Holding

If the Corporation does not apply for all the temporary permits corresponding to the vacancies, the State Transport Authority must consider and may grant permits to other eligible applicants for the remaining vacancies, as mandated by sections 68‑F(1‑A) and 68‑F(1‑C).

Summary

The appellants, Praveen Ansari and others, applied for temporary permits to ply passenger vehicles on an inter‑regional route under section 68‑F(1‑C) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The State Transport Authority granted three temporary permits to the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, which had applied for only three permits, and rejected the appellants' applications despite there being seven vacancies created by an increase in the authorized fleet strength. The Supreme Court examined the interplay of sections 68‑F(1‑A) and 68‑F(1‑C) and held that the corporation enjoys exclusive rights only to the extent it applies for all available vacancies; any unclaimed vacancies must be offered to other eligible applicants. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the State Transport Authority, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and the Allahabad High Court, and remitted the matter to the Authority to consider the appellants' applications for the remaining four permits. The decision emphasizes that the primary consideration is the service to the travelling public, not the corporation’s preferential status.

Issues considered

Whether the State Transport Authority can grant temporary permits to persons other than the State Road Transport Corporation when the corporation applies for fewer permits than the total vacancies.
Interpretation of the expression "any person" in section 68‑F(1‑C) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
Whether sections 68‑F(1‑A) and 68‑F(1‑C) must be read harmoniously to determine the authority's power to allocate temporary permits.

Legislation cited

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939s. 68C, s. 68-F(1-A), s. 68-F(1-C), s. 68-F(1-D)

Subjects

Motor Vehicles Acttemporary permitsState Transport Authoritypublic interestpreferential treatmentinterpretation of statutesinter‑regional transport routetemporary permit vacancies

Judgment

PRAVE.EN. ANSARI & ORS. A
v.
STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, LUCKNOW
& ORS.
October, 29 1980
[D. A. DESAI AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.] B
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, sections 68-F(I}, section 68-F (I-A) and 68-F
(1-C), interpretation of-Whe•n once the Corporation made an application for
1emporary permils not for the full strength but something short of it, whether
there was no power left in the State Transport Authority to grant temporary
fJermits to anyone else-words and phrases-The expression "any person"
comprehends any person even other than the Corporation. c
Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court

HELD:
1. The combined reading of section 68-F (l-A) and section 68-F (1-C) makes
it clear that keeping in view the strength of the vehicles fixed in public interest
by the competent authority under section 68-F (I-A), for the period intervening
between the date of publication of the scheme and the date of publication
D
of the approved or modified scheme, the authority should first examine the
application for number of temporary permits made by the Corporation. 1£
the Corporation has made application for temporary permits covering all the
vacancies, the authority must grant permit to the Corporation to the exclusion
of any other applicant, as section 68-F(l) makes it obligatory upon the State
Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, .as the case may be,
to grant the same. If the Corporation does not apply for all the permit9
but only for some, the inescapable conclusion will be that for the remaining
strength the Corporation has mad~ no application for the temporary permits
and section 68-F (1-C) of the Act squarely being attracted, the State Tran'Sport
Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, will have ·
to examine the application for temporary permits made by persons other than
the Corporation and if they are found to be competent eligible and qualified!
they may have to be granted permits for the benefit o~ the largo travelling
public. That is why power to increase strength of fleet operating on the route
is conferred under section 68-F (l·A) of the Act and has to be exercised in
public interest meaning transport facility to travelling public. Jn this case
there were 7 vacancies for temporary permits. The Corporation applied for
only 3. It was incumbent upon · the Sta1e Transport Authority to consider
the applications of the present appellants for the remaining four vacancies
and grant four permits according to law. [986A-D]
G

2. The expression "any person" in section 68-F (l·C) of the Motor Vehicles
Act would ·comprehend any person to mean any one other than the Corpor ation.
(985A· B]
Section 68-F (l·C} caters to such a situation where a scheme bas been
published and, therefore, the Corporation would be entitled to temporary H
permits till the approved scheme is published, yet if the Corporation is unable
to provide vehicles for the optimum strength fixed by the State Transport
2-·6 S. C. India/ND/81
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R

Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, the
concerned authority in exercise of power conferred specifically upon it · by
section 68-F (l-C) can grant temporary permits to persons other than the
Corporation to operate vehicles on the route for which the scheme is published
till modified or approved scheme is published. [984C·E]
3. In interpreting the provisions of Chapter IV-A of Motor Vehicles Act,
1939 it is, undoubtedly, true that the Corporation enjoys a pre.ferential
B treatment in the matter oE obtaining permits the authority under the Act must
not ever lose sight of the fact that the primary consideration must be ihe ~ervice
available to the travelling public. While interpreting the provisiom :Jf tlie
Motor Vehicles Act, undoubtedly, the competing claims between the Corporation \
~.
and the other private operators may be examined with reference to the
provisions of the Act. But the overall consideration namely the service is
for the benefit of the travelling public should never be overlooked for a
moment. [985F·G]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2520 of
1980.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
D 3-12-1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. NIL
of 1979.
Y ogeshwar Prasad and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellants.
0. P~ Rana and P. K . Pillai for the Respondents.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-
DESAI, J .-The appellants applied for temporary permits under
section 68-F (1-C) for plying the passenger vehides on Khurja-
Paliasu-Chhatari-Dabai-Rajghat-Ramghat-Atrauli route (route for short)
which. applications came to be rejected by the State Transport Autho- (
\
rity and their appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and a
F
writ petition to the High Court of Allahabad did not meet with
&uccess.
It is a common ground that in respect of the route a scheme
has been prepared and published under section 68C of Chapter IV-A
of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The route in que~tion is an inter
G Fegional route and therefore an application for temporary permit for
the period intervening between the date of publication of the scheme
and the date of publication of the approved or modified scheme has
to be made to the State Transport Authority under sec.68(1-C).
Ignoring the previous his~ory of the litigation for the present, it may
be noticed that the appellants made applications to the State Trans-
H port Authority for grants of temporary permits to ply their vehicles
on the route. The U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (Corpo-
tation for short) also made an application for granj of three temporary
PRAVEEN ANSARI v. STATE TRANSPORT LUCKNOW (Desai J.) 983

permits for the same purpose and the application of the Corporation A
for three permits was granted while the application made by each
of the appellants was rejected on the ground that once a scheme has
been published in view of the provision contained in Sec. 68-F(l-A)
the Corporation alone to !he exclusion of others, is entitled to apply
for temporary permit and if such application is made by the Corpor-
ration and granted no one else is entitled to obtain a temporary B
permit. Tl)is decision of !he State Transport Authority has been ·
npheld both by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and the High
Court.
Section 68-F(l) makes it obligatory upon the State Transport
Authority or Regional Transport Aµthority as the case may be to c
grant permit of the nature envisaged in the section to the Corporation
to the exclusion of any other applicant. ·section 68-F (1-A) confers
power on the State Traruport Authority or the Regional Transport
Authority as the case may be, for the period intervening between
the date of publication of the scheme and the date of publication of
the approved or modified scheme to increase in public interest the D
· number of vehicles operating on the route or the area in respect of which
the scheme has been published by State Transport Corporation under
section 68C and further enables the Corporation to apply for tempo-
rary permits to ply the vehicles during the inter-regnum. On
-such applications being made it is obligatory upon the State Transport
~uthority or the Regional Transport Authority as the case may be E
'to grant such temporary permits. Section 68-F (1-B) is not relevant
for the present purpose .
.Section 68-F(l-C) reads as under:
"If no application for a temporary permit is made under
sub-section (1-A), the StateTransport Authority or the Regional F
Transport Authority, as the case may be, may gra!Jt, subject
to such conditions as it may think fit, . temporary permit to any
. person in respect of the area or route or portio~ thereof specified
in the scheme and the permit so granted shall cease to be
effective on the issue of a permit to the State Transport Under-
G
taking in respect of that area or route or portion thereof."
. ' ,
'Section 68-F (lD) takes away the power of permit granting authority
to grant or renew any permit during the period intervening between
the date of publication, under section 68-C of any scheme and the
·date of publication of the approved or modified scheme, in favour ·
·<'lf any person for any class of road transport service in relation to an H
area or route or portion thereof covered by such scheme except as
provided in sub-section (1-A) and snl>-section (1-C).
984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 s.c~
A The Corporation has published a scheme .in respect of the route.I
Even when a scheme is published it is open to the State Transport~
Authority or the Regional Transport Authority as the case may b6
to fix or increase the number of vehicles that may opera~e on the
route. But the power fo increase the number must be exercised in
public interest. It is <:ommon ground that the strength of vehicles
B on the route in question was raised from 13 to 20. Hence in view
of this raising of the strength, 7 temporary permits could be granted.
However, in view of the provision contained in section 68-F(l-A)
consequent upon the scheme being p1,1blished by the Corporatio~ under
section 68-C in respect of the route the Corporation will be entitled to
all the temporary· permits lo the exclusion of any other operator. But
c Legislature was aware of a possible situation where the Corporation
though entitled to ~emporary permits to the exclusion of other
operators may not be in a position to avail of this statutory right.
Section 68-F(l-C) appears to have been introduced to meet with the
situation arising out of the inability of the Corporation to obtain all
available temporary permits. Sf~ction 68-F(l-C) caters to such a
D
situation where a scheme has been published and, therefore, the
Corporation would be entitled to temporary permits till the approved
scheme Is published, yet if the Corporation is unable to provide
service by obtaining all requisite temporary permits, the State-
Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority as the case
E may be, in exercise of power conferred specifically upon it by section
68-F ( 1-C) can grant temporary permits to persons other than the
Corporation to operate vehicles on the route for which the schem~
is published till modified or approved scl).eme is published.

It is not in dispute that there are 7 vacancies for temporary
F permits. It is an admitted position that the Corporation applied for
only 3 permits. The State Transport Authority has not recorded a·
finding that in public interest remaining 4 permits were not required
to be issued. Und.oubtedly, therefore, there were 4 vacancies for
which 4 temporary permits could be issued by the State Transport
Authority on this inter regional route. Undoubtedly the permits.
G will have to be temporary permits because the scheme has been pub-
lished in respect of the route under section 68C.
The State Transport Authority, the State Transport Appellate
Tribunal and the High Court fell into arl error by interpreting section
68-F(l -C) only to mean that even though there are 7 vacancies and
H the Corporation applied for only 3 temporary permits, once the
Corporation made an application for temporary permits not for t~e .
full strength but something short of it there was no power left m;.
PRAVEEN ANSARI v. STATE TRANSPORT LUCKNOW (Desai J.) 985

the State Transport Authority to grant temporary permits to any A
-0ne else. Obviously section 68-F(l-C) does no~ admit of such a
' construction. The State Transport Authority has power under sub
section ( 1-C) to grant temporary permit to any person in respect
of the area or the route or part thereof specified in the scheme.
The expression 'any person' would comprehend any person even other
than the Corporation. One has to read section 68-F ( 1-A) and section !.B
68-F (1-C) harmoniously. If the Corporation applies for-temporary
permits undoubtedly the State Transport Authority cannot grant
permit to any one else if the Corporation has applied for all the permits.
But section 68-F (1-C) clearly envisaged a situation where
,,.- application for a temporary permit is not made under section 68-F
{1-A) by the Corporation. And there is felt need for providing c
transport service on the route in question.
Now it cannot be gain said that there were 7 vacancies for
temporary permits because the strength was increased from 13 to 20.
The State Transport Authority is the proper authority to decide the
strength of vehicles .to be plied on a route. If !he Corporation is D
willing to operate vehicles· to the maximum strength undoubtedly
the State Transport Authority will have to grant permit to the Cor-
poration under section 68-F(l-A) to the exclusion of others. But if
the Corporation was unable to provide vehicles for the optimum
strength fixed by the State Transport Authority the remaining permits
will have to be granted to any other person willing to obtain tern porary E
,permit and ply vehicle because in respect of the remaining strength
there would be no application by the Corporation and section 68-F
{1-C) would be squarely attracted. In interpreting the provisions of
Chapter IV-A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 it is undoubtedly true
that the Corporation enjoys a preferential treatment in the matter of
obtaining permits. The authority under the Act must not ever lose F
•igbt of the fact that the primary consideration must be the service
available to the travelling public. While interpreting the'provision!
-0f the Motor Vehicles Act undoubtedly the competing claims bet-
ween the Corporation and the other private operators may be examin-
ed with reference to the l'rovisions of the Act:; But the overall G
consideration namely the service is for the benefit 'of the travelling
public should never be overlooked for a moment.
Reverting to the facts of this case if the approach of the High
Court is accepted it would lead to a startling result. Assuming there
were 10 vacancies for temporary permits and the Corporation was able
to provide only one vehicle and therefore applied for only one permit, H
according to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal as well as the
High Court no temporary permit can be granted to any one els~
986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

for the remaining 9 vacancies. Such is. not the position emerging
from a combined reading of section 68-F(l-A) and·· Sectio.n
68-F(l-C). The correct approach would be that keepi.'1g in view •
the strength of the vehicles fixed by· the competent authority, the
authority should first examine the applieation fo: number of temporary
permits made by the Corporation. If the Corporation has made·
B application for temporary permits covering all the vacancies the
matter ends there. But if !he Corporation does not apply for all the
permits but ollly for some, the inescapable conclusion is that' for
the· remaining strength the Corporation has made no application for
the \emporary permits and section 68-F(l-C) ·would be squarely
attracted. In that event the State Transport Authority or the
Regional Transport Authority as the case may be will have to examine
· the application for temporary permits made by persons other than
the Corporation and if they are found to be competent, eligible and
qualified they may have to be granted permits fqr the benefit of the
large· travelling public. That· is why power to increase strength of
D fleet operating on \he .route is conferred and has to be exercised in
public interest meaning transport facili\y to travelling public. In
this case there were 7 vacancies for temporary permits. The Corpo-
ration applied for only 3. It was incumbent upon the S_tate Transport
Authori\y to .consider the applications of the present appellants for
the remaining 4 vacancies and grant follr permits according to law.
E Accordingly this appeal is allowed and tbe orders of the State
Transport Authority, the State Transpor\ Appellate Tribunal and the
. High Court are set aside and the matter is remitted to the State Trans-
port Authority to consider the applications of the present appellants for
the remaimng 4 vacancies and pass orders according to law. In the
circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.
F
S'.R. Appeal allowed.

•,

•

L