Holding

Teachers are not covered by the definition of "employee" under section 2(e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and therefore are not entitled to gratuity under the Act.

Summary

A teacher employed by a municipal school sought gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, but the Gujarat High Court held that teachers are not "employees" within the meaning of section 2(e) and dismissed the claim. The Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers' Association appealed, arguing that the definition of employee should be given a wide construction, especially after a 1997 notification extending the Act to educational institutions. The Supreme Court examined the definition of "employee" in the Gratuity Act and compared it with similar definitions in the Employees' Provident Funds Act, Minimum Wages Act, Payment of Bonus Act and Industrial Disputes Act. Applying the rule of noscitur a sociis, the Court concluded that the terms skilled, semi‑skilled, unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical and clerical refer to industrial work and do not encompass teachers, whose main function is imparting education. Consequently, teachers are excluded from the definition and are not entitled to gratuity under the Act, and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether teachers employed in educational institutions fall within the definition of "employee" under section 2(e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.
Whether the 1997 notification extending the Gratuity Act to educational institutions brings teachers within its ambit.
Whether the definition of "employee" in the Gratuity Act should be interpreted broadly to include teachers.
Whether the rule of noscitur a sociis applies to the terms skilled, semi‑skilled, unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical and clerical in the definition.

Legislation cited

Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952s. 2(f)
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 2(s)
Minimum Wages Act, 1948s. 2(i)
Payment of Bonus Act, 1965s. 2(13)
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972s. 1(3)(c), s. 2(e)

Subjects

gratuitydefinition of employeestatutory interpretationnoscitur a sociiseducational institutionslabour lawPayment of Gratuity Act

Judgment

A AHMEDABAD PVT. PRIMARY TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION
v.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER AND ORS.

JANUARY 13, 2004

B [SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND D.M. DHARMADHIKAR!, JJ.)

Paymenl of Gratuity Act, 1972-Section 2(e)-Benejit of gratuity to
teachers under the Act-Entitlement of-Held, not entitled as they are neither
C skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled nor working in any managerial or
administrative capacity-legislature never intended 10 extend the benefit of
gratuity to teachers under the Act-Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952;
Sectirm 2(/)-Minimum Wages Act, 1948; Section 2(i)-Payment of Bonus
Act, 1965; Section 2(13)-lndustrial Disputes Act, 1947; 2(s).

D R,espondent No. 2, a teacher filed a petition before High Court
claiming the benefit of gratuity under the provisions of the payment of
Gratuity Act, 1972. The Full Bench of the High Court dismissed the
petition holding that the teachers are not covered by the definition of .-'
'\
'employee' under section 2(e) of the Act and hence not eligible to gratuity.
Hence the appeal by the petitioner-association.
E
The appellant-association contended that a Beneficial, purposeful and
wide interpretation should be given to the definition of 'employee' in
section 2(e) of the Act by including teachers under the Act; that, after the
amendment of the definition of 'employee', the benefit of the Act is given
to all employees including those working in managerial or administrative
capacit:y irrespective of the quantum of wages paid to them; that by a
notification in April 1997, the Act was made applicable to educational ~ ,.
institutions.

The respondents contended that on comparative reading of the
various definitions in different enactments in the field of labour legislation
viz. Section 2(i) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, Section 2(13) of the
Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, Section 2(f) of the Employees' Provident
Funds Act, 1952 and Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, a
teacher can neither be said to be employed for skilled, semi-skilled, 1
unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work nor in any
470
~
AHMEDABAD PVT. PRIMARY TEACHERS' ASSN. ••.ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER 471
managerial or administrative capacity; that the teacher is engaged in A
"'· imparting education for intellectual or moral development of students; that
the benefit of the Act by notification of April 1997 was given to only non-
teaching staff employed in educational institutions.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
B
HELD: 1.1. By comparing the various definition clauses of word
'employee' in different enactments, viz. Section 2(i) of the Minimum Wages
Act, 1948, Section 2(13) of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, Section 2(f)
of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 and Section 2(s) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, with due regard to the their respective
different aims and objects, on plain construction of the words and
c
expression used in definition clause 2(e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act,
1972, 'teachers', who are mainly employed for imparting education, are
not intended to be covered for extending gratuity benefits under the Act.
Teachers do not answer the description of being employees who are
'skilled', 'semi-skilled' or 'unskilled'. These three words, used in D
association with each other, intend to convey that a person who is unskilled
is one who is not skilled and a person who is semi-skilled·may be one who
~ falls between two categories meaning he is neither fully skilled nor
unskilled. The word 'unskilled' cannot be understood and dissociated from
the word 'skilled' and 'semi-skilled' to read and construe it to include in
it all categories of employees irrespective of the nature of employment. E
In construing the above mentioned three words, which are used in
association with each other, the rule of construction noscitur a sociis may
be applied. If the legislature intended to cover all categories of employees
for extending benefit of gratuity under the Act, specific mention of
categories of employment in the definition clause was not necessary at all. F
.. "1 Any construction of definition clause which renders it superfluous or otiose
has to be avoided. 1480-A-C; 481-A, Bl

Black's Law Dictionary; Principles of Interpretation by Justice G.P.
Singh, (8th Edition) referred to.
G
A. Sundarambal v. Govt. of Goa, Daman and Diu, 119981 4 SCC 42
and Haryana Unrecognised School's Association v. State of Haryana, 119961
.:.- 4 sec 225, referred to .
'
1.2. Teachers might have been imparted training for teaching or
there may be cases where teachers who are employed in primary schools H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] I S.C.R.

A are untrained. A trained teacher is not described in industrial field or
service jurisprudence as a 'skilled employee'. Such adjective generally is
used for employee doing manual or technical work. Similarly, the words
'semi-skilled' and 'unskilled' are not understood in educational
establishments as describing nature of job of untrained teachers. Even if
B all the words are read disjunctively or in any other manner, trained or
untrained teachers do not plainly answer any of the descriptions of the
nature of various employments given in the definition clause. Trained or
untrained teacher are not 'skilled', 'semi-skilled', 'unskilled', 'manual',
'supervisory', 'technical' or 'clerical' employees. They are also not
employed in 'managerial' or 'administrative' capacity. Occasionally, even
C if they do some administrative work as part of their duty with teaching,
since their main job is imparting education, they cannot be held to be
employed in 'managerial' or 'administrative' capacity. Teachers are
clearly not intended to be covered by the definition of 'employee'.
1481-B, Fl

D 1.3. The legislature was alive to various kinds of definitions of word
'employee' contained in various previous labour enactments when the Act
was passed in 1972. If it intended to cover in the definition of 'employee' ,J
all kinds of employees, it could have as well used such wide language as is ''
contained in section 2(1) of the Employee's Provident Funds Act, 1952.
E Non use of such wide language in the definition of 'employee' in section
2(e) of the Act reinforces that teachers are clearly not covered in the
definition. 1481-F, GI

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6369 of200 l.

From the Judgment and Order dated 4.5.200 I of the Gujarat High
F Court in S.C.A.No. 5272 of 1987.
Dr. Rajeev Dhawan (AC), H.A. Raichura, Mrs. S.H. Raichura and A.K. t •
Mishra for the Appellant.

R.F. Nariman, Devang S. Nanavati, Deepak Shukla, Nakul Diwan, Ms.
G V.D. Khanna and Ms. Nirmala Gupta for Mis. l.M. Nanavati Associates
Huzefa Ahmadi for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
f
DHARMADHIKARI, J. This appeal has been preferred by Ahmedabad
H Private Primary Teacher's Association. The Association complains that in the
AHMEDABAD PVT.'PRIMARY TEACHERS' ASSN. •·.ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER[DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 4 7)

~ -1( petition filed by an individual teacher [respondent no. 2 herein] employed in A
a school run by Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, the Full Bench of the
High Court of Gujarat by impugned judgment dated 04.5.2001 in Special
Civil Application No. 5272of1987 not only rejected the claim of the teacher
· for payment of gratuity under the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act,
1972 [for short 'the Act] but has decided an important question of law against
the teachers as a class that they do not fall within the definition of 'employee' B
as contained in Section 2(e) of the Act and hence can raise no claim to
gratuity under the Act.

The definition of employee contained in section 2( e) of the Act of 1972
reads as under:-
c
'2(e). 'employee' means any person (other than an apprentice)
employed on wages, in any establishment, factory, mine, olifield,
plantation, port, railway company or shop, to do any skilled, semi-
skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work,
whether the terms of such employment are express or implied, [and D
whether or not such person is employed in a managerial or
administrative capacity, but does not include any such person who
.f. holds a post under the Central Government or a State Government
and is governed by any other Act or by any rules providing for
payment of gratuity].
E
[Italics giving emphasis]

One of the learned Judges of the High Court in his separate concurring
opinion held that as gratuity payable to teachers employed in schools of
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation are governed by statutory regulations
known as 'Gratuity Regulations of the Municipal Corporation of the city of F
Alunedabad' framed by the Corporation under Section 465(i)(h) of the Bombay
' " 1 Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, such teachers even if held to be covered
by main part of definition of 'employee' are expressly excluded by the last
exclusionary clause of the definition shown by underlining it as above.

As all the learned judges have unanimously held that teachers are not G
covered by the definition of 'employee' under section 2(e) of the Act, it has
become necessary for this court to consider the correctness of the view with
~
-\ regard to the applicability of the Act to the teachers as a class.

We have heard the learned counsel appearing for all contesting pa11ies.
H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] I S.C.R.

A As the legal question involved is general in nature affecting teachers as a
class, on our request, senior advocate Dr. Rajeev Dhawan appeared as Amicus
Curiae. We are immensely benefited by his able assistance which we thankfully
acknowledge.

The Act is a piece of social welfare legislation and deals with the
B payment of gratuity which is a kind of retiral benefit like pension, provident
fund etc. As has been explained in the concurring opinion of one of the
learned judges of the High Court 'gratuity in its etymological sense is a gift,
especially for services rendered, or return for favours received.' It has now
been universally recognized that all persons in society need protection against
C loss of income due to unemployment arising out of incapacity to work due
to invalidity, old age etc. For the wage earning population, security of income,
when the worker becomes old or infirm, is of consequential importance. The
provisions contained in the Act are in the nature of social security measures
like employment insurance, provident fund and pension. The Act accepts, in
principle, compulsory payment of gratuity as a social security measure to
D wage earning population in industries, factories and establishments.

... '
Thus, the main purpose and concept of gratuity is to help the workman
after retirement, whether, retirement is a result of rules of superannuation, or
physical disablement or impairment of vital part of the body. The expression,
'gratuity' itself suggests that it is a gratuitous payment given to an employee
E on discharge, superannuation or death. Gratuity is an amount paid unconnected
with any consideration and not resting upon it, and has to be considered as
something given freely voluntarily or without recompense. It is sort of financial
assistance to tide over post-retiral hardships and inconveniences.

F The following important words and expressions in the definitions clause
2(e) are before us for consideration and interpretation in the light of the
arguments advanced which project different points of view:-

2(e). '2(e). 'employee' means any person (other than an apprentice)
employed on wages, in any establishment, factory, mine, olifield,
G plantation, port, railway company or shop, to do any skilled. semi-
skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical
ll'ork, ......................... whether or not such person is employed in a
managerial or administrative capacity.
~-
[Italics giving emphasis]
H
AHMEDABAD PVT. PRIMARY TEACHERS' ASSN. «.ADMINISTRATIVEOFFICER[DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 475

The learned counsel appearing for the Te'acher's Association and also A
the learned Amicus Curiae very strenuously urged that a beneficial, purposeful
and wide interpretation shou Id be placed on the definition of employee in
section 2(e) of the Act particularly in the light of the fact that earlier in the
definition clause, there was an income limit of wages being not more than
Rs. 2300 per month, for extending coverage of gratuity benefit to the B
employees. That wages or salary limit has, however, been done away with by
introducing amendment to the definition clause 2( e) of the Act. Now gratuity
is payable to all employees irrespective of the quantum of salary or wages
paid to them. It is, further, pointed out that in the unamended definition
clause, employees working in managerial or administrative capacity were
excluded from the definition of an 'employee' but after the amendment C
introduced with effect from 01.7.1984, even employees in managerial or
administrative capacity and without any bar or limit on their salaries or
wages are brought within the definition of 'employee' to extend the benefit
of gratuity to them. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the
learned Amicus Curiae, therefore, contended that a very wide meaning has to D
be given to the word 'employee' in the definition contained in Section 2(e)
)'
! ' of the Act.

On the other hand, learned senior counsel Shri R.F. Nariman contends
that the Act is one of the labour welfare legi£1ations. The words and expressions
used in the provisions of the Act should be considered in the light of the E
provisions contained in other labour legislations where similar expressions
and definitions have been used. He has referred to the definition of 'employee'
in section 2(i) of the Minimum Wages Act, Section 2(13) of the Payment of
Bonus Act and compared those provisions with definition of 'employee' in
section 2(f) of the Provident Funds Act. Reference is also made to definition F
of 'workman' under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Thus, on
comparative reading of the· various definitions in different enactments in the
field of labour legislation, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents
argues that a teacher cannot be said to be employed either for skilled, semi-
skilled, unskilled, manual, superviso1y, technical or clerical work. He/she is G
also not employed in any managerial or administrative capacity. The teacher
is engaged in imparting education for intellectual or moral development of
student. He/She does not answer any of the above mentioned descriptions in
the definition clause with regard to the nature of work.

The learned Amicus Curiae, in is counter reply submitted that the words- H
'skilled', 'semi-skilled' or 'unskilled,' do not qualify the words 'manual',
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] I S.C.R.

A 'supervisory', 'technical' or 'clerical'. It is contended that all the words
'skilled', 'semi-skilled', 'unskilled', 'manual', 'supervisory', 'technical', or
'clerical', because of the commas in between them have to be read disjunctively
and they all qualify the word 'work' which is mentioned at the end of all
•
these words.

B We have critically examined the definition clause in the light of the
arguments advanced on either side and have compared it with the definitions
given in other labour enactments. On the doctrine of 'pari materia', reference
to other statutes dealing with the same subject or forming part of the same
system is a permissible aid to the construction of provisions in a statute. See
C the following observations contained in Principles of Statutory Interpretation
by G.P. Singh [8th Ed.)-Synopsis 4 at pg. 235 to 239:-

'Statutes in Pari Materia:- It has already been seen that a statute
must be read as a whole as words are to be understood in their
context. Extension of this rule of context permits reference to other
D statutes in pari materia i.e. statutes dealing with the same subject
matter or forming part of the same system. Viscount Simonds in a
passage already noticed conceived it to be a right and duty to construe ' '
every word of a statute in its context ar.d he used the word context
in its widest sense including 'other statutes in pari materia '. As stated
E by Lord Mansfield 'where there are different statutes in pari materia
though made at different times, or even expired, and not referring to
each other, they shall be taken and construed together, as one system
and as explanatory of each other. ....

The application of this rule of construction has the merit of avoiding
F any apparent contradiction between a series of statutes dealing with
the same subject, it allows the use of an earlier statute to throw light
on the meaning of a phrase used in a later statute in the same context,
it permits the raising of a presumption, in the absence of any context
indicating a contrary intention, that the same meaning attaches to the
G same words in. a later statute as in an earlier statute if the words are
used in similar connection in the two statutes, and it enables the use
of a later statute as parliamentary exposition of the meaning of
ambiguous expressions in an earlier statute. ,.
The definition of 'workman' contained in section 2(s) of the Industrial
H Disputes Act, I 947 meaning 'any person employed in any industry to do any
AHMEDABAD PVT. PRIMARY TEACHERS' ASSN." ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER[DHARMADHIKARI, J] 477

skilled or unskilled manual, supervisolJ', technical, operational, or clerical A
work' came up for consideration before this Court when teachers claimed
that they are covered by the definition of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the
case of A. Sundarambal v. Govt. of Goa, Daman and Diu, [1988] 4 SCC 42
this Court negatived the claim of teachers that they are covered by the
definition of 'workman' under Industrial Disputes Act thus:-
B
"Even though an educational institution has to be treated as an
'industry', teachers in an educational institution cannot be considered
as workman.

The teachers employed by educational institutions whether the said
institutions are imparting primary, secondary, graduate or postgraduate C
education cannot be called as 'workman' within the meaning of Section
2(s) of the Act. Imparting of education which is the main jimction of
teachers cannot be considered as skilled or unskilled manual work or
supervisory work or technical work or clerical work. Imparting of
education is in the nature of a mission or a noble vocation. The D
clerical work, if any, they may do, is only incidental to their principal
(. work of teaching."

The definition of 'employee' as contained in section 2(i) of the Minimum
Wages Act, 1948 came up for consideration before this Court in the case of
Haryana Unrecognised Schools' Association v. State of Haryana, [1996] 4 E
SCC 225. In section 2(i) of the Minimum Wages Act, the worJ 'employee'
is defined to mean: 'any person who is employed for hire or reward to do any
work, skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical, in a scheduled employment in
respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed'. This Court held
that as teachers are not employed for any skilled or unskilled, manual or
, 1 clerical work, it is not open to the State Government to include their F
employment as a scheduled employment under the Minimum Wages Act.
The relevant observations need to be quoted:-

"A combined reading of sections 3, 2 (i) and 27 of the Minimum
Wages Act, 1948 and the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
legislation makes it explicitly clear that the State Government can G
add to either part of the Schedule any employment where persons are
employed for hire or reward to do any work skilled or unskilled,
manual or clerical. If the persons employed .do not do the work of
any skilled or unskilled or of a manual or clerical nature then it
would not be possible for the State Government to include such an H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] I S.C.R.

A employment in the Schedule in exercise of power under Section 27
of the Act. Since the teachers of an educational institution are not
employed to do any skilled or unskilled or manual or clerical work
and therefore, could not be held to be an employee under Section 2(i)
of the Act, it is beyond the competence of the State Government to
bring them under the purview of the Act by adding the employment
B in educational institution in the Schedule in exercise of power under
Section 27 of the Act. Hence, the State Government in exercise of
powers under the Act is not entitled to fix the minimum wage of such
teachers. The impugned notifications so far as the teachers of the
educational institution are concerned are accordingly quashed."
c [Emphasis added by Italics]

The definitions of 'employee' in other labour legislations which need
to be considered for comparison are first section 2(13) of the Payment of
Bonus Act, 1965 where the definition reads as under:-
D '2(13). 'Employee' means any person (other than an apprentice)
employed on a salary or wage not exceeding [three thousand and five
hundred rupees] per mensem in any industry to do any skilled or
unskilled, manual, supervisory, managerial, administrative, technical
or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment
E be express or implied.'

[Emphasis added]

Section 2(f) of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 defines
'employee' as under:-
F "2(f). 'employee' means any person who is employed for wages in
any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the
work of [an establishment] and who gets his wages directly or
indirectly from the employer."

[Emphasis added]
G
Learned counsel appearing for the Corporation does not dispute that
definition of employee under the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 is
very wide and may include even a teacher in an educational establishment
because the expression in the definition clause used is 'any person' who is
H employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in
.Ji.,

AHMEDABAD PVT. PRIM.-\RY TEACHERS" ASSN. 1·.ADMINISTRAT!VE OFFICER[DIIARMADHIKARI, J.] 479

connection with the work of [an establishment] and who gets his wages A
directly or indirectly from the employer.'

It is submitted that since such language of wide import in defining
'employee' is not used in the Payment of Gratuity Act of 1972, the definition
is restrictive and not expansive. It has to be understood as excluding 'teachers'
who are not doing any kind of skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, B
managerial, administrative, technical or clerical work.

It is not disputed that by notification dated 3rd April, 1997, issued in
exercise of powers, under section 1(3)(c) of the Payment of Gratuity Act,
1972, the Gratuity Act is extended to educational institutions in which ten or C
more persons are employed or were employed on any day preceding 12
months. The relevant part of the notification reads as under:-

APPLICABILITY OF THE PAYMENT OF GRATUITY ACT, 1972

IN
D
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

'Notification No. 5-42013/1/95-SS II. Dated 3rd APRIL 1997-In
exercise of the powers conferred by Cl. (c) of sub-clause (3) of Sec
I of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, (39 of 1972), the Central
Government hereby specifies the educational institutions in which ten E
or inore persons are employed or were employed on any day preceding
12 months as a class of establishments to which the said Act shall
apply effect from the date of publication of this notification.

Provided that nothing contained in this notification shall effect the F
operation of the notification of the Ministry of Labour S.O. 239 dated
8th January, 1982.'

An educational institution, therefore, is an 'establishment' notified under
section 1(3)(c) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. On behalf of the
Municipal Corporation, it is contended that the only beneficial effect of the G
Notification issued under section 1(3)(c) of the Act of 1972, is that such non-
teaching staff of educational institutions as answer the description of any of
the employments contained in the definition clause 2( e), would be covered
by the provisions of the Act. The teaching staff being not covered by the
definition of'employee' can get no advantage merely because by notification
'educational institutions' as establishments are covered by the provisions of H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] I S.C.R.

A the Act.
Having thus compared the various definition clauses of word 'emplo;:ee'
in different enactments, with due regard to the different aims and objects of
the various labour legislations, we are of the view that even. orwplain
construction of the words and expression used in definition clause 2( e) of the
B Act, 'teachers' who are mainly employed for imparting education are not
intended to be covered for extending gratuity benefits under the Act. Teachers
do not answer description of being employees who are 'skilled', 'semi-skilled'
or 'unskilled'. These three words used in association with each other intend
to convey that a person who is 'unskilled' is one who is not 'skilled' and a
C person who is 'semi-skilled' may be one who falls between two categories
meaning he is neither fully skilled nor unskilled. The Black's Law Dictionary
defines these three words as under:-

"Semi-skilled work. Work that may require some alertness and close
attention, such as inspecting items or machinery for irregularities, or
D guarding property or people against loss or injury.
•
Skilled work. Work requiring the worker to use judgment, deal with
' '
the public, analyze facts and figures, or work with abstrnct ideas at
a high level of complexity.

Unskilled work. Work requiring little or no judgment, and involving
E simple tasks that can be learned quickly on the job.

In construing the above mentioned three words which are used in
association with each other, the rule of construction noscitur a soc/ls may be
applied. The meaning of each of these words is to be understood by the
company it keeps. It is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in
F
an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection
with them. The actual order of these three words in juxtaposition indicates
that meaning of one takes colour from the other. The rule is explained
differently; 'that meaning of doubtful words may be ascertained by reference
to the meaning of words associated with it.' [See Principles of Statutory
G Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh (8th Ed.), Syn. 8 at pg. 379.

The word 'unskilled' is opposite of the word 'skilled' and the word
'semi-skilled', seems to describe a person who falls between the two categories t
i.e. he is not fully skilled and also is not completely unskilled but has some
amount of skill for the work for which he is employed. The word 'unskilled'
H cannot, therefore, be understood dissociated from the word 'skilled' and 'semi-
AHMEDABAD PVT. PRIMARY TEACHERS' ASSN. 1•.ADMINISTRATIVEOFF!CER[DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 481
-~ ~ skilled' to read and construe it to include in it all categories of employees A
irrespective of the nature of employment. If the Legislature intended to cover
all categories of employees for extending benefit of gratuity under the Act,
specific mention of categories of employment in the definition clause was not
necessary at all. Any construction of definition clause which renders it
superfluous or otiose has to be avoided.
B
The contention advanced that teachers should be treated as included in
~-
expression 'unskilled' or 'skilled' cannot, therefore, be accepted. The teachers
might have been imparted training for teaching or there may be cases where
teachers who are employed in primary schools are untrained. A trained teacher
is not described in industrial field or service jurisprudence as a 'skilled
employee'. Such adjective generally is used for employee doing manual or
c
technical work. Similarly, the words 'semi-skilled' and 'unskilled' are not
-, understood in educational establishments a describing nature of job of untrained
teachers. We do not attach much importance to the arguments advanced on
the question as to whether 'skilled', 'semi-skilled' and 'unskilled' qualify the
words 'manual', 'supervisory', 'technical, or 'clerical' or the above words D

.>-
'
qualify the word 'work'. Even if all the words are read disjunctively or in any
other manner, trained or untrained teachers do not plainly answer any of the
descriptions of the nature of various employments given in the definition
clause. Trained or untrained teachers are not 'skilled', 'semi-skilled',
'unskilled', 'manual', 'supervisory', 'technical' or 'clerical' employees. They
E
are also not employed in 'managerial' or 'administrative' capacity.
Occasionally, even if they do some administrative work as part of their duty
with teaching, since their main job is imparting education, they cannot be
held employed in 'managerial' or 'administrative' capacity. The teachers are
clearly not intended to be covered by the definition of 'employee'.
~
F
""' The Legislature was alive to various kinds of definitions of word
'employee' contained in various previous labour enactments when the Act
was passed in 1972. If it intended to cover in the definition of 'employee' all
kinds of employees, it could have as well used such wide language as is
contained in section 2(f) of the· Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 which
defines 'employee' to mean 'any person who is employed for wages in any G
kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of[an
-1. establishment] ........... Non-use of such wide language in· definition of
'employee' in section 2(e) of the Act of 1972 reinforces our conclusion that
teachers are clearly not covered in the definition.

Our conclusion should not be misunderstood that teachers although
H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] I S.C.R.
).. ..,
A engaged in very noble profession of educating our young generation should
not be given any gratuity benefit. There are already in several States separate
statutes, rules and regulations granting gratuity benefits to teachers in
educational institutions which are more or less beneficial than the gratuity
benefits provided under the Act. It is for the Legislature to take cognizance
of situation of such teachers in various establishments where gratuity benefits·
B are not available and think of a separate legislation for them in this regard.
That is the subject matter solely of the Legislature to consider and decide.

In conclusion, we find no merit in this appeal. It is, hereby, dismissed
but without any order as to costs.
c B.S. Appeal dismissed.