Holding

A second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot be entertained unless the High Court first formulates a substantial question of law; the phrase “on any other substantial question of law” presupposes an earlier formulated question.

Summary

The appellant, B.C. Shivashankara, challenged a second appeal allowed by the Karnataka High Court in favour of B.R. Nagraj. The High Court had permitted the appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure but failed to formulate any substantial question of law as required by the statute. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a second appeal can be entertained without such formulation and how the phrase “on any other substantial question of law” in Section 100(5) should be interpreted. The Court held that a substantial question of law must first be formulated under Section 100(4) and that Section 100(5) only allows the Court to consider an additional question after an initial one has been set. Relying on earlier judgments, the Court set aside the High Court’s order and remitted the matter for disposal in accordance with law. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court can entertain a second appeal under Section 100 CPC without first formulating a substantial question of law.
Interpretation of the expression “on any other substantial question of law” in Section 100(5) of the CPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 100

Subjects

Section 100 CPCsecond appealsubstantial question of lawformulation of questionhigh court jurisdictioncivil procedureappeal allowedremand

Judgment

B.C. SHIVASHANKARA A
v.
> '1 B.R. NAGARAJ

FEBRUARY 27, 2007

[DR. ARJJIT PASAYA T AND TARUN CHATTERJEE, JJ.] B

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

s. l 00-Second appeal allowed by High Court without formulating any
substantial question of /aw-Justification of-Held, not justified. c
s. 100(5)-Applicability of-Held: It is applicable only when any
substantial question of law has already been formulated and it empowers the
High Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal "on any other
substantial question of law''.
D
Words and Phrases-"On any other substantial question of law"-
Meaning of
'r
Challenge in the present appeal is to the judgment of the High Court
<· allowing the Second Appeal filed by Respondent No. 1. It was contended that
the Second Appeal was allowed without formulating any substantial question
E
of law as required under Section 100, CPC.

Disposing of the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High
Court does not show that any substantial question of law has been formulated
F
or that the second appeal was heard on the question, if any, so formulated.
-·....: That being so, the judgment cannot be maintained. [Para 4) (391-El

1.2. Sub-section (5) of Section I 00, CPC is applicable only when any
substantial question of law has already been formulated and it empowers the G
High Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other
substantial question of law. The expression "on any other substantial question
of law" clearly shows that there must be some substantial question of law
already formulated and then only another substantial question of law which

389 H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A was not formulated earlier can be taken up by the High Court for reasons to
be recorded, if it is of the view that the case involves such question. (Para 10( ~ ,

Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, (2000] I SCC 434; Roop Singh v. Ram
Singh, (2000( 3 SCC 708; Kanhaiyalal v. Anupkumar, (2003( 1 SCC 430;
Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram and Ors., (2004( 6 SCC359; Joseph Severane
B and Ors. v. Benny Mathew and Ors .. (2005] 7 SCC 667; Sasikumar and Ors.
v. Kunnath Chellappan Nair and Ors., (2005] 12 SCC 588 and Gian Dass v.
Gram Panchayat, Village Sunner Kalan and Ors., (2006] 6 SCC 271, relied
on.

2. Under the circumstances the impugned judgment is set aside. The
C matter is remitted to the High Court so far as it relates to the Second Appeal
for disposal in accordance with law. (Para 11 ( (393-C(

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5452 of2000.

D From the final Judgment and Decree dated 27.5.1998 of the High Court
of Kamataka at Bangalore in R.S.A. No. 236/1991.

S.N. Bhat for the Appellant.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by . ')

E DR. ARIJIT PASAYA T, J. l. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment
of a learned Single Judge of the Kamataka High Court allowing the Second
Appeal filed by respondent No. I. Originally, there were three defendants and
the present appeal has been filed only by defendant no. I. The other defendants
were impleaded as respondents 2 and 3 in the present appeal but their names
F were deleted at the request of the appellant. Though several points were
urged in support of the appeal, we think it unnecessary to deal with them in
detail considering the primary stand taken that the Second Appeal was allowed )r -
without formulating any substantial question of law as required under Section
I00 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the 'Code').

G 2. None appeared for the respondent in spite of service of notice.

3. Section I00 of the Code deals with "second appeal". The provision
reads as follows:

"JOO (I) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this
H Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall
B.C. SHIVASHANKARA v. B.R. NAGARAJ [PASA YAT,J.] 391

,, lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court
subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the
A

' case involves a substantial question of law.

(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree
passed ex-parte.
B
(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall
precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.

(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of
law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.

(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the c
respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue
that the case does not involve such question:

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take
away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be
recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not D
formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question."

4. A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court does
r
not show that any substantial question of law has been formulated or that
(
the second appeal was heard on the question, if any, so formulated. That
E
being so, the judgment cannot be maintained.

5. In /shwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, [2000] I SCC 434 this Court in para
10 has stated thus:

"10. Now under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 amendment, it is F
essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law
and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate
court without doing so."

6. Yet again in Roop Singh v. Ram Singh, [2000] 3 SCC 708 this Court
has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High Court is confined to appeals G
involving substantial question of law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads:

"7. It is to be reiterated that under Section 100 CPC jurisdiction of the
High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such
appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not
confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100
CPC. That apart, at the time of disposing of the matter, the High Court
did not even notice the question of law formulated by it at the time
of admission of the second appeal as there is no reference of it in the
impugned judgment. Further, the fact finding courts after appreciating
. '
the evidence held that the defendant entered into the possession of
B the premises as a batai, that is to say, as a te:nant and his possession
was permissive and there was no pleading or proof as to when it
became adverse and hostile. These findings recorded by the two
courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the
material on record and there was no perversity, illegality or irregularity
c in those findings. If the defendant got the possession of suit land as
a lessee or under a batai agreement then from the permissive possession
it is for him to establish by cogent and convincing evidence to show
hostile animus Page 1532 and possession adverse to the knowledge
of the real owner. Mere possession for a long time does not result in
converting pet missive possession into adverse possession Thakur
D Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar; [1994] 6 SCC 591. Hence the High
Court ought not to have interfered with the findings of fact recorded
by both the courts below.

7. The position has been reiterated in Kanhaiyalal v. Anupkumar, . ·~

E (200311 sec 430.
8. In Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram and Ors., [2004] 6 SCC 359, it was
observed thus:

"6. In view of Section 100 of the Code the memorandum of appeal shall
precisely state substantial question or questions involved in the appeal
F as required under Sub-section (3) of Section I 00. Where the High
Court is satisfied that in any case any substantial question of law is
involved, it shall formulate that question under Sub-section (4) and
the second appeal has to be heard on the question so formulated as
stated in Sub-section (5) of Section 100."
G 9. The position was highlighted by this Court in Joseph Severane and Ors.
v. Benny Mathew and Ors., [2005] 7 SCC 667, Sasikumar and Ors. v. Kunnath
Chellappan Nair and Ors., [2005] 12 SCC 588] and Gian Dass v. Gram ~
Panchayat, Village Sunner Kalan and Ors., [2006] 6 SCC 271.

H IO. Sub-section (5) of Section 100 is applicable only when any substantial
B.C. SHIVASHANKARA v. B.R. NAGARAJ [PASA YAT, J.] 393
question of law has already been formulated and it empowers the High Court A
to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial
question of law. The expression "on any other substantial question of law"
clearly shows that there must be some substantial question of law already
formulated and then only another substantial question of law which was not
formulated earlier can be taken up by the High Court for reasons to be B
recorded, if it is of the view that the case involves such question.

11. Under the circumstances the impugned judgment is set aside. We
remit the matter to the High Court so far as it relates to Second Appeal No.
236 of 1991 for disposal in accordance with law. The appeal is disposed of
in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs. c·
B.B.B. Appeal disposed of.

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