AMINA AHMED DOSSA AND ORS.versusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA

'.

                                     AMINA AHMED DOSSA AND ORS.                                      A
             ""'                                         v.
                                         STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

                                               JANUARY 15, 2001

                                     [K.T. THOMAS AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.]                               B
             7

                           Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 Sections 8
                   and 19-Claim of rights and interests by third party in properties of
                   proclaimed person sought to be attached under law-Order of Designated
                   Court rejecting the claims-Interlocutory order or final order-Held, it is an      c.
                   i11t.er!ixZ1tory order for third party claimants

                         Words and Phrases:

                        Interlocutory Order-Meaning of-In the context of Code of Criminal
                   Procedure, 1973-Sections 82 to 84.                                                D


             •·         Appellants claimed rights and interests before Designated Court in
                   properties of a proclaimed person under Section 84 Cr.P.C., which were
                   sought to be attached under Section 8 of Terrorists and Disruptive Activities
                   (Prevention) Act, 1987. The Designated Court rejected the claims of the
                   appellants. Hence the appeal.
                                                                                                     E
     '
•'I
     ...,,
             .          · Respondent-State contended that the order of the Designated Court is
                   only an interlocutory order and therefore the remedy of appeal is not available
                   to the appellants.
                                                                                                     F
                        The appellants, on the other hand, contended that the order of the
                   Designated Court is a final ordi;r and therefore an appeal lies under the Act.

                         Dismissing the appeal, the Court

,.           ~           HELD: 1.1. A combined reading of Sections 8 and 19 of the Terrorists        G
                   and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and Section 84(4)      of
                                                                                          the
                   Code makes it abundantly clear that the person not being a proclaimed
                   offender against whom an order is passed under Section 8 of the Act read
                   with Section 84 of the Code has remedy of filing a suit which reflects the
                   intention of the Legislature to treat the order of the Designated Court, in
                                                              345
                                                                                                     H
    346                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2001) I S.C.R.

A so far as it affects the third party claimant, to be an interlocutory· order. Such    Y
    an order would, however, be deemed to be a final order so far as the prosecution,
    the State and the proclaimed offender are concerned particularly in view of
    the provisions of Section 96 of the Code. Interlocutory order in law means,
    not that which decides the cause but which only settles intervening matter
B   relating to the cause. Such an order is made pending the cause and before
    the final hearing on merits. It is made to secure some end and purpose
    necessary and essential to the progress of the case and generally collateral
    to the issues to be settled by the court in the final judgment. Orders
    summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for
    reports, attaching the properties (with the exception of Section 86) and such
c   other steps in the aid of pending proceedings shall amount to be interlocutory
    orders against which no appeal can be oreferred with the aid of Section 19
    of the Act. As the order attaching the property in so far as it relates to the
    claimant third party, is subject to the decision of the civil court, it cannot
    be held to be a final order. [349-F-G-H; 350-A-B]

D          t.2. The order impugned herein has not, in any manner, finally
    adjudicated the rights of the appellants entitling them to file the appeal on
    the ground of their claim of the impugned order being final. Having regard
    to the scheme of the Act, read with relevant provisions of the Code, the
    expression "interlocutory order" appearing in Section 19 of the Act would
E   have to be understood to be not deciding the rights of the claimants finally
    and thus are interlocutory orders. Giving any other interpretation would
    defeat the dominant purpose of the Act and result in not only multiplicity of
    litigation but ultimately conflicting verdicts. If the impugned order is held
    to be not an interlocutory order and subject to appeal, the consequence would
    be that despite dismissal of the appeal by this Court, the aggrieved claimant
F   would be entitled to resort to the remedy of filing the suit with the aid and
    under the cover of the mandate of sub-section (4) of Section 84 of the Code.
    In that event a fresh litigation would commence, not only unnecessarily
    burdening the parties and wasting the public time of the courts but also
    creating embarrassing positions for the civil courts to adjudicate afresh the
G   claims of the parties as finally determined by this Court in proceedings
    under the Act. Such could not be the intention of the Legislature. Upon a
    harmonious interpretation of the various provisions of the Act and the Code,
    there is no escape from the position that the order passed by the Designated
    Court under Section 84 of the Code in so far as it relates to the third party
    rights of the claimant is only an interlocutory order and not final order for
H   which an appeal could be filed under Section 19 of the Act. But if such
               AMINA AHMED DOSSA v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [SETHI, J.]                347

 'V    aggrieved claimant does not choose to challenge the order by way of a suit,          A
       such order would become final so far as the State is concerned. A suit can
       be filed only at the instance of the person whose claims or objections are
       disallowed. Hence, when the claims or objections are upheld, the aggrieved
       party can avail himself of the remedy under Section 19 of the Act.
                                                                 (350-C-D-E-F-GJ
                                                                                            B
            CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                         Criminal Appeal
       Nos. 757, 760 and 763 of 2000.

             From the Judgment and Order dated 05.11.1999 passed by the Hon'ble
       Designated Judge, Mumbai at Mumbai on Notice No. 283/94 in BBC Case No.
       1193.
                                                                                            c
\:.
            P.K. Dhakepalkar, S.K. Srivastava, Pramit Saxena, Yash Pal Dhingra, T.C.
       Sharma, P. Parmeswaran and Mukul Rohatgi, ASG for the appea~ing parties.

             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                                            D
              SETHI, J. Appearing for the respondent Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, Additional
       Solicitor General has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability
       of the appeals in terms of Section 18 of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities
       (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") in this Court on
       the ground that as the order impugned is not a judgment, sentence or final           E
       order passed by the Designated Court, the remedy of appeal is not available
       to the appellants. In support of his contention he has referred to the provisions
       of Section 8 of the Act read with Sections 82 to 84 of the Code of Criminal
~      Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code").

             In proceedings for attachment of properties under Section 8 of the Act,        F
       the appellants herein along with some other persons preferred claims, claiming
       rights and interests in the properties sought to be attached on the prayer of
       the prosecution. In a lengthy and detailed judgment, spread over 559 pages,
       the Designated Court rejected their claims and passed orders against them in
....   terms of Section 8 of the Act read with Section 84 of the Code.                      G
             It is conceded before us that the impugned order is neither a judgment
       nor a sentence. The controversy is with respect to the nature of the order
       impugned as the respondent-State submits that the said order passed under
       Section 8 of the Act read with Section 84 of the Code is an interlocutory order
       whereas the appellants submit that the order is a final order so far as parties      H
    348                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     12001] I S.C.R.

A in the appeals are concerned.
           Section 8 of the Act provides:

          "Forfeiture of property of certain persons - (I) Where a person has
          been convicted of any offence punishable under this Act or any rule
B         made thereunder, the Designated Court may, in addition to awarding
          any punishment, by order in writing, declare that any property, movable
          or immovable or both, belonging to the accused and specified in the
          order, shall stand forfeited to the Government free from all
          encumbrances.

c         (2) Where any person is accused of any offence under this Act or any
          rule made thereunder, it shall be open to the Designated Court trying
          him to pass an order that all or any properties, movable or immovable
          or both belonging to him, shall, during the period of such trial, be
          attached, and where such trial ends in conviction, the properties so
          attached shall stand forfeited to the Government free from all
D         encumbrances.

           (3)(a) If upon a report in writing made by a police officer or an officer
          referred to in sub- section (I) of Section 7, any Designated Court has
          reason to believe that any person, who has committed an offence
          punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder, has absconded
E         or is concealing himself so that he may not be apprehended, such
          court may, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 82 of the
          Code, publish a written proclamation requiring him to appear at a
          specified place and at a specified time not less than fifteen days but
          not more than thirty days from the date of publication of such
F         proclamation.

           (b) The Designated Court issuing a proclamation under clause (a)
          may, at any time, order the attachment of any property, movable or
          immovable or both, belonging to the proclaimed person, and thereupon
          the provisions of sections 83 to 85 of the Code shall apply to such
G         attachment as if such attachment were made under that Code.

           (c) If, within six months from the date of the attachment, any person,
          whose property is, or has been, at the disposal of the Government
          under sub- section (2) of Section 85 of the Code, appears voluntarily
          or is apprehended and brought under the Designated Court by whose
H         order the property was attached, or the Court to which such Court is
       AMINA AHMED DOSSA v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [SETHI, J.]                349

       subordinate, and proves to the satisfaction of such court that he did        A
       not abscond or conceal himself for the purpose of avoiding
       apprehension and that he had not received such notice of the
       proclamation as to enable him to attend within the time specified
       therein, such property or, if the same has been sold, the net proceeds
       of the sale and the residue of the property, shall, after satisfying         B
       therefrom all costs incurred in consequence of the attachment, be
       delivered to him.

        (4) Where any shares in a company stand forfeited to the Government
        under this Section, then, the company shall notwithstanding anything
        contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or the articles of         C
        association the company, forthwith register the Government as the
        transferee of such shares.''

       Section 82 of the Code authorises the Court to declare a person
abscondlng on existence of the circumstances specified therein. The Court
issuing a proclamation under Section 82 may, for reasons to be recorded in          D
writing, at any time after the issue of proclamation, order the attachment of
any property, movable or immovable or both, belonging to the proclaimed
person in exercise of Section 83 of t~e Code. Any person feeling that he has
a claim with respect to the properties attached under Section 83 of the Code
can prefer claims and objections in terms of Section 84 of the Code within the
time specified and if the claim or objection is disallowed in whole or in part,     E
such aggrieved person may, within a period of one year from the date of such
order, institute a suit to establish the rights which he claims in respect of the
property in dispute. Subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall
be conclusive.

       Right of appeal under Section 19 is conferred against such orders which      F
are not interlocutory orders. A com~ned reading of Sections 8 and 19 of the
Act and Section 84(4) of the Code makes it abundantly clear that the person
not being a proclaimed offender against whom an order is passed under
Section 8 of the Act read with Section 84 of the Code has the remedy of filing
a suit which reflects the intention of the Legislature to treat the order of the    G
Designated Court, in so far as it affects the third party claimant, to be an
interlocutory order. Such an order would. however, be deemed to be a final
order so far as the prosecution, the state and the proclaimed offender are
concerned particularly in view of the provisions of Section 86 of the Code.
Interlocutory order in law means, not that which decides the cause but which
only settles intervening matter relating to the cause. Such an order is made        H
    350                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [200 I] I S.C.R.

A   pending the cause and before the final hearing on tlie merits. It is made to
    secure some end and purpose necessary and essential to the progress of the
    case and generally collateral to the issues to be settled by the court in the
    final judgment. Orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders
    for bail, calling for reports, attaching the properties (with the exception of
B   Section 86) and such other steps in the aid of pending proceedings shall
    amount to be interlocutory orders against which no appeal can be preferred
    with the aid of Section 19 of the Act. As the order attaching the property in
    so far as relates to the claimant third party, is subject to the decision of the
    civil court, it cannot be held to be a final order.
          The order impugned herein has not, in any manner, finally adjudicated
C the rights of the appellants entitling them to file the appeal on the ground of
    their claim of the impugned order being final. Having regard to the scheme
    of the Act, read with relevant provisions of the Code, the expression
    "interlocutory order" appearing in Section 19 of the Act would have to be
    understood to be not deciding the rights of the claimants finally and thus are
D   interlocutory orders. Giving any other interpretation would defeat the dominant
    purpose of the Act and result in not only multiplicity of litigation but ultimately
    conflicting verdicts. If the impugned order is held to be not an interlocutory
    order and subj•:ct to appeal, the consequence would be that despite dismissal
    of the appeal by this Court, the aggrieved claimant would be entitled to resort
    to the remedy of filing the suit with the aid and under the cover of the
E   mandate of Sub-section (4) of Section 84 of the Code. In that event a fresh
    litigation would commence, not only unnecessarily burdening the parties and
    wasting the public time of the courts but also creating embarrassing positions
    for the civil courts to adjudicate afresh the claims of the parties as finally
    determined by this Court in proceedings under the Act. Such could not be
F   the intention of the Legislature. Upon a harmonious interpretation of the
    various provisions of the Act and the Code, there is no escape from the
    position that the order passed by the Designated Court under Section 84 of
    the Code in so far as it relates to the third party rights of the claimant is only
    an interlocutory order and not final orders for which an appeal could be filed
    under Section 19 of the Act. But if such aggrieved claimant does not choose
G   to challenge the order by way of a suit, such order would become final so
    far as the State is concerned. It may be noted in this context that a suit can
    be filed only at the instance of the person whose claims or objections are
    disallowed. Hence, when the claims or objections are upheld the aggrieved
    party can avail himself of the remedy under Section 19 of the Act.

H         It has been stated at the Bar that after the impugned order the claimants
                AMINA AllMED DOSSA v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [SETHI, J.]              351

-        have in fact filed civil suits which a·re still pending. ~iling of the civil suits A
         indicates the proper understanding of the position of"law by the appellants.
         There is no gainsaying that the civil suits filed by the claimants shall be
         decided on merits and in accordance with the procedure established by law.

            We have noted with concern that the _Special Court has unnecessarily
      spent valuable public time in writing the lengthy jucfpment for disposing of B
      the claims of the appellants which, we feel, could have been decided by a
    ~ brief but speaking orders. Brevity of orders on application of mind and not

      the length of the order is the criterion for adjudicating the rights of the
      parties which are otherwise subject to the decision of a civil court. It would
      be appreciated that the Designated Courts which are otherwise over-burdened C
      shall refrain themselves from writing such unnecessary lengthy judgments
      and pass appropriate brief orders, surely dealing with all points, while
      adjudicating the claims of all the parties. At any rate we do not appreciate
      such lengthy orders for deciding_ interlocutory matters.
                                                                i
              Agreeing with the preliminary objection of the Additional Solicitor         D
         General, we hold that the present appeals are not maintainable and are
         accordingly dismissed.

    ,.._ B.S.                                                       Appeals dismissed.