AMAR PAL SINGHversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANR.

                        [2012) 5 S.C.R. 1154


A                         AMAR PAL SINGH
                                   v.
                     STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 651 of 2009)

                            MAY 17, 2012
B
          [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

        Judiciary - Adverse remarks and direction against
  Subordinate Judicial officer in judgment of High Court -
C Expunction of - Application filed before appellant, the Chief
  Judicial Magistrate, Bulandshahar, u/s. 156(3) of CrPC for
  issuance of direction to the police to register FIR and make
  investigation into the alleged criminal offences - Appellant
  dismissed the application - In revision, High Court set aside
o the impugned order and made adverse comments and
  observations against the appellant and also passed direction
  for appropriate action against him - Prayer for expunction of
  comments, observations and the direction passed against the
  appellant - Held: Derogatory remarks against a judicial officer
E not only causes immense harm to him individually (as the
  expunction of the remarks later on may not completely
  resuscitate his reputation) but also affects the credibility of the
  institution and corrodes the sacrosanctity of its zealously
  cherished philosophy - A judge of a superior Court however
F str:ongly he may feel about the unmerited and fallacious order
  passed by an officer, but is required to maintain sobriety,
  calmness, dispassionate reasoning and poised restraint - The
  concept of loco parentis has to take a foremost place in the
  mind to keep at bay any uncalled for, any unwarranted
G remarks - In the case at hand, the observations, the comment
  and the eventual direction were wholly unwarranted and
  uncalled for - Appellant had felt that due to delay and other
  ancillary factors there was no justification to exercise power
  uls. 156(3) CrPC - High Court, as is manifest, had a different

H                                1154
   AMAR PAL SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.                1155


perception of the whole scenario - Perceptions of fact and          A
application of law may be erroneous but that never warrants
such kind of observations and directions - Regard being had
to the aforesaid, the remarks and the direction against the
appellant are expunged - If the said remarks have been
entered into the annual confidential roll of the judicial officer   B
the same shall stand expunged.

    An application was filed before the appellant, the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bulandshahar, under Section
156(3) of CrPC for issuance of direction to the police to           C
register FIR and make investigation into the alleged
offences of murderous assault causing fire-arm injuries
to one person. The appellant ascribed certain reasons
and dismissed the application. Dissatisfied, the
complainant preferred revision before the High Court
which while setting aside the order of appellant-Chief              D
Judicial Magistrate made adverse comments and
observations against the appellant and also passed
direction for appropriate action against him.

     Prayer was made in the instant appeal to delete the · E
aforesaid comments, observations and the ultimate
direction passed by the High Court. It was submitted on
behalf of the appellant that the observations and the
consequential direction made by the High Court were
totally unwarranted and indubitably affected the self- F
esteem and career of a member of the subordinate
judiciary and therefore deserved to be expunged.

     The issue which therefore arose for consideration
was whether the remarks and the directions made by the
High Court were made in consonance with the principles              G
laid down by the various pronouncements of this Court
and was in accord with judicial decorum and propriety.

     Allowing the appeal, the Court
                                                                    H
    1156    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012) 5 S.C.R.

A      HELD:1. The present appeal frescoes a picture and
  exposits a canvas how, despite numerous
  pronouncements of this Court, while dealing with the
  defensibility of an order passed by a Judge of
  subordinate court when it is under assail before the
B superior Court in appeal or revision, the imperative
  necessity of use of temperate and sober language
  warranting total restraint regard being had to the fact that
  a judicial officer is undefended and further, more
  importantly, such unwarranted observations, instead of
c enhancing the respect for the judiciary, creates a
  concavity in the hierarchical system and brings the
  judiciary downhill, has been totally ostracised. Further,
  the trend seems to be persistent like an incurable
  cancerous cell which explodes out at the slightest
D imbalance. [Para 1) [1160-A-C]

         Masuman v. State of UP. and Anr. 2007 AIJ (1) 221 -
    referred to.

         2.1. For more than four decades this Court has been
E   laying emphasis on the sacrosanct duty of a Judge of a
    superior Court how to employ the language in judgment
    so that a message to the officer concerned is conveyed.
    It has been clearly spelt out that there has to be a
    process of reasoning while unsettling the judgment and
F   such reasoning are to be reasonably stated with clarity
    and result orientation. A distinction has been lucidly
    stated between a message and a rebuke. A Judge is
    required to maintain decorum and sanctity which are
    inherent in judicial discipline and restraint. A judge
G   functioning at any level has dignity in the eyes of public
    and credibility of the entire system is dependent on use
    of dignified language and sustained restraint,moderation
    and sobriety. Independence of judiciary has an
    insegregable and inseparable link with its credibility.
H   Unwarranted comments on the judicial officer creates a
   AMAR PAL SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.           1157


dent in the said credibility and consequently leads to         A
some kind of erosion and affects the conception of rule
of law. The sanctity of decision making process should
not be confused with sitting on a pulpit and delivering
sermons which defy decorum because it is obligatory on
the part of the superior Courts to take recourse to            B
correctional measures. A reformative method can be
taken recourse to on the administrative side. It is condign
to state it should be paramount in the mind of a Judge
of superior Court that a Judicial officer projects the face
of the judicial system and the independence of judiciary       c
at the ground reality level and derogatory remarks
against a judicial officer would cause immense harm to
him individually (as the expunction of the remarks later
on may not completely resuscitate his reputation) but
also affects the credibility of the institution and corrodes
                                                               0
the sacrosanctity of its zealously cherished philosophy.
A judge of a superior Court however strongly he may feel
about the unmerited and fallacious order passed by an
officer, but is required to maintain sobriety, calmness,
dispassionate reasoning and poised restraint. The
concept of loco parentis has to take a foremost place in       E
the mind to keep at bay any uncalled for, any unwarranted
remarks. [Para 19] [1170-D-H; 1171-A-D]

     2.2. Every judge has to remind himself about the
aforesaid principles and religiously adhere to them. There     F
is a distinction between a man who has command over
'Shastras' and the other who knows it and puts into
practice. He who practises them can atone be called a
'vidvan'. The said principle can be taken recourse to, for
one may know or be aware of that use of intemperate            G
language should be avoided in judgments but white
penning the same the control over the language is
forgotten and acquired knowledge is not applied to the
arena of practice. Or to put it differently the knowledge
stands still and not verbalised into action. Therefore, a      H
    1158    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 5 S.C.R.

A committed comprehensive endeavour has to be made to
  put the concept to practice so that it is concretised and
  fructified and the litigations of the present nature are
  avoided. [Para 20] [1171-E-G]

       lshari Prasad Mishra v. Mohammad Isa AIR 1963 SC
8
  1728: 1963 SCR 722; Alok Kumar Roy v. Dr. S.N. Sarma
  and Anr. AIR 1968 SC 453: 1968 SCR 813; lshwar Chand
  Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana and Anr. AIR 1988
  SC 1395: 1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 396; K. P. Tiwari v. State of
  Madhya Pradesh AIR 1994 SC 1031: 1993 (3) Suppl. SCR
C 497; Kasi Nath Roy v. State of Bihar AIR 1991 SC 3240; Braj
  Kishore Thakur v. Union of India 1997 SCR 420; A. M.
  Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta AIR 1990 SC 1737: 1990
  (2) SCR 110 ; Re; K, a Judicial officer AIR 2001 SC 1972;
  State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nairn AIR 1964 SC
D 703: 1964 SCR 363; Samya Sett v. Shambu Sarkar and Anr.
  AIR 2005 SC 3309: 2005 (2 ) Suppl. SCR 686 and State of
  M. P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and Ors. 1987 1 SCR 1; State of Bihar
  v. Nilmani Sahu and Anr. (1999) 9 sec 211 - relied on.

E      3. In the case at hand, the observations, the
  comment and the eventual direction were wholly
  unwarranted and uncalled for. The appellant-Chief
  Judicial Mag!strate had felt that due to delay and other
  ancillary factors there was no justification to exercise the
F power under Section 156 (3) of the Code. The High Court,
  as is manifest, had a different perception of the whole
  scenario. Perceptions of fact and application of law may
  be erroneous but that never warrants such kind of
  observations and directions. Regard being had to the
G aforesaid, the remarks and the direction against the
  appellant [as reproduced in paragraph three of this
  judgment] are expunged. If the said remarks have been
  entered into the annual confidential roll of the judicial
  officer the same shall stand expunged. A copy of the
  order be sent by the Registrar of this Court to the
H
   AMAR PAL SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.                1159


Registrar General of the High Court of Allahabad to be            A
placed on the personal file of the concerned judicial
officer. [Para 21] [1171-H; 1172-A-D]

                     Case Law Reference:
    2007 AIJ (1) 221              referred to     Para 7          B
    1963 SCR 722                  relied on       Para 9
    1968 SCR 813                  relied on       Para 10, 17
    1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 396       relied on       Para 11         c
    1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 497       relied on       Para 12
    AIR 1991 SC 3240              relied on       Para 13
    1997 SCR 420                  relied on       Para 14
                                                                  D
    1990 (2) SCR 110              relied on       Para 15
    AIR 2001 SC 1972              relied on       Para 16
    1964 SCR 363                  relied on       Para 16, 17
    2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 686       relied on       Para 17         E

    1987 1 SCR 1                  relied on       Para 17
    (1999) 9 sec 211              relied on       Para 18

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal             F
No. 651 of 2009.

    From the Judgment and Order dated 31.05.2007 of the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No.
1541 of 2007.
                                                                  G
    S.S. Dahiya, M.S. Bakshi, Debasis Misra for the Appellant.

    R.K. Dash, Abhishth Kumar, Dr. Monika Guaain for the
Respondents.
                                                                  H
    1160    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A       The Judgment of the Court was deiivered by

       DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. The present appeal frescoes a
  picture and exposits a canvas how, despite numerous
  pronouncements of this Court, while dealing with the
  defensibility of an order passed by a Judge of subordinate court
8
  when it is under assail before the superior Court in appeal or"
  revision, the imperative necessity of use of temperate and
  sober language warranting total restraint regard being had to
  the fact that a judicial officer is undefended and further, more
  importantly, such unwarranted observations, instead of
C enhancing the respect for the judiciary, creates a concavity in
  the hierarchical system and brings the judiciary downhill, has
  been totally ostracised. Further, the trend seems to be
  persistent like an incurable cancerous cell which explodes out
  at the slightest imbalance.
D
       2. The appellant, a judicial officer, being aggrieved by the
  comments and observations passed by the learned Single
  Judge of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal
  Revision No. 1541 of 2007 vide order dated 31.05.2007, has
E preferred the present appeal. The brief resume of facts are that
  one Sunil Solanki had filed an application under Section 156
  (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code')
  before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bulandshahar with the
  allegation that on 11.02.2007 at 09.30 p.m. when he was
F standing outside the door of his house along with some others,
  a marriage procession passed through the front door of his
  house and at that juncture, one Mauzzim Ali accosted him and
  eventually fired at him from his country made pistol which
  caused injuries on the abdomen area of Shafeeque, one of his
  friends. However, as good fortune would have it, said
G Shafeeque escaped unhurt. Because of the said occurrence,
  Sunil Solanki endeavoured hard to get the FIR registered at the
  concerned police station but the entire effort became an
  exercise in futility as a consequence of which he was compelled
  to knock at the doors of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate
H
     AMAR PAL SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.                  1161
                 [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

by filing an application under Section 156 (3) of the Code for         A
issue of a direction to the police to register an FIR and
investigate the matter. While dealing with the application, the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, the appellant herein, ascribed
certain reasons and dismissed the same.
                                                                       B
     3. Being dissatisfied, said Sunil Solanki preferred a
revision before the High Court and the learned Single Judge,
taking note of the allegations made in the application, found that
it was a fit case where the learned Magistrate should have
directed the registration of FIR and investigation into the alleged    C
offences. While recording such a conclusion, the learned Judge
has made certain observations which are reproduced below:-

      "This conduct of chief Judicial Magistrate is deplorable
      and wholly malafide and illegal"
                                                                       D
Thereafter the learned Judge treated the order to be wholly
hypothetical and commented it was :-

      "vexatiously illegal"

After so stating the learned Single Judge further stated that          E
Chief Judicial Magistrate has committed a blatant error of law.
Thereafter the passage runs thus:-

     "....... and has done unpardonable injustice to the injured and
the informant. His lack of sensitivity and utter callous attitude
                                                                       F
has left the accused of murderous assault to go Scot-free to
this day."

After making the aforesaid observations, he set aside the order
and remitted the matter to the Chief Judicial Magistrate to
decide the application afresh in accordance with law as has            G
been spelt out by the High Court of Allahabad in the case of
Masuman v. State of U. P. and Another1 • Thereafter, he
directed as follows-

1.   2007 ALJ (1) 221.                                                 H
     1162      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A         "Let a copy of this order be sent to the Administrative
          Judge, Bulandshahar to take appropriate action against
          the concerned C.J.M. as he deem fit."

         4. The prayer in the Special Leave Petition is to delete the
    aforesaid comments, observations and the ultimate direction.
8
        5. We have heard Mr. Ratnakar Dash, learned senior
    counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the State.

         6. It is submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing
c   on behalf of the appellant that the aforesaid observations and
    the consequential direction were totally unwarranted and
    indubitably affect the self-esteem and career of a member of
    the subordinate judiciary and therefore deserve to be expunged.

       7. The learned counsel for the State has fairly stated that
D a judicial officer enjoys a status in the eyes of the public at large
  and his reputation stabilises the inherent faith of a litigant in the
  system and establishes authenticity and hence, the remarks
  made by the learned Single Judge should not be allowed to
  stand.
E
          8. At the very outset, we make it clear that we are neither
  concerned with the justifiability of the order passed by the Chief
  Judicial Magistrate nor are we required to dwell· upon the legal
  pregnability of the order passed by the learned Single Judge
F as far as it pertains to dislodging of the order of the learned
  Magistrate. We are only obliged to address to the issue whether
  the aforesaid remarks and the directions have been made in
  consonance with the principles that have been laid down by the
  various pronouncements of this Court and is in accord with
G judicial decorum and propriety.

        9. In lshwari Prasad Mishra v. Mohammad lsa 2, the High
    Court, while dealing with the judgment of the trial court in an
    appeal before it, had passed severe strictures against the trial

H   2.   AIR 1963 SC 1728.
     AMAR PAL SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.                 1163
                 [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

couh at several places and, in substance, had suggested that           A
the decision of the trial court was not only perverse but was also
based on extraneous considerations. Dealing with the said kind
of delineation and the comments, Gajendragadkar, J (as His
Lordship then was) authoring the judgment held that the High
Court was not justified in passing the strictures against the trial    B
Judge. The Bench observed that judicial experience shows that
in adjudicating upon the rival claims brought before the courts,
it is not always easy to decide where the truth lies. Evidence
is adduced by the respective parties in support of their
conflicting contentions and circumstances are similarly pressed        c
into service. In such a case, it is, no doubt, the duty of the Judge
to consider the evidence objectively and dispassionately,
examine it in the light of probabilities and decide which way
the truth lies. The impression formed by the Judge about the
character of the evidence will ultimately determine the                D
conclusion which he reaches. But it would be unsafe to overlook
the fact that all judicial minds may not react in the same way to
the said evidence and it is not unusual that evidence which
appears to be respectable and trustworthy to one Judge may
not appear to be respectable and trustworthy to another Judge.
                                                                       E
That explains why in some cases courts of appeal reverse
conclusions of facts recorded by the trial Court on its
appreciation of oral evidence. The knowledge that another view
is possible on the evidence adduced in a case acts as a
sobering factor and leads to the use of temperate language in
recording judicial conclusions. Judicial approach in such cases        F
would always be based on the consciousness that one may
make a mistake; that is why the use of unduly strong words in
expressing conclusions, or the adoption of unduly strong
intemperate, or extravagant criticism against the contrary view,
which are often founded on a sense of infallibility should always      G
be avoided. ft is worth noting that emphasis was laid on
sobriety, judicial poise and balance.

      10. In Alok Kumar Roy v. Dr. S. N. Sarma and Anr., 3 the
3.   AIR 1968 SC 453.                                                  H
    1164      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A Constitution Bench was dealing the issue whether a Judge of
  High Court can pass order in that capacity while he was working
  as Head of the Commission of enquiry and whether he can
  entertain writ petition and pass interim order while being at a
  place which was not seat of High Court. The learned Chief
B Justice of High Court while dealing with the matter commented
  on the Judge that he had passed the order in "unholy haste and
  hurry". That apart certain observations were made. While not
  appreciating the said remarks in the judgment against a
  colleague, their Lordships opined that such observations even
c about the Judges of subordinate courts with the clearest
  evidence of impropriety are uncalled for in a judgment. The
  Constitution Bench further proceeded to state that it is
  necessary to emphasise that judicial decorum has to be
  maintained at all times and even where criticism is justified it
  must be in language of utmost restraint, keeping always in view
0
  that the person making the comment is also fallible. Even when
  there is jurisdiction for criticism, the language should be
  dignified and restrained.

       11. In lshwar Chand Jain v High Court of Punjab and
E Haryana and Anr. 4, it has been observed that while exercising
  control over subordinate judiciary under Article 235 of the
  Constitution, the High Court is under a Constitutional obligation
  to guide and protect subordinate judicial officers.

F       12. In K. P. Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh 5, the High
  Court while reversing the order passed by the lower Court had
  made certain remarks about the interestedness and the motive
  of the lower Court in passing the impugned order. In that context
  this Court observed that one of the functions of the higher Court
G is either to modify or ser aside erroneous orders passed by
  the lower Court. It has been further observed that a judge tries
  to discharge his duties to the best of his capacity. While doing
  so, sometimes, he is likely to err. "It is well said that a judge
    4.   AIR 1988 SC 1395.
H   5.   AIR 1994 SC 1031.
   AMAR PAL SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.               1165
               [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

who has not committed an error is yet to be born", and that A
applies to judges at all levels from the lowest to the highest.
Sometimes, the difference in views of the higher and the lower
courts is purely a result of a difference in approach and
perception. On such occasions, the lower courts are not
necessarily wrong and the higher courts always right. It has also B
to be remembered that the lower judicial officers mostly work
under a charged atmosphere and are constantly under a
psychological pressure with all the contestants and their
lawyers almost breathing down their necks - more correctly upto
their nostrils. They do not have the benefit of a detached         c
atmosphere of the higher courts to think coolly and decide
patiently. Every error, however gross it may look, should not,
therefore, be attributed to improper motive. It is possible that
a particular judicial officer may be consistently passing orders
creating a suspicion of judicial conduct which is not wholly or
                                                                    0
even partly attributable to innocent functioning. Even in such
cases, the proper course for the higher court to adopt is to
make note of his conduct in the confidential record of his work
and to use it on proper occasions. The judges in the higher
courts have also a duty to ensure judicial discipline and respect
for the judiciary from all concerned. The respect for the judiciary E
is not enhanced when judges at the lower level are criticised
intemperately and castigated publicly. No greater damage can
be done to the administration of justice and to the confidence
of the people in the judiciary than when the judges of the higher
courts publicly express lack of faith in the subordinate judges F
for one reason or the other. It must be remembered that the
officers against whom such strictures are publicly passed, stand
condemned for ever in the eyes of their subordinates and of
the members of the public. No better device can be found to
destroy the judiciary from within. The judges must, therefore, G
exercise self-restraint. There are ways and ways of expressing
disapproval of the orders of the subordinate courts but
attributing motives to them is certainly not one of them as that
is the surest way to take the judiciary downhill.
                                                                   H
      1166       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 5 S.C.R.

A       13. In Kasi Nath Roy v. State of Biha~ it has been ruled
  that in our hierarchical judicial system the appellate and
  revisional Courts have been set up with the pre-supposition that
  the lower Courts in some measure of cases can go wrong in
  decision making, both on facts as also on law. The superior
B Courts have been established to correct errors but the said
  correction has to be done in a befitting manner maintaining the
  dignity of the Court and independence of the judiciary. It is the
  obligation of the higher Courts to convey the message in the
  judgment to the officers concerned through a process of
C reasoning, essentially, persuasive, reasonable, mellow but clear
  and result orienting but rarely a rebuke.

      14. In Braj Kishore Thakur v. Union of lndia 7 this Court
  disapproved the practice of passing strictures for orders
  against the subordinate officers. In that context the two-Judge
D Bench observed thus:-

            "No greater damage can be caused to the administration
            of justice and to the confidence of people in judicial
            institutions when judges of higher courts publicly express
            lack of faith in the subordinate judges. It has been said,
E           time and again, that respect for judiciary is not in hands
            by using intemperate language and by casting aspersions
            against lower judiciary."

           15. In A M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta 8 though in a
F     different context immense emphasis was laid on judicial
      restraint and discipline, it is appropriate to reproduce a passage
      from the said decision:-

                   "Judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to
            the orderly administration of justice as they are to the
G           effectiveness of the army. The duty of restraint, this humility
            of function should be a constant theme of our judges. This
            quality in decision making is as much necessary for
    , 6.   AIR 1991 SC 3240.
      7.   1997 SCR 420.
H     8.   AIR 1990 SC 1737.
     AMAR PAL SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.                 1167
                 [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

      judges to command respect as to protect the                      A
      independence of the judiciary. Judicial restraint in this
      regard might better be called judicial respect; that is,
      respect by the judiciary. Respect to those who come
      before the Court as well to other coordinate before the
      Court as well to other coordinate branches of the State,         B
      the Executive and Legislature. There must be mutual
      respect. When these qualities fail or when litigants and
      public believe that the judge has failed in these qualities,
      it will be neither good for the judge nor for the judicial
       process."                                                       c
     16. In Re; K, a Judicial officer, 9 a two-Judge Bench of this
Court was dealing about the adverse remarks contained in the
judgment of the High Court disposing of a Criminal Misc.
Petition under Section 482 of the Code and the expunction
sought by a Metropolitan Magistrate was aggrieved of such              D
remark. After discussing that aggrieved judicial officer could
approach this Court for expunging the remarks the Bench
opined under what circumstances the exercise of power of
making remarks can withstand scrutiny. The Bench reiterated
the view expressed in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad               E
Naim 10, wherein it was clearly stated that the overall test is that
the criticism or observation must be judicial in nature and should
not formally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve.
Thereafter their Lordships referred to the conception of judicial
restraint, the controlling power, the expectations of subordinate      F
judiciary form the High Court, the statutory jurisdiction exercised
by the High Court and eventually opined that the High Courts
 have to remember that criticisms and observations touching a
subordinate judicial officer incorporated in judicial
 pronouncements have their won mischievous infirmities.                G
 Thereafter the Court proceeded to enumerate the infirmities.
 They read as follows:-

9.   AIR 2001 SC 1972.
10. AIR 1964 SC 703.                                                   H
     1168      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A          "Firstly, the judicial officer is condemned unheard which is
           violative of principles of natural justice. A member of
           subordinate judiciary himself dispensing justice should not
           be denied this minimal natural justice so as to shield
          against being condemned unheard. Secondly, the harm
B         caused by such criticism or observation may be incapable
          of being undone. Such criticism of the judicial officer
          contained in a judgment, reportable or not, is a
          pronouncement in open and therefore becomes public. The
          same Judge who found himself persuaded, sitting on
c         judicial side, to make observations guided by the facts of
          a single case against a subordinate Judge may sitting on
          administrative side and apprised of overall meritorious
          performance of the subordinate Judge, may irretrievably
          regret his having made those observations on judicial side
         the harming effect whereof even he himself cannot remove
D
          on administrative side. Thirdly, human nature being what
         it is, such criticism of a judicial officer contained in the
         judgment of a higher Court gives the litigating party a sense
         of victory not only over his opponent but also over the
         Judge who had decided the case against him. This is
E        subversive of judicial authority of the deciding Judg~.
         Fourthly, seeking expunging of the observations by judicial
         officer by filing an appeal or petition of his own reduces
         him to the status of a litigant arrayed as a party before the
         High Court or Supreme Court - a situation not very happy
F        from the point of view of the functioning of the judicial
         system."

  Thereafter the Bench laid down how the matter should be
  handled and should be dealt with on the administrative side and
G ultimately expunged the remarks.

        17. In Samya Sett v. .Shambu Sarkar and Anr., 11 the court
    was dealing with the case where a judicial officer was
    constrained to approach this court for expunging the remarks
H   11. AIR 2005 SC 3309.
    AMAR PAL SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.                  1169
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

made by Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta against             A
him. Their Lordships referred to the decisions in Mohammad
Nairn (supra), Alok Kumar Roy (supra), State of M. P. v.
Nand/al Jaiswal and Ors. 12 and certain other authorities and
opined that the stricture was totally inappropriate. In that context
the court referred to certain passages about the view expressed        B
in other countries. We think it apt to reproduce them.

     "It is universally accepted and we are conscious of the fact
     that judges are also human beings. They have their own
     likes and dislikes; their preferences and prejudices.             C
     Dealing with an allegation of bias against a Judge, in
     Linahan, Re, (1943) 138 F llnd 650, Frank J. stated;

             "If, however, 'bias' and 'partiality' be defined to
             mean that total absence of preconceptions in the
             mind of the judge, then no one has ever had a fair        D
             trial, and no one ever will. The human mind, even
             at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born
             with predispositions and the processes of
             education, formal and informal create attitudes
             which precede reasoning in particular instances           E
             and which, therefore, by definition are prejudices."

     Justice John Clarke has once stated;

             "I have never known any judges, no difference how
             austere of manner, who discharged their judicial          F
             duties in an atmosphere of pure, unadulterated
             reason. Alas! we are 'all the common growth of the
             Mother Earth' - even those of us who wear the long
             robe."
                                                                       G
    18. In State of Bihar v. Nilmani Sahu and Anr. 13 a sitting
judge of the Patna High Court had approached this Court for

12. 1987 1 SCR 1.
13. (1999) 9 sec 211.                                                  H
    1170     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A expunction of the some observations made by this Court in
  disposing of a special leave petition arising out of a land
  acquisition proceeding. A Bench of this Court had used the
  expression "We find that the view taken by the learned Singh
  Judge, Justice P. K. Dev, with due respect, if we can say so,
B is most atrocious". The learned Single Judge had treated this
  to be stigmatic and approached this Court and raised a
  contention that it was not necessary for the decision. A two-
  Judge Bench of this Court after hearing the learned counsel for
  the parties and considering the judgment of this Court opined
c the expression used in the judgment was wholly inappropriate
  inasmuch as when this Court uses an expression against the
  judgment of the High Court it must be in keeping with dignity
  of the person concerned. Eventually the said observations were
  deleted.

D       19. From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is quite clear
  that for more than four decades this Court has been laying
  emphasis on the sacrosanct duty of a Judge of a superior Court
  how to employ the language in judgment so that a message to
  the officer concerned is conveyed. It has been clearly spelt out
E that there has to be a process of reasoning while unsettling the
  judgment and such reasoning are to be reasonably stated with
  clarity and result orientation. A distinction has been lucidly
  stated between a message and a rebuke. A Judge is required
  to maintain decorum and sanctity which are inherent in judicial
F discipline and restraint. A judge functioning at any level has
  dignity in the eyes of public and credibility of the entire system
  is dependent on use of dignified language and sustained
  restraint, moderation and sobriety. It is not to be forgotten that
  independence of judiciary has an insegregable and
G inseparable link with its credibility. Unwarranted comments on
  the judicial officer creates a dent in the said credibility and
  consequently leads to some kind of erosion and affects the
  conception of rule of law. The sanctity of decision making
  process should not be confused with sitting on a pulpit and
H delivering sermons which defy decorum because it is obligatory
    AMAR PAL SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.                   1171
               [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 6

on the part of the superior Courts to take recourse to                 A
correctional measures. A reformative method can be taken
recourse to on the administrative side. It is condign to state it
should be paramount in the mind of a Judge of superior Court
that a Judicial officer projects the face of the judicial system
and the independence of judiciary at the ground reality level and      B
derogatory remarks against a judicial officer would cause
immense harm to him individually (as the expunction of the
remarks later on may not completely resuscitate his reputation)
but also affects the credibility of the institution and corrodes the
sacrosanctity of its zealously cherished philosophy. A judge of        c
a superior Court however strongly he may feel about the
unmerited and fallacious order passed by an officer, but is
required to maintain sobriety, calmness, dispassionate
reasoning and poised restraint. The concept of loco parentis
has to take a foremost place in the mind to keep at bay any
                                                                       0
uncalled for any unwarranted remarks.

     20. Every judge has to remind himself about the aforesaid
principles and religiously adhere to them. In this regard it would
not be out of place to sit in the time machine and dwell upon
the sagacious saying of an eminent author who has said that            E
there is a distinction between a man who has command over
'Shastras' and the other who knows it and puts into practice.
He who practises them can alone be called a 'vidvan'. T)1ough
it was told in a different context yet the said principle can be
taken recourse to, for one may know or be aware of that use            F
of intemperate language should be avoided in judgments but
while penning the same the control over the language is
forgotten and acquired knowledge is not applied to the arena
of practice. Or to put it differently the knowledge stands still and
not verbalised into action. Therefore, a committed                     G
comprehensive endeavour has to be made to put the concept
to practice so that it is concretised and fructified and the
litigations of the present nature are avoided.

     21. Coming to the case at hand in our considered opinion
                                                                       H
    1172     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A the observations, the comment and the eventual direction were
  wholly unwarranted and uncalled for. The learned Chief Judicial
  Magistrate had felt that the due to delay and other ancillary
  factors there was no justification to exercise the power under
  Section 156 (3) of the Code. The learned Single Judge, as is
B manifest, had a different perception of the whole scenario.
  Perceptions of fact and application of law may be erroneous
  but that never warrants such kind of observations and directions.
  Regard being had to the aforesaid we unhesitatingly expunge
  the remarks and the direction which have been reproduced in
c paragraph three of our judgment. If the said remarks have been
  entered into the annual confidential roll of the judicial officer the
  same shall stand expunged. That apart a copy of the order be
  sent by the Registrar of this Court to the Registrar General of
  the High Court of Allahabad to be placed on the personal file
  of the concerned judicial officer.
0
       22. The appeal is ailowed accordingly.

    B.B.B.                                          Appeal allowed.