AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING COMMITIEEversusBANNAMA (D) BY LRS.

                     [2014] 8 S.C.R. 965


 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING COMMITIEE                           A
                               v.
                   BANNAMA (D) BY LRS.
               (Civil Appeal No.3198 of 2007)
                        JULY 25, 2014
                                                                    8
         [RANJAN GOGOi AND M.Y. EQBAL, JJ.]

     Suit - For declaration of title and possession - The suit
property claimed to be 'Stridhan' of the plaintiff - It was sold
by her son without her knowledge and consent, after getting C
the property mutated in his name - Suit decreed by trial court
- First appellate court held that her son (vendor) had title in
the property - High Court, in second appeal, decreed the suit
- Held: Trial court as well as High Court have decreed the suit .
by elaborately discussing the evidence while the first appellate D
court failed to consider most relevant documents - Decree
confirmed.

     Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - s. 43 - Doctrine of feeding
the grant by estoppel - Applicability of - Held: As per the         E
doctrine, where the vendor selfs without title and subsequently
acquires title, right accrues to the purchaser to claim interest
in the property - In the present case the doctrine is not
applicable because the vendor did not acquire title in the
property during his life-time, and consequently his children
also did not acquire title through him.                             F

    Estoppel - Doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel -
Applicability of.

    Respondent-Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title      G
and possession of land and declaration regarding sale-
deed. The case of the plaintiff was that the suit property
was her 'Stridhan Property' standing in her name. She
being in ·old age allowed her son (defendant No.2) who
                              965                                   H
    966       SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A was also Vice President of the appellant-Society
  (defendant No.1) to take care of the property. Without the
  knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, respondent No.2
  got the suit land mutated in his name and further sold the
  same to defendant No.1- Society. Trial court decreed the
B suit directing delivery of possession to her. The court
  also directed defendant No.2 to refund the purchase
  amount to defendant No.1. First appellate court held that
  defendant No.2 was the owner and thus had title to sell
  the property. In second appeal, High Court reversed the
c finding of first appellate court and decreed the suit.
       In appeal to this court, the appellant-defendant inter
  alia contended that the plaintiff was not able to establish
  her title on the suit property and that after death of
  defendant No.2 at first appellate stage his children were
D substituted as legal representatives and on death of the
  plaintiff during pendency of the present appeal, children
  of defendant No.2 have been substituted as legal heirs
  of plaintiff being her grand-children; and in view of this
  fact, by applying the principle of feeding the grant by
E estoppel, the sale executed by defendant No.2 would
  become validated by virtue of death of. plaintiff.
          Dismissing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1. The first appellate court, while reversing the
F finding of the trial court, has not considered most
  relevant documents which were relied upon by the trial
  court in coming to the conclusion that the suit property
  was owned by the plaintiff. The High Court elabol'ately
  discussed the evidence adduced by the parties, both oral
G and documentary, and affirmed the finding of facts
  recorded by the trial cburt. From perusal of the facts and
  evidence available on record, there is·no perversity in the
  judgment passed by the High Court. [Para 9] [972-B-C]
          2.1. The doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel as
H
 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MKTG. COMMITTEE. v.              967
           BANNAMA (D) BY LRS.

contemplated under Section 43 of the Transfer of               A
Property Act is based on the principle of law of estoppal.
It simply provides that when a person by fraudulent or
erroneous representation transfers certain immovable
property, claiming himself to be the owner of such
property, then such transfer will subsequently operate on      8
any interest which the transferor may acquire in such
property during which the contract of transfer subsists.
This doctrine knoY{n in English law has formed part of
Roman Dutch law, according to which where a granter
has purported to grant an interest iri the land which he       C
did not at the time possess, but subsequently acquires,
the benefit of his subsequent acquisition goes
automatically to the earlier grantee. In other words, where
a vendor sells without title in the property, but
subsequently acquires title then a right accrues to the
purchaser to claim interest in the said property and it        D
C!Utomatically goes in favour of the transferor. [Paras 13
and 14] [973-C, F-H; 974-A]
    2.2. In the peculiar facts of the present case, the
appellant would not be entitled to take the benefit of the     E
doctrine of feeding th~ estoppel. The finding of facts
recorded by the two courts based on the records is that
the original plaintiff was the owner and title holder of the
said property but by making false and fraudulent
representation by her son that the property belonged to        F
him, transferred the same in favour of the appellant.
During the pendency of the first appeal before the district
court, the vendor (son of the original plaintiff) died.
Although on the death, his children did not inherit or
succeeded any interest in the property,,through their          G
deceased father, but they were impleaded as legal
representatives in the appeal. However, during the
pendency of this appeal, the original plaintiff, died. After
her death, the respondents being the grand children
Inherited and acquired interest in the suit property.
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    968       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A Admittedly, the deceased son of the original plaintiff,
  never acquired any interest in the suit property owned by
  his mother during his life time. In the aforesaid premises,
  the doctrine of feeding the estoppel would not come into
  operation as against the grand children of the original
8 plaintiff. [Para 15) [974-B-E]
      2.3. Section 43 applies when the transferor having no
  interest in the property transfers the same but
  subsequently acquires interest in the said property, the
  purchaser may claim the benefit of such subsequent
C acquisition of the property by the transferor. Had it been
  a case where the son during his life time succeeded or
  inherited the property but- died subsequently, then to
  some extent it could have been argued that the heirs of
  defendant No. 2-vendor who inherited the property on the
D death of their father would be bound by the principle of
  estoppel. In a case where a transferor never acquired by
  succession, inheritance or otherwise any interest in the
  property during his life time then the provision of Section
  43 will not come into operation as against the heirs who
E succeeded the stridhan property of their grandmother.
  [Para 15] [974-E-H; 975-A]
         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.3198
    of 2007.

F       From the Judgment and Order dated 17.10.2003 in R.S.A.
    No. 556 of 1.997 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore.

          Anjana Chandrashekar for the Appellant.

      Basava Prabhu S. Patil, B. Subrahmanya Prasad for the
G Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      M.Y. EQBAL, J. 1. This appeal by special leave is directed
H against the judgment and order dated 17.10.2003 passed by
  AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MKTG. COMMITTEE. v. 969
      BANNAMA (0) BY LRS. [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
the Htgh Court of Karnataka in R.S.A.No.556of1997, whereby             A
the appeal preferred by plaintiff-respondent no.1 was allowed
setting aside the judgment and decree of the appellate court
in RA No.12 of 1994 and confirming the judgment and decree
of the trial court.
                                                                       B
     2. The brief facts of the case of the plaintiff-respondent
no.1, as set out in the trial court judgment, are that the plaintiff
was an agriculturist and old lady residing at Saidapur village.
Whereas, respondent no.2 (defendant no.2) was none other
than the son of the plaintiff and was vice president of the
appellant-first defendant society, which is a statutory body           C
constituted and functioning under the Karnataka Agricultural
Produce Marketing Committee (Regulation) Act. The suit land
bearing Sy.No.58/1 measuring 7 acres 19 guntas situated at
Saidapur village of Yadgir Taluk, for which Smt. Bannamma -
plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title claiming that the      D
property was inherited by her from her father and it was her
stridhan property, which is alleged to be standing in the name
of the plaintiff since 1954-55. The land Sy.No.58-B has got two
hissas as Hissa Nos.1 and 2, each measuring 7 acres 18
guntas and its khasra pahani numbers are 131 and 132                   E
respectively. The property claimed by the plaintiff is Sy.No.58/
A bearing Khasra No.131.

       3. The plaintiff being an old lady, allowed her son second
  defendant to look after and manage the suit property on her          F
  behalf. It is pleaded that taking advantage of the same, second
  defendant, without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff,
  got mutated the suit land in his name on the basis of the release
  deed. It is contended that second defendant sold the entire suit
  land to the appellant-first defendant, who purchased the same        G
, without verifying the title of second defendant and got a
  registered sale deed on 28.12.1978(Ex.P.24). The suit land has
  also been converted into non-agriculture land. The first
  defendant, thereafter, notified the plots in the property for sale
  by public auction on 22.12.1989 and 23.1.1990, which came            H
    970       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014) 8 S.C.R.


A   to the information of the plaintiff and consequently she moved
    the court by filing suit for declaration of title· and possession of
    land and declaration regarding the sale deed.

         4. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff-
s   Bannamma was the owner and directed delivery of possession
    of the suit land.

       The trial court also directed second defendant to refund
  the purchase price to the appellant-first defendant, who, by
  preferring an appeal, challenged the decree granted in favour
C of plaintiff. The second defendant flied a separate appeal
  challenging the direction to refund the sale price. The appeals
  of the defendants were allowed and the judgment and decree
  passed by the trial court was set aside, holding that Nagi Reddy-
  second defendant was the owner of the suit property with title
D to sell the property. It is evident from the record that Nagi
  Reddy-second defendant died during the pendency of the
  appeal and his children, who are grandchildren of Bannamma-
  plaintiff were brought on record as Lrs. of Nagi Reddy.

          5. Aggrieved by the decision of the Appellate Court,
E   Bannamm·a-plaintiff preferred regular second appeal being RSA.
    No.556of1997. The High Court reversed the finding recorded
    by the Appellate Court and allowed the regular second appeal
    decreeing the suit of plaintiff-Bannamma holding that plaintiff
F   has title to the suit property and her son-defendant no.2 could
    not have sold the property. The second defendant remained
    absent before the High Court. The first defendant contended
    that second defendant in collusion with plaintiff brought the suit.
    The plea of limitation was also raised. In the impugned
    judgment, the High Court found that the sale deed was obtained
G   by the ffrst defendant in December, 1978 and the suit is filed
    during April, 1990 before the expiry of 12 years. Learned Single
    Judge of the High Court further observed that merely by the fact
    that the plaintiff came to know about the execution of sale deed
    cannot be inferred as an effective threat to the title. Even
H   otherwise, in case of relief of possession based on title, a
 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MKTG. COMMITTEE. v. 971
     BANNAMA (D) BY LRS. [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
person can always maintain an action within 12 years from the       A
date of the dispossession. In the present case, within 12 years
from the date of Ex.P.24, the suit was filed. It is not really
necessary for the plaintiff to seek a declaration that the sale
deed is void. On the proof of title, the plaintiff is entitled to
maintain an action for recovery of possession.                      B

     6. Learned Single Judge of the High Court in the impugned
judgment further held that there is no evidence to show that the
plaintiff had expressly or tacitly allowed the second defendant
to execute the sale under Ex.P.24 in favour of first defendant. C
The fact that the first and second defendants were residing
together is not sufficient by itself to infer a collusion or a fraud
when the revenue records indicated that the property was
standing in the name of the plaintiff. In that view of the matter,
regular second appeal preferred by the plaintiff is allowed by
the High Court.                                                      D

     7. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment of the High Court,
defendant no.1 has preferred present appeal by special leave
in which on 20.7.2007, leave was granted and interim order to
maintain status quo with regard to possession was continued. E
During the pendency of the appeal, respondent no.1-plaintiff
also died and her legal heirs namely Shailaja, Prabhavati and
Prakash, who are also legal heirs of respondent no.2-second
defendant Nagi Reddy, were brought on record by this Court
on 17.10.2012.                                                F

     8. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the
appellant. Mrs. Anjana Chandrashekhar, learned advocate
appearing for the appellant, assailed the findings of the High
Court on various grounds which were taken before the first
appellate court including that the plaintiff in her evidence        G
admitted that she along with her son-defendant No.2 were living
in the same house, but nowhere she stated in her evidence as
to in which year she acquired the suit land as stridhan.
Learned counsel put reliance on exhibit P-20, P-21 and P-22
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    972       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014) 8 S.C.R.


A   to establish that defendant No.2 Nagi Reddy, was shown as
    owner of the property.

         9. We do not find much force in the submissions made by
    the counsel. The first appellate court, while reversing the finding
    of the trial court, has not considered most relevant documents
8
    which were relied upon by the trial court in coming to the
    conclusion that the suit property was owned by the plaintiff. The
    High Court elaborately discussed the evidence adduced by the
    parties, both oral and documentary, and affirmed the finding of
    facts recorded by the trial court. From perusal of the facts and
C   evidence available on record, we do not find any perversity in
    the judgment passed by the Hig~ Court.

        10. Mrs. Anjana Chandrashekhar, learned counsel
    appearing for the appellant, however, raised an additional
D   ground which is interesting and needs to be discussed.

          11. As noticed above, during the pendency of the first
    appeal before the District Court the son of the plaintiff
    (defendant No.2), died and his legal representatives were
E   substituted in his place. Thereafter, during the pendency of this
    appeal the original plaintiff-respondent No.1 also died on
    17.5.2010 leaving behind the children of her son Nagi Reddy
    as legal representatives, who have been brought on record in
    different capacity.

F       12. In these backgrounds, Mrs. Anjana Chandrashekhar,
   learned counsel for the appellant submitted that assuming for
   a moment, Nagi Reddy had no title to the property as his
   mother-original plaintiff was the absolute owner, as held by the
   High Court, the grand children being the legal representatives
G of Nagi Reddy would step into the shoes of plaintiff as title
   holders. Since Nagi Reddy having no title to sell the property,
   his children got the title on account of death of grandmother
  ·through her son Nagi Reddy. In this regard, learned counsel
   referred Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act and submitted
H that on the death of the original plaintiff the grand children
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MKTG. COMMITIEE. v. 973
    BANNAMA (D) BY LRS. [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]

having been claimed through their father Nagi Reddy, the            A
principle of feeding the grant by estoppal would come into
operation and the sale executed by Nagi Reddy in favour of the
appellant would become validated by virtue of the death of the
plaintiff's mother. Learned counsel in this regard referred
Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act.                         B

     13. We do not find any substance in the contention made
by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. The
doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppal as contemplated under
Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under:-
                                                                    c
    "43. Transfer by unauthorised person who subsequently
    acquires interest in property transferred.-Where a person
    fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised
    to transfer certain immoveable property and professes to
    transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, D
    at the option of the transferee, operate on any interest
    which the transferor may acquire in such property at any
    time during which the contract of transfer subsists.

    Nothing in this section shall impair the right of transferees   E
    in good faith for consideration without notice of the
    existence of the said option."

     14. The doctrine is based on the principle of law of
estoppal. It simply provides that when a person by fraudulent
or erroneous representation transfers certain immovable F
property, claiming himself to be the owner of such property, then
such transfer will subsequently operate on any interest which
the transferor may acquire in such property during which the
contract of transfer subsists. This doctrine known in English law
has form part of Roman Dutch law, according to which where G
a granter has purported to grant an interest in the land which
he did not at the time possess, but subsequently acquires, the
benefit of his subsequent acquisition goes automatically to the
earlier grantee. In other words, where a vendor sells without title
in the property, but subsequently acquires title then a right H
    974      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A   accrues to the purchaser to claim interest in the said property
    and it automatically goes in favour of the transferor.

        15. In the peculiar facts of the instant case, in our
  considered opinion, the appellant would.not be entitled to take
  the benefit of the doctrine of feeding the estoppel. The finding
8
  of facts recorded by the, two courts based on the records that
  the original plaintiff was the owner and title holder of the said
  property but by making false and fraudulent representation by
  her son that the property belonged to him, transferred the same
  in favour of the appellant. During the pendency of the first
C appeal before the district court, the vendor (son of the original
  plaintiff) died. Although on the death, his children did not inherit
  or succeeded any interest in the property, through their
  deceased father, but they were impleaded as legal
  representatives in the appeal. However, during the pendency
D of this appeal, the original plaintiff, namely, Bannamma died.
  After her death, the respondents being the grand children
  inherited and acquired interest in the suit property. Admittedly,
  the deceased son of the original plaintiff, namely Nagi Reddy
  never acquired any interest in the suit property owned by his
E mother during his life time. In the aforesaid premises, the
  doctrine of feeding the estoppel would not come into operation
  as against the grand children of the original plaintiff. Section
  43 in our considered opinion applies when the transferor having
  no interest in the property transfers the same but subsequently
F acquires interest in the said property, the purchaser may claim
  the benefit of such subsequent acquisition of the property by
  the transferor. Had it been a case where· the son Nagi Reddy
  during his life time succeeded or inherited the property but- died
  subsequently, then to some extent it could have been argued
G that the heirs of Nagi Reddy who inherited the property on the
  death of their father would be bound by the principle of estoppel.
  We have, therefore, no doubt in our mind that in a case where
  a transferor never acquired by succession, inheritance or
  otherwise any interest in the property during his life time then
H
 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MKTG. COMMITTEE. v.                   975
     BANNAMA (D) BY LRS. [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]

the provision of Section 43 will not come into operation ·as       A
against the heirs who succeeded the stridhan property of their
grandmother.

    16. For all these reasons, we do not find any merit in this
appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.
                                                                   B
Kalpana K. Tripathy                            Appeal dismissed.