Holding

A son’s requirement for a non‑residential shop qualifies as "own use" under s.13(3)(a)(ii), and the High Court erred in interfering with the Appellate Authority’s factual findings, so the eviction on personal necessity stands.

Summary

The appellants, a father and his son who became the landlord of a shop after a family partition, filed an eviction petition against the respondents for sub‑letting, non‑payment of rent and personal requirement. The Rent Controller allowed eviction only on the sub‑letting ground; the Appellate Authority, after examining evidence, also permitted eviction on the basis of personal necessity for the son. The High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction, set aside the Appellate Authority’s order, holding that the landlord had not proved the statutory requirements of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The Supreme Court held that the son’s requirement for the shop falls within “own use” under the Act, that the High Court cannot disturb factual findings of the Appellate Authority unless they are perverse or arbitrary, and that the shop is a non‑residential premises. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside, the Appellate Authority’s eviction order restored, and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

The landlord (or his son) must aver and prove personal requirement under s.13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 for eviction.
Whether the High Court can interfere with the Appellate Authority's findings of fact on bonafide requirement.
Whether a portion of a commercial premises used as residential can be treated as residential for eviction purposes.
The proper interpretation of "own use" in the context of a non‑residential building.

Legislation cited

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949s. 13(3)(a)(ii), s. 13(3)(a)(iv)

Subjects

evictionpersonal requirementlandlord's sonEast Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Actsub‑lettingrevisional jurisdictioninterpretation of "own use"non‑residential premises

Judgment

[2008] 13 S.C.R 555

--i
AJIT SINGH & ANR. A
v.
JIT RAM & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No.5680 of 2008}

SEPTEMBER 16, 2008
B
)< .J. [TARUN CHATTERJEE AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ.]

East Punjab Urban eent Restriction Act, 1949:
s. 13(3)(ii) - Shop - Eviction for personal use of landlord's
son - Held: In eviction petition, son must aver and prove his c
case of personal requirement.
s. 13(3)(ii) - Eviction from shop - Plea of tenant that par-
....., tion of shop was used for residential purposes - Held: Not
tenable . D
___ .,. Revisional jurisdiction - Interference with findings of fact
- Held: Called for, only when findings are found to be per-
verse or arbitrary.
The appellants were father and son. The appellant
E
no.1-son was the owner of the suit shop on the basis of a
family partition and appellant no.2 was the landlord of the
said shop. Prior to the family partition, the appellant no.2
was the owner and landlord of the said shop.
Respondent nos.1 and 2 were also father and son. F
~ Respondent no.1, father was inducted as tenant in respect
of the said shop on monthly rent of Rs.500/-.
...' The appellants filed eviction petition against respon-
dents on the ground of sub-letting, non-payment of rent and
also for bonafide requirement for personal use and occupa- G
tion of the appellant no.1. Rent Controller held that the re-
spondents were not defaulters in payment of rent and the
-~
ground for personal necessity was not made out; how-
ever there was relationship of landlord tenant between
555 H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A the parties as the respondents in their examination-in-chief
admitted that the appellant no.2 was the owner of the said
shop who had given the same to the appellant no.1 by
way of family partition. Accordingly Rent Controller held
that the appellants were entitled to evict the respondents
B only on the ground of sub-letting as the said shop was
sub-let by respondent no.1 to respondent no.2 without
the consent of the appellants.
The Appellate Authority allowed the appeal filed by
respondents and also the cross objections of the appel-
C lants and directed the eviction of the respondents from
the said shop on the ground of personal necessity by the
appellants.
The High Court in exercise of its revisional power
set aside the order of eviction on the ground that the ap-
0
pellant no.2 failed to prove the ingredients as required
under s.13(3)(ii) of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
Act, 1949; and that the averments made in the eviction
petition were only to the extent of personal need of ap-
E pellant no.1-son and did not relate to the personal require-
ment of the appellant no.2, who was also the landlord of
the said shop. Hence the present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The High Court in the exercise of its
F revisional power under the East Punjab Urban Rent Re-
striction Act, 1949 was not entitled to interfere with the
findings of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority on
the question of bonafide requirement of the said shop at
the instance of the appellants. Since the findings arrived
G at by the Appellate Authority on the question of bonafide
requirement was set aside by the High Court in the exer-
cise of its revisional power under the Rent Act, the evic-
tion of the respondents from the said shop therefore rests y-

only on the ground whether the pleadings made by the
H appellants in their eviction petition would satisfy the re-
AJIT SINGH & ANR. v. JIT RAM & ANR. 557.

quirement of s.13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Bengal Rent Restric- A
tion Act, 1949. The pleadings made by the appellants in
the eviction petition must therefore be looked into in depth
and in detail. A plain reading of s.13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act show
that in order to get an order of eviction under said sec-
tion, the landlord had to aver and prove that he required B
the said shop for his own use as the said shop was a
non-residential building. [Paras 8, 9] [563-G,H, 564 A-B]
Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal (2002) 5 SCC 397
- relied on.
c
1.2. A non-residential premises, if required by a son
for user by him would cover the requirement of words
used in the Section, i.e. "for his own use" in reference to
a landlord. The requirements as laid down in
s.13(3)(a)(ii)(b) and (c) of the Act has to be interpreted in
0
the same manner to hold that (a) the son of the landlord
-~·
has to plead in the eviction petition that, (b) he is not oc-
cupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose of
his business any other such building or rented land as
the case may be; and (c) he has not vacated such a build-
ing or rented land without sufficient cause after the com- E
mencement of the Rent Act, in the urban area concerned.
[Para 11] [566 E-G]
1.3. The requirement is made for the son who is ad-
mittedly the owner of the shop room and also the land- F
lord, after the said shop was, by a family partition, given
to the son. It was pleaded and proved that the said shop
was required for the use of the son and, therefore, the
pleadings of the son in regard to the aforesaid require-
ment, being mandatory, were satisfied, otherwise it would G
make the requirement laid down under the said provisions
nugatory. [Paras 10, 12] [566 C,D, 566 H, 567 AB]
1.4. A plain reading of s.13(3)(a)(ii)(a) to (c) in conjunc-
tion with s.13(3)(a)(iv)(a) and (b) of the Act, would make it
ample clear that when the said shop is being got vacated H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S C.R

~ ~
A on the ground of user for the son of the landlord, then in
the eviction petition, the son (appellant No.1) must plead
that he was not occupying any other building and that he
had not vacated such a building without sufficient cause.
It is well settled that while interpreting a provision of a
B statute, the same has to be interpreted taking into con-
sideration the other provisions of the same statute. [Para ..i ~

13] [567 C-EJ
2.1. While making an interpretation of s.13 of the Act,
the High Court did not deal with said Section completely
c but it dealt with only that part of it which deals with resi-
dential building only and not dealt with portion, which
deals with non-residential building. [Para 14] [567 G-H]
2.2. The Appellate Authority while directing eviction
to the respondents considered the oral and documentary
D
evidence on record and also the pleadings of the parties
and then came to a finding that the appellants had sue- ..,. -

cessfully averred and proved their case of personal re-
quirement as made out by them under s.13(3)(a)(ii) of the
Rent Act. It is true that the High Court in its revisional ju-
E risdiction could have interfered with such findings of fact
arrived at by the Appellate Authority, if the High Court had
found that the findings of the Appellate Authority on the
question of bonafide requirement were either perverse or
arbitrary. On a close examination of the impugned order
F of the High Court, there is no ground to hold that the find-
ings of fact, regarding the bonafide requirement of the ap- ~

pellants, were perverse or arbitrary or the pleadings made
by the appellants in their eviction petition could be said
to be not in conformity with the requirement of s.13(3)(a)(ii)
G of the Rent Act. Therefore, the High Court was in error in
interfering with the order of eviction passed by the Ap-
pellate Authority on the ground of bonafide requirement.
[Para 14] [568 B-F]
y-
3. The contention of respondent that a portion of the
H
AJIT SINGH & ANR. v. JIT RAM &ANR 559

demised premises may also be used as a residential pre- A
mises, which cannot be considered to be a commercial
premises for the purpose of evicting the tenant under
s.13(3)(a){ii) of the Rent Act, cannot be accepted. In order
to obtain an order of eviction under s.13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent
Act, the landlord has to prove that he required the said B
shop for his own use and the said shop was a non-resi-
dential building. Admittedly the said shop is used for com-.
mercial purposes and therefore there was no question of
the said shop being used as residential purposes or be-
ing used for a portion of residential purposes for residen- C
tial use. [Para 15] [568 H, 569 B·C]
Hasmat Rai & Anr. v. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC
103 - distinguished.
Case Law Reference
D
(2002) 5 sec· 397 relied on Para 9
(1981) 3 sec 103 distinguished Para 15
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5680
of 2008
E_,
From the final Judgment and Order dated 8.2.2006 of the·
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Revi-
sion No. 4231 of 2004
Satinder S. Gulati, Kamaldeep Narag and Dr. Kai lash·
Chand for the Appellant. · F1

Raj Shekhar Rao, Senthil Jagadeesan and Nikhil Nayyar
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment
and final order dated 81h of February, 2006 of the High Court of
Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Revision No. 4231 of
H
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 13 S.C.R.

A 2004, whereby the High Court in the exercise of its revisional
power had interfered with the findings of fact arrived at by the
Appellate Authority which was the final authority on fact and set
aside the order of the Appellate Authority, Chandigarh dated 5th
of August, 2004 directing the eviction of the respondent only on
B the ground of subletting, which affirmed the order of eviction
passed by the Rent Controller on a different ground namely, on
the ground of sub-letting.

3. The appellants are father and son and the appellant No.1
(son) is the owner of a shop being Shop No. 142, Village Badheri,
C U.T. Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as "the said shop") on
the basis of a family partition dated 26th of August, 1998 and
the appellant No.2 is the landlord of the said shop. Prior to the
family partition dated 26th of August, 1998 the father, namely,
appellant No.2 was the owner and landlord of the said shop.
D Respondent Nos.1 and 2 are also father and son. The father,
namely, respondent No.1 was inducted as a tenant in respect
of the said shop at a monthly rental of Rs.500/- per month ex-
cluding the electricity charges. The appellants filed an eviction
petition against the respondents for evicting them from the said
E shop inter alia on the ground of sub- letting, for non payment of
rent and also for bonafide requirement for the personal use and
occupation of the appellant No.1. According to the appellants,
the respondent No.1 had sub-let the said shop to respondent
No.2, his own son, who is in possession of the same and has
F been running the said shop under the name of M/s. New Paris
Furniture without the consent of the appellants. It was further
alleged that the respondent No.1 neither paid the rent of the
sa.id shop nor tendered the same as such was in arrears of
payment of rent since 1•1 of October, 1995 till the filing of the
G application for eviction. The appellants further alleged in the
eviction petition that the said shop was required for the per-
sonal use and occupation of the appellant No.1. Accordingly,
the appellants were constrained to file the eviction petition
against the respondents in respect of the said shop when it
was found that in respect of the notice, the respondents had
H
AJIT SINGH & ANR. v. JIT RAM & ANR. 561
[TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.)

failed to vacate and deliver peaceful possession of the said A
shop to the appellants.
4. The respondents entered appearance and filed a writ-
ten statement inter alia contending that the eviction petition
against them was not maintainable and the personal necessity
of the said shop for the use and occupation of the appellant 8
No.1 was also not available and that the Rent Controller had no
jurisdiction to try and entertain the eviction petition. Accordingly,
the respondents prayed for rejection of the eviction petition.
5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, as noted c
herein above, the Rent Controller framed the following issues :-
"(I) Whether the respondents were in arrears of rent w.e.f.
01-10-95 and as such were liable fo be evicted from
demised premises on the ground of non-payment of
ra~ D
(II) .. Whether the rent tendered by the respondent was
short and insufficient?
(Ill) Whether the said shop was sublet bythe respondent
no. 1 to respondent no.2 without the consent of the E
appellants?
(IV) Whether the appellant No1 for his personal use and
occupation required the said shop?
(V) Whether this court has no jurisdiction to try and F
entertain the eviction petition?
(VI) Whether the ground of personal necessity was not
available to the appellants as the shop in dispute
was not a commercial property?
G
(VII) Whether the respondents are entitled for counter
claim as prayed for?
(VIII) Relief."
The Rent Controller decided issue Nos. 1, 2 and 7 together H
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A and held that the respondents were not defaulters in payment
of rent nor they were entitled to get refund of any amount from
the appellant as the case made out by them that they have paid
the appellant in excess. This finding arrived at by the Rent Con-
troller by holding that the appellant had failed to produce any
B credible and reliable evidence, accordingly, Issue Nos. 1, 2 and
7 were held against the appellant and, therefore, no order for
ejectment could be passed on the ground of non-payment of
rent. Issue No.4 and 6 were also taken up together. Issue No.4
was decided against the appellants and Issue No.6 was de-
e cided in favour of the respondents. Accordingly, the Rent Con-
troller held that the ground for personal necessity was not made
out and therefore, on that issue, the appellants were not entitled
to evict the respondents from the said shop. So far as Issue
No.5 was concerned, before the Rent Controller the said issue
was not pressed. It may be mentioned here that the Rent Con-
0
troller, however, held that there was relationship of landlord ten-
ant between the parties as the respondents in their examina-
., -
tion-in-chief admitted that the appellant No.2 was the owner of
the said shop who had given the same to the appellant No.1 by
way of family settlement dated 26th of August, 1998. Accord-
E ingly, the Rent Controller held that the appellants were entitled
to evict the respondents only on the ground of sub-letting as the
said shop was sub-let by respondent No.1 to respondent No.2
without the consent of the appellants. Upon the issues being
decided in the manner indicated above, the Rent Controller fi-
F nally passed the order of eviction against the respondents in
respect of the said shop only on the ground of sub-letting.
6. Feeling aggrieved by the order of eviction passed by
the Rent Controller, the respondents filed an appeal before the
G Appellate Authority under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restric-
tion Act, 1949 (in short the 'Rent Act'). The Appellate Authority
by its judgment and final order dated 5th of August, 2004 al-
lowed the appeal and also the cross objections of the appel-
lants and directed the eviction of the respondents from the said
shop on the ground of personal necessity by the appellants.
H
~---4 AJIT SINGH & ANR. v. JIT RAM & ANR. 563
[TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

7. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of the A
Appellate Authority directing eviction on a finding that the ap-
pellants required the said shop for their own use and occupa-
tion, the respondents filed a civil revision petition in the High
j Court which, by the impugned order, was allowed and the High
~
Court, as noted herein earlier, in the exercise of its revisional B
power had set aside the order of eviction passed by the Appel-
late Authority on the ground that appellant No.2 was the land-
lord of the said shop but they had failed to prove the ingredients
as required under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act. It was
held by the High Court that the averments made in the eviction c
petition would evidently show that such averments were made
only to the extent of the personal requirement of the appellant
No.1, Ajit Singh, but such pleadings did not relate to the per-
sonal requirement of the appellant No.2, who was also the land-
lord of the said shop and, accordingly, in the absence of any
----"" D
pleading or averment made in the eviction petition to the extent
of the personal requirement of the said shop of the appellant
No.2, the High Court held that the order of eviction passed by
the Appellate Authority could not be sustained in law. Feeling
aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of the High Court al-
lowing the revision petition, the appellants filed a special leave E
petition which on grant of leave was heard in presence of the
learned counsel for the parties.

8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and
after examining the impugned order of the High Court as well F
as the order of the appellate authority and the Rent Controller
and the materials on record including the averments made by
the appellants in their petition for eviction, we are of the view
that the High Court in the exercise of its revisional power under
the Rent Act was not entitled to interfere with the findings of fact
G
arrived at by the Appellate Authority on the question of bonafide
requirement of the said shop at the instance of the appellants.
-"'." Since the findings arrived at by the Appellate Authority on the
question of bonafide requirement was set aside by the High
Court in the exercise of its revision a I power under the Rent Act
H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 13 S.C.R.

A and the eviction of the respondents from the said shop there-
fore rests only on the ground whether the pleadings made by
the appellants in their eviction petition would satisfy the require-
ment of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act. The pleadings made
by the appellants in the eviction petition must therefore be
B looked into in depth and in detail.
9. It is an admitted position that the said shop is at Village
Badheri, Chandigarh. Since the eviction granted by the appel-
late authority and reversed by the High Court in revision was on
bonafide requirement of the appellants, it will be fit and proper
C that Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act should now be referred
to, which runs as under:

"13. Eviction of tenant -

(3)(a) A landlord may apply to the controller for an order
D directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession; ,. -
(i) .......................................
(ii) in the case of non-residential building or rented land, if
(a) he requires it for his own use;
E
(b) he is not occupying in the urban area concerned fqr
the purpose of his business any other such building
or rented land as the case may be; and

(c) he has not vacated such a building or rented land ~/
F without sufficient cause after the commencement of
this Act, in the urban area concerned;"
A plain reading of the aforesaid provision, namely, Sec-
tion 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act would show that in order to get
G an order of eviction on the aforesaid ground, the landlord had
to aver and prove that the landlord required the said shop for
his own use as the said shop was a non-residential building. In
y-
Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal [(2002) 5 SCC 397],
this Court considered the aforesaid provision in detail and in-
terpreted the words "his own use" in regard to a non-residential
H
>-~
AJIT SINGH & ANR. v. JIT RAM & ANR. 565
[TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

building. In that view of the matter, it would be appropriate for us A
to refer to the aforesaid consideration by this Court in the afore"
said decision which crystallised the question as under :
"(1) The words "for his own use" as occurring in Section
) 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act must receive a wide, liberal
• B
and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow
construction.
(2) The expression - landlord requires for "his own use"
is not confined in its meaning to actual physical user
by the landlord personally. The requirement not only c
of the landlord himself but also of the normal
"emanations" of the landlord is included therein. All
the cases and circumstances in which actual physical
occupation or user by someone else, would amount
-- ., to occupation or user by the landlord himself, cannot
D
be exhaustively enumerated. It will depend on a
variety of factors such as interrelationship and ·
interdependence - economic or otherwise, between
the landlord and such person in the background of
social, socio-religious and local customs and
obligations of the society or region to which they E
belong.
(3) The tests to be applied are : (i) whether the
requirement pleaded and proved may properly be .
regarded as the landlord's own requirement; and, F
(ii) whether on the facts and in the circumstances of
a given case, actual occupation and user by a person
other than the landlord would be deemed by the
landlord as "his own" occupation or user. The answer
would, in its turn, depend on (i) the nature and degree
G
of relationship. and/or dependence between the
landlord pleading the requirement as "his own" and
----,; the person who would actually use the premises; (ii)
the circumstances in which the ciaim arises and is
put forward; and (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the Claim.
H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A The court on being satisfied of the reasonability and
genuineness of claim, as distinguished from a mere
ruse to get rid of the tenant, will uphold the landlord's
claim.
(4) While casting its judicial verdict, the court shall adopt \
•
B a practical and meaningful approach guided by the
realities of life.
.
(5) In the present case, the requirement of the landlord
of the suit premises for user as office of his chartered
c accountant son is the requirement of landlord "for his
own use" within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii)."
10. This judgment is the answer to the question posed
before us. Here also, the requirement is made for the son who
is admittedly the owner of the shop room and also tt\e landlord,
D after the said shop was, by a family partition dated 261h of Au- .... -
gust, 1998, given to the son who also became the landlord after
family partition and also he became the owner of the said shop
by such family partition.
11. From the aforesaid decision of this Court, it is there-
E fore, clear that this Court has laid down authoritatively that a
non-residential premises, if required by a son for user by him
would cover the requirement of words used in the Section, i.e.
"for his own use" in reference to a landlord. Therefore, if "his
own use" has been interpreted by this Court in the above-said \>
F manner, then the requirements as laid down in Section
13(3)(a)(ii)(b) and (c) of the Act has to be interpreted in the same
manner to hold that (a) the son of the landlord has to plead in
the eviction petition that, (b) he is not occupying in the urban
area.concerned for the purpose of his business any other such
G building or rented land as the case may be; and (c) he has not
vacated such a building or rented land without sufficient cause
after the commencement of the Rent Act, in the urban area con- y-
cerned.
12. In the present case, it was pleaded and proved that
H
"--+ AJIT SINGH & ANR. v. JIT RAM & ANR. 567
[TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

the said shop was required for the use of the son and, there- A
fore, the pleadings of the son in regard to the aforesaid require-
ment, being mandatory, were satisfied, otherwise it would make
the requirement laid down under the said provisions nugatory
). in view of the interpretation given by this Court in the aforesaid
" decision, with which we are in full agreement. B
13. Applying the principles as laid down by the aforesaid
decision namely, Joginder Pal (Supra) which also deals with
commercial premises, as in the present case, we are of the
view that a plain reading of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) (a) to (c) in con-
junction with Section 13(3)(a)(iv)(a) & (b) of the Rent Act, would c
make it ample clear when the said shop is being got vacated
on the ground of user for the son of the landlord, then in the
eviction petition, the son (appellant No. 1) must plead that he
was not occupying any other building and that he had not va-
--~
cated such a building without sufficient cause. It is well settled D
that while interpreting a provision of a statute, the same has to
be interpreted taking into consideration the other provisions of
the same statute. In the aforesaid decision, namely, Joginder
Pal (Supra), this Court has clearly laid down that a balanced
interpretation has to be given in regard to the rent legislation E
and the provisions itself contemplate a case in regard to user
of non-residential building by a professional and the statute it-
self lays down requirement in that regard within the same re-
quirements will have to be read in regard to shop required to
~ be used by the son of the landlord for business purpose. Ac- F
cordingly, we are of the view that the impugned decision of the
High Court is in direct conflict with the Judgment of this Court in
Joginder Singh's case (supra) and therefore, the said Judg-
ment cannot be sustained.
14. There is another aspect of this matter. While making G
an interpretation of Section 13 of the Act, the High Court did not
~--- deal with Section 13 of the Rent Act completely but it dealt with
only that part of Section 13 which deals with residential building
only and has not dealt with portion of Section 13, which deals
with non-residential building. It is true that while reversing the H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A order of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority, the High
Court in the impugned order had also taken note of the deci-
sion in Joginder Pal's case (supra), but in view of our discus-
sions made herein above, the ratio of the aforesaid decision
was not applied in the present case. There is yet another angle
B in which the High Court was not justified in interfering with the
order of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority which was
the final court of fact. The Appellate Authority while directing
eviction to the respondents considered the oral and documen-
tary evidence on record and also the pleadings of the parties
C and then came to a finding that the appellants had successfully
averred and proved their case of personal requirement as made
out by them under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act. It is true
that the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction could have inter-
fered with such findings of fact arrived at by the Appellate Au-
D thority, ifthe High Court had found that the findings of the Appel-
late Authority on the question of bonafide requirement were ei-
ther perverse or arbitrary. On a close examination of the im-
pugned order of the High Court, we do not find any ground to
hold that the findings of fact, regarding the bonafide require-
ment of the appellants, were perverse or arbitrary or the plead-
E ings made by the appellants in their eviction petition could be
said to be not in conformity with the requirement of Section
13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act. Therefore, we are also of the view
that the High Court was in error in interfering with the order of
eviction passed by the Appellate Authority on the ground of
F bonafide requirement.
15. At this stage, an argument advanced by the learned
counsel for the respondents may be considered. The learned
counsel for the respondents relied on a decision of this Court in
G Hasmat Rai &Anr. Vs. Raghunath Prasad [(1981) 3 SCC 103]
and contended that a portion of the demised premises may
also be used as a residential premises, which cannot be con-
sidered to be a commercial premises for the purpose of evict-
ing the tenant under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act. We are
unable to accept this submission of the learned counsel for the
H
AJIT SINGH & ANR. v. JIT RAM & ANR. 569
[TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

respondents, for the simple reasons, first, the decision in A
Hasmat Rai's case (supra) was based on M.P. Accommoda-
tion Control Act, 1961 which confers on the authority to pass
order of eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement on a
different wording from the words used in East Punjab Urban
.. J. Rent Registration Act, 1949. Furthermore, it may be reiterated B
that in order to obtain an order of eviction under Section
13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act, the landlord has to prove, as noted
herein earlier, that he required the said shop for his own use
and the said shop was a non-residential building. In this case,
admittedly the said shop is used for commercial purposes and c
therefore there was no question of the said shop being used as
residential purposes or being used for a portion of residential
purposes for residential use. That being the position, the afore-
said decision, in our view, is clearly distinguishable. Accord-
ingly, the above decision of this court is of no help to the re-
---"' spondents.
0

16. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the
High Court is hereby set aside and the order of the Appellate
Authority is restored and the eviction petition filed by the appel-
lants stands allowed. E
-17. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case
and considering the facts that the respondents are using the
said shop for commercial purposes and have been carrying on
business in the same, we grant the respondents 9 months' time
to vacate the same, subject to filing the usual undertaking in F
this Court within two weeks from this date. Accordingly, the ap-
peal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
D.G. Appeal allowed.