Holding

The consent decree is valid and binding on all members of the original tenant's family, and the appellant cannot resist its execution.

Summary

The original tenant died leaving two sons; after his death rent was paid by the elder son and later by his widow. The landlord sued the widow for eviction and the parties settled, resulting in a consent decree. The landlord sought execution of the decree, but the younger son (appellant) and his family objected, claiming they were tenants under Section 5(1)(c) of the Bombay Rent Control Act and that the decree was not binding on them because they were not impleaded. The trial and appellate courts held that the appellant had not been residing in the premises since 1962 and therefore was not a tenant at the time of the suit. The Supreme Court affirmed that the tenancy was a single joint tenancy, the widow represented all family members, and the decree was binding on all successors. Consequently, the decree could be executed and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a member of the original tenant's family who was not impleaded in an eviction suit can resist execution of a consent decree under the Bombay Rent Control Act.
Whether the tenancy created on the death of the original tenant is joint or separate for purposes of notice and liability.
Whether Section 5(1)(c) of the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947 applies to the appellant and makes the decree binding on him.

Legislation cited

Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947s. 5(11), s. 5(1)(c)
Transfer of Property Acts. 106

Subjects

rent controlevictiontenancy successionjoint tenancyexecution of decreeBombay Rent Control ActSection 5landlord-tenant

Judgment

}--

ASHOK CHINTAMAN JUKER AND ORS. A
\'.
KISHORE PANDURANG MANTRI AND ANR.

MAY 9, 2001
,B
[D.P. MOHAPATRA AND BRJJESH KUMAR, JJ.]

Rent Control and Eviction :

• Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947-Section 5(1 l)(C)-Tenant-Meaning
of-Tenancy-Joint or separate-Original tenant having died, rent receipts C
issued in the name of his elder son and after his death in the name of his
widow-Eviction petition against the widow-Consent decree in favour of
landlord-Execution-Appellant being second son of original tenant resisting
on the ground of not being impleaded as a party in the suit-Tenability of-,
Held, the decree under execution does not suffer from any illegality or D
infirmity-Tenancy being on.e, all the members of the family of the original
tenant residing with him at the time of his death succeeded to the tenancy
together-In the, circumstances the widow who was impleaded as a tenant
in the suit filed by landlord represented all the tenants and the decree passed:
in the suit is binding on all the inembers of the family covered by the
tenancy-Moreover, trial court and appellate court concurrently holding E
that appellant has not been residing in the premises when his elder brother
was alive-Held, appellant has no justification to resist execution of the
decree for possession of the pre111ises by the landlord

- Original tenant in respect of the suit premises died leaving two sons,
one K and appellant no. 1. After his death, rent receipts were issued in the F
name of Kand thereafter upon K's death, in the name of K's widow, respondent
no. 2. Subsequently, landlord filed a suit for eviction against respondent no.
I
2. The parties settled the dispute and the suit was disposed of in terms of
the said settlement. A decree was drawn up incorporating the terms of the
settlement. Thereafter, landlord filed a petition for execution of the decree G
in which a warrant of possession was issued.

Appellant no. I along with his wife and children, filed objection against
execution of the decree. The case of the appellants was that appellant no. 1
became a tenant of the suit premises on the death of his father. The landlord
had filed a suit for eviction against respondent no. 2 without impleading him .H
627
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS l2001] 3 S.C.R.

A as a defendant. In the circumstances, consent decree obtained in the suit was
not binding on him.

The Executing Court rejected the objection filed by appellants, holding
inter alia that the compromise decree was executable against them. Appeal
filed by appellants in the Court of Small Causes was dismissed. Civil writ
B petition filed by th~m in High Court was also dismissed by a Division Bench.
Hence the present appeal.

On behalf of the appellants, it was contended that Section 5(11) of the
Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947 defined the term tenant to mean all the
C members of the family of tenant; that appellant no. I who was then a minor.
was undisputedly residing with his father, the original tenant along with his
brother Kand the status continued till the date of the filing of the suit; that
the landlord having not impleaded appellant no. 1 as a defendant in the suit
could not get delivery of possession of the property in execution of the
consent decree which was not binding on him.
D
On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that the Trial Court and
the Appellate Court concurrently held that appellant no. 1 had not been
residing in the suit premises for a long time; that in fact he had shifted to-
another place and was residing in the premises owned by him; that when the
landlord filed suit for eviction, appellant no. 1 was not a tenant in occupation
E of the suit premises and as s.uch it was not necessary for the landlord to
implead him as a defendant in the suit.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The decree under execution does not suffer from any illegality ,,_
F or infirmity. Appellants have no justification on the facts as well as in law
to resist execution of the decree for possession of the premises by the
landlord. On the death of the original tenant the rent bills in respect of the
premises in question were issued in the name of his elder son Kand on his
death the rent bills were issued in the name of his window respondent no.
G 2. It is not the case of appella.nt no. l that there was any division of the
premises in question or that rent was being paid to the landlord separately
by him. Indeed appellant No. l took the plea that he was paying the rent
through respondent no. 2. Thus the tenancy being one, all the members of
the family of the original tenant residing with him at the time of his death,
succeeded to the tenancy together. In the circumstances the conclusion is
H inescapable that respondent no. 2 who was impleaded as a tenant in the suit
AS HOK CHINTAMAN .IUKER 1·.KJSHORE l'ANDURANG MANTRI [MOHAPATRA . .I J 629

filed by the landlord represented all the members of the family covered by A
the tenancy. Further, the trial court and the appellate court concurrently
held that appellant no. 1 has not been residing in the premises since the time
-<.,
when his elder brother was alive. Therefore, when the suit was filed there
was no necessity for the landlord to implead appellant no. 1 or members of
his family in the suit since the landlord had no cause of action for seeking
a decree of recovery of possession from them. 1634-D-HI B

Ganpath Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde, 11978) 3 SCR 198; Kanji
Manji v. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay, Al R (1963) SC 468; fi. C.
Pandey v. G.C. Paul, AIR (1989) 1470 and Textile Association (India) Bombay
JI ,'Unit v. Balmohan Copa! Kurup and Anr., AIR (1990) SC 2053, referred to.
c
2. There are two requisites which must be fulfilled before a person is
entitled to be called 'tenant' under sub-clause (c) of Section 5(1) of Bombay
) Rent Control Act; first he must be a member of the tenant's family and
secondly, he must have been residing with the tenant at the time of his death.
Besides fulfilling these conditions he must have been agreed upon to be a D
tenant by the members of the tenant's family; in default of such agreement
the decision of the Court shall be binding on such members. The issue that
arises for consideration in such cases is whether the tenancy is joint or
f separate. In the former case notice on any one of the tenants is valid and a
~
suit impleading one of them as a defendant is maintainable. A decree passed
in such a suit is binding on all the tenants. Determination of the issue E
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No inflexible rule or
straight-jacket formula can be laid down for the purpose. 1632-G; 633-A)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3759 of

-
~
2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 6. 11.2000 of the Bombay High
F

Court in C.W.P. No. 5768 of2000.

Dhruv Mehta, S.K. Mehta and Ms. Shobha for the Appellants.

Bhim Rao M. Naik, P.N. Puri and A.V. Jain for the Respondents. G

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D.P. MOHAPATRA, J. Leave granted.

One Chintarnan Keshav Juker was the tenant 111 respect of the suit H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 I] 3 S.C.R.

A premises, described as no. R/o 6, Mantri Building, Ground Floor, Bhendi Lane,
Gamdevi, Bombay. He died in the year 1958 leaving two sons, Kesrinath
Chintaman.Juker (appellant No. I herein) and Ashok Chintaman Juker. Ashok
was then a minor. After the death of Chintaman the rent bills (rent receipts)
were issued in the name of Kesrinath. Kesrinath died in 1981. Thereafter the
rent bills were issued in the name of his widow Smt. Kishori Kesrinath Juker
B (respondent no. 2 herein). Kishore Pandurang Mantri the landlord (respondent
No. I herein) filed the suit for eviction against respondent No.2. The parties
settled the dispute and the suit was disposed of in terms of the said settlement
by the order dated 31.1.1994 which reads as follows:

"Order
c
Both plaintiff and defendant alongwith their respective advocates are
present. Both plaintiff and defendant admits the contents of the consent
terms as well as their respective signatures. Therefore the Consent
Terms are taken on record and marked Ex.A."
D The decree was drawn up incorporating the terms of the settlement. The
respondent No. I tiled the petition for execution of the decree dated 31.1.1994
in which a warrant of possession was issued on 23rd November, 1994. The
appellants filed objection against the execution of the decree which was
registered as Notice No. 66 of 1994.
E
The executing court by the order dated 30th September, 1998 rejected
the objection filed by the appellants and dismissed Notice No.66/94 holding
inter alia that the compromise decree is executable against them. The appeal
filed by the appellants i.e. Appeal No.620/1999 was dismissed by the Court
F of Small Causes, Bombay Bench by order dated 8.9.2000. Civil Writ Petition
No. 5768 of 2000 filed by the appellants was dismissed by a Division Bench
of the Bombay High Court by the judgment/order dated 6th November, 2000.
The said judgment/order is under challenge in this appeal filed by special
leave.

G The case of the appellants, shorn of unnecessary details, is that the
appellant No. I, who is the husband of appellant No.2 and father of appellant
Nos.3 to 5 became a tenant of the suit premises on the death of his father
Ch intaman in 1958. Therefore, he was entitled to occupy the premises as a
tenant. The respondent No. I filed a suit for eviction against respondent No.2
Smt Kishori Kesrinath .Juker without impleading him (appellant No. I) as a
H defendant. In the circumstances the consent decree obtained in the suit is not
i\SHOKClllNT/\Mi\N HIKER ,·.KISllORE PAN DUR/\ NG Mi\NTRI IMOllAl'i\TR/\, .1.l 631

binding on appellant No. I and members of his family who are residing with A
him. They cannot, therefore, be evicted in execution of the said decree.

.--<;. The gist of the case of the respondent No. I is that on the death of the
original tenant Chintaman the rent bills were raised in the name of Kesrinath
and after his death in the name of his widow the respondent no.2. The
appellant No. I was not accepted as a tenant by the landlord. Indeed he has B
not been residing in the suit premises since 1962. In such circumstances it
was not incumbent on the part of the respondent No. I to imp lead the appellant
No. I as a defendant in the suit and he has no right to obstruct delivery of
possession of the premises in execution of the decree.

Sri Dhruv Mehta, learned counsel for the appellants strenuously urged C
that in view of the pr_ovision in section 5(11) (c) of the Bombay Rent Control
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') defining the term 'tenant' to
mean all the members of the family of the tenant and appellant No. I who was
then a minor was undisputedly residing with his father Chintaman, the original
tenant; therefore he was a tenant alongwith his brother Kesrinath and the D
status continued till the date of the filing of the suit. The landlord having not
impleaded appellant no. I as a defendant in the suit cannot get delivery of
possession of the property in execution of the consent decree which is not
) binding on him.

Per contra Shri Bhim Rao M. Naik, learned senior counsel appearing for E
the respondents contended that the trial court and the appellate court
concurrently held that the appellant No. I had not been residing in the suit
premises since 1962. I.n fact he had shifted to Kalyan and was residing in the
premises owned by him there. He had also booked another accommodation
at Borivli. Therefore, in the year 1992 when the respondent No. I filed the suit
for eviction the appellant No. I was not a tenant in occupation of the suit
F
premises and as such it was not necessary for the landlord to imp lead him
as a defendant in the suit. The learned counsel further contended that the
appellant No. I having taken the stand that he was staying in the suit premises
and he was paying the rent through his sister-in-law respondent No.2 after
death of his brother Kesrinath which has been disbelieved by the trial court G
and the appellate court, the High Court was right in declining to interfere with
the order passed by the trial court rejecting the objection to the execution of
the decree filed by the appellants which was confirmed by the appellate court.

Before considering the case of the appellants on merits it is necessary
to record the finding and observations made by the appellate court, which are H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 12001] 3 S.C.R.

A quoted below:

"The evidence go to show that in 1962 or thereafter the present -·
Obstructionists Ashok shifted to Kalyan. Not .only that but thereafter >--
he has acquired premises at Kalyan and booked the premises at
Borivli. We are not concerned with these premises and not necessary
B to give all particulars of those premises but this is an admitted fact
because the witness has admitted in the cross examination. Not only
that but in the co. i.e. on the place of employment said Ashok
Obstructionist No.1 has given his address of correspondence at Kalyan.
This goes to show that his so called accrued right of tenancy has
c been either waived or the alleged right of tenancy which is acquired
under section 5( 11 )( c) has been surrendered or no right has been
claimed at all."

In sub-section(l 1) of section 5 of the Act the expression 'tenant' means
any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises
D and include -(a) such sub-tenants and other persons as have derived title
under a tenant before the coming into operation of this Act; (b) any person
remaining, after the determination of the lease, in possession, with or without
the assent of the landlord, of the premises leased to such person or his
predecessor who has derived title before the coming into operation of this
E Act; (c) any member of the tenant's family residing with him at the'time of
his death as may be decided in default of agreement. by the Cou1t. The
language of the provision indicates that the definition of the term is an
inclusive one and wide in its amplitude. In the present case we are concerned
with clause (c) of sub-section( 11) of section 5 which provides that 'tenant'
includes any member of the tenant's family residing with him at the time of
F his death as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court. There are
two requisites which must be fulfilled before a person is entitled to be called
'tenant' uffder sub-clause (c); first he must be a member of the tenant's family
and secondly, he must have been residing with the tenant at the time of his
death. Besides fulfilling these conditions he must have been agreed upon to
G be a tenant by the members of the tenant's family; in default of such agreement
the decision of the Court shall be binding on such members. The further
question that arises for consideration is whether a member of the family of
the original tenant who claims to have been residing with the tenant at the
.. -
time of his death can resist execution of a decree passed against a member

H
of the tenant's family who undisputedly was accepted by the landlord. as a
tenant on the death of the original tenant. •
/\SHOK Cl llNT/\M/\N .llJKER 1·.KISHORE l'/\NOUR/\NG M/\NTRI IMOl IAl'i\TR/\ . .1.J 633

...
I The question that ·arises for consideration in such cases is whether the A
tenancy is joint or separate. lrt the former case notice on any one of the
-..j -. tenants is valid and a suit impieading one of them as a defendant is
maintainable. A decree passed in such a suit i§ binding on all the tenants.
Determination of the question depends on the facts and circumstances of the
case. No inflexible rule or straight-jacket formula can be laid down for the
purpose. Therefore, the case in hand is to be decided in the facts and B
circumstances thereof.

In the case of Ganpath ladhd V. Stiahikant Vishnu Shinde, [1978] 3
..#; SCR 198 a Bench of three learned Judges of this Cottfl tonstn1i11g the provision
.. ofsection 5(1 l)(c) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 held:
c
"The Act interferes With. the landlord's right to property and freedom
of contract only for the limited ptlffUJsg o'f protecting tenants against
. exercise of the landlord's power to evict them if! th€1le days of scarcity
of accommodation by asserting superior rights in property or trying
to exploit his positloii by i\!lifrm:ting too high rents from helpless D
tenants. The object was not ttt deprive th1;1 landlord altogether of his
rights in property which have also to be resp-ested."

-<
In the case of Kanji Manji v. The Trustees of the Pol'/ tif Bombay, AIR
(1963) SC 468, a bench of three learned Judges of this Court, consttuing the
=:'.I
terms of the deed of assignment, observed as follows: E
"The argument about notice rte~d not detain us long. By the deed of
assignment dated February 28, 1947, the tenants took the premises as
joint tenants. The exact words of the assignment were that " ... the
Assignors do and each of them both hereby assign and assure with
the Assignees as Joint Tenants .. .''. The deed of assignment was F
approved and accepted by the Trustees of the Port of Bombay, and
Rupji Jeraj and the appellant must be regarded as joint tenants. The
trial_ Judge, therefore, rightly held them to be so. Once it is held that
the tenancy was joint, a notice to one of the joint tenants was
sufficient; and the suit for the same reason was also good. Mr. B. Sen, G
in arguing the case of the appellant, did not seek to urge the opposite.
In our opinion, the notice and the frame of the suit were, therefore,
proper, and this argun:ient has no merit."

This Court in the case of H.C. Pandey v. G.C. Paul J, AIR (1989) SC
I4 70 taking note of the settled position that on the death of the original H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 120011 3 S.C.R.

A tenant, subject to any provision to the contrary either negativing or limiting
the succession, the tenancy rights devolve on the heirs of the deceased
tenant, held that it is a single tenancy which devolves on the heirs. There is
no division of the premises or of the rent payable thereafter and that is the
position as between the landlord and the heirs of the deceased tenant. In
B other words, the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants. This Court
further held that the respondent acted on behalf of the tenants; he paid rent
on behalf of his father and he accepted notice on behalf of all; in the
circumstances the notice served under section I 06 of the Transfer of Property
Act on the respondent was sufficient and it was a valid notice.

C In the case of Textile Association (India) Bombay Unit v. Balmohan
Gopal Kurup and another, AIR ( 1990) SC 2053, th is Court on the facts and
circumstances stated therein took the view that the ex-parte decree obtained
against mother and brother was not binding against the respondent therein.

In the case on hand, as noted earlier, on the death of the original tenant
D Chintaman the rent bills in respect of the premises in question were issued
in the name of his elder son Kesrinath and on his death the rent bills were
issued in the name of his widow Smt.Kishori Kesrinath Juker. It is not the case
of the appellant no. I that there was any division of the premises in question {
or that rent was being paid to the landlord separately by him. Indeed the >--
E appellant no. I took the plea that he was paying the rent through Smt. Kishori
Kesrinath Juker. Thus the tenancy being one, all the members of the family .
of the original tenant residing with him at the time of.his death, succeeded
to the tenancy together. In the circumstances the conclusion is inescapable
that Smt. Kishori Kesrinath Juker who was impleaded as a tenant in the suit
filed by the landlord represented all the tenants and the decree passed in the
F suit is binding on all the members of the family covered by the tenancy. In
the circumstances the decree passed in terms of the compromise entered ~
between the landlord and Smt. Kishori Kesrinath Juker can neither be said to
be invalid nor inexecutable against any person who claims to be a member
of the family residing with the original tenant, and therefore, a 'tenant' as
G defined in section 5( 11 )(c). The position that follows is that the appellants
have no right to resist on the ground that the decree is not ~inding on them.
Further, the trial court and the appellate court concurrently held that the
appellant no. I has not been residing in the premises since 1962 i.e. when his
elder brother Kesrinath was alive. Therefore, when the suit was filed in the
year 1992 there was no necessity for the land lord to implead appellant no. I
H or members of his family in the suit since he (lan<)lord) had no cause of action
i\SI IOK CHINTi\Mi\N JU KER 1·.KISllURL' l'i\NDllRi\NG Mi\NTRI I MOHi\Pi\TRA,.l. I 635

for seeking a decree of recovery of possession from them. In that view of the A
matter the decree under execution does not suffer from any illegality or
infirmity. Viewed from any angle the appellants have no justification on the
facts as well as in law to resist execution of the decree for possession of the
premises by the landlorc. The Executing Court rightly rejected the objection
filed by the appellants against execution of the decree and the appellate court
and the High Court rightly confirmed the said order. This appeal being devoid B
of-merit is dismissed with costs which is assessed at Rs. I 0,000.

M.P. Appeal dismissed.