoint of the employee. If an activity falls under
either part of the definition, it will be an industry within the meaning
c of the Act. (2) The history of industrial dispµtes and the legislation
recognizes the basic concept that the activity shall be an organized
one and not that which pertains to private or personal employment .
.(3) The regal functions described as primary and inalienable functions
of State though statutorily delegated to a corporation are necessarily
D excluded from the purview of the definition. Such regal functions shall
be confined to legislative power, administration of law and judicial
power. (4) If a service rendered by an individual or a private person
would be an industry, it would equally be an industry in the hands
of a corporation. (5) If a service rendered by a corporation is an
industry, the employees in the departments connected with that service,
E whether financial, administrative or executive, would be entitled to the
benefits of th.e Act. (6) If a department of a municipality discharges
many functions, some pertaining to industry as defined in the Act and
other non-industrial activities, the predominant functions of the
department shall be the criterion for the purposes of the Act."
F Within this premises this Court considered various departments of the
corporation as to whether employees of such department would be covered
by the Central .Act. This Court holds various departments of the corporation
including tax department, assessment department, marketing department to be
an "industry".
G
This Court in Bangalore Water-Supply & Sewerage Board etc. v. R.
Rajappa & Ors., [1978) 3 SCR 207 (Constitution Bench), considered the
definition of "industry" as defined under Section .20) of the Central Act. This
Court held:

H "Although we are not concerned in this case with those categories
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE 1•. ASHOKHARIKUNI [MISRA,J.) 393
of employees who particularly come under departments charged with A
the responsibility for essential constitutional functions of government,
it is appropriate to state that if there are industrial units severable from
the essential functions and possess an entity of their own it may be
plausible to hold that the employees of those units are workmen and
those undertakings are industries. A blanket exclusion of every one B
of the host of employees engaged by government in departments
falling under general rubrics like, justice, defence, taxation, legislature,
may not necessarily be thrown out of the umbrella of the Act. We say
no more except to observe that closer exploration, not summary rejection,
is necessary."

This decision also records Corporation of Nagpur City case (supra) as
c
to how in that case various departments of the corporation were held to be
an "industry". This Court considered the submission, as in the present case
that functions of the various departments are only out of statutory sanction
and no private individual can discharge those statutory functions. Corporation
of Nagpur City case (supra) considered this aspect and records to the D
following effect:

"It is said that the functions of this department are statutory and
no private individual can discharge those statutory functions. The
question is not whether the discharge of certain functions by
Corporation have statutory backing, but whether those functions can E
equally be performed by private individuals."

Strong reliance is placed by learned counsel for the appellant to the
following observations of this Court in Bangalore Water-Supply case (supra)
which is an exception which excludes it from the operation of the Central Act: F
"In any case, it is open to Parliament to make law which governs
the State's relations with its employees. Articles 309 to 311 of the
Constitution oflndia, the enactments dealing with the Defence Forces
and other legislation dealing with the employment under statutory
bodies may, expressly or by necessary implication, exclude the operation G
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947."

The submission is, this observation excludes implicitly services under
the statutory bodies from the operation of the Industrial Disputes Act. This ,·
submission is misconceived. This observation merely records what Parliament
can make law in relation to the employees of statutory bodies etc. In other H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A words, if it so desires may exclude the employees of any statutory bodies
expressly or by necessary implication from the purview of Industrial Disputes
Act. This decision does not carve out any exception to exclude employees
of all the statutory bodies. It merely indicates power of the Parliament, to
place any class of employees outside the purview of the Central Act. The
B question is, whether there is any such provision under the State Act or the
Central Act, which excludes these employees from the operation of the Central
Act. In fact, Section 2(a) of the Central Act itself reveals large number of
statutory corporations falling within the rubric of "industry".

In relation to what are "sovereign" and what are "non-sovereign"
C functions, this Court in Chief Conservator of Forests and Anr. v. Jagannath
Maruti Kondhare and Ors., [1996] 2 SCC 293, holds:

"We may not go by the lebels. Let us reach the hub. And the
same is that the dichotomy of sovereign and non-sovereign functions
does not really exist - it would all depend on the nature of the power
and manner of its exercise, as observed in para 23 of Nagendra Rao
D
case. As per the decision in this case, one of the tests to determine
whether the executive function .is sovereign in nature is to find out
whether the State is answerable for such action in courts of !aw. It was
stated by Sahai, J. that acts like defence of the country, raising armed
forces and maintaining it, making peace or war, foreign affairs, power
E to acquire and retain territory, are functions which are indicative of
external sovereignty and are political in nature. They are, therefore,
not amenable to the jurisdiction of ordinary civil court inasmuch as
the State is immune from being sued in such matters. But then,
according to this decision the immunity .ends there. It was then
observed that in a welfare State, functions of the State are not only
F the defence of the country or administration of justice or maintaining
law and order but extends to regulating and controlling the activities
of people in almost every sphere, educational, commercial, social,
economic, political and even martial. Because of this the demarcating
line between sovereign and non-sovereign powers has largely
G disappeared.

The aforesaid shows that if we were to extend the concept of
sovereign function to include all welfare activities as contended on
behalf of the appellants, the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply case
would get eroded, and substantially. We would demur to do so on the
H face of what was stated in the aforesaid case according to which
.
'
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE 1•. ASHOK HARIKUNI [MISRA, J.] 395
except the strictly understood sovereign function, welfare activities of A
the State would come within the purview of the definition of industry;
and, not only this, even within the wider circle of sovereign function,
there may be an inner circle encompassing some units which could be
considered as industry if substantially severable."

In other words, it all depends on the nature of power and the manner B
of its exercise. What is approved to be "Sovereign" is defence of the country,
raising armed forces, making peace or war, foreign affairs, power to acquire
and retain territory. These are not amenable to the jurisdiction of ordinary civil
courts. The other functions of the State including welfare activity of State
could not be construed as "sovereign" exercise of power. Hence, every C
governmental function need not be "sovereign". State activities are multifarious.
From the primal sovereign power, which exclusively inalienably could be
exercised by the Sovereign alone, which is not subject to challenge in any
civil court to all the welfare activities, which would be undertaken by any
private person. So merely one is employee of statutory bodies would not take
it outside the Central Act. If that be then Section 2 (a) of the Central Act read D
with Schedule I gives large number of statutory bodies should have been
excluded, which is not. Even if a statute confers on any statutory body, any
function which could be construed to be "sovereign" in nature would not ,
mean every other functions under the same statute to be also sovereign. The
court should examine the statute to severe one from the other by E
comprehensively examining various provisions of that statute. In interpreting
any statute to find it is "industry' or not we have to find its pith and
substance. The Central Act is enacted to maintain harmony between employer
and employee which brings peace and amity in its functioning. This peace
and amity should be the objective in the functioning of all enterprises. This
is to the benefit of both, employer and employee. Misuse of rights and F
obligations by either or stretching it beyond permissible limits have to be
dealt with within the frame work of the law but endeavour should not be in
all circumstances to exclude any enterprise from its ambit. That is why courts
have been defining "industry" in the widest permissible limits and "sovereign"
functioning within its limited orbit.
G
In N. Nagendra Rao & Co. v. State of A.P., [1994] 6 SCC 205, the
question raised was about the liability of the State to pay compensation for
the negligence or misfeasance on the part of its officers in discharge of their
. public duties under a statute, which are incidental or ancillary and not primary
H
• or inalienable function of the State. This decision holds that the State is
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A immuned only in cases where its officers perform primary or inalienable
functions such as defence of the country, administration of justice, maintenance
of law and order. This Court held:

"A search or seizure effected under such law could be taken to
be an exercise of power which may be in domain of inalienable function.
B Whether the authority to whom this power is delegated is liable for
negligence in discharge of duties while performing such functions is
a different matter. But when similar powers are conferred under other
statute as incidental or ancillary power to carry out the purpose and
objective of the Act, then it being an exercise of such State function
c which is not primary or inalienable, an officer acting negligently is
.liable personally and the State vicariously.

In the modem sense the distinction between sovereign or non-
sovereign power .thus does not exist. It all depends on the nature of
power and manner of its exercise ..... One of the tests to determine ifthe
D legislative or executive function is sovereign in nature is whether the
State is answerable for such actions in courts of law. For instance,
acts such as defence of the country, raising armed forces and
maintaining it, making peace or war, foreign affairs, power to acquire
and retain territory, are functions which are indicative of external
sovereignty and are political in nature. Therefore, they are not amenable
E to jurisdiction of ordinary civil court."

With reference to irrigation department of the State of Punjab this Court
considered the question whether it is an "industry" within the meaning of
Section 20) of the Central Act. The function of this department is for the
development of agriculture. It undertakes harness of the surface and ground
F water resources of the State, the equitable distribution. It involves construction
of major, medium and minor irrigation projects, maintenance of network of
channels, regulation of canal supplies, enforcement of water laws etc. It is
also responsible to provide protection to the valuable irrigated lands and
public property from flooding, river action and waterlogging. This requires
G construction of flood protection, river training, drainage and anti- waterlogging
works and their maintenance. Its functions includes plan for irrigation
development in the State. Each of these functions overall are inherently of the
State. With reference to this irrigation department in Des Raj and Ors. v. State
of Punjab & Ors., [ 1988] 2 SCC 53 7 this Court held:

H "With regard to the activities of the irrigation department and as
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE"· ASHOKHARIKUNI [MISRA, J.] 397

also the tests laid down in various decisions of this Court particularly A
applying the Dominant Nature test in Bangalore Water Supply and
Sewerage Board case (Supra), it was held to be an "industry"."

In this background we may proceed to examine the present State Act.
The preamble of this Act records:
B
"An Act to provide for the better regulation of marketing and
agricultural produce and the establishment and administration of
markets for agricultural produce in the State of Kamataka".

We may also usefully produce the Statement of Objects and Reasons
- of the State Act :
·C
"STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS:

Among other things, provision is made in this Bill for -
(i) defining 'agricultural produce' to include all produce of
agriculture, animal husbandry, apiculture, horticulture, forest D
produce and any other produce, live-stock and poultry;
(ii) notifying the intention of Government to regu!ate the purchase

.. and sale of agricultural produce in specified area and declaration
of market area and of market yard;
(fu) Establishment of market committees for trading in specified kinds E
of agricultural produce and also separate market committees
within the same market area for trading in any particular kind of
' agricultural produce;

(iv) representation on the market committee to purchasers of
agricultural produce, representatives of the purchasers' co- F
operative societies, representatives of co-operative marketing
and processing societies, municipalities, taluk boards and the
Central Warehousing Corporation or State Warehousing
Corporation;
(v) levy and collection of marke.t fees by the market committee; G
(vi) constitution of market committee funds and Central Market Fund;
r (vii) conferring borrowing powers on market committee;
(viii) appointment of Government servants as Secretaries, Assistant
Secretaries, Technical Accounts and Audit Staff of market H
0

398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A committees to ensure efficient administration and control of
markets; ·--
(ix) inquiry or inspection by the Chief Marketing Officer;

(x) supersession of market committee for failure to perform duties."

The aforesaid preamble and Statement of Objects and Reasons clearly
disclose the sphere of this Act to be for the regulation of marketing of
agricultural produce, establishment of market committee for controlling, trading
in specified kind of agricultural produce. It provides for levying of market fees
by the market committee. It confers power on the market committee to borrow
C money. The appointment of Government servants as Secretaries, Assistant
Secretaries, Technical Accounts and Audit Staff is to ensure efficient
administration and control of markets. In order to strengthen the said objectives
Chapter II deals with the establishment of markets, Chapter III with constitution
of market committees including provisions for election of its members. The
constitution of the committee under Section 11 consists of 11 membeis out
D of which one has to be a woman, two persons belonging to Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes elected by the agriculturists in the market area, one
qiember to be person other than retail traders, one member to be a representative
of co-operative marketing society carrying on business in notified agricultural
produce, one member to be representative of agricultural cooperative
E processing society, one to be an officer not below the rank of Secretary of -
the concerned market committee nominated by the Director of Agricultural
Marketing who has no right to vote and three members to be nominated by
the State Government who have right to vote. Chapter IV deals with conduct
of business of the market committee, Chapter V refers to staff of the market
committee, Chapter VI deals with the powers and duties of market committee.
F It indicates it is for regulating the trading of agriculture produce within the
market area, Chapter VII directly deals with regulation of trading which includes
grant of licences, power to cancel and suspend it, Chapter VIII pertains to
market fund, Chapter IX refers to special commodities market, Chapter X deals
with Mandal Panchayats as agents of market committee, Chapter XI deals
G with establishment of independent markets and market committees for special
commodities. Chapter XII is about penalties, Chapter XIII controls the
functioning of the various officers and members including that of market
committee and Chapter XIV is miscellaneous which includes provisions for
recovering of sums due to the market committee or board etc. After scanning
the whole Act and perusing the preamble and Statement of Objects and
H Reasons of the Act, it reveals that this Act deals with various facets of
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE 1•. ASHOK HARIKUNI [MISRA, J.] 399

regulating activities within the market area with respect to the trading in A
agricultural produce. It includes establishment of various committees including
charging of fees for service rendered to the traders of agricultural producers.
Any enactment, scheme or project which sponsors helps in the trading activity
is one of the State's essential functions towards welfare activities for the
benefit of its subject. Such activities can be undertaken even by any non-
governmental organisation or a private person, corporate or company. In fact, B
prior to the abolition of Zamindari, the Hats and Bazars (Markets) held on
Zamindar's (Landowner) land, the Zamindar used to charge fees for rendering
service for holding such market, by providing land and facilities to the
participants of such market. By this it helped producers, sellers and public at
large through such trading. This is similar, in a nature and form to what is C
being done now under the State Act through statutory functionaries. Thus
none of these functions could be construed to be sovereign in nature or
inalienable in character.

It is true various functionaries under this Act are creature of statute.
But creation as such, by itself, cannot confer it the status of performing D
inalienable functions of the State. The main controlling functions and power
is conferred on the market committee whose constitution itself reveals, except
one or two rests are all elected members representing some on other class
from the public. In fact, all governmental functions cannot be construed either
primary or inalienable sovereign function. Hence even if some of the E
functionaries under the State Act could be said to be performing sovereign
functions of the State Government that by itself would not make the dominant
object to be sovereign in nature or take the aforesaid Act out of the purview
of the Central Act.

Thus merely an enterprise being statutory corporation, creature under F
a statute, would not take it outside the ambit of "industry" as defined under
the Central Act. We do not find the present case falling under any exception
laid down in the Bangalore Sewerage Board case (Supra). The mere fact that
some employees of the appellant are government servants would make no
difference as the true test to find -has to be gathered from the dominant object G
for which functionaries are working. It cannot be doubted that the appellant
is an undertaking performing its duties in a systematic and organised manner,
regulating the marketing and trading of agricultural produce, rendering services
to the community. In the present case, as we have recorded earlier, we are
concerned only with those employees who are not government servants.
Testing the dominant object as laid down in Bangalore Sewerage Board case · H
400 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A (Supra), we reach to inescapable conclusion that none of the activities of the
Agriculture Produce Market Committee could be construed to be sovereign
in nature. Hence we have no hesitation to hold that this corporation falls
within the definition of "industry" under Section 20) of the Central Act.

Section 2(a) of the Central Act defines 'Appropriate Government' in
B relation to any industrial disputes concerning any industry carried on by or
under the authority of Central Government, or railway company etc. and refers
to large number of corporations and corporate bodies which falls in the
category of "industry". This indicates even Legislature intends a very large
arms of "industry'', to include large number of enterprises to be industry to
C confer benefit to the employees working under it. In fact, several corporations
conferred with statutory powers also curtails individual rights like, through
levy of demurrages, detention charges in the warehousing corporation under
the Warehouse Corporation Act; Regulation of entry into airport, ATC, levy
and regulation of taxes and fees by the international airport authority.
Assessment and levy of damages as well as penalties by authorities under
D the Employees State Insurance Act and Employees Provident Fund Act.·
Though each of the aforesaid corporations and statutory bodies are "industry".
So one of the feeble submission that curtailment of right of an individu~l
could only be by the exercise of sovereign power has also no merit.

From the aforesaid catena of authorities, inalienability is one of the
E basic character of sovereignty. The Encyclopaedia of the American
Constitution with reference to "sovereignty" attempts to define sovereignty.
It records:

"Within the American regime the ultimate power and authority to
alter or a abolish the constitutions of government of state and Union
F resides only and inalienably with the people. If it be necessary or
useful to use the term "sovereignty" in the sense of ultimate political
power, then there is no sovereign in America but the people.
DENNIS J. MAHONEY"

G Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 39A with1eference to
"sovereign power" records:

"The "sovereign powers" of a government include all the powers
necessary to accomplish its legitimate ends and purposes. Such powers
must exist in all practical governments. They are the incidents of
H sovereignty, of which a state cannot devest itself. Boggs v. Meree
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE v. ASHOK HARIKUNI [MiSRA, J.) 40}

Min. Co., 14 Cal. 279, 309 .... .ln all governments of constitutional A
limitations "sovereign power" manifests itself in but three ways. By
exercising the right of taxation; by the right of eminent domain; and
through its police power. United States v. Douglas-Wil/an Sartoris
Co., 22 p. 92, 96, 3 Wyo. 287."

So, sovereign function in the new sense may have very wide ramification B
but essentially sovereign functions are primary inalienable functions which
only State could exercise. Thus, various functions of the State, may be
ramifications of 'sovereignty' but they all cannot be construed as primary
inalienable functions. Broadly it is taxation, eminent domain and police power
which covers its field. It may cover its legislative functions, administration of C
law, eminent domain, maintenance of law and order, internal and external
security, grant of pardon. So, the dichotomy between sovereign and non-
sovereign function could be found by finding which of the functions of the
State could be undertaken by any private person or body. The one which
could be undertaken canno~ be sovereign function. In a given case even in
subject on which the State has the monopoly may also be non-sovereign in D

..
nature. Mere dealing in subject of monopoly of the State would not make any
such enterprise sovereign in nature. Absence of profit naking or mere quid
pro would also not make such enterprise to be outside the ambit of"industry"
as also in State of Bombay & Ors. case (Supra).

The last submission for the appellant is with reference to sub-section E
(3) of Section 59 of the said Act. The submission is, this excludes the
application of the Central Act to the employees under the State Act. The
reliance is plac.ed on the following opening words of this sub-section (3)
namely:

"Notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, F
1947."

On the contrary this indicates that exclusion of the Central Act is limited
to the sphere as specified under this sub-section, namely, payment of
compensation to the officers or servants of the transferred employees. Thus G
by necessary implication, other field under the Central Act is made applicable.
Hence this submission has no merit.

In view of the aforesaid settled legal principle the width of "industry"
being of widest amplitude and testing it in the present case, in view of the
preamble, Objects and Reasons and the scheme of the Act, the pre-dominant H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A object clearly being regulation and control of trading of agricultural produce,
thus appellant-committee including its functionaries cannot be said to be
performing functions which are sovereign in character. Most of its functions
could be undertaken even by private persons. Thus the appellant would fall
within the definition of "industry" under Section 2G) of the Central Act. Jn
B view of this, we uphold that respondent employees are 'workmen' under the
Central Act as held by the Labour Court and confirmed by _t~e High Court.
The Labour Court has dealt with each individual cases and came to the
conclusion in favour ofrespondent-employees which has also been confirmed
by learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court, which does
not call for any interference. Accordingly, the present appeals have no merit
C and are dismissed. Costs on the parties.

S.VK Appeals dismissed.

,-