Holding

When the existence of a landlord‑tenant relationship is genuinely disputed, the bar under Section 25 does not preclude a civil court from reviewing the validity of an eviction order passed under Section 14A.

Summary

The appellants, claiming to have purchased land from a Mahant, obtained an order of ejectment against the respondent tenant under Section 14A of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. The tenant contested the existence of a landlord‑tenant relationship, arguing that the Mahant had no authority to convey title and that the Mandir was the true owner. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Section 25 of the Act bars a civil court from reviewing the validity of an eviction order when the landlord‑tenant relationship itself is disputed. The Court held that the bar does not apply in such genuine disputes; a civil court retains jurisdiction to examine the legality of the revenue authority’s order, though a frivolous denial by the tenant cannot defeat the authority’s power. Applying this principle, the Court found the appellants’ claim meritless and dismissed the appeal, ordering each party to bear its own costs.

Issues considered

Whether Section 25 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 bars a civil court from questioning the validity of an eviction order when the existence of a landlord‑tenant relationship is disputed.
Whether the revenue authority under Section 14A has the power to decide the existence of a landlord‑tenant relationship in a summary proceeding.
Whether the appellant’s claim of title based on a sale deed executed by the Mahant is valid.

Legislation cited

East Punjab Displaced Persons (Land Resettlement) Act, 1949s. 2(1)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 116
Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953s. 10(2), s. 10(3), s. 14A, s. 24, s. 25
Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887s. 39, s. 40, s. 41, s. 42, s. 43, s. 4(5), s. 45, s. 4(6), s. 46, s. 50A, s. 77, s. 77(3), s. 80, s. 81, s. 82, s. 83, s. 84

Subjects

landlord‑tenant relationshipevictionjurisdictioncivil courtrevenue courtSection 25Section 14Asummary decisionres judicatainvalid order

Judgment

1162 [2021]
SUPREME COURT 9 S.C.R. 1162
REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs.
v.
SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. & OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 6915 of 2021)
B NOVEMBER 17, 2021
[K. M. JOSEPH AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.]
Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953:
s. 25 – Bar of jurisdiction of the civil court under – When the
C landlord-tenant relationship is disputed in a proceeding u/s. 14A –
Held: If a landlord-tenant relationship is disputed, despite the
exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Revenue Court, to even order
eviction of a tenant, the Civil Court would still retain jurisdiction in
a case, despite the bar u/s. 25 – Thus, the validity of the orders u/s.
14A is open to scrutiny in a Civil Court, in a situation, when the
D
tenant denies and disputes the case of the landlord that there is a
landlord-tenant relationship – However, a mere plea by the tenant,
should not render the Authorities helpless and bereft of power to
order eviction – In a situation, where the Authority finds the plea of
the tenant to be completely frivolous and mere attempt at blocking
E the proceedings, the validity enacted u/s. 25 cannot be diluted – On
facts, appellant claiming to have purchased the suit property from
Mahant, the previous landlord filed application for ejectment of
respondent No. 1-tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent which
was allowed by the Assistant Collector and thereafter, upheld by
the Collector and the Commissioner – First respondent then filed
F
suit seeking declaration that the suit property is owned by a Mandir,
the Mahant having sold it to appellant as manager of the Mandir
without having any title in the property– Suit decreed by the trial
court holding that the Mandir was the owner and no rights were
conveyed to the appellants under the sale – Thereafter, appeal as
G also Second Appeal by the appellants dismissed – Appellants claim
under an assignment made by the Mahant, who has been found to
be without Authority to convey any right to the appellants – In such
circumstances, it cannot be said that the suit filed by tenant is clearly
barred – s. 14A.
H
1162
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1163
& OTHERS

s. 25 – Exclusion of courts and authorities – Interpretation A
of – Explained.
Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887: ss. 40-45, 75-78, 80, 82, 84, 88,
89, 98-100 – Provisions pertaining to ejectment of tenant –
Provisions pertaining to jurisdiction and procedure – Stated.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court B

HELD: 1.1 The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953
received the assent of the President on 15.04.1953. The Act went
on to introduce the concept of permissible area, which was
defined in the Act. It further provided for protection of the tenant
from being evicted except in certain circumstances. C
[Para 15][1176-A-B]
1.2 The submission of the respondent, who successfully
instituted the Suit in question and prosecuted the same, is that
the bar on the Section 25 will not apply, having regard to the fact
that there is a dispute relating to the very existence of landlord- D
tenant relationship; and that the ouster of the Civil Court’s
jurisdiction does not apply in view of the fact that plaintiff-tenant
does not admit that the appellants are his landlords. Such a
question cannot be decided by the Authority in an action under
Section 14A of the Act. Equally, the incompetency is applicable E
to the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Body, viz., the
Collector and the Commissioner. In fact, the Financial
Commissioner rightly opined that it is a matter for consideration
by a Civil Court. [Para 21][1178-C-E]
1.3 The application for ejectment was filed by the appellants F
claiming to have purchased the rights of the previous landlord by
way of sale deed. The dispute was whether the Mandir was the
owner and the Mahant was competent in his own rights to convey
the rights of the land owner. The Assistant Collector, Collector
and the Commissioner repelled the contention of the respondent-
tenant, by holding that in view of the transfer by the sale deed G
dated 16.11.1956 by the Mahant, the appellants became landlords,
competent to eject the respondent-tenant. The findings of the
Civil Courts, on the other hand, is that the respondent-tenant
has never paid rent and attorned to the appellants and the Mandir
H
1164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A was the owner and no rights were conveyed to the appellants
under the sale. [Para 22][1178-E-G]
2.1 Section 14A of the Act provides that the Assistant
Collector is to proceed as provided for in sub section 2 of Section
10 of the Act and the provisions of sub section 3 of Section 10
B was to apply in relation to such application. Section 10 (2) declares
that on the receipt of an application the Assistant Collector after
giving to the parties notice in writing and the reasonable
opportunity to be heard determine the dispute summarily and
shall keep a memorandum of evidence and a gist of his final order
with brief reasons therefor. Section 10 (3) on the other hand
C provides that when an application has been made which in the
context of Section 14A must be read as an application under
Section 14A, any proceeding in relation to the same matter
pending in any other court or before any other authority shall be
stayed on receipt of information by that court or authority from
D the Assistant Collector that he has received an application under
Section 14A. The effect of Section 10 (3) further would be that all
proceedings in a court or before any authority shall lapse when
the dispute has been determined by the Assistant Collector acting
under the Act.There are two aspects which emerge. The first
aspect is that the Assistant Collector acting under Section 14A
E read with Section 10 (2) must give a reasonable opportunity to
the tenant and determine the dispute summarily. This is an
important pointer to the nature of the power which is exercised
by the Assistant Collector. In a case of a dispute raised by the
tenant about the very existence of the landlord-tenant
F relationship, in a provision which contemplates evicting a person
who is the tenant, the duty to render a summary decision appears
incongruous with the imperative need for the authority to be able
to unravel the many dimensions of a dispute which is genuinely
raised by the tenant about there being a landlord-tenant
relationship. In other words what is to be rendered is a summary
G decision and justice would neither be done to the nature of the
power enjoyed by the Assistant Collector nor to the right of a
party to seek redress in a Civil Court otherwise, unless the power
of the Civil Court is preserved. [Paras 46-48][1196-C, F-H;
1197-A-D]
H
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1165
& OTHERS

Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi AIR 1962 SC A
547:[1962] SCR 673 – referred to.
2.2 The other aspect which emerges is that Section 10(3)
which contemplates proceedings in relation to the same matter
in any other court or authority being stayed, when such court or
authority is informed by the Assistant Collector of having received B
an application under Section 14A read with Section 10. The law
giver has however provided that the Assistant Collector must
proceed with the application but determine the dispute summarily.
Upon the dispute being determined by the Assistant Collector
the proceedings which were stayed by the court or any other
authority would lapse. This sub section gives the impression that C
the powers of the Assistant Collector are meant to be exhaustive.
[Para 49][1197-E-F]
2.3 An application for ejectment of a tenant is to be made
before the Assistant Collector under Section 14A. Such an
application is to be decided after giving notice and it is to be D
decided summarily. Since the exclusive power to decide the
application to evict the tenant has been conferred on the Assistant
Collector, the law giver has further contemplated that after receipt
of such an application by the Assistant Collector no other court
or authority is to proceed with ‘any case relating to the same E
matter’ upon being informed by the Assistant Collector of the
receipt of the application under Section 14A. What is more such
proceeding is to lapse after the determination of the dispute by
the Assistant Collector. The law giver no doubt does contemplate
an exclusive and expeditious remedy for the landlord to seek
eviction brooking no over lapping of jurisdiction by exercise of F
power by any other court or authority on a parallel basis. However,
this provision cannot mean that when the very existence landlord-
tenant relationship is brought under a cloud by the tenant raising
a dispute then the very premise on which the exclusive jurisdiction
conferred on the Assistant Collector is not overturned. In other G
words, the law giver has proceeded on the basis that the Assistant
Collector is clothed with the power to decide a matter relating to
eviction in a summary fashion. This would be inconsistent with
scenario where the very existence of the landlord-tenant

H
1166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A relationship is disputed. The law giver in other words proceeds
on an assumption that the application made by the landlord is
against a person who is indeed the tenant. [Para 50][1197-G-H;
1198-A-D]
2.4 What is contemplated is that during the pendency of
B the proceeding before the Assistant Collector even a suit in a
civil court where the title of the landlord is questioned or in other
words there is a challenge thrown to the very existence of the
landlord-tenant relationship is not permitted. Even in such a
scenario after the conclusion of the proceeding, in the light of
the decisions of this court starting with Magiti Sasamal’s case,
C Raja Durga Singh’s case and Richpal Singh’s case, would apply
and the bar under Section 25 would not available. The Civil Court
would have the power in a case where without it being a frivolous
challenge to the landlord tenant-relationship, in a genuine dispute
relating to landlord-tenant relationship, the orders passed by the
D authorities under the Act can be found to be null and void for the
reason that transgressing the power conferred, the authorities
proceed to decide the matter, (which again it must be remembered
under Section 10 (2) is to be a summary decision) which is the
vexed issue relating to the very existence of the landlord-tenant
relationship. [Para 51][1198-D-G]
E
Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi AIR 1962 SC 547 :
[1962] SCR 673; Shri Raja Durga Singh of Solon v.
Tholu and others AIR 1963 SC 361 : [1963] SCR 693;
Richpal Singh and others v. Dalip (1987) 4 SCC 410 :
[1988] 1 SCR 93 – referred to.
F
2.5 The words used in Section 25 of the Act, is that except
in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the validity of any
proceeding or Order, taken or made under the Act, cannot be
questioned in any Court or before any other Authority. In other
words, an Order passed under Section 14A, could be challenged
G by way of an Appeal, Review and Revision, as provided in the
Tenancy Act, adverted to in Section 24 of the Act. This explained,
the question perseveres, however, as to whether the validity of
proceeding or Order passed, is beyond challenge in a Civil Court,
under circumstances analogous to that obtaining, with reference
H
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1167
& OTHERS

to a proceeding under Section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act. In A
other words, Section 77 of the Tenancy Act, inter alia, provided
for seeking eviction of a tenant before the Revenue Officer.
Section 14A of the Act, similarly, confers powers upon the
Revenue Officer, to entertain an application for evicting a tenant.
[Para 52][1198-G-H; 1199-A-C]
B
Amar Singh and others v. Dalip (1981) ILR 3 P&H
582 – referred to
2.6 The principles relating to exclusion of Civil Court’s
jurisdiction are well-settled. Ouster of the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court is not readily inferred. In the scheme of the Tenancy Act C
also, an Order under Section 77 could be subjected to Appeal,
Review and Revision, as provided in the Act. Section 77(3) of
the Tenancy Act, purported to confer exclusive power on the
Revenue Court to decide certain disputes and ousted jurisdiction
of courts. This included the proceeding to evict the tenant. In
other words, Civil Court could not entertain the application to D
evict a tenant. It is in this statutory framework that this Court
has stated the view that if a landlord-tenant relationship is
disputed, despite the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the
Revenue Court, to even Order eviction of a tenant, the Civil
Court would still retain jurisdiction in a case where there is a E
dispute relating to landlord-tenant relationship. The Act was
enacted in 1953. Section 14A of the Act, provided for the eviction
of a tenant notwithstanding anything contained in any other law.
Therefore, apart from the fact that it became an exhaustive
catalogue of circumstances, entitling the landlord to launch
proceedings for eviction and also further designating the Statutory F
Authority, before which, it could be filed, it provided for a bar to
challenge the validity of the orders passed, except by way of the
remedies provided under the Tenancy Act. There would not be
any justification for revisiting the principle laid down that when
the relationship between landlord and tenant is contested, the G
Civil Court continue to have the jurisdiction despite the bar under
Section 25 of the Act. There is no reason to hold that the validity
of the Order passed by the Assistant Collector, as may be upheld
in Appeal, Review or Revision, cannot be questioned in a Civil

H
1168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A Court, if the expression “validity” is conflated with legality. In
other words, if an Order is illegal, it would be invalid. The illegality
of an Order can arise out of various causes. An Order may be
illegal, and therefore, invalid, on the ground that the Author of
the Order, in this case, the Authorities designated under Section
14A, did not have the power to decide the issue. In this case, the
B
concern is with illegality due to absence of power. This Court is
not called upon to decide the position, where the Authority, under
the Act, violates the fundamental procedure relating to natural
justice and the Civil Court is invited to sit in Judgment over the
same. It is found that the expression “validity of the decision or
C the Order” in Section 25 of the Act, would not include a case
where, despite a dispute projected, that there was no landlord-
tenant relationship, the Authority decides the said issue in the
course of the Order of Eviction, under Section 14A, after brushing
aside the tenant’s objection relating to his position, viz., that he
is not a tenant. In such a situation, the validity is tied-up with the
D
fundamental aspect of absence of power of the Authority to decide
on the question of landlord-tenant relationship. Therefore, the
validity of the orders under Section 14A is open to scrutiny in a
Civil Court, in a situation, when the tenant denies and disputes
the case of the landlord that there is a landlord-tenant relationship.
E However, a mere plea by the tenant, should not lead, without
anything more, to render the Authorities helpless and bereft of
power to order eviction. In a situation, where, the Authority finds
the plea of the tenant to be completely frivolous and mere attempt
at blocking the proceedings, the validity enacted under Section
25, cannot be diluted. The position must be understood as that
F
the power to decide, cannot be assigned to the Authorities under
the Act, of the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship.
[Para 53][1199-C-H; 1200-A-F]
3. The case of the appellants is that of failure to pay rent by
the respondent-tenant. The tenant claims to be a tenant under
G the Mandir, which has been found to be the owner of the property.
Appellants claim under an assignment made by the Mahant, who
has been found to be without Authority to convey any right to the
appellants. In such circumstances, the submission of the
appellants is meritless. [Paras 54, 55][1200-F-G]
H
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1169
& OTHERS

Shankar Singh Etc. v. Mangal Singh Etc. AIR 1973 A
P&H 307; State of Punjab (now Haryana) and others
v. Amar Singh and another (1974) 2 SCC 70 : [1974] 3
SCR 152; Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union
of India (2005) 6 SCC 344 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 929;
Kamla Devi Widow of Hans Raj, etc. v. Financial
B
Commissioner (Appeals), Punjab and others (2013)
SCC Online P&H 7911; Bhagwat Sharan (Dead
Through Legal Representatives) v. Purushottam and
others (2020) 6 SCC 387; Heman and another
Appellants v. Tulsi Ram R.S.A. No. 1511 of 1970;
Chandu Lal v. Kalia and Goria Civil Revision No. 849 C
of 1973; Kul Bhushan etc. v. Faquira and others L.P.A.
No. 35 of 1974; Ramzani v. Abad Shah R.S.A. No. 1975
of 1971; Jia Lal and another v. State of Haryana and
others Writ Petition No. 1785 of 1968; Jaswant Rai
and another v. Bhagwan Dass and another R.S.A. No.
D
1120 of 1963; Raja Ram and another v. Raghubir Singh
and another Civil Writ No. 1288 of 1967; Khazan Singh
another v. Dalip Singh and another L.P.A. No. 623 of
1968; Om Prakash Gupta v. Dr. Ratan Singh and
another (1964) 1 SCR 259 – referred to
Case Law Reference E

AIR 1973 P&H 307 referred to Para 24
[1974] 3 SCR 152 referred to Para 24
[2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 929 referred to Para 24
F
(2020) 6 SCC 387 referred to Para 24
(1964) 1 SCR 259 referred to Para 37
[1962] SCR 673 referred to Para 48, 51
[1963] SCR 693 referred to Para 51
G
[1988] 1 SCR 93 referred to Para 51
(1981) ILR 3 P&H 582 referred to Para 52

H
1170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6915
of 2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.02.2004 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No.1777 of 1981.
Ms. Archna Midha, Vineet Bhagat, K. G. Bhagat, Ms. Manju
B Bhagat, Mohit Gulati, Advs. for the Appellants.
Tarun Jindal, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Saksham Maheshwari, Advs.
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. M. JOSEPH, J.
C 1. Leave granted.
2. An application for Ejectment was filed by the Appellants and
Proforma Respondents 2 to 21 for ejectment of Respondent No. 1 on
the ground of non- payment of rent. The application was filed under the
Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 hereinafter referred to as
D ‘the Act’.The application was allowed by the Assistant Collector1st Grade,
Ferozepur by Order dated 13.09.1972. The appeal filed by the first
respondent before the Collector, Ferozepur under Section 24 of ‘the
Act’was dismissed vide order dated 04.09.1973. The Commissioner by
order dated 04.02.1974 on revision filed by the first respondent
recommended to the Financial Commissioner, Punjab for setting aside
E
the order leaving the parties to seek relief through the Civil Court. This
reference was disallowed and the revision petition of the first respondent
was dismissed by the Commissioner, Punjab vide his order dated
22.08.1974. The review filed by the first respondent was dismissed. The
first respondent instituted a Suit wherein the relief sought as noted in the
F judgment of the Trial Court is:
“... declaration to the effect that agricultural land measuring 594
kanals 17 marlas as per details given in the heading of the plaint,
situated in Jhoke Harl Har, Tehsil Ferozepure as entered in
Jamabandi for the year 1965-66 is owned by Mandir Jhoke Hari
G Har (Public Religious Endowment) through Shri Inder Singh son
of Harnam Singh resident of village Jhoke Hari Har, one of the
worshippers and defacto trustee of Mandir Jhoke Hari Har
(defendant No.18) and defendant No. 1 to 17 have got no concern
with the land and a decree for ejectment of land in dispute obtained
by defendant No. 1 to 17 against the plaintiff from the Assistant
H Collector Grade-I, Ferozepure is nullity and without jurisdiction
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1171
& OTHERS [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

with consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the A
defendants No. I to 17 from taking actual possession of the suit
land.”
3. The Trial Court, by Judgment dated 18.11.1978, decreed the
Suit. The Appeal carried by the appellants before the 1st Additional District
Judge, Ferozepur, was dismissed. By the impugned Decree and Judgment, B
the Regular Second Appeal No. 1777 of 1981, has been dismissed.
4. We heard the learned Counsel for the Appellants and learned
Counsel for the Respondents. The only question, which falls for our
decision, revolves around the interpretation of Section 25 of the Act.
Section 25 of the Act reads as follows: C
“Section 25. Exclusion of courts and authorities - Except in
accordance with the provisions of this Act, the validity of any
proceedings or order taken or made under this Act shall not be
called in question in any court or before any other authority.”
5. In other words, the only contention asserted by the appellants D
is that the suit filed by the first respondent is clearly barred. On the other
hand, the contention of the respondents is that, having regard to both the
facts and law, the Suit is maintainable.
THE FINDINGS IN THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
E
6. It is necessary to notice the case of the appellants. They claim
that they purchased the suit property which measured 594 Kanals and
17 Marlas by sale deed dated 16.11.1956 from Mahant Ramji Dass. The
first respondent was the tenant in the said land. The case of the first
respondent, on the other hand, was that, he obtained the Suit land on
lease on 20.10.1955 from Mahant Ramji Dass as the Manager of the F
Mandir for a period of five years on payment of Rs.1,000/- per annum
as rent. Thereafter, the suit property was leased to him for a period of
20 years from 1960 to 1980. While so, it is the further case of the first
respondent that Mahant Ramji Dass sold the Suit land to the appellants
vide registered sale deed dated 16.11.1956,without having any title in the
G
property, as the property belonged to the Mandir. Thus, the first
respondent set up the case that he was not a tenant under the appellants.
Resultantly the order passed for eviction was null and void being without
jurisdiction. The appellants took up the contention that the land was the
personal property of Mahant Ramji Dass and on failure of the first
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1172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A respondent as tenant to pay the rent the application before the Revenue
Court was perfectly maintainable.
7. The Trial Court framed 8 issues. They are as follows: -
“l. Whether the plaintiff secured the disputed land on lease from
Mandir Jhoke Hari Har defendant No.18 through its Manager
B Ramji Dass deceased and is in possession of the disputed land as
lessee of defendant No.18? OPP
2. Whether Mahant Ramji Dass (deceased) was the absolute
owner of the disputed land having right to alienate the same?OPD

C 3. Whether Mahant Ramji Dass (deceased) validly sold the
disputed land in favour of defendants No. I to 17 by means of
registered sale deed dated 16.11.56? If so, its effect?OPD
4. Whether the orders of ejectment passed by the Revenue
Authorities are void and illegal in view of the grounds mentioned
D in para No.4 of the plaint? OPP
5. Whether the present suit is barred by principle of resjudicata?
OPD
6. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court
fee and jurisdiction? OPD
E 7. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from challenging the title of
Mahant Ramji Dass deceased in the disputed property? OPD
8. Whether there is no Mandir by the name of Mandir Jhoke Hari
Har, if so, what is its effect? (Onus objected to)”

F 8. The Trial Court held that the suit land was the property of the
Mandir. It was leased to the first respondent plaintiff by its Manager
Mahant Ramji Dass. It proceeded to hold further that there is no valid
sale vide registered sale deed dated 16.11.1956 to the appellants, as
Mahant Ramji Dass had no title in the property to convey. Answering
Issue No. 4, it was found that the revenue authorities had no jurisdiction
G to order eviction. There was no relationship of landlord and tenant
between the appellants and the respondent. Issue No. 6 was not pressed
and it stood decided against the appellants. Equally, the Court found that
the Suit was not barred by principle of res judicata. The respondent
was found not estopped from challenging the title of Mahant Ramji Dass.
H
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1173
& OTHERS [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

9. The First Appellate Court found that Section 116 of the Indian A
Evidence Act, 1872 (for short ‘Evidence Act’) did not apply to a person
who claimed to be a representative of the landlord by assignment by
merely purchasing the landlord’s interest. The purchaser did not become
the landlord entitled to the protection of Section 116 of Evidence Act. It
was only if the tenant attorned to him that benefit of Section 116 of
B
Evidence Act became available. The Appellate Court found that there
was no evidence that first respondent had paid any rent to the appellants
or recognized them as the landlords. There was no privity of contract. In
other words, Section 116 of the Evidence Act was available only to a
person who was the landlord at the beginning of the tenancy. The tenancy
in favour of the first respondent had commenced based on the lease C
deed dated 20.10.1955 executed by the General Attorney of Mahant
Ramji Dass, Shri Balak Nath. This lease was found to be period of 5
years wherein the Mandir was described as the owner in possession.
Therefore, when the subsequent lease deed was executed dated
25.01.1956, the first respondent was already in possession as a tenant.
D
The tenancy was under the Mandir and not under the Mahant in an
individual capacity. The further finding of the Appellate Court is that, in
the Jamabandis for the year 1939-40, the Suit property had been recorded
as owned by the Mandir under the management of Mahant Ramji Dass
Chela Baba Mohan Dass. In the earlier Jamabandis though the name
of the Mandir did not occur as owner, it was found that the property had E
been devolving from Guru to Chela. The natural heirs were being
excluded. Mahant Ramji Dass, through the General power of Attorney,
had admitted that the Suit property was owned by the Mandir. Mahant
Ramji Dass was only its Manager. The first respondent was not a party
to the decree dated 26.08.1960 obtained by Mahant Ramji Dass. Equally,
F
the Mandir was also not a party under the revenue records. Mahant
Ramji Dass was not the owner of the property mutation in favour of the
vendees was not being sanctioned. Then, the Mahant filed the said Suit,
wherein, the appellants were made defendants, who admitted the claim
of Mahant Ramji Dass.The suit went uncontested in the First Appellate
Court. Consequently, it is found that the Decree, dated 26.08.1960, was G
merely a collusive decree. Mahant Ramji Dass being only the manager
of the suit property was bereft of power to sell and the sale deed was
invalid. Consequently, the appellants did not acquire title.
10. The High Court, by the impugned Judgment, agreed with the
concurrent findings of the courts. The High Court went on to find Mahant H
1174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A Ramji Dass was only the Manager of the Mandir and he did not have
power to alienate its property. Protection under Section 116 of the
Evidence Act was not available to the appellants as there was no landlord-
tenant relationship between the appellants and the first respondent. The
contention further that the sale deed and the Decree dated 26.08.1960,
could only be challenged by the Mandir and not by the first respondent
B
was rejected. It was found that no such plea was raised in the courts
below. It was further found that the legal proposition that a revenue
court authorities could not decide the question of title has not been disputed
by the Counsel for the appellants. The revenue authority acted illegally
by deciding the question of title and passing Order of Eviction.
C 11. We are concerned in this case with the bar of jurisdiction of
the Civil Court under Section 25 of the Act. The Act must be read and
understood bearing in mind, the provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act,
1887 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tenancy Act’, for short). The word
‘tenant’ is defined in the Tenancy Act in Section 4(5). The word ‘landlord’
D was defined in Section 4(6) of the said Act, as meaning the person under
whom a tenant holds land, and to whom, the tenant, or but for the special
contract would be, liable to pay rent for that land. The word ‘tenant’ and
‘landlord’ were defined to include the predecessors and successors in
interest of a tenant and landlord, respectively. Under Section 5, tenants
having right of occupancy was described and declared. Chapter III of
E the Tenancy Act dealt with ‘rents’ generally. Rents were to consist of
either produce rents or cash rents. Section 39 provided for ground of
ejectment of occupancy tenant.
12. Section 40 provides for ejectment of tenants for a fixed term.
The third categorization of tenant in the matter of ejectment is captured
F in Section 41, which provided for ejectment of tenant from year to year.
Section 42 provided for restriction on ejectment. It reads as follows:
“42. Restriction on ejectment – A tenant shall not be ejected
otherwise than in execution of a decree for ejectment, except in
the following cases, namely:-
G
(a) when a decree for an arrear of rent in respect of his tenancy
has been passed against him and remains unsatisfied;
(b) when a tenant has not a right of occupancy and does not hold
for a fixed term under a contract or a decree or order of competent
authority.”
H
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1175
& OTHERS [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

13. Section 43 provided for the exceptional cases mentioned in A
Section 42, viz., when a tenant could be ejected, otherwise than in
execution of a Decree for Ejectment. The application was to be made to
a Revenue Officer. Sections 44 and 45 provided for circumstances
mentioned in Section 42(a) and 42(b), prospectively. Section 50A provided
for a bar to Civil Court entertaining a Suit filed by a tenant contesting his
B
liability to ejectment or to recover possession or occupancy rights or to
recover compensation in the circumstances mentioned therein. Chapter
VII deal with jurisdiction and procedure. Section 75 provided that there
shall be the same classes of Revenue Officers as provided in the Punjab
Land Revenue Act, 1887. Section 76 provided for applications and
proceedings to be considered by the Revenue Officer. They were divided C
into three groups. Section 77(1) reads as follows:
“77. Revenue Courts and suits cognizable by them - (1) When a
Revenue-officer is exercising jurisdiction with respect to any such
suit as is described in sub-section (3); or with respect to an appeal
or other proceeding arising out of any such suit, he shall be called D
a Revenue Court.”
14. Section 77(3) provided that the Suit mentioned thereafter, were
to be instituted, heard and determined by the Revenue Court and no
other Court was to take cognizance of any dispute or matter with respect
to which any such Suit may be instituted. Again, it is divided into three E
groups. In the first group, Clause (e) was “Suits by landlords to eject the
tenant”. Under Section 78, the Financial Commissioner was conferred
general superintendence and control over all other Officers and Revenue
Courts. Section 80 provided for Appeal from an Original or Appellate
Order or Decree made under the Tenancy Act by a Revenue Officer or
Revenue Court. Section 82 provided for power of review by a Revenue F
Officer. Section 84 provided for the power of Revision with the Financial
Commissioner, the Commissioner and Collector. Section 88 provided for
the procedure to be followed by the Revenue Court. The Revenue Officer
and the Revenue Court are empowered under Section 89 to summon
any person. Section 98 contemplated power to refer a party to a Civil G
Court. Section 99 clothes the Presiding Officer of a Civil or a Revenue
Court entertaining doubts regarding jurisdiction to refer a matter to the
High Court. Section 100 empowered the High Court in certain
circumstances to validate proceedings held under mistake as to
jurisdiction.
H
1176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A 15. The Act of 1953, with which, we are concerned, received the
assent of the President on 15.04.1953. The Act went on to introduce the
concept of permissible area, which was defined in the Act. It further
provided for protection of the tenant from being evicted except in certain
circumstances. The word “land owner” was defined in Section 2(1) as
follows:
B
“2(1) “Landowner” means a person defined as such in the Punjab
Land Revenue Act, 1887 (Act XVII of 1887), and shall include
an “allottee” and “lessee” as defined in clauses(b) and (c),
respectively, of section 2 of the East Punjab Displaced Persons
(Land Resettlement)Act, 1949 (Act XXXVI of 1949), hereinafter
C referred to as the “Resettlement Act”. Explanation – In respect
of land mortgaged with possession, the mortgagee shall be deemed
to be the landowner.”
16. “Tenant” was assigned the same meaning as was assigned
under the Tenancy Act and was to include a sub-tenant and self-
D cultivating lessee but not to include a present holder, as defined in Section
2 of the Resettlement Act. Section 9 provided for the liability of the
tenant to be ejected. This was to apply not withstanding anything contained
in any other law for the time being in force. Section 9(ii) provided for
ejecting of the tenant if he failed to pay the rent regularly without sufficient
E cause. Section (iii) further provided for ejectment of the tenant in arrears
of rent at the commencement of the Act. There were other grounds also
available. Section 14A of the Act read as follows:
“14-A. Not with standing anything to the contrary contained in
any other law for the time being in force, and subject to the
F provisions of section 9-A.-
(i) a land owner desiring to eject a tenant under this Act shall
apply in writing to the Assistant Collector First Grade having
jurisdiction, who shall thereafter proceed as provided for in
sub-section (2) of sub-section 10 of this Act, and the
G provisions of sub-section (3) of the said section shall also
apply in relation to such application, provided that the tenants
rights to compensation and acquisition of occupancy rights,
if any under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 ( XVI of 1887),
shall not be affected;

H
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1177
& OTHERS [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

(ii) a land-owner desiring to recover arrears of rent from a A
tenant shall apply in writing to the Assistant Collector Second
Grade, having jurisdiction, who shall thereupon send a notice
in the form prescribed to the tenant either to deposit the
rent or value thereof , if payable in kind or give proof of
having paid it or of the fact that he is not liable to pay the
B
whole or part of the rent or of the fact of the landlords
refusal to receive the same or to give a receipt, within the
period specified in the notice. Where, after summary
determination, as provided for in sub-section (2) of Section
10 of this Act, the Assistant Collector finds that the tenant
has not paid or deposited the rent he shall eject the tenant C
summarily and put the landowner in possession of the land
concerned;
(iii) (a) if a landlord refuses to accept rent from his tenant or
demands rent in excess of what he is entitled to under this
Act, or refuses to give a receipt, the tenant may in writing D
inform the Assistant Collector second Grade, having
jurisdiction of the fact; 1New section 14-A, added by Punjab
Act, 11 of 1955.
(b) on receiving such application, the Assistant Collector
shall by a written notice require the landlord to accept the E
rent payable in accordance with this Act, or to give a receipt,
as the case maybe, or both,within 60 days of the receipt of
the notice.”
17. Section 23 read as follows:
“23. Abrogation of pending decrees, orders and notices: F
No decree or order of any court or authority and no notice of
ejectment shall be valid to the extent to which it is consistent with
the provisions of this Act.”
18. Section 24 provided for Appeal, Review and Revision and it
G
reads as follows:
“24. The provisions in regard to appeal, review and revision under
this Act, shall, so far as may be, the same as provided in Sections
80, 81, 82, 83 and 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (Act XVI
of the 1887).”
H
1178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A 19. It is thereafter that Section 25 provided:
“25. Exclusion of courts and authorities:
Except in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the validity
of any proceeding or order taken or made under this Act, shall not
be called in question in any court or before any other authority.”
B
20. We are called upon to decide the ambit of Section 25 of the
Act, which is the only contention raised by the appellants. We have
already noticed that the appellants have lost in all the three Courts on
merits.

C 21. The contention of the respondent, who successfully instituted
the Suit in question and prosecuted the same, is that the bar on the
Section 25 will not apply, having regard to the fact that there is a dispute
relating to the very existence of landlord-tenant relationship. It is his
contention that the ouster of the Civil Court’s jurisdiction does not apply
in view of the fact that plaintiff-tenant does not admit that the appellants
D are his landlords. Such a question cannot be decided by the Authority in
an action under Section 14A of the Act. Equally, the incompetency is
applicable to the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Body, viz., the
Collector and the Commissioner. In fact, the Financial Commissioner
rightly opined that it is a matter for consideration by a Civil Court.
E 22. To recapitulate the facts, application for ejectment was filed
by the appellants claiming to have purchased the rights of the previous
landlord by way of sale deed dated 16.11.1956. The dispute was whether
the Mandir was the owner and the Mahant was competent in his own
rights to convey the rights of the land owner. The Assistant Collector,
F Collector and the Commissioner repelled the contention of the respondent-
tenant, by holding that in view of the transfer by the sale deed dated
16.11.1956 by the Mahant, the appellants became landlords, competent
to eject the respondent-tenant. The findings of the Civil Courts, on the
other hand, is that the respondent-tenant has never paid rent and attorned
to the appellants and the Mandir was the owner and no rights were
G conveyed to the appellants under the sale.
23. Both parties have relied upon a large body of case law.
THE CASE LAWS RELIED UPON BY THE APPELLANTS
24. They are as follows:
H
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1179
& OTHERS [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

i. In Shankar Singh Etc. v. Mangal Singh Etc.1, an ex parte A
Order of Ejectment passed by the Assistant Collector came
to be set aside by the Collector. The Collector ordered the
tenant to be put back in possession. The learned Judge found
assurance in the principle that an act of Court could not
cause injury to any of the parties. The Court relied upon
B
Rules made under the Act and also the Tenancy Act. It
was further, no doubt, observed that, under Section 25 of
the Act, the Order could not be challenged in a Civil Court
and the Suit was, therefore, barred under Section 25. We
may at once notice that this case did not involve any dispute
concerning the existence of landlord-tenant relationship. C
ii. In State of Punjab (now Haryana) and others v. Amar
Singh and another2, a Bench of three learned Judges had
to consider the question,inter alia, as to whether the
expression “transfer” or “other disposition of land”, in Clause
(b) of Section 10A of the Act, included involuntary transfer D
of a part of holding of a land owner by operation of an
Order forcing a land owner to sell a part of his holding to a
tenant under Section 18 of the Act. In the Majority Judgment,
the contention of the appellant-State was accepted. Justice
R.S. Sarkaria dissented. In the course of his dissent, while
surveying the Act and having considered the scheme of the E
Tenancy Act as well, the learned Judge held as follows:
“101. Section 25 of the Act provides:
“Except in accordance with the provisions of this Act,
the validity of any proceedings of order taken or made F
under this Act shall not be called in question in any Court
or before any other authority.”
102. On analysis of the Section, it is clear that it gives a
two-fold mandate. On one hand it debars the jurisdiction
of Courts or other authorities to question the validity of G
any proceeding or order taken or made under the Act,
and on the other it prohibits the impeachment of such
orders or proceedings in a manner which is not in
accordance with the provisions of the Act. It indicates
1
AIR 1973 P&H 307
2
(1974) 2 SCC 70 H
1180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A that decisions of the authorities under the Act can be
challenged only by way of appeal, review or revision as
provided in Sections 80, 81, 82, 83 and 84 of the Punjab
Tenancy Act, 1887, made applicable by Section 24 of
the Act, or in the Rules made under the Act.
B 103. The Punjab and Haryana High Court has
consistently taken this view. The Full Bench
in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri (supra) also held that the
Assistant Collector while dealing with the purchase
application under Section 18 has no jurisdiction to sit in
appeal or revision over the order of the Surplus Area
C Collector passed in surplus area proceeding and he has
no jurisdiction to ignore that order.
104. The rule equally holds good in the converse. In the
Full Bench decision in Mam Raj v. Punjab State
(supra), it was held that once an application of the tenant
D under Section 18 has been allowed and the order is not
set aside in appeal or revision, the same becomes final
and remains immune to an attack against its validity on
any ground including that of collusion, before the co-
ordinate authorities under the Act dealing with the
E question of determination of surplus area. If I may say
so with respect, this proposition laid down by the Full
Bench is unexceptionable.”
We may incidentally notice the substance of the question which
arose in the said case. The Act contemplates a maximum holding,
F which is permissible, which is described as the permissible area.
The Act also provided for the excess land or the surplus land to
be vested in the State to be utilised for assigning the land to the
landless. The tenant of a landlord, in certain circumstances, could
obtain an order of purchase. This was provided in Section 18.
Section 10A(b) of the Act, on the other hand, provided that
G ‘transfer’ or ‘other dispossession of property’ in certain
circumstances, were to be treated as void. Justice R.S. Sarkaria
took the view that merely because there was a compromise, as
long as the ingredients of the statutory provisions were satisfied,
such an Order could not be brushed aside on the ground that it
H was born out of compromise. As we shall see from a consideration
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1181
& OTHERS [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

of other decisions that this Judgment may not advance the case A
of the appellants that Section 25 will be an absolute bar.
iii. We do not think that the Judgment of this Court in Salem
Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of India3 should
detain us as it does not specifically deal with the question at
hand. B
iv. In Kamla Devi Widow of Hans Raj, etc. v. Financial
Commissioner (Appeals), Punjab and others4, a Bench
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was dealing with an
Order of the learned Single Judge allowing the Writ Petition,
by which, setting aside the Order of the Authorities under C
the Act, he ordering the appellant’s-tenant’s eviction. A
perusal of the said Judgment does not show that there was
any dispute relating to landlord-tenant relationship. In fact,
the question revolved around whether right to purchase the
right of the landlord by the tenant stood crystalised upon
the declaration of the surplus area. It was found by the D
Court that any subsequent Act, after the declaration of the
surplus area by a “big land owner”, by transferring of the
land by a big land owner or his death before the application
of purchase was allowed or even the enactment of the 1972
Act (by which the Act was repealed), did not adversely E
affect the right of the appellant-tenant to effect purchase
of landlord’s right under Section 18 of the Act. We would
observe that this Judgment, does not, in any way, advance
the case of the appellants.
v. The Judgment of learned Single Judge in R.S.A. No. 948 F
of 2017 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana also does
not, in any way, assist the case of the appellants. On facts,
it does not have application as regards the question at hand.
vi. The last Judgment relied upon by the appellants is Judgment
of this Court inBhagwat Sharan (Dead Through Legal G
Representatives) v. Purushottam and others5. We take it
that the appellants seek to derive support from following
paragraphs:
3
(2005) 6 SCC 344
4
(2013) SCCOnline P&H 7911
5
(2020) 6 SCC 387 H
1182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A “26. It is also not disputed that the plaintiff and
Defendants 1 to 3 herein filed suit for eviction of an
occupant in which he claimed that the property had been
bequeathed to him by Hari Ram. According to the
defendants, the plaintiff having accepted the will of
Hariram and having taken benefit of the same, cannot
B
turn around and urge that the will is not valid and that
the entire property is a joint family property. The plaintiff
and Defendants 1 to 3 by accepting the bequest under
the will elected to accept the will. It is trite law that a
party cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate at
C the same time. This principle is based on the principle of
doctrine of election. In respect of wills, this doctrine has
been held to mean that a person who takes benefit of a
portion of the will cannot challenge the remaining
portion of the will. In Rajasthan State Industrial
Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond &
D
Gem Development Corpn. Ltd. [Rajasthan State
Industrial Development & Investment
Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd.,
(2013) 5 SCC 470 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 153 : AIR 2013
SC 1241] , this Court made an observation that a party
E cannot be permitted to “blow hot and cold”, “fast and
loose” or “approbate and reprobate”. Where one party
knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or
conveyance or an order, it is estopped to deny the validity
or binding effect on him of such contract or conveyance
or order.
F
27. The doctrine of election is a facet of law of estoppel.
A party cannot blow hot and blow cold at the same time.
Any party which takes advantage of any instrument must
accept all that is mentioned in the said document. It would
be apposite to refer to the treatise Equity—A Course
G of Lectures by F.W. Maitland, Cambridge University,
1947, wherein the learned author succinctly described
principle of election in the following terms:
“The doctrine of election may be thus stated : that he
who accepts a benefit under a deed or will or other
H
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1183
& OTHERS [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

instrument must adopt the whole contents of that A
instrument, must conform to all its provisions and
renounce all rights that are inconsistent with it….”
This view has been accepted to be the correct view
in Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable
Trust [Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable B
Trust, (2010) 4 SCC 753 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 262] .
The plaintiff having elected to accept the will of Hari
Ram, by filing a suit for eviction of the tenant by claiming
that the property had been bequeathed to him by Hari
Ram, cannot now turn around and say that the averments
made by Hari Ram that the property was his personal C
property, is incorrect.”
vii. This is essentially a matter relating to merit concluded by
decision of three courts. Further on facts, we do not think
the principles are attracted.
D
CASE LAW RELIED UPON BY THE RESONDENT-
TENANT
25. They are as follows:
a. In Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi6, the case arose under
the Orissa Tenant Protection Act, 1948. Section 7(1) of the Orissa Tenant E
Protection Act provided as follows:
“6. xxx xxx xxx
“Any dispute between the tenant and the landlord as regards, (a)
tenant’s possession of the land on the 1st day of September, 1947
F
and his right to the benefits under this Act, or (b) misuse of the
land by the tenant, or (c) failure of the tenant to cultivate the land
properly, or (d) failure of the tenant to deliver to the landlord the
rent accrued due within two months from the date on which it
becomes payable, or (e) the quantity of the produce payable to
the landlord as rent, shall be decided by the Collector on the G
application of either of the parties”.”
The appellant laid a Suit for Inunction in the Civil Court. The
respondent-defendant therein pleaded that they were tenants and

6
AIR 1962 SC 547 H
1184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A contended that Section 7 posed a bar to the Civil Court entertaining the
Suit. This Court went on to hold as follows:
“10. Let us then revert to Section 7. It would be noticed that Section
7(1) has expressly and specifically provided for five categories of
disputes which are within the jurisdiction of the Collector and which
B must therefore be taken to be excluded from the jurisdiction of
the civil court. On a reasonable construction of Section 7(1) a
dispute specified by Section 7(1)(a) would be a dispute between
a tenant and a landlord in regard to the former’s possession of the
land on 1-9-1947. It is clear that the dispute to which Section
7(1)(a) refers is a narrow dispute as to the possession of the
C tenant on a specific date and his consequential right to the benefits
of the Act. The same is the position with regard to the other
categories of the dispute specified by Section 7(1). In none of the
said categories is a dispute contemplated as to the relationship of
the parties itself. In other words, Section 7(1) postulates the
D relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties and
proceeds to provide for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector
to try the five categories of disputes that may arise between the
landlord and the tenant. The disputes which are the subject-matter
of Section 7(1) must be in regard to the five categories. That is
the plain and obvious construction of the words “any dispute as
E regards”. On this construction it would be unreasonable to hold
that a dispute about the status of the tenant also falls within the
purview of the said section. The scheme of Section 7(1) is
unambiguous and clear. It refers to the tenant and landlord as
such and it contemplates disputes of the specified character arising
F between them. Therefore, in our opinion, even on a liberal
construction of Section 7(1) it would be difficult to uphold the
argument that a dispute as regards the existence of the relationship
of landlord and tenant falls to be determined by the Collector under
Section 7(1).
G 11. … If a serious dispute as to the existence of the relationship
of landlord and tenant between the parties had been covered by
Section 7(1) it is difficult to imagine that the legislature would
have left the decision of such an important issue to the Collector
giving him full freedom to make such enquiries as he may deem
necessary. As is well known, a dispute as to the existence of the
H relationship of landlord and tenant raises serious questions of fact
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1185
& OTHERS [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

for decision, and if such a serious dispute was intended to be tried A
by the Collector the legislature would have provided for an
appropriate enquiry in that behalf and would have made the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to such an
enquiry. Section 7(2) can be easily explained on the basis that the
relationship between the parties is outside Section 7(1) and so the
B
disputes that are covered by Section 7(1) are not of such a nature
as would justify a formal enquiry in that behalf. The provisions of
sub-sections (3), (6) and (7) also indicate that the relationship
between the parties is not, and cannot be, disputed before the
Collector. The parties arrayed before him are landlord and tenant
or vice versa, and it is on the basis of such relationship between C
them that he proceeds to deal with the disputes entrusted to him
by Section 7(1).”
b. In Shri Raja Durga Singh of Solon v. Tholu and others7,
the Appeal before this Court arose from a Judgment rendered by the
Judicial Commissioner in Second Appeal, taking the view that the Suit in D
the said case could not be tried by the Civil Court but was to be tried by
the Revenue Court under Section 77 of the Tenancy Act, which applied
to Himachal Pradesh as well. The Court drew support from Magiti
Sasamal (supra) and held that the observation in Magiti Sasamal (supra)
would apply to the case also in as much as relationship of landlord and
tenant as between the parties to the Suit was not admitted by the E
appellant-plaintiff. This Court held:
“6. As these facts were not established the High Court held that
the landlord was entitled to sue the defendant who had entered on
the land asserting a claim to be a collateral of the deceased tenant
but who failed to substantiate his claim. This view was affirmed F
by a Full Bench consisting of five Judges in the other Lahore
case. In Daya Ram v. Jagir Singh [AIR (1956) Him Pra 61] the
same Judicial Commissioner who decided the appeal before us
has expressed the view that where in a suit for ejectment the
existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant is not admitted G
by the parties the civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit and that
such a suit did not fall under Section 77(3) of the Act. In Magiti
Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi [AIR (1962) SC 547] this Court was
considering the provisions of Section 7(1) of the Orissa Tenants
7
AIR 1963 SC 361 H
1186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A Protection Act, 1948 (3 of 1948). The provisions of that section
run thus:
“Any dispute between the tenant and the landlord as regards,
(a) tenant’s possession of the land on the 1st day of September,
1947 and his right to the benefits under this Act, or (b) misuse
B of the land by the tenant, or (c) failure of the tenant to cultivate
the land properly, or (d) failure of the tenant to deliver to the
landlord the rent accrued due within two months from the date
on which it becomes payable, or (e) the quantity of the produce
payable to the landlord as rent, shall be decided by the Collector
on the application of either of the parties.”
C
7. It was contended in that case on behalf of the respondents
who claimed to be tenants that the suit for permanent injunction
instituted by the appellant-landlord was barred by the provisions
of Section 7(1). Dealing with this contention this Court observed
as follows:
D
“In other words, Section 7(1) postulates the relationship of
tenants and landlord between the parties and proceeds to
provide for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector to try the
five categories of disputes that may arise between the landlord
and the tenant. The disputes which are the subject-matter of
E Section 7(1) must be in regard to the five categories. That is
the plain and obvious construction of the words ‘any dispute
as regards’. On this construction it would be unreasonable to
hold that a dispute about the status of the tenant also falls
within the purview of the said section. The scheme of Section
F 7(1) is unambiguous and clear. It refers to the tenant and landlord
as such and it contemplates disputes of the specified character
arising between them. Therefore, in our opinion, even on a
liberal construction of Section 7(1) it would be difficult to uphold
the argument that a dispute as regards the existence of the
relationship of landlord and tenant falls to be determined by
G the Collector under Section 7(1).”
The observations of this Court would clearly apply to the present
case also inasmuch as the relationship of landlord and tenant as
between the parties to the suit is not admitted by the appellant.”
8
H (1987) 4 SCC 410
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1187
& OTHERS [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

c. In Richpal Singh and others v. Dalip8, a Decree of Ejectment A
was passed under Section 77(3) of the Tenancy Act, on the ground of
default of rent. The tenant was evicted, the Decree having become final
under the Tenancy Act. He, thereafter, filed a Suit in the Civil Court
against the appellant therein, contending that he was a mortgagee and
not a tenant. A Full-Bench was constituted to hear the question as to
B
whether the decision of the Revenue Court, under Section 77 of the
Tenancy Act, or of the Rent Controller, could operate as res judicata.
This Court, in Richpal Singh and others (supra),followed the decision
in Shri Raja Durga Singh of Solon (supra) and also the Full Bench of
the Lahore High Court in ILR 1942(24) Lahore High Court 191 (Full
Bench), and held as follows: C
“14. Applying the aforesaid principles, it appears to us that if the
dispute was as to the nature of the relationship of landlord and
tenant between the parties, the Revenue Court under the Punjab
Tenancy Act had no jurisdiction; when there was admitted position,
the relationship of landlord and tenant was accepted, the remedies D
and rights of the parties should be worked out under the scheme
of the Act.
15. A salutary and simple test to apply in determining whether the
previous decision operates as res judicata or on principles analogous
thereto is to find out whether the first court, here the Revenue E
Court could go into the question whether the respondent was a
tenant in possession or mortgagee in possession. It is clear in
view of language mentioned before that it could not. If that be so
there was no res judicata. The subsequent civil suit was not barred
by res judicata.”
F
d. A Bench of five learned Judges of Punjab and Haryana High
Court, in the decision in State of Haryana and others v. Vinod Kumar
and others dated 14.10.1985, Second Appeal No. 2930 of 1980, took the
view that a Suit lay despite the bar under Section 25 of the Act to challenge
an Order, which is a nullity even though passed by the Authority under
the Act, in a situation where no notice was served by the Collector G
before the Order was passed. This case would not have any application
in the facts in this case.
26. In Heman and another Appellants v. Tulsi Ram (died),
represented by Lrs. [in R.S.A. No. 1511 of 1970 dated 07.01.1982], an
H
1188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A Application was filed under Section 14A of the Act. The defendant denied
the title of the plaintiff and claimed that they were the owners. The
Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction
to entertain the Civil Suit. It was, inter alia, held on the fact “once a
tenant denies the title of the landlord, they become trespassers of
the suit land and are, therefore, liable to eviction therefrom”. This is
B
so despite the fact that the Civil Court found that the defendants were
tenants.
27. In Chandu Lal v. Kalia and Goria (in Civil Revision No. 849
of 1973, decided on 06.01.1976), the learned Single Judge of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court was dealing with the bar under Sections 45, 50
C and 50A of the Punjab Tenancy Act in the light of the jurisdiction conferred
under Section 77 (3) (f) and (g) of the Act.
28. The tenant, who was ordered to be ejected under Section
45(5), filed a Suit, contesting his liability to be ejected. The Court took
the view that the bar under Section 50 A was confined only in respect of
D a suit when ejectment was ordered under Section 46 (6) of the Act. The
bar did not apply in regard to the tenant, as he was ordered to be ejected
under Section 45(5).
29. In Kul Bhushan etc. v. Faquira and others (in L.P.A. No.
35 of 1974, decided on 10.03.1976), a Division Bench of Punjab and
E Haryana High Court had to consider the following facts – The surplus
area of a big land owner was determined under the Act. Thereafter, he
died. After two and a half years, the surplus area was allotted to tenants.
Possession was also given to them. Kul Bhushan, along with others,
who were the legal heirs of the big land owner, filed the Suit for possession,
F contending that they have become small land owners upon the death of
their predecessor in interest (the big land owner). Consequently, they
were illegally dispossessed. The defendants set up the bar under Section
25 of the Act. The Court took the view that the Order of Utilisation and
possession in favour of the defendants-tenants, having been passed and
implemented upon the death of the big land owner, Section 10B did not
G apply. It was found that the matter was governed by Section 10A(b).
On this basis, it was found that the proceeding or Order, which was
sought to be immunised under Section 25 of the Act, was not taken or
made under the Act.

H
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1189
& OTHERS [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

30. This decision may not, on the facts of the present case, advance A
the case of the respondents.
31. In Ramzani v. Abad Shah [in R.S.A. No. 1975 of 1971,
decided on 13.11.1981], the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court held that the jurisdiction of the Assistant Collector
under Section 77 of the Tenancy Act was very limited. In the said case, B
the appellant had filed the Suit under Section 77 of the Tenancy Act,
declaring him as the occupancy tenant. In the said proceeding, one of
the issues, which arose was, whether respondent was grandson of one
Ashiq Hussain. The Assistant Collector held in the negative, i.e., against
the respondent. Thereafter, a Suit was filed in the Civil Court. The Court
took the view that the earlier finding would not be res judicata. C

32. In Jia Lal and another v. State of Haryana and others (in
Writ Petition No. 1785 of 1968, decided on 04.11.1970), the learned
Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court purported to follow
Magiti Sasamal (supra) and Shri Raja Durga Singh of Solon (Supra)
to find that when the relationship of landlord and tenant was denied, it D
could be decided by the Civil Court and the Writ Petition was not
entertained. This was a case where the title of the writ petitioner who
claimed as landlord was denied and the Court held that the writ petitioners
were entitled to treat the respondent as trespasser and proceed in the
Civil Court. E
33. In Jaswant Rai and another v. Bhagwan Dass and another
(in R.S.A. No. 1120 of 1963, decided on 31.08.1971), a Bench of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court proceeded on the basis that the Suit in
question was maintainable despite Section 77(3) of the Tenancy Act.
The plaintiff took the contention that he was not the tenant. It was found F
that jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred.
34. In Raja Ram and another v. Raghubir Singh and another
(in Civil Writ No. 1288 of 1967, decided on 29.5.1970), a learned Single
Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, followed Magiti Sasamal
(supra) and took the view that the existence of relationship of landlord G
and tenant being in dispute, the Revenue Court should stay its hands. It
was found that the dispute, in the first instance, must be decided by a
Civil Court. If the relationship was found to exist of landlord and tenant,
the matter should be returned for decision by the Revenue Court.

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1190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A 35. In Khazan Singh another v. Dalip Singh and another (in L.P.A.
No. 623 of 1968, decided on 15.07.1969), a Division Bench of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court, found that it is open to the Civil Court to go
into the question as to whether the conditions required to be established
before the Assistant Collector could exercise power under Section 18 of
the Act, existed or not.
B
Section 18, as already noticed, conferred right on the tenant to
seek purchase of the land from the land owner. The Court repelled the
contention based on Section 25 of the Act, which was pressed by the
tenant that the Suit was not maintainable. The argument, which was
advanced by the landlord was, when the matters relevant to Section 18
C were in dispute, bar under Section 25, would not apply.
36. In this context, it is necessary to notice the reasoning employed
in the majority Judgment and also the view taken by the learned Chief
Justice, who authored the dissenting view, in Amar Singh and others v.
Dalip9 (in R.S.A. No. 1821 and 1822 of 1978, decided on 12.03.1981)
D which was considered by this Court in 1987 (4) SCC 410 RICHPAL
SINGH (supra). We notice the following statement from the judgment
forming the majority view:
“12. The question which then remains to be decided is as to whether
the Revenue Court or Rent Controller has been invested with the
E jurisdiction under the Punjab Tenancy Act or the East Punjab Urban
Rent Restriction Act, as the case may be, to decide the question
of relationship of landlord and tenant or they are entitled incidentally
to go into this matter for exercising the jurisdiction expressly
invested in them under the said Acts. A perusal of section 77 of
F the Punjab Tenancy Act would show that the Revenue Court has
been invested with the jurisdiction to decide certain dispute between
the landlord and tenant which necessarily means that the existence
of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is a
condition precedent before any matter specified therein can be
taken cognizance of by a Revenue Court. There is no provision in
G whole of the section which authorises the Revenue Court to pass
a decree regarding the relationship of the parties. It is, therefore,
obvious that the Revenue Court is only entitled to pronounce on
the relationship between the parties for the purposes of deciding

9
H (1981) ILR 3 P&H 582
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1191
& OTHERS [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

disputes within its cognizance enumerated in that section and the A
Legislature has not conferred any jurisdiction on the Revenue
Court to pronounce finally on the jurisdictional facts, i.e., the
existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the
parties. The reason for not doing so is also not far to seek. The
determination of the status of the parties or a question of title
B
between them may involve very intricate questions of civil law.
For example, the status of the landlord may depend on the proof-
and validity of adoption or a will. Nobody can even suggest that
the Revenue Court has jurisdiction to pronounce on the validity of
adoption or a will or that such a decision could be final and binding
on the parties. If that is so, then it has to be ruled that the Revenue C
Court has no jurisdiction to pronounce finally on the question of
status of the parties or any other question of title because no
distinction can be made between a simple question of title and
question of title which involve intricate and complicated questions
of law so far as the extent of jurisdiction is concerned. Further
D
more, not a single decision has been cited at the bar wherein it
may have been ruled that the decision of the Revenue Court under
the, Punjab Tenancy Act on the question of title or status of the
parties is final, and not open to challenge in a civil suit. On the
contrary, as early as the year 1935, a Division Bench of the Lahore
High Court in Mt. Harnam Kaur v. Narain Singh and others, E
MANU/LA/0285/1935: AIR 1935 Lah. 739 while interpreting the
scope of the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court took the view that
where a revenue suit is instituted for ejecting the tenants and this
is the only jurisdiction exclusively vested in the Revenue Courts,
that Court cannot determine the question of title in that case and
F
its decision, therefore cannot operate so as to prevent the civil
Courts from entertaining the subsequent suit which involves the
question of title. This view has held the field for all these years
and its correctness has never been doubted in any decision so far.
A similar view was taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High
Court in Pollapalli Venkatarama Rao and others v. Masunuru G
Verkayya and others, MANU/TN/0343/1954 : AIR 1954 Madras
788 while dealing with the question of exclusive jurisdiction of the
Revenue Court under the Madras Estates Land Act (1 of 1908),
which is evident from the following passage:—
H
1192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A “If a particular matter is one which does not fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue court, then a decision of a
revenue court on so much a matter, which might be incidentally
given by the revenue court, cannot be binding on the parties in
a civil court. One practical test would be to deter ne if that
particular matter would not be matter in respect of which the
B
civil court would have jurisdiction. To give an obvious instance,
suppose in a suit under section 55 For the grant of a patta inst
toted by a person calming to be the adopted son of the ryot
who was a pattedar, the, landlord raises a plea that he is not
entitled to the patta because his adoption is not valid. It may be
C that the revenue court would have to summarily go into the
question whether the person suing is or is not the validly adopted
son of the previous ryot. Can it possibly be said that the finding
of the revenue court on the issue of adoption is binding on the
parties in a subsequent suit in a civil court in which the validity
of the adoption might fall to be decided? There can be no doubt
D
about the answer.
That is because the dispute as to the validity of the adoption is not
a dispute in respect of which a revenue court has exclusive jurisdiction.
Such a dispute is a matter well within the jurisdiction of a civil court.
Therefore, it cannot be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue
E Court, and the decision of such a dispute by a revenue court cannot be
binding in a civil court.”
37. In the dissenting opinion, the learned Chief Justice, on the
other hand, formulated four questions, out of which, the second question,
was as follows - “II. If so, whether such a Revenue Court has the
F jurisdiction to decide the issue of relationship of landlord and
tenant, if disputed before it?” In answering this question, we notice
that the court followed the Judgment of this Court under the Delhi Rent
Control Act in Om Prakash Gupta v. Dr. Ratan Singh and another 10
and it was held as follows:
“38. Coming now to question No. (ii) aforesaid it appears to be
G
now so well-settled by a precedent of the final Court and a string
of Division Bench judgments of this Court that it would be wasteful
to examine the issue on principle. In Om Parkash Gupta v. Dr.
Rattan Singh and an others, 1963 P.L.R. 543. an identical question
arose under the rent jurisdiction. It was contended before their
H 10
(1964) 1 SCR 259
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1193
& OTHERS [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

Lordships that in a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction, like the Rent A
Controller, if the relationship of the landlord and tenant is denied
then it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate thereon and must stay its
hands forthwith. Categorically repelling the same it was observed
as follows:—
“............If a person moves a Controller for eviction of a person B
on the ground that he is a tenant who had, by his acts, or
omissions, made himself liable to be evicted on any one of the
grounds for eviction, and if the tenant denies that the plaintiff
is the landlord, the Controller has to decide the question whether
there was a relationship of landlord and tenant. If the Controller
decides that there is no such relationship the proceeding has to C
be terminated, without deciding the main question in
controversy namely, the question of eviction. If on the other
hand, the Controller comes to the opposite conclusion and holds
that the person seeking eviction was the landlord and the person
in possession was the tenant the proceedings have to go on. D
Under section 15(4) of the Act the Controller is authorised to
decide the question whether the claimant was entitled to an
order for payment of rent, and if there is a dispute as to the
person or persons to whom the rent is payable, he may direct
the tenant to deposit with him the amount payable until the
decision of the question as to who is entitled to that payment.” E
and again
“............The Act proceeds on the assumption that there is
such a relationship. If the relationship is denied, the authorities
under the Act have to determine that question also because a
simple denial of the relationship cannot oust the jurisdiction of F
the tribunals under the Act. True, they are tribunals of limited
jurisdiction the scope of their power and authority being limited
by the provisions of the Statute. But a simple denial of the
relationship either by the alleged landlord or by the alleged
tenant would not have the effect of oust-ting the jurisdiction of
G
the authorities under the Act, because the simplest thing in the
world would for the party interested to block the proceedings
under the Act to deny the relationship of landlord and tenant.
The tribunals under the Act being creatures of the Statute have
limited jurisdiction and have to function within the four corners
of the Statute creating them. But within the provisions of the H
1194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A Act, they are tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction and their orders
are final and not liable to be questioned in collateral proceedings,
like a separate suit or application in execution proceedings.”
The enunciation of the law aforesaid appears to me as categoric
in laying down that even a persona designate, like the Rent
B Controller (see Messrs Pitmans’s Shorthand Accadamy v. M/s.
B. Lila Ram and sons) has the fullest jurisdiction to decide the
question of the relationship of landlord and tenant when it is raised
before it. That view has been unreservedly followed in this Court
in a series of Division Bench decisions which at this stage may
only be noticed chronologically, that it, Muni Lal v. Chandu Lal,
C 1968 PLR 473; Ambala Bus Syndicate (P) Ltd. v. M/s. Indra
Motors Kurali, 1968 PLR 650 and J.G. Kohli v. Financial
Commissioner Haryana and another, 1975 Rent Control Journal
689. In passing it may be noticed that some doubts about the
correctness of the view in the aforesaid judgments was raised by
D a learned Single Judge which was considered in depth and the
earlier view was reaffirmed afresh in the recent Division Bench
judgment in Balbahadar and others v. Hindi Sahitya Sadhna, 1980
(1) Rent Control Journal 376, to which I was a party.”
38. We must notice that the learned Chief Justice, in the dissenting
opinion, was of the view that even the dispute relating to existence of
E the landlord-tenant relationship could be decided by a Revenue Court.
In fact, this Court, in Om Prakash (supra), deals with a situation, whereby
a simple denial of the landlord-tenant relationship, the proceedings under
the Rent Act would be blocked.
39. However, as already noticed, this Court, in the decision reported
F in Richpal Singh and others (supra), upheld the view of the majority.
The dissenting view, which was essentially premised on Om Prakash
(supra), was not approved.
40. Though, the question arose in the context of the contention as
to whether the matter was res judicata, this Court went on to hold, in
G paragraph 14, which we have already adverted to, that when the nature
of relationship between landlord and tenant was in dispute, the Revenue
Court, under the Tenancy Act, has no jurisdiction.
41. In paragraph-15, the Court proceeded to reject the contention
of the finding being res judicata. The question was whether the Revenue
Court could go into the question, whether the respondent therein was a
H
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1195
& OTHERS [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

tenant or mortgagee. It was found that the Revenue Court could not do A
so. The Judgment in Richpal Singh (supra) was decided after considering
the Judgment in Om Prakash (supra), which took the view that the
Rent Control Court’s power could not be frustrated by mere taking of
the plea disputing the landlord-tenant relationship.
42. In this regard, we have noticed, the view of the Judges in the B
Majority Judgment. The Majority Judgment proceeded on the basis that
there was no provision in Section 77 of the Tenancy Act, which authorised
the Revenue Court to pass a Decree regarding the relationship of the
party. However, it has also pronounced that the Revenue Court was
entitled to pronounce on the relationship for the purpose of deciding the
dispute within its jurisdiction. But it was not conferred with power to C
finally decide on the same. The dispute relating to landlord-tenant
relationship can arise in various circumstances, as noticed in the Majority
Judgment.
43. Therefore, it is not, as if, if there is indisputable material or
binding admission and, which, without raising any debatable dispute at D
all, established the landlord-tenant relationship, the Revenue Court cannot
decide the matter, which it is ordained to decide as part of its duty to
decide the case for eviction, inter alia. However, what has been laid
down is that, the Civil Court would continue to have jurisdiction to finally
pronounce on a question of landlord-tenant relationship despite the bar
under Section 77(3) of the Tenancy Act. E
44. It is, at this juncture, relevant to notice Section 77(3) of the
Tenancy Act:
“77(3) The following suits shall be instituted in, and heard and
determined by Revenue Courts and not other Court shall take
cognizance of any dispute or matter with respect to which any F
such suit might be instituted:”
Procedure where revenue matter is raised in a Civil Court.
Provided that-
(1) where in a suit cognizable by and instituted in a Civil Court it
G
becomes necessary to decide any matter which can under this
sub-section be heard and determined only by a Revenue Court,
the Civil Court shall endorse upon the plaint the nature of the
matter for decision and the particulars required by Order VII,
rule 10, Civil Procedure Code and return the plain for presentation
to the Collector; H
1196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A (2) on the plaint being presented to the Collector, the Collector
shall proceed to hear and determine the suit where the value thereof
exceeds Rs. 1,000 or the matter involved is of the nature mentioned
in section 77 (3). First Group of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887,
and in other cases may send the suit to an Assistant Collector of
the first grade for decision.
B
45. We are called upon to decide on the ambit of the bar under
Section 25 of the Act of 1953. Can it be argued that the bar under
Section 25 is far more rigorous and exhaustive? Would it be said that the
bar will operate, even in a situation, where the landlord-tenant relationship
is disputed in a proceeding under Section 14A of the Act?
C 46. In this regard Section 14A of the Act provides that the Assistant
Collector is to proceed as provided for in sub section 2 of Section 10 of
the Act and the provisions of sub section 3 of Section 10 was to apply in
relation to such application. There is a proviso with which we are not
concerned. Section 10 must therefore be scanned. Section 10 (2) and 10
(3) reads as follows: -
D
“Section 10. Restoration of tenant ejected after the 15th of August,
1947 -
(2) On receipt of an application the Assistant Collector shall, after
giving to theparties notice in writing and a reasonable opportunity
to be heard, determine the dispute summarily, and shall keep a
E memorandum of evidence and a gist of his final order with brief
reasons therefor.
(3) When an application has been made, any proceedings in relation
to the same matter pending in any other court or before any other
authority shall be stayed on receipt of information by that court or
F authority from such Assistant Collector of the fact of having
received the application and all such proceedings in a court or
before any authority shall lapse when the dispute has been
determined by the Assistant Collector acting under this Act.
47. Section 10 (2) declares that on the receipt of an application
the Assistant Collector after giving to the parties notice in writing and
G the reasonable opportunity to be heard determine the dispute summarily
and shall keep a memorandum of evidence and a gist of his final order
with brief reasons therefor. Section 10 (3) on the other hand providesthat
when an application has been made which in the context of Section 14A
must be read as an application under Section 14A, any proceeding in
relation to the same matter pending in any other court or before any
H
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1197
& OTHERS [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

other authority shall be stayed on receipt of information by that court or A
authority from the Assistant Collector that he has received an application
under Section 14A. The effect of Section 10 (3) further would be that all
proceedings in a court or before any authority shall lapse when the dispute
has been determined by the Assistant Collector acting under the Act.
48. There are two aspects which emerge. The first aspect is that
B
the Assistant Collector acting under Section 14A read with Section 10
(2) must given a reasonable opportunity to the tenant and determine the
dispute summarily. This is an important pointer to the nature of the power
which is exercised by the Assistant Collector. We must bear in mind the
principle which has been noticed by this courtin MAGITI SASAMAL
(supra). In a case of a dispute raised by the tenant about the very existence C
of the landlord-tenant relationship, in a provision which contemplates
evicting a person who is the tenant, the duty to render a summary decision
appears incongruous with the imperative need for the authority to the
able to unravel the many dimensions of a dispute which is genuinely
raised by the tenant about there being a landlord-tenant relationship. In
other words what is to be rendered is a summary decision and we would D
neither be doing justice to the nature of the power enjoyed by the Assistant
Collector as also the right of a party to seek redress in a Civil Court
otherwise, unless the power of the Civil Court is preserved.
49. The other aspect no doubt which emerges is Section 10 (3)
which contemplates proceedings in relation to the same matter in any
E
other court or authority being stayed, when such court or authority is
informed by the Assistant Collector of having received an application
under Section 14A read with Section 10. The law giver has however
provided that the Assistant Collector must proceed with the application
but determine the dispute summarily. Upon the dispute being determined
by the Assistant Collector the proceedings which were stayed by the F
courtor any other authority would lapse. This sub section gives the
impression that the powers of the Assistant Collector are meant to be
exhaustive.
50. We would hold the true effect of Section 10 (2) and (3) read
with Section 14A is as follows. An application for ejectment of a tenant
is to be made before the Assistant Collector under Section 14A. Such an G
application is to be decided after giving notice and it is to be decided
summarily. Since the exclusive power to decide the application to evict
the tenant has been conferred on the Assistant Collector, the law giver
has further contemplated that after receipt of such an application by the
Assistant Collector no other court or authority is to proceed with ‘any H
1198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A case relating to the same matter’ upon being informed by the Assistant
Collector of the receipt of the application under Section 14A. What is
more such proceeding is to be lapseafter the determination of the dispute
by the Assistant Collector. The law giver no doubt does contemplate an
exclusive and expeditious remedy for the landlord to seek eviction
brooking no over lapping of jurisdiction by exercise of power by any
B
othercourt or authority on a parallel basis. However, this provision cannot
mean that when the very existence landlord-tenant relationship is brought
under a cloud by the tenant raising a dispute then the very premise on
which the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Assistant Collector is
not overturned. In other words, the law giver has proceeded on the basis
C that the Assistant Collector is clothed with the power to decide a matter
relating to eviction in a summary fashion. This would be inconsistent
with scenario where the very existence of the landlord-tenant relationship
is disputed. The law giverin other words proceeds on an assumption that
the application made by the landlord is against a person who is indeed
the tenant.
D
51. We will however proceed on the basis that what is contemplated
is that during the pendency of the proceeding before the Assistant
Collector even a suit in a civil court where the title of the landlord is
questioned or in other words there is a challenge thrown to the very
existence of the landlord-tenant relationship is not permitted. Even in
E such a scenario after the conclusion of the proceeding, in the light of the
decisions of this court starting with MAGITI SASAMAL (supra) RAJA
DURGA SINGH (supra) AND RICHPAL SINGH (supra), would apply
and the bar under Section 25 would not available. The Civil Court would
have the power in a case where without it being a frivolous challenge to
F the landlord tenant-relationship, in a genuine dispute relating to landlord-
tenant relationship, the orders passed by the authorities under the Act
can be found to be null and void for the reason that transgressing the
power conferred, the authorities proceed to decide the matter, (which
again it must be remembered under Section 10 (2) is to be a summary
decision) which is the vexed issue relating to the very existence of the
G landlord-tenant relationship.
52. The words used in Section 25 of the Act, as already noticed, is
that except in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the validity of
any proceeding or Order, taken or made under the Act, cannot be
questioned in any Court or before any other Authority. In the dissenting
H opinion, Justice R.S. Sarkaria, in Amar Singh and another (supra),
ASSA SINGH (D) BY LRs. v. SHANTI PARSHAD (D) BY LRs. 1199
& OTHERS [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

has explained the scope of the expression “except in accordance with A
the provisions of the Act”,with reference to Section 24 of the Act. In
other words, an Order passed under Section 14A, could be challenged
by way of an Appeal, Review and Revision, as provided in the Tenancy
Act, adverted to in Section 24 of the Act. This explained, the question
perseveres, however, as to whether the validity of proceeding or Order
B
passed, is beyond challenge in a Civil Court, under circumstances
analogous to that obtaining, with reference to a proceeding under Section
77 of the Tenancy Act. In other words, Section 77 of the Tenancy Act,
inter alia, provided for seeking eviction of a tenant before the Revenue
Officer. Section 14A of the Act, similarly, confers powers upon the
Revenue Officer, to entertain an application for evicting a tenant. C
53. The principles relating to exclusion of Civil Court’s jurisdiction
are well-settled. Ouster of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily
inferred. In the scheme of the Tenancy Act also, an Order under Section
77 could be subjected to Appeal, Review and Revision, as provided in
the Act. Section 77(3) of the Tenancy Act, purported to confer exclusive
D
power on the Revenue Court to decide certain disputes and ousted
jurisdiction of courts. This included the proceeding to evict the tenant. In
other words, Civil Court could not entertain the application to evict a
tenant. It is in this statutory framework that this Court has stated the
view that if a landlord-tenant relationship is disputed, despite the exclusive
jurisdiction conferred on the Revenue Court, to even Order eviction of a E
tenant, the Civil Court would still retain jurisdiction in a case where there
is a dispute relating to landlord-tenant relationship. The Act was enacted
in 1953. As noticed by us, Section 14A of the Act, provided for the
eviction of a tenant notwithstanding anything contained in any other law.
Therefore, apart from the fact that it became an exhaustive catalogue
F
of circumstances, entitling the landlord to launch proceedings for eviction
and also further designating the Statutory Authority, before which, it
could be filed, it provided for a bar to challenge the validity of the orders
passed, except by way of the remedies provided under the Tenancy
Act.There would not be any justification for revisiting the principle laid
down that when the relationship between landlord and tenant is contested, G
the Civil Court continue to have the jurisdiction despite the bar under
Section 25 of the Act. We see no reason to hold that the validity of the
Order passed by the Assistant Collector, as may be affirmed in Appeal,
Review or Revision, cannot be questioned in a Civil Court, if the expression
“validity” is conflated with legality. In other words, if an Order is illegal,
H
1200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A it would be invalid. The illegality of an Order can arise out of various
causes. An Order may be illegal, and therefore, invalid, on the ground
that the Author of the Order, in this case, the Authorities designated
under Section 14A, did not have the power to decide the issue.We are in
this case concerned with illegality due to absence of power. We are not
called upon to decide the position, where the Authority, under the Act,
B
violates the fundamental procedure relating to natural justice and the
Civil Court is invited to sit in Judgment over the same. What we find, is
that, the expression “validity of the decision or the Order” in Section 25
of the Act, would not include a case where, despite a dispute projected,that
there was no landlord-tenant relationship, the Authority decides the said
C issue in the course of the Order of Eviction, under Section 14A, after
brushing aside the tenant’s objection relating to his position, viz., that he
is not a tenant. In such a situation, the validity is tied-up with the
fundamental aspect of absence of power of the Authority to decide on
the question of landlord-tenant relationship. We must clarify, therefore,
that the validity of the orders under Section 14A is open to scrutiny in a
D
Civil Court, in a situation, when the tenant denies and disputes the case
of the landlord that there is a landlord-tenant relationship. We must,
however, further hold that a mere plea by the tenant, should not lead,
without anything more, to render the Authorities helpless and bereft of
power to order eviction. In a situation, where, the Authority finds the
E plea of the tenant to be completely frivolous and mere attempt at blocking
the proceedings, the validity enacted under Section 25, cannot be diluted.
The position must be understood as that the power to decide, cannot be
assigned to the Authorities under the Act, of the existence of the landlord-
tenant relationship, as noted hereinbefore.
54. In the facts of this case, we have noticed the nature of the
F
contention. Even the case of the appellants is that of failure to pay rent
by the respondent-tenant.The tenant claims to be a tenant under the
Mandir, which has been found to be the owner of the property. Appellants
claim under an assignment made by the Mahant, who has been found to
be without Authority to convey any right to the appellants.
G 55. In such circumstances, we would find that the contention raised
by the appellants is meritless and the Appeal will stand dismissed. We,
however, direct the parties to bear their own costs.

Nidhi Jain Appeal dismissed.

H