Supreme Court of India
AHMMADSAHAB ABDUL MULLA (DEAD) BY PROPOSED LRS.versusBIBIJAN AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 445
- Decided
- 1 April 2009
- Disposal
- Reference answered
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The expression "date fixed for the performance" in Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 is a crystallized notion and definitely denotes a specific date in the calendar.
Summary
The Supreme Court was asked to interpret whether the word "date" in Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 denotes a specific calendar date. The Court examined the meanings of "date" and "fixed" and held that "date fixed for the performance" is a crystallized notion indicating a definite day. It observed that the second limb of the provision, concerning the time from which the limitation period begins when no date is fixed, further underscores the need for a specific date when one is fixed. Consequently, the expression unquestionably suggests a specified calendar date, and the matter was referred to a Division Bench for determination on merits. The reference was therefore answered.
Issues considered
- Whether the expression "date" in Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 is suggestive of a specific calendar date
Legislation cited
- Limitation Act, 1908s. Article 113
- Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 54 (Schedule)
Subjects
Limitation Actdate fixedspecific performancestatutory interpretationcalendar datecivil appeal
Judgment
[2009] 5 S.C.R. 476
A AHMMADSAHAB ABDUL MULLA (DEAD) BY
PROPOSED LRS.
v.
BIBIJAN AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 4190 of 2000)
B APRIL 01, 2009
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND ASOK
KUMAR GANG ULY, JJ.]
c UM/TA TION ACT, 1963:
Schedule - Article 54 - Word 'date' occurring in the
expression 'date fixed for the performance' - HELD: Is
D
suggestive of a specified date in the calendar.
In the instant appeal the question referred to three-
.
•
Judge Bench for consideration was: whether the
expression "date" used in Article 54 of the Schedule to
the Limitation Act, 1963 is suggestive of a specific date
in the calendar.
E
Answering the reference, the Court
HELD: On analyzing the expressions 'date' and
'fixed', the inevitable conclusion is that the expression I, -
'date fixed for the performance' used in Article 54 of the
F Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 is a crystallized
notion. This is clear from the fact that the second part
"time from which period begins to run" refers to a case
where no such date is fixed. When date is fixed, it means
that there is a definite date fixed for doing a particular act.
G Even in the second part the stress is on 'when the
,
plaintiff has notice that performance is refused'. Here
again, there is a definite point of time, when the plaintiff
notices the refusal. In that sense both the parts refer to
definite dates. So, there is no question of finding out an
H 476
AHMMADSAHAB ABDUL MULLA (DEAD) BY PROPOSED 477
LRS. v. BIBIJAN AND ORS.
intention from other circumstances. Whether the date A
was fixed or not, the plaintiff had notice that performance
is refused and the date thereof is to be established with
reference to materials and evidence to be brought on
record. The expression 'date' used in Article 54 of the
Schedule to the Act definitely is suggestive of a specified 8
).
date in the calendar. [Para 7] [481-D-F]
S. Brahmanand v. K.R. Muthugopal 200~ (12) SCC 764;
Ramzan v. Hussaini 1990 (1) SCC 104 and Tarfok Singh v.
Vijay Kumflr Sabharwal 1996 (8) SCC 367, distinguished.
c
Kashi Prasad v. Chhabi Lal AIR 1933 All 412; Alopi
Parshad v. Court of Wards AIR 1938 Lah 23; Lala Ram
Sarup v. Court of Wards AIR 1940 PC 19; Kruitiventi
Mallikharjuna Rao v. Vemuri Pardhasaradhirao AIR 1944
""" Mad 218; R. Muniswami Goundar v. B.M. Shamanna Gouda D
"
~
AIR 1950 Mad 820; Hutchegowda v. H.M. Basaviah AIR 1954
Mys 29; Purshottam Sava v. Kunverji Devji AIR 1954 Sau
104; Lakshminarayana Reddiar v. Singaravelu Naicker AIR
1963 Mad 24; Shrikrishna Keshav Kulkarni v. Balaji Ganesh
Kulkarni AIR 1976 Born 342 and P. Sivan Muthiah v. John E
Sathiavasagam 1990 (1) MLJ 490, referred to.
Case Law Reference:
2005 (12) sec 764 distinguished para 1
- .~ 1990 (1) sec 104 distinguished para 1
F
1996 (8) sec 367 distinguished para 1
AIR 1933 All 412 referred to para 1
.... AIR 1938 Lah 23 referred to para 1 G
AIR 1940 PC 19 referred to para 1
..
-(
AIR 1944 Mad 218 referred to para 1
AIR 1950 Mad 820 referred to para 1 H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R.
A AIR 1954 Mys 29 referred to para 1
AIR 1954 Sau 104 referred to para 1
AIR 1963 Mad 24 referred to para 1
AIR 1976 Born 342 referred to para 1
B
1990 (1) MLJ 490 referred to para 1
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
4190 of 2000.
c I
From the Judgment & Order dated 31.08.1998 of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in RS.A. No. 1225 of 1996.
Rajesh Mahale for·the Appellants.
Mohan V. Katarki and Ashok Kumar Sharma for the
D t ~
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. A reference was made to a
E three-Judge Bench, by reference order dated 21st April, 2008.
The relevant question is whether the use of the expression
"date" used in Article 54 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963
(in short the 'Act') is suggestive of a specific date in the
calendar. In S. Brahmanand v. K.R. Muthugopal (2005 (12)
F SCC 764) a Bench of this Court did not go into this issue. It
decided the appeal on the factual scenario applicable. It was
)
-
however noticed that several High Courts have dealt with the
matter differently. In all these cases, for example in Kashi
Prasad v. Chhabi Lal (AIR 1933 All 412), Alopi Parshad v.
G
Court of Wards (AIR 1938 Lah 23), Lala Ram Sarup v. Court
of Wards (AIR 1940 PC 19), Kruitiventi Mal/ikharjuna Rao v.
•
Vemuri Pardhasaradhirao (AIR 1944 Mad 218), R. Muniswami
Goundar v. B.M. Shamanna Gouda (AIR 1950 Mad 820), • II-
Hutchegowda v. H.M. Basaviah (AIR 1954 Mys 29),
H
AHMMADSAHAB ABDUL MULLA (DEAD) BY PROPOSED 479
LRS. v. BIBIJAN AND ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
Purshottam Sava v. Kunverji Oevji (AIR 1954 Sau 104), A
Lakshminarayana Reddiar v. Singaravelu Naicker (Al R 1963
Mad 24), Shrikrishna Keshav Kulkarni v. Balaji Ganesh
Kulkarni (AIR 1976 Born 342), P. Sivan Muthiah v. John
Sathiavasagam (1990 (1) MLJ 490), the High Courts had
decided the issue in the background of Article 113 of the B
) Limitation Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Old Act').
Article 113 of the Old Act is in pari materia with Article 54 of
Schedule to the Act. Some of the High Courts took the view
that the force of the word 'fixed' implies that the date should
be fixed definitely and should not be left to be gathered from c
the surrounding circumstances of the case. Some other High
Courts, however, took a different view. There are two decisions
of this Court i.e. Ramzan v. Hussaini(1990 (1) SCC 104) and
Tarlok Singh v. Vijay Kumar Sabharwal (1996 (8) SCC 367).
In Tarlok Singh's case (supra) the factual scenario was noticed 0
and the case was decided after referring to Article 54 of the
Schedule to the Act. Ramzan's case (supra) related to the
specific performance of contingent contract. It was held that the
expression 'date fixed for performance' need not be
ascertainable in the face of the contract deed and may be E
ascertainable on the happening of a certain contingent event
specified in the contract.
2. Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act reads as follows:
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which F
_ .J Period begins to run
54 For specific performance The date fixed for the
three years Of a contract performance or, if no
Such date is fixed,
when the plaintiff has G
notice that performance
is refused."
3. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that
purposive interpretation has to be given to the expression "the H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R.
A date fixed".
4. The judgments in Ramzan and Tarlok Singh cases
(supra) were rendered in a different factual scenario and the
discussions do not throw much light on the controversy at hand.
B 5. According to Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha
Aiyar, 3rd Edition 2005, the word 'date' means as follows:
"Date. (As a noun) The point of time at which a
transaction or event takes place; time given or specified;
c time in some way ascertained and fixed; in a deed, that
part of the deed or writing which expresses the day of the
month and year in which it was made, (2 Bl. Commn. 304;
Tomlin). In Bement v. Trenton Locomotive, etc., Mfg. Co.,
32 NLJ 513 (515), it is said : 'The primary signification of
D the word date, is not time in the abstract, nor time taken
absolutely but, as its derivation plainly indicates, time given
or specified time in some way ascertained and fixed; this
is the sense in which the word is commonly used. When
we speak of the date of a deed, we do not mean the time
when it was actually executed but the time of its execution,
E
as given or stated in the deed itself.
"Where a deed bears no date, or an impossible date, and
in the deed reference is made to the 'date', that word must
be construed 'delivery'; but if the deed bears a sensible
F date, the word 'date', occurring in the deed, means the day \. -
of the date, and not that of the delivery" (Elph. 123, citing
Styles v. Wardle, 4 B&C 908;
"Date", though sometimes used as the shortened form of
G "day of the date", is not its synonym; but mean the
particular time on which an instrument is given, executed,
or delivered (Howard's Case, 1 Raym. Ld 480; Armitt v.
Brea me, 2 Raym Ld 1076; Pewtress v Annan, 9 Dowl
828, at pp. 834, 835).
H
AHMMADSAHAB ABDUL MULLA (DEAD) BY PROPOSED 481
LRS. v. BIBIJAN AND ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
"The word 'date' is much more commonly descriptive of a A
day than of any smaller division of time" (per Simpson v.
Marshall, 37 SLR 316).
"Date" means day, so that where a cover note providing
~,
for temporary insurance of a motor car expires "15 days B
) after date of commencement" it runs for the full 15 days
after the day on which it was to commence (Cartwright v.
Mac Cormack; Trafalgar Insurance Co. (Third Party),
(1963) 1WLR18)."
6. 'Fixed' in essence means having final or crystallized c
form or character not subject to c.hange or fluctuation.
7. The inevitable conclusion is that the expression 'date
-
. '·
fixed for the performance' is a crystallized notion. This is clear
from the fact that the second part "time from which period begins
to run" refers to a case where no such date is fixed. To put it
differently, when date is fixed it means that there is a definite
D
date fixed for doing a particular act. Even in the second part
the stress is on 'when the plaintiff has notice that performance
is refused'. Here again, there is a definite point of time, when E
the plaintiff notices the refusal. In that sense both the parts refer
to definite dates. So, there is no question of finding out an
intention from other circumstances. Whether the date was fixed
or not the plaintiff had notice that performance is refused and
the date thereof are to be established with reference to materials
F
_j
and evidence to be brought on record. The expression 'date'
-- used in Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act definitely is
suggestive of a specified date in the calendar. We answer the
reference accordingly. The matter shall now be placed before
the Division Bench for deciding the issue on merits.
G
8. The reference is disposed of accordingly.
• R.P . Reference answered.
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