AU. KURESHIversusHIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR.
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 79
- Decided
- 27 January 2009
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
A judge who participated in the disciplinary committee that recommended dismissal is disqualified from hearing the judicial challenge to that dismissal.
Summary
The appellant, a civil judge of the Gujarat Judicial Service, was accused of misconduct for acquitting an accused and returning seized money, leading to a departmental inquiry and a recommendation for dismissal by the High Court's Disciplinary Committee. The High Court then recommended the dismissal to the State Government, which issued the dismissal order. The appellant challenged this dismissal in a Special Civil Application before the High Court, where a judge who had been a member of the Disciplinary Committee also sat on the bench hearing the challenge. The Supreme Court held that a judge who participated in the disciplinary process cannot later adjudicate the same matter, as it violates the principle of natural justice and creates a reasonable apprehension of bias. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and remitted the matter for a fresh hearing by a bench without the conflicted judge.
Issues considered
- Whether a member of the High Court's Disciplinary Committee who recommended the dismissal of a judicial officer can sit as a judge in the subsequent judicial hearing of the officer's challenge to that dismissal.
Subjects
Judgment
[2009] 1 S.C.R. 879
AU. KURESHI A
V.
HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 472 of 2009)
JANUARY 27, 2009
B
[K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J. AND P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
Administrative Law:
Bias - Disciplinary Committee of High Court c
recommending dismissal of a Judicial Officer for misconduct
- Officer dismissed by State Government - Dismissal order
challenged by Judicial Officer before High Court on judicial
side - Bench hearing the petition comprising one of the
members of Disciplinary Committee as Judge - Petition
0
dismissed - HELD: The decision made by Disciplinary
Committee was a vital component of the process by which
High Court made recommendation to State Government for
dismissal of the Judicial Officer - It is, therefore, not proper
for a member of the said. Disciplinary Committee to decide
on a challenge against the same dismissal order while acting E
in a purely judicial capacity - Order of the High Court set
aside and case remitted to it for decision afresh in accordance
with law - Maxim - ·nemo debet esse judex in propria sua
causa' - Applicability of
F
Ashok Kumar Yadav vs. State of Haryana (1985) 4 SCC
417, relied on.
-1
Case Law Reference:
(1985) 4 sec 417 relied on para 9 G
~ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
472 of 2009.
879 H
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 1 S.C.R.
A From the Judgment/Order dated 25.7.2006 passed by the
Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Ahmedabad in Special
Civil Appln. No. 6164/2002.
Sanjeev Kumar and Venkateswara Rao Anumolu for the
Appellant.
8
Sunil Kumar Jain and Aneesh Mittal for the Respondent.
The Order of the Court was delivered by
ORDER
c
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal has been filed against the impugned
order of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, dated July
0 25, 2006 which was passed in Special Civil Application No.
6164 of 2002, whereby the High Court has dismissed the said
application.
FACTS:
E 3. The appellant was a Judicial Officer who joined the
Gujarat Judicial Service in 1991 and was posted as Civil
Judge (Junior Division) at the District Court, Bharuch. The High
Court of Gujarat (respondent) received a complaint wherein it
was alleged that a case bearing Criminal Case No. 2059/89
F under the Gambling Act was listed for hearing in the appellant's
Court and that the appellant had acquitted the accused and
also returned the money seized from the accused from the
scene of occurrence. On the basis of this complaint the
respondent issued a charge-sheet to the appellant and the
G appellant submitted his reply. A departmental inquiry was
initiated against the appellant and the concerned Inquiry officer
submitted his report to the High Court of Gujarat stating that
the charges levelled against the appellant had been proved. On
the basis of this report, a show-cause notice was issued to the
H appellant. The appellant filed his reply to this show-cause notice.
A.U. KURESHI v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 881
Dissatisfied with the appellant's reply, the High Court decided A
that it would be appropriate to dismiss the appellant from
service. By letter dated October 25, 2001, the High Court of
Gujarat recommended to the State Government that the
appellant be dismissed from service and accordingly an order
was passed. B
4. The appellant, being aggrieved, filed Special Civil
Application No. 6164 of 2002 before the High Court of Gujarat
at Ahmedabad, which has been dismissed by the impugned
order.
c
5. Hence, this appeal by grant of special leave.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted
before us that one of the members of the Disciplinary
Committee of the High Court of Gujarat which dealt with the D
+ appellant's appeal was one of the judges on the bench which
heard Special Civil Application No. 6164 of 2002 on the judicial
side. This fact has not been contested by the learned counsel
appearing for the respondents.
7. In view of this, it is our opinion that the learned judge E
who was part of the Disciplinary Committee which suggested
the appellant's dismissal should not have later heard the matter
on the judicial side. In the present case, the Disciplinary
Committee had suggested the appellant's dismissal on the
basis of which the High Court of Gujarat made the subsequent F
recommendation to the State government.
8. The decision made by the Disciplinary Committee was
a vital component of the process by which the High Court of
Gujarat made the recommendation to the State government for G
the dismissal of the appellant. It is therefore not proper for a
member of the said Disciplinary Committee to decide on a
challenge against the same dismissal order while acting in a
purely judicial capacity.
H
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A 9. It is an accepted principle of natural justice that a person
should not be a judge in his or her own cause. In common law,
this principle has been derived from the Latin maxim - 'nemo
debet esse judex in propria sua causa'. A reasonable
permutation of this principle is that no judge should adjudicate
B a dispute which he or she has dealt with in any capacity, other
than a purely judicial one. The failure to adhere to this principle
creates an apprehension of bias on part of the said judge. It
would be useful to refer to the observations of Justice P.N.
Bhagwati in Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1985)
c 4 sec 417:
"One of the fundamental principles of our
jurisprudence is that no man can be a judge in his own
cause. The question is not whether the judge is actually
biased or has in fact decided partially but whether the
D circumstances are such as to create a reasonable
apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood
of bias affecting the decision. If there is a reasonable
likelihood of bias 'it is in accordance with natural justice
and common sense that the judge likely to be so biased
E should be incapacitated from sitting'. The basic principle
underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but
must also appear to be done."
10. Accordingly, we accept this appeal, set aside the
F impugned order of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad and
remit the case to the High Court to decide it afresh in
accordance with law.
R.P. Appeal allowed.
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