Holding

A private trust managing an aided college performs a public function and is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226; it is liable to pay the teachers’ dues and mandamus lies.

Summary

The Anand Mukta Smarak Trust, a public trust running an aided science college in Ahmedabad, closed the college and failed to pay arrears of salary, provident fund, gratuity and closure compensation to 11 retrenched teachers. The teachers filed writ petitions under Article 226 seeking mandamus to compel payment. The Trust argued it was a private body not subject to writ jurisdiction, that the University’s pay‑scale award and Ordinance 120E were not binding, and that the State, not the Trust, was liable for the dues. The Supreme Court held that despite being a trust, the college performed a public function funded by government aid and was therefore subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court; the University’s award created a legal duty on the Trust, and Ordinance 120E was applicable. Consequently, mandamus could be issued and the Trust was liable to pay all amounts awarded by the High Court. The appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The liability of the trust to pay arrears of salary, provident fund, gratuity and closure compensation to the retrenched teachers.
The maintainability of writ petitions under Article 226 against a private trust managing an aided educational institution.
Whether the University’s award and Ordinance 120E are binding on the trust.
The question of State reimbursement for amounts payable by the trust (not decided).

Legislation cited

Subjects

Article 226mandamuspublic trustaided educational institutionclosure compensationwrit jurisdictionpublic functionemployment benefits

Judgment

ANAND! MUKTA SADGURU SHREE MUKTA JEEVANDAS A
SWAMI SUVARNA JAYANTI MAHOTSAV SMARK TRUST
& ORS.
v.
V.R. RUDANI & ORS.

APRIL 21, 1989 B

[G.L. OZA AND K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950: Article 226-'Any person or
authority'-Not to be confined only to statutory authorities or instru-
mentalities of the State-Mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that C
duty to be enforced is not imposed by statute.

Appellant No. 1 is a public trust and the other appellants are its
trustees. The Trust was running a science college at Ahmedabad. The
college initially had temporary affiliation to the Gujarat University.
From June 15, 1973 onwards the college had permanent affiliation. D

A dispute between the University Area Teachers Association and
the University was referred to the Chancellor of the University who
gave his award on June 12, 1970. The award was accepted by the State
Government as well as by the University. The latter issued direction to
all affiliated colleges to pay their teachers ln terms of the award. E

The appellants instead of implementing the award served notice of
termination upon 11 teachers on the ground that they were surplus, and
approached the University for permission to remove them. The Vice-
Chancellor did not accept their request. Thereupon the Trust decided
to close down the college. F

The retrenched persons demanded arrears of salary and allowan-
ces, provident fund and gratuity dues, and closure compensation. But
the management did not pay these dues. The employees then moved the
High Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Trust to pay the
retrenched employees their legitimate dues. The High Court accepted G
the writ petitions.

Before this Court, the appellants while conceding the just right of
the employees to get salary for 2~ months and the provident fund dues,
contended that the Trust was entitled to get reimbursement from the
Government in lieu of these payments. As regards the arrears of salary H
697
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A payable under the Chancellor's aWljrd, the appellants contended that it
was the liability of the Government and not of the management of the
college. As regards the closure compensation it was contended that
Ordinance 120E prescribing compensation was ultra vires, and, at any
rate, it was itot binding on the Trust since it was enacted prior to the
affiliation of the college. It was further contended tltat the Trust was a
B private body and was not subject to the writ jurisdiction under Article
226.
i
t.
Dismissing the appeals, it was,

Held: ( I)Tbe Court is only concerned with the liability of the
C management of the college towards the employees. Under the relation-
ship of master and servant, the management is primarily responsible to
pay salary and other benefits to the employees. The management cannot -f-
say that unless and until the State compensates, it will not make full
payment to the staff. [703E-F]

D (2) The college had temporary affiliation even earlier to the Ordi-
nance 120E. That apart, the benefits under the Ordinance are to be
given when the college is closed which in this case was admittedly after
•the Ordinance was enacted. [704A-B]

(3) If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus
E can issue. If the management of the college is vurely a private body with
no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to
mandamus. But once these are absent and when the party has no other
equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied. [7058-C l

(4) Public money paid as Government aid plays a major role in
F the control, maintenance and working of educational institutions.
The aided institutions, like Government institutions, discharge public
function by way of imparting education to students. They are subject
to the rules and regulations of the affiliating University. Their
activities are closely supervised by the University authorities
Employment in such institutions, therefore, is not devoid of any public
G character. [705C-D]

(5) When the University takes a decision regarding the pay scales
of the employees of the aided institution, it will be binding on the
management. The service conditions of the academic staff are, there-
fore, not purely of a private character. It has SJlper-added protection by
H University decisions creating a legal right-duty relationship. When there
ANAND! MUKTA SMARK TRUST v. V.R. RUDANI 699

"" )--·is existence of this relationship, mandamus cannot be refused to the A
aggrieved party. [705E J

.. (6) Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Court to issue
writs in he nature of prerogative writs. Under Article 226, writs can
be issued to "any- person or authority". It can be issued "for the B
enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other
purpose." l706F-G)
•
• Executive Committee of Yaish Degree College v. Lakshmi
Narain., [1976) 2 SCR 1006; Deepak Kumar Biswas v. Director of
Public Instructions., [1987) 2 SCC 252 distinguished Dwarkanath v.
Income Tax Officer, [1965) 3 SCR 536, referred to. c
(7) This is a striking departure from the English Law. Under the
English Law, the prerogative writ of mandamus is confined only to
public authorities to compel performance of public duty, and 'public
authority' there means every body which is created by statute-and D
whose powers and duties are defined by statute. [706E-F)

(8) The words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 are
not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities
of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing
public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. E
What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The
duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the
person or authority to the affected party, no matter by what means the
duty is. imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be
denied. [707G-H; 708A-B)

(9) Mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be F
enforced is not imposed by the statute. [708B)

Praga Tools Corporation v. Shri C.A. !manual, [1969) 3 S.C.R.
773, referred to.

(10) The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies G
affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water-tight
compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements
of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which
must be easily available 'to reach injustice wherever it is found'. Tech-
nicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under H
Article 226. [708F-G)
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos>{ •
2704-06 of 1979.

From the Judgment and Order dated 1.5.1979 of the Gujarat
High Court in Special Civil Appln. Nos. 133 of 1976, 325 and 384 of
1976.
8
A.B. Rohatagi, Harish N. Salve, Ms. Palavi Shroff, S.S. Shroff,
P.S. Shroff and R. Sasiprabhu for the Appellants.

Kapil Sibbal, Suresh Shela!, P.H. Parekh and Ms. Gitanjali for
•
the Respondents.
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. These appeals, by certificate,
are from a common judgment of the Gujarat High Court giving some
monetary benefits to the respondents.
D
The facts of the case cane be quite shortly stated:

The appellant no. 1 is a public trust and other appellants are its
trustees. The trust was running a science college at Ahmedabad. The
college initially had temporary affiliation to the Gujarat University
E under the Gujarat University Act, 1949. From June 15, 1973 onwards,
the college had permanent affiliation under the said Act as amended
by Gujarat Act No. VI of 1973. The University teachers and those
employed in the affiliated colleges were paid in the pay scale recom-
mended by the University Grants Commission. At one stage, there
was some dispute between the University Area Teachers Assodation
F and the University about the implementation of certain pay scales.
That dispute, by agreement of parties, was referred to the Chancellor
of the University for decision. On June 12, 1970, the Chancellor gave _.
his award in the following terms:

"(!) That the revised pay scales as applicable to
G teachers who joined before April 1, 1966, should similarly
be applicable to those who joined after April 1, 1966 and
they be continued even after April 1, 1971.

(2) That these pay scales be exclusive of dearness
allowance. Therefore, fixing the pay of the teachers who
H joined after April 1, 1966, no petition of existing dearness
ANAND! MUKTA SMARK TRUST v. V.R. RUDANI [SHETIY, J.] 701

allowance would be merged. However, with effect from A
April 1, 1971 in respect of both the eategories of teachers
i.e. Pre-1966 and Post-1966 teachers, dearness allowance
, was to be merged with the salary.

(3) That arrears for the period from April 1, 1966 to
March 31, 1970 accruing due under the award were to be B
paid (without interest) in ten equal instalments beginning
from April 1, 1971.

... (4) The award was to be given effect to from April l,
1970. There are other provisions also. But we are not con-
cerned with those provisions for our purpose."
c
This award of the Chancellor was accepted by the State Govern-
ment as well as by the University. The latter issued direction to all
affiliated colleges to pay their teachers in terms thereof. The appel-
lants instead of implementing the award served notice of termination
upon 11 teachers on the ground that they were sm:plus and approached D
the University for permission to remove them. But the Vice-
Chancellor did not accede to their request. He refused the permission
sought for. There then the management-we mean the trust-took a
suicidal decision. The decision was to close down the college to the
detriment of teachers and students. The affiliation of the college was
surrendered and the University was informed that the management did E
not propose to admit any student from the academic year 1975-76. It
• was again a unilateral decision without approval of the University. The
college was closed with effect from June 15, 1975 with the termination
of services of all the academic staff.

The academic staff under law were entitled to terminal benefits. f
In fairness, that ought to have been paid simultaneously while being
removed. But the management did not do that. The teachers waited
with repeated representations only to get a negative reply and
ultimately, they moved the High Court with writ petitions for the
following reliefs:
G
"To issue a writ of mandamus or writ in the nature of
mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction or
order directing the respondent Trust and its trustees
respondents to pay to the petitioners their due salary and
allowances, the provident fund and gratuity dues in accord-
ance with the Rules framed by the University and pay them H
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989) 2 S.C.R.

A
compensation that would be payable to them under Ordi- --f "
nance 120 E and they may be further directed to pay the
difference of pay payable to them on the implementation of
the U.G.C. pay scales in accordance with Government
Resolution as clarified by the Award passed by the
Chanc<:llor."
B
As is obvious from these reliefs, the retrenched persons were not A.
agitating for their continuance in the service. They seem to have mad°" •
a tryst with the destiny and accepted the closure of the college. They ·

c
demanded only the arrears of salary, provident fund, gratuity and the
closure compensation which were legitimately due to them.

The trust, however, resisted the writ petitions on every conceiv-
-
able ground. The objections raised by the trust may be summarised as · 't '-
follows: (i) The trust is not a statutory body and is not subject to the
writ jurisdiction of the High Court; (ii) the Resolution of the
University directing payment to teachers in the revised pay scales is
D not binding on the trust; (iii) The University has no power to burden
the trust with additional financial liability by retrospectively revising
the pay scales; (iv) the claim for gratuity by retrenched teachers is
untenable. It is payable only to teachers retiring, resigning, or dying
and not to those removed on account of closure of the college; and (v) "t"-
Ordinance 120E prescribing closure compensation is ultra vires of the
E powers of the syndicate. It is at any rate not binding on the trust, since
it was enacted prior to affiliation of the college.
•
The High Court rejected all these submissions, and accepted the
writ petitions by delivering a lengthy judgment. The High Court thus
directed the trust to make payments in the following terms: y
F
"(1) Amount of the remaining six instalments as per ,-.
Chancellor's Award in respect of arrears from 1.4.1966 to
31.3.1970 as detailed category No. 1 above, (2) Salary for
the period from 1.4.1975 to 14.6.1975 as per revised pay-
scales, (3) Compensation as per sub-clause (a) and (b) of
G ~lause (vii) of Ordinance 120 E, (4) Provident Fund dues as \
per the approved scheme." \.--.:

The trust by obtaining certificate has appealed to this Court.

Counsel for the appellants mercifully concedes the just right of
H the teachers to get salary for the period of two and a half months from
ANAND! MUKTA SMARK TRUST v.. Y.R. RUDANI [SHE1TY, J.] 703

., ':t''April 1, 1974 to June 14, 1974. He has also no objection to pay provi-
A
dent fund dues. He, however, says that the trust is entitled to get
reimbursement from the Government and that question must be de-
termined in these appeals. As regards the arrears of salary payable
under the Chancellor's Award, the counsel contends that it is the
liability of the Government and not of the management9f the college.
} As regards the closure compens11-tion payable under the Ordinance, he B
~ repeats the contention taken before the High Court. He also maintains
• '11that the trust is a private body and is not subject to the writ jurisdiction
under Article 226.

Having heard the counsel for both parties, we are left with an
impression that the appellants are really trying to side-track the issue C
and needlessly delaying the legitimate payments due to the respon-
~ ·· dents. The question whether the State is liable to recompense the
appellants in respect of the amount payable to the respondents was not
considered by the High Court and indeed could not have been
examined since the State was not a party to the proceedings. However,
by the persuasive powers of the counsel in this Court, the State has D
been impleaded as a party in these appeals. Perhaps, this Court
wanted to find out the reaction of the State on the appellants' assertion
for reimbursement. We heard counsel for the State. He disputes the
appellants' claim. In fact, he challenged the claim on a number of
grounds. He says that the State is under no obligation to pay the
appellants as against the sum due to the respondents. We do not think E
that we need rule to day on this controversy. It is indeed wholly out-
side the scope of these appeals. We are only concerned with the liabil-
ity of the management of the college towards the employees. Under
the rela;ionship of master and servant, the management is primarily
responsible to pay salary and other benefits to the employees. The
management cannot say that unless and .until the State compensates, it F
will not make full payment to the staff. We cannot accept such a
contention.

Two questions, however, remain for consideration: (i) The liabi-
lity of the appellants to pay compensation under Ordinance 120E and
(ii) The maintainability of the writ petition for mandamus as against G
-{ the management of the college. The first questio,n presents no problem
since we do not find any sustainable argument. The power of the
Syndicate to enact the Ordinance is not in doubt or dispute. What is,
however, argued is that the Ordinance is not binding on the manage-
ment since it was enacted before the college was affiliated to the
University. This appears to be a desperate contention overlooking the H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A antecedent event. The·counseJ overlooks the fact that the coJlege had ·"" v
temporary affiliation even earlier .to the Ordinance. That apart, the
benefits under the Ordinance shall be given when the college is closed.
The college in the instant case was closed admittedly after the Ordi-
nance was em1cted; The appellants cannot, therefore, be heard to
contend that tliey are not liable to pay compensation under the
B Ordiiiance.

The essence of the attack on the maintainability of the writ peti- ll •
lion under Article 226 may now be examined. It is argued that the
management of the college being a trust registered under the Public
Trust Act is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.
..
C The contention in other words, is that the trust is a private institution
against which no writ of mandamus can be issued. Jn support of the
contention, the counsel relied upon two decisions of this Court: (a)
Executive Committee of Vaish De!(ree College, Shamli and Others v.
Lakshmi Narain & Ors., [1976] 2 SCR 1006 and (b) Deepak Kumar
Biswas v. Director of Public Instructions, [1987] 2 SCC 252. In the first
D of the two cases, the respondent institution was a Degree College
managed by a registered co-operative society. A suit was filed against
the college by the dismissed principal for reinstatement. It was con-
tended that the Executive Committee of the college which was re-
gistered under the Co-operative Societies Act and affiliated to the
Agra University (and subsequently to Meerut University) was a statut-
F ory body. The importance of this contention lies in the fact that in suoh
a case, reinstatement could be ordered if the dismissal is in violation of
statutory obligation. But this Court refused to accept the contention. •
It was observed that the management of the college was not a statutory
body since not created by or under a statute. It was emphasised that an
institution which adopts certain statutory provisions will not become a
F statutory body and the dismissed employee cannot enforce a contract
of personal service against a non-statutory body.

The decision in Vaish Degree College was followed in Deepak
Kumar Biswas case. There again a dismissed lecturer of a private
college was seeking reinstatement in service. The Court refused to
G grant the relief although it was found that the dismissal was wrongfuL
This Court instead granted substantial monetary benefits to the
lecturer. This appears to be the preponderant judicial opinion because
of the common law principle that a service contract cannot be specifi-
cally enforced.

H But here the facts are quite different and, therefore, we need not
ANAND! MUKTA SMARK TRTJSl' v. V.R. RUDANI (SHETTY, J.] 705

"-r go thus far. There is no plea for specific performance of contractual
service. The respondents are not seeking a declaration that they be A
continued in service. They are not asking for mandamus to put them
back into the college. They are claiming only the terminal benefits and
arrears of salary ·payable to them. The question is whether the trust
can be compelled to pay by a writ of mandamus?
B
If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can
.•)ssue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no

- ~
public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to
Mandamus. But once these are absent and when the party !Jas rio other
equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied. It has to be
appreciated that the appellants-trust was managing the affiliated
college to which public money is paid as Government aid. ·Public C
-~ money paid as Government aid plays a major role in the control,
maintenance and working of educational institutions. The aided
institutions like Government institutions discharge public function by
way of imparting education to students. They are subject to the rules
and regulations of the affiliating University. Their activities are closely D
supervised by the University authorities. Employment in such institu-
tions, therefore, is not devoid of any public character. (See-The
Evolving Indian Administration Law by M.P. Jain [1983] p. 266). So
.,4 are the service conditions of the academic staff. When the University
takes a decision regarding their pay scales, it will be binding on the
management. The service conditions of the academic staff are, there- E
fore, not purely of a private character. It has super-added protection
by University decisions creating a legal right-duty relationship
between the staff and the management. When there is existence of this
relationship, mandamus can not be refused to the aggrieved party.

., The Law relating to mandamus has made the most spectacular F
...... England
advance. It may be recalled that the remedy by prerogative writs in
started with very limited scope and suffered from many pro-
cedural disadvantages. To overcome the difficulties, Lord Gardiner
(the Lord Chancellor) in pursuance of Section 3(1)(e) of the Law
Commission Act, 1965, requested the Law Commission "to review the
existing remedies for the judicial control of administrative acts and G
omission with a view to evolving a simpler and more effective proce-
dure." The Law Commission made their report in March 1976 (Law
Com No. 73). It was implemented by Rules of Court (Order 53) in
1977 and given statutory force in 1981 by Section 31 of to Supreme
Court Act 1981. It combined all the former remedies into one proceed-
ing called Judicial Review. Lord Denning explains the scope of this H
"judicial review'':
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A "At one stroke the courts could grant whatever relief was -+- "
appropriate. Not only certiOrari-and mandamus, but also
declaration and injunction. Even damages. The procedure
was much more simple and expeditious. Just a summons
instead of a writ. No formal pleadings. 1he evidence was
given by affidavit. As a rule no cross-examination, no dis-
B covery, and so forth. But there were important safeguards.
In particular, in order to qualify, the applicant had to get A
the leave ofa judge. • '

c
The Statute is phrased in flexible terms. It gives scope for
development. It uses the words "having regard to". Those
words are very indefinite. The result is that the courts are
-
not bound hand and foot by the previous law. They are to
'have regard to' it. So the previous law as to who are-and
who are not-public authorities, is not absolutely binding.
Nor is the previous law ,as to the matters in respect of which
relief may be granted. This means that the judges can
D develop the public law as they think best. That they have
done and are doing." (See-The Closing Chapter-by Rt.
Hon Lord Denning p. 122).

Thete, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus is confined ~-
only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty. The
E 'public authority' for them mean every body which is created by
statute-and whose powers and duties are defined by statue. So
Government departments, local authorities, police authorities, and
statutory undertakings and corporations, are all 'public authorities'.
But there is no such limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ 'in
the nature of mandamus'. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High y
F Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a strik-
ing departure from the English law. Under Article 226, writs can be ,.,.
issued to "any person or authority". It can be issued "for the enforce-
ment of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose".

Article 226 reads:
G
"226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs (1)
Notwithsianding anything in Art. 32, every High Court
shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction,. to issue to any person or
authority including in appropriate cases, any Government,
H within those territories directions, orders or writs, includ-
ANAND! MUKTA SMARK TRUST v. V.R. RUDANI {SHETTY, J.] 707

ing (Writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, pro- A
hibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them for
the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part II
and for any other purpose.

xxx xxx xxx xxx''
B
./' The scope of this article has been explained by Subba Rao., in
•Dwarkanath v. Jncome Tax Officer, [1965] 3 SCR 536 at (540-41):

"This article is couched in comprehensive phraseol-
ogy and it ex-facie confers a wide power on the High Courts
to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution C
designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of
the power, the purpose for which and the person or autho-
rity against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in
the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England;
but the use of the expression "nature", for the said expres-
sion does not equate the writs that can be issued in India D
with those in England, but only draws an analogy from
them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions,
orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables
the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar
and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt
to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under E
Article 226 of the Constitution with that of the English
Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the
unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in
a comparatively small country like England with a unitary
form of Government into a vast country like India func-
tioning under a federal structure. Such ·a construction F
defeats the purpose of the article itself."

The term "authority" used in Article 226, in the context, must
receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is
relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights
under Art. 32. Article 226 confers power on the B'igh Courts to issue G
writs for enforcement of the fundamental· rights as well as non-
fundamental rights. The words "Any person or authority" used in
Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory
authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any
other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body
concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of 'iii
positive obligation .owed by the person or authority to the affected ..,
party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive
obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.

B In Praga Tools Corporation v. Shri C.A. !manual & Ors., [1969)
3 SCR 773, this Court said that a mandamus can issue against a person ).c
or body to carry out th~ duties placed on them by the Statutes even
though they are not public officials or statutory body. It was observed•
(at 778):

"It is, however, not necessary that the person or the
c authority on whom the statutory duty is imposed need be a
public official or an official body. A mandamus can issue,
for instance, to an official or a society to compel him to ·y
carry out the terms of the statute under or by which the
society is constituted or governed and also to companies or
D corporations to carry out duties placed on them by the
statutes authorising their undertakings. A mandamus
would also lie against a company constituted by a statute
for the purpose of fulfilling public responsibilities. (See
Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Ed. Vol. II p. 52 and
onwards)." i-
E
Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied
on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the
statute. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor De
Smith states: "To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not
necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for
F the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or
even contract.'' (Judicial Review of Administrative 'Act 4th Ed.
j
p. 540). We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expand- .
ing maze of bodies effecting the rights of the people should not be put
into water-tight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the
requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide
G remedy which must be easily available 'to reach injustice wherever it is
found'. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that
relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for
the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition.

In the result, the appeals fail and are dismi»ed but with a dire<·
H tion to the appellants to pay all the amounts due to the respondents as
ANAND! MUKTA SMARK TRUST v. V.R. RUDANI [SHETIY, J.] 709

" ··f' per the ju<!gment of the High Court. The amount shall be paid with 12 A
per cent inferest. The balance remaining shall be paid within two
months from today. The appellants shall alsp pay the costs of the
respondents teachers which we quantify at Rs.20,000.

R.S.S. Appeals dismissed. B.

I

•

--