Holding

Section 73A imposes an absolute bar on any proceeding for levy of estate duty after five years, rendering the requirement of a certificate under Section 56(2) impossible and invalidating the Controller’s notice.

Summary

The appellant, Ashok Singh, sought a succession certificate for his father Ganga Singh's intestate estate after attaining majority. The estate duty guardian had failed to file the required account within five years of death, invoking Section 73A of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, which bars any levy proceedings after that period. The Assistant Controller demanded a certificate under Section 56(2) before granting the succession certificate, which the appellant contested as impossible after the statutory bar. The Supreme Court held that Section 73A imposes an absolute, comprehensive bar on any proceeding for levy, including assessment, after five years, and therefore the Controller cannot require or issue a certificate under Section 56(2). Consequently, the notice issued under Section 58(2) was invalid and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 73A of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 bars the Controller from requiring a certificate under Section 56(2) after the five‑year limitation has expired.
Whether the term 'levy' in Section 73A includes assessment proceedings.
Whether the statutory bar under Section 73A defeats the requirement of Section 56(2) for granting a succession certificate.
Whether the Controller has jurisdiction to commence assessment proceedings after the limitation period.

Legislation cited

Estate Duty Act, 1953s. 53, s. 53A, s. 56, s. 58, s. 59, s. 73A

Subjects

Estate DutySuccession CertificateLimitation PeriodSection 73ALevyAssessmentStatutory BarInterpretation of Statutes

Judgment

A ASHOK SINGH y
v.
ASSISTANJ.: CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY,

CALCUT'I'A AND OTHERS.

B MAY 12, 1992

[S. MOHAN AND G.N. RAY, JJ.]

Estate Duty Act, 1953:
c Sections 53-A, 56(2), 58, 59 and 73A-Estate Duty-Levy of-Proceed-
ings not commenced within five years from the death of estate owner-Ap-
plication for grant of succession certificate made by the deceased's son after
attaining majority-Whether proceedings debtm"ed-Whether succession cer-
tificate could be denied on ground of non-production of certificate from -----<
D Controller-"Proceedings for the levy of any duty"--whether includes proceed-
ings for assessment.

Interpretation of Statues-Plain meaning to be given effect to.

Words and Phrases-Word 'levy'-Meaning of
E
Legal Maxims-Quai Haeret in Litera Haeret in Cortice.

The appellant's father died intestate leaving behind the appellant
and his brother. Since they were minors at that time their maternal uncle
was appointed as guardian by the City Civil Court. The guardian never
F filed the account of the property or the return as required under Sections
53 or 56 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 in respect of the estate of the A_
appellant's father within five years from the date of his death. ~

On attaining majority, the appellant as Karta, applied to the City
Civil Court for the grant of a succession certificate in respect of the estate
G
of his father. However, during the proceedings, it was· pointed out that a
certificate from Estate Duty Authority was necessary under Section 56(2) ,,..,
of the Act.

On behalf of the appellant it was urged that in view of Section 73A
H of the Act, the time to commence any proceedings for levy of estate duty
190 "
ASHOK SINGH v. ASSIT. CONTROLLER 191

had become barred inasmuch as five years had expired from the date of A.
the death of his father. Hence, the question of production of certificate
under Section 56(2) did not arise.

The Chief Judge of the City Civil Court held that he could not go
into this question since the authorities constituted under the Act alone
could decide this. H
Thereafter, the appellant filed the return with the Assistant Control-
ler of Estate Duty. The appellant was sened with a notice under Section
58(2), along with a questionnaire with the first respondent-the Assistant
Controller of Estate Duty. Despite the appellant's objection that no C

- proceedings could be initiated in view of the statutory bar under Section
73~ inasmuch as the period of five years had expired form the date of his
father's death, the appellant was called upon to furnish certain par-
ticulars. Under these circumstances the appellant challenged before the
High Court the notice issued under Section 58(2) of the Act, along with
the questionnaire and the proceedings. A Single Judge cancelled the notice D
in question.

On appeal by the first respondent, the Division Bench held that
Section 73A did not do away with the liability of an accountable person for
payment of duty; it only barred the initiation of proceedings for levy of E
duty. Therefore, if the liability remained but proceedings could not be
initiated, there was no question of full payment of duty. As such it could
not be stated in the certificate by the Controller that there was no claiin
of estate duty from accountable person; and, accordingly, the bar of
limitation was not applicable to cases as provided under Section 73A where
application was made for grant of representation or succession certificate F
and the account or the copy application was delivered to the Controller as
required under Section 56.

In the appeal before this Court, on behalf of the appellant it was
contended that the construction placed by the Division Bench was totally
incorrect; Section 73A was comprehensive in its scope in so far it threw a G
statutory bar preventing the authority from commencing any proceeding
after th" expiry of nve years; and would take within It Section !6 also; ~hat
the High Court was not correct In Its view that no grant of representation
of succession certificate could be made after the expiry or nve years; that
Section 56 would have to be so read as to bring about a harmonlous H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.

A construction between Section 73A and Section 56; and that strict literal
interpretation would defeat the object and purpose of the statutory bar
under Section 73A.

Allowing the appeal, this Court,

B HELD : 1.1 The language of Section 73A of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 is
unambiguous. This section throws a statutory bar and is comprehensive in
nature. In so far as it says "no proceeding under this Act", that means any
proceedings whatever in relation to levy can ever be commenced after five
years. The word "levy" used in Section 73A embraces within it the process of
C assessment and also the imposition of tax. Therefore, it is certain that even a
proceeding for assessment cannot be taken after five years.

Padampat Singhania and others v. Controller of Estate Duty, Kanpur,
-
122 ITR 162 at 163, relied on.

D Controller of Estate Duty v. Bhola Dutt, 130 ITR 468 approved.

P.C. Saxena v. The State, 104 ITR 106, distinguished.

Black's Law Dictionary (fifth edition) page 816, referred to.

E 1.2 No doubt, both under sub-section (1), clause (b) and sub-section
(2), the language used is "no order shall be made upon his applica.tion".
To require in a case of this character, the production of a certificate from
the Controller would amount to the insistence of an impossible com-
pliance.

F 1.3 The Division Bench of the High Court was not correct in holding
that Section 73A was only applicable to proceedings initfated under Sec-
tion 59. Merely because Section 59 says "subject to section 73A" that does
not mean a statutory bar under Section 73A is lifted. On the contrary,
Section 53A reinforces the rigour of Section 73A. The words "commence-
G ment of any proceedings under the Act" are comprehensive enough to
.include Section 59 as well. Equally, it was not correct in holding that the
application of 73A to cases coming under Section 56 would make the latter
Section unsustainable. That will be only placing a literal interpretation of
Section 56 regardless of situation.

H 1.4 If, therefore, the object of Section 73A is unambiguous to bar the .....
ASHOK SINGH v. ASSIT. CONTROLLER [MOHAN, J.) 193

commencement of any proceeding for levy after the period of five years in A
the case of first assessment, the rigour of the Section cannot be diluted,
by introducing a construction not warranted in the situation. If it was the
.intention of the Parliament to provide exceptional cases making Section
73-A inapplicable to such cases nothing would have been easier than to
have so expressed. The language under Section 73A is imperative. It admits B
of no doubt that there cannot be two limitations (i) in a case where the
assessee files a belated return, and (ii) in a case where the assessee seeks
a succession certificate. In such a case where the assessee, as in the instant
case, seeks a certificate from the Controller, all that the Controller has to
say is that no such certificate could be issued since in view of the statutory
bar under Section 73A. In this context, Section 56 will have to be given C
meaning and life. He who clings to the letter of the law clings to the dry
bone; that would be against the spirit of the Act.

HerlJert Broom f.:_egal Maxims, pp. 466-67.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2107 of D
1980.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.3.1979 of the Calcutta High
Court in Appeal No. 348 of 1973.
E
Shanker Ghosh and P.K. Mukharjee for the Appellant.

B.B. Ahuja,Ms. A.Subhashini and Manoj Arora for the Respondents.

The. Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
MOHAN J. This appeal by certificate is directed against the judg-
ment and order of the Calcutta High Court dated 16th March 1979 in
Appeal No. 348 of 1973.

The facts are that on 6th February, 1967 one Ganga Singh, governed
by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, died intestate. He left two sons, the G
appellant and one Binod Singh. The wife of Ganga Singh had pre-deceased
him. As the appellant and Binod Singh were minor at the time of death of
Ganga Singh the maternal uncle of the appellant moved a~ application in
the City Civil Court at Calcutta in March 1967 for the appointment of
.guardian of the appellant and his brother. Accordingly, he was appointed H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 3 S.C.R.

A as the guardian. When the paternal uncle of the appellant and his brother
appealed against the order, the appointment was confirmed. However, the
guardian was directed to continue till the appellant a~tained majority.

On 7th December, 1970 the appellant attained majority. As karta he
applied to the City Civil Court at Calcutta for the grant of a succession
B certificate in respect of the estate of Ganga Singh. It appears that the
guardian never filed the account of the property or the return as required
under Sections 53 or 56 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred
to as the Act). The appellant being a minor did not know about this. The
result is that no account had been filed by any person in respect of the
C estate of Ganga Singh within five years from the date of his death.

In the proceedings before City Civil Court for the grant of succession
certificate it was pointed out that a certificate from Estate Duty Authority
was necessary under Section 56(2) of tile Act. It \\fas urged on behalf of
D the appellant that in view of Section 73A of the Act the time to commence
any proceedings for levy of estate duty had become barred inasmuch as
five years had expired from the date of the death of Ganga Singh. Hence,
the question of production of certificate under Section 56(2) would not
arise.

E By an order dated July 25, 1972 the learned Chief Judge of the City
Civil Court held that he could not go into this question since the authorities
constituted under the Act alone could decide this. Since the appellant was
advised to file an account to the Estate Duty Authority, he filed the return
on 18th August, 1972 with the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty. As per
F the return the estate was valued approximately at Rs. 52,000. The appellant
was served with a notice under Section 58(2) along with a questionnaire by
the first respondent, the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, fixing t~e date ~..
for hearing. On the said date of hearing the appellant contended that no
proceedings could be initiated in view of the statutory bar under Section
73A, inasmuch as the period of five years had expired from the date of the
G death of Ganga Singh. Hence, no proceedings coulc:I be commenced. In
spite of these objections, the first respondent adjourned the case calling
upon the appella~t to furnish certain particulars. It is under these cir-
cumstances the n'otice dated 4th of September, 1972 issued under Section
58(2) of the Act along with a questionnaire and the proceedings were
H challenged in the High Court of Calcutta by way of a writ petition in Matter
AsHOK SINGH v. ASSIT. CONlROLLER [MOHAN, J.] 195

.No. 417 of 1972. The learned Single Judge making the rule absolute· held A
that the impugned notice under Section 58(2) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953,
'-(
dated 4th Septembe~, 1972 was cancelled by a writ of mandamus.

Aggrieved by the said order, the first respondent took up the matter
in appeal. The Division Bench considered the scope of Section 73A vis-a-
vis Section 56 and concluded that Section 73A does not do away with the B
liability of an accountable person for payment of duty. It only bars the
initiation of proceedings for levy of duty. Therefore, if the liability remains
but proceedings cannot be initia~ed, there is no question of full payment
of duty. In such a case, it cannot be . stated in the certificate by the
Controller that there is no claim of estate duty from accountabie person. c
.. Accordingly, the bar of limitation is not applicable to cases as provided
under Section 73A where application is made for grant of representation
or succession certificate and the account or the copy application is
delivered to the Controller as required under Section 56. Thus, this appeal
)-- by special leave.
D
Mr. S. Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant would urge that the
. construction placed by the Division Bench is totally inc01 rect. Section 13A
is comprehensive in its scope in so far as it throws a statutory bar prevent-
ing the authority from commencing any proceeding after the expiry of five
years. Having regard to the use of words "under this Act" that will take E
...... within it Section 56 also. If in any case of this character the appellant is
required to produce a certificate from the Controller it will be requiring
him to do the impossible. In respect of his submission he would place
reliance on the ruling of the Allahaba:d High Court in Controller of Estate
Duty v. Bhola Dutt, (130 ITR 468). That was a case when the proceeding
was sought to be commenced on the basis of a return filed by the account- F
able person voluntarily after five years. The High Court held that the
__,,l.. Assistant Controller had no jurisdiction because of the expiry of the
limitation. It is that ratio which has to be adopted in this case.

If the interpretation placed by the High Court is accepted it would G
amount to putting a premium on the laches of the authority and enabling
it to do something indirectly which it cannot do even directly.

The view of the High Court that no grant of representation or
succe.~sion certificate can be made after the expiry of five year, cannot be
supported. Section 56 will have to be so read as to bring about a bar- H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.

A monious construction between Section 73A and Section 56. No doubt if
there is no original assessment, reassessment is impossible but on the score
the statutory bar under Section 73A cannot be lifted. If, as held by the High
Court, Section 73A is made inapplicable where application is made for the .
grant of representation or succession certificate and the account or copy
application is delivered to the Controller as required by Section 56 it will
B be conferring an additional power on Controller which is not in contempla-
tion under the Act. The strict literal interpretation will defeat the object
and purpose of the statutory bar under Section 73A. In support of the
submission reliance is placed on Herbert Broo~'s Selection of Legal
Maxims: QUI HAERET IN LITERA HAERET IN CORTICE (Page
c 466).
In opposition to this, Mr. B.B. Ahuja, learned counsel for the Revenue
comments the acceptance of the view of the Division Bench of the High
-
Court. When Section 56 i'.i mandatory io character the requirement of that
Section cannot be disp.ensed with even by Court. The party who s~eks a
D suecession certificate or representastion in Civil Court is bound to fulfil the
statutory conditions without any exception, is exactly the view taken by the
v:
Delhi High Court inP.C. Saxena The State, (104 ITR 106).

Section 73A uses the word "levy". As to what exactly is mentioned by
E levy under the Act could be gathered by Padampat Singhania and other$ v.
Controller of Estate Duty, Kanpur, (122 ITR 162 at 163). Therefore, there
is no merit in the plea.

We shall now proceed to consider the relative merits of the respec-
~ive submissions. Section 73A reads as follows: -
F
"73A. No proceedings for the levy of any estate duty under this
Act shall be commenced'-

(a) in the case of a first assessment, after the expiration of five
years from the date of death of the deceased in respect of whose
G property estate duty became payable; and

(b) in the case of a re-assessment, after the expiration of three
years from the date of assessment of such property to estate ~-
duty under this Act."

H A carP.ful reading of the above Section discloses the following :
ASHOK SINGH v. ASSIT. CONTROLLER [MOHAN, J.) 197

(i) For the levy of any estate duty A
~-

(ii) Under this Act

(iii) No proceedings shall be commenced.

We are concerned, in this case, only with clause (a). Therefore, the B
fourth qualification will be after the expiration of five years from the date
of death of the deceased. The language, in our considered view, is unam-
~. biguous. This section throws a statutory bar and is comprehensive in
nature. In so far as it says "no proceeding under this Act" that means any
proceeding whatever in relation to levy can ever be commenced after five c
- years. The word "levy" in Black's Law Dictionary (fifth edition) at page 816
is stated thus :

"Levy, v. To assess; raise; execute; exact; tax; collect; gather;
take up; seize. Thus, to levy (assess, exact, raise, or collect) a
tax; to levy (raise or set up) a nuisance; to levy (acknowledge) D
a fine; to levy (inaugurate) war; to levy an execution, i.e., to
levy or collect a sum of money on an execution."

As a matter of fact, in Padampat Singhania (supra) the meaning of
this word under this very Act came to be laid down which is extracted as
/~
E
under:

"The word "levy" has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. National
Tobacco Co. of India Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 2563, as embracing
within it the process of assessment and also the imposition of F
tax."

Therefore, even a proceeding for assessment cannot be taken after
five years. That much is certain. Now, we come to the decisions cited on
behalf of the appellant. bi Controller of Estate Duty v. Bhola Dutt, (130 ITR
468 at 470) the following passage is found : G

~ ''This provision lays do~ a clear and categorical bar to the
commencement of assessment proceedings. They cannot be
commenced after the expiry of five years from the date of death
of the deceased. H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 3 S.C.R.

A ·Under the E.D. Act, the assessment proceedings commence
with the filing of the retwn as prescribed by s. 53(3) of the Act "['
and, under it, the retwn could validly be filed within six months
of the date of death or within such further time ·as may be
extended by the Asst. Controller. That provision obviously is
not applicable to the facts of the present case. Under s. 56 of
B the Act another method of commencement of assessment
proceedings is by the Controller requiring the accountable
person to file the requisite return. Yet another method of
commencement of assessment proceedings is prescribed by s.58
of the Act. Sub~section (4) of s.58 provides that in any case
c where no account has been delivered as required by s.53 or
s.56, or the person accountable fails to comply with the terms
of the notice served under sub-s. (2), the Controller shall make -
the assessment to the best of his judgment and determine the
amount payable as estate duty. In this provision assessment
proceedings could be commenced by the Controller in case the
-f
D
requisite return has not been filed by the accountable person.
But to all these modes of commencement of assessment
proceeding s.73A is applicable. Ex hypothesi assessment
proceedings under either of these provisions could not validly
be commenced after the expiry of the period of limitation
E prescribed by s.73A of the Act. Here, the proceedings were ~
sought to be commenced on the basis of the return filed by the
accountable person voluntarily but after the expiry of the

F
prescribed period of five years. In view of s.73A, the Asst.
Controller had no jurisdiction to commence the proceedings
even on the basis of such a voluntary return.
--
Our attention was invited to s.56 of the Act. It is true that .l__
s.56 does not prescribe any period of limitation, but it applies
in limited circumstances. Sub-section (1) of s.56 applies to a
case where the executor of the deceased wants a representation
G certificate. Then alone he is required to file an account of the
properties of the deceased to the Controller. Under sub-s. (2),
the accountable person is required to produ~e a certificate -~
from the Controller that the requisite estate duty has been paid
in respect of the property for which a succession certificate is
H applied for. Proceedings under s.56 commence when some one
ASHOK SINGH v. ASSIT. CONTROLLER [MOHAN, J.] 199

desires to have a representation certificate or a succession A
certificate, not otherwise. In the present case, none of the two
situations have occurred. We are, therefore, clear that the
assessment proceedings were invalid and w~re rightly quashed
by the Tribunal."

We think the High Court is right in its approach. In opposition to B
this, what is relied on is the case in P.C. Saxena (supra). It is sufficient to
extract the head-note:

"In 1966 the appellant applied in the court of the Subor-
dinate Judge for grant of a succession certificate to realise C

- various debts and securities of the deceased who had died ®
October 28, 1959. The Subordinate Judge allowed the petitions
and ordered grant of the succession certificate subject to the
production of a certificate of clearance in respect of estate duty
under section 56(2) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. The appellant
thereupon applied for exemption from complying with the D
condition for production of the clearance certificate in respect
of estate duty claiming that in view of Section 73A of the Act
no proceedings could be commenced for levy of estate duty on
the estate of the deceased after the expiry of five years from
the date of his death. The Subordinate Judge rejected the E
application for exemption. On appeal to the High Court :

Held, dismissing the appeal, (i) that the civil court did not
possess any jurisdiction or discretion to waive the condition
under section 56(2) of the Act which was precedent to the grant
of representation or succession certificate; F
)_ (ii) that the bar imposed by Section 73A of the Act could not
.be claimed by a party who sought a succession certificate and
applied to a civil court for grant of representation or succession
certificate and he was bound to fulfil the statutory conditions, G
without my exception, before obtaining the certificate."

We are of the vie'Y that this is only an authority for the proposition
that the civil court does not possess any jurisdiction or discretion to waive
the condition to produce the certificate from the Controller which is a
precedent to the grant of representation or succession certificate. H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 3 S.C.R.

A Now, we come to Section 56. That is extracted below:

"56. (1) In all cases in which a grant of representation is applied
for-

(a) the executor of the deceased shall, to the best of his
B knowledge and belief, specify in an appropriate account. an-
nexed to the affidavit of valuation filed in court under section
19-1 of the Court-Fees Act, l870, all the property in respect of
which estate duty is payable upon the death of the deceased ·'
~
and shall deliver a copy of the affidavit with the account to the
c Controller, and

(b) no order entitling the applicant ·to the grant of repre- ......
sentation shall be made upon .his application until he has
deHvered the account prescribed in clause (a) and has
produced .a certificate from the Controller under sub-section -i
D (2) of section 57 or section 67 that the estate duty payable in
respect of the property included in the account has been or
will be pai~ or that none is due, as the case may be. l
i

E
(2) ID all cases in which a grant of a succession certificate is
applied for, a copy of the application shall be furnished by the
'
applicant to the Controller and no order entitling the applicant ~
to the grant of such a certificate. shall be made upon his
a
application until he has produced certificate from the Con- [
\

---
troller under sub-section (2} of section 57 or section 67 that
the estate duty payable in respect of the property mentioned "\
F in the application has been or will be paid, or that none is due,
as the case may be."
A I ~
No doubt, both under sub-section (1) clause (b) of sub-section (2) ~

the language used is "no order shall be made upon his application". To '~ (

require in a case of this character the production. of a certificate from the
G
Controller would amount to the insistence of an impossible compliance.

The view of the Division Bench of the l:figh Court is unacceptable .,....
to us when it holds that Section 73A is only applicable to proceedings
ini_tiated under Section 59. Merely because Section 59 says "subject to
H section 73A" that does not mean a statutory bar under Section 73A is lifted.
ASHOK SINGH v. ASSIT. CONTROLLER (MOHAN, J.] 201

On the contrary, Section 53A reinforces the rigour of Section 73A. The A
'f words "commencement of any proceedings under the Act" as we stated
above are comprehensive enough to include Section 59 as well.

Equally, the finding that the application of Section 73A to cases
coming under Section 56 would make the latter Section unsustainable is
not correct. That will be only placing a literal interpretation of Section 56
B
regardless of situation. In this connection, we may usefully quote Herbert
Broom's Legal Maxims (Pages 466-67):
..
"QUI HAERET IN LITERA HAERET IN CORTICE (Co.
Litt. 283 b.)- c
-- He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes skin-
deep into its meaning.

}-- The law of England respects the effect and substance of the D
matter, and not every nicety of form or circumstance. "The
reason and spirit of cases make law, and not the letter of
particular precedents". Hence it is, as we have already seen, a
general rule connected with the interpretation of deeds and
written instruments, that, where the intention is clear, too
minute a stress should not be laid on the strict and precise E
~
signification of words. For instance, by the grant of a remainder,
a reversion may pass, and a converso; and if a lessee covenant
to leave all the timber which was growing on the land when he
took it down, but leaves it there; for this, though a literal
performance of the covenant, would defeat its intent." F
).. "In interpreting an Act of Parliament, likewise, it is not always
a true line of construction to decide according to the strict
letter of the Act; but, subject to the remarks alr~av made, the
Courts may ronsider what is its fair meaning, and expound it
differently from the letter, in order to preserve the intent. The G
meaning of particular words, indeed, in statutes, as well as in
other instruments, is to. be found not so much in a striCl
--<(
etymological propriety of language; nor even in popwar use, as
in the subject or occasion on which they are used, and the
.,bject that is intended to be attained." H
202 fiUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 3 S.C.R.

A If, therefore, the object of Section 73A is umambiguous to bar the
commencement of any proceeding for levy after the period of five years in
the case of first assessment, we do not think we can dilute the rigour of
Section 73A by introducing a construction not warrant~d in the situation.
If it was the intention of the Parliament to provide exceptional cases
B malting Section 73A inapplicable to such cases nothing would have been
easier than to have so expressed. The language under Section 73A is
imperative. It admits of no doubt that there cannot be two limitations (i)
in a case where the assessee files a belated return and (ii) in a case where
the applicant seeks a succession certificate. In such a case where the
assessee, as in the instant case, seeks a certificate from the Controller, all
C that the Controller has to say is, that no such certificate could be issued
since in view of the statutory bar under Section 73A. In this context, Section
56 will have to be giveri meaning and life. He who clings to the letter of
the law clings to the dry bone; that would be agaipst the spirit of the Act.
-
In the result, we set aside the impugned judgment. The appeal will
stand allowed. Howeyer, there shall be no orders as to costs.

N.P.V. 1peal allowed.