Holding

Requisition under the 1952 Act is temporary; with the Act’s lapse in 1987 the Union’s occupation became unlawful and the Union must restore possession to the appellants.

Summary

The appellants, B.K. Ravichandra and others, sought to recover possession of three parcels of land that had been requisitioned by the Union of India under the Defence of India Act, 1962 and deemed to be covered by the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952. The High Court, despite finding the Union's claim of acquisition untenable, refused to order the return of the lands, prompting a special leave petition to the Supreme Court. The Court held that the requisition under the 1952 Act was expressly temporary and ceased to be lawful upon the Act’s lapse in 1987, and that the Union could not retain possession thereafter. It affirmed that the right to property, though no longer a fundamental right, remains a valuable constitutional right protected by Article 300A. Consequently, the Union was directed to restore possession of the suit lands within three months and the appellants were permitted to seek fresh compensation through arbitration. The appeal was allowed and costs awarded to the appellants.

Issues considered

The legal effect of a requisition order under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952 after the Act lapsed in 1987
Whether the Union of India has a continuing right to occupy the suit lands in the absence of a valid acquisition
Whether the right to property under Article 300A can be enforced despite its removal from Part III
Whether the High Court erred in refusing to direct the Union to vacate the lands
Whether the appellants are entitled to fresh compensation for the period after 2000

Legislation cited

Defence of India Act, 1962
Land Acquisition Act (as amended 1984)s. 11A
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952s. 1(3), s. 3, s. 6(1A), s. 7, s. 8, s. 8(2), s. 8(2A), s. 8(2B)

Subjects

right to propertyrequisitiontemporary acquisitioncompensationArticle 300Aconstitutional lawland acquisitionSupreme Courtstate liabilitypublic purpose

Judgment

974 [2020]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 12 S.C.R. 974 [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS.
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1460 of 2010)
B NOVERMBER 24, 2020
[INDIRA BANERJEE AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.]
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act,
1952:
C Requisition under – Continuation of occupation of the Union
Government, even after lapse of the Act – Refusal to hand back the
possession – High Court by impugned order despite holding that
the Union claim has no merit, did not issue any direction to release
the lands in question – Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: Acquisition
under the Act is temporary – State’s occupation ceased to be lawful,
D
with the lapse of the Act in the year 1987 – Right to property though
not fundamental, is a valuable constitutional right ensuring
guaranteed freedoms and economic liberty – Court’s role is to act
as the guarantor and protector of the people’s liberties – It is not
open to the State to claim that the law or the Constitution can be
E ignored or complied at its convenience – Permitting the State to
assert its indefinite or overriding right to continue occupying one’s
property, bereft of lawful sanction, would be condoning lawlessness
– The State is directed to hand back possession of the suit lands to
the appellants.
F Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The legal effect of requisitioning immovable
property is that temporarily- i.e. for the period the requisition
order is in operation, the owner loses her possessory rights, even
though the title remains undisturbed. Since the deprivation of
G possession is through authority of law, in keeping with fair
procedure, the law (in this case, the Requisitioning Act) provides
for payment of compensation in accordance with predetermined
principles. Yet, the taking of property by definition is finite: it
cannot result in expropriation or deprivation of title altogether,
unless another process for acquiring it, is initiated. [Para 18][989-
H B-D]
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 975

Grahak Sanstha Manch v. State of Maharashtra (1994) A
4 SCC 192 : [1994] 3 SCR 746 – followed.
Rajendra Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P (1997) 4 SCC
511 : [1997] 1 SCR 1056 – relied on.
2. Although the right to property is not a fundamental right
protected under Part III of the Constitution of India, it remains a B
valuable constitutional right. The decisions of this court, and the
history of the right to property show that though its pre-eminence
as a fundamental right has been undermined, nevertheless, the
essence of the rule of law protects it. The evolving jurisprudence
of this court also underlines that it is a valuable right ensuring C
guaranteed freedoms and economic liberty. The phrasing of
Article 300-A is determinative and its resemblance with Articles
21 and 265 cannot be overlooked- they in effect, are a guarantee
of the supremacy of the rule of law, no less. [Paras 21 and 26][993-
B; 998-B-C]
D
Delhi Airtech Services Pvt Ltd v. State of U.P (2011) 9
SCC 354 : [2011] 12 SCR 191; State of Rajasthan v.
Basant Nahata (2005) 12 SCC 77 : [2005] 3 Suppl.
SCR 1; K. T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka
(2011) 9 SCC 1 : [2011] 13 SCR 636; T. Vijayalakshmi
v. Town Planning Member (2006) 8 SCC 502 : [2006] E
7 Suppl. SCR 534; D. B. Basnett v. Land Acquisition
Officer (2020) 4 SCC 572; State of U.P. v. Manohar
(2005) 2 SCC 126 : [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 911;
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P)
Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 : [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 517; F
Shrirampur Municipal Council v. Satyabhamabai
Bhimaji Dawkher, (2013) 5 SCC 627 : [2013] 2 SCR
664 – relied on.
Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial
Coke & Chemicals Ltd. (2007) 8 SCC 705 : [2007] 6 G
SCR 799; Ramchandra Ravindra Waghmare v. Indore
Municipal Corporation (2017) 1 SCC 667 : [2016] 9
SCR 373; M. C. Mehta v Union of India (2020) SCC
Online (SC) 658 – referred to.

H
976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A 3. It is not open to the State: in any of its forms (Executive,
State Agencies or Legislature) to claim that the law – or the
Constitution can be ignored, or complied at its convenience.
[Para 26][998-B]
Superintendent Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v.
B Corpn. of Calcutta [1967] 2 SCR 170 – relied on.
Director of Rationing and Distribution v. Corporation
of Calcutta [1961] 1 SCR 158 – stood overruled.
4. The Union asserted that it had acquired at least some
parts of the suit lands; these were examined by the High Court
C on two occasions, and in arbitration proceedings under the
Requisitioning Act, on three occasions. Each time, the factual
findings went against the Union. The Union’s occupation ceased
to be lawful, with the lapse of the Requisitioning Act, in 1987.
Yet, it has implacably refused to hand back possession, each time
D asserting that it has some manner of rights over it. The High
Court, while noticing that the Union’s claim had no merits (in
both its appeal, which was dismissed, as well as in the impugned
judgment, disposing of the writ petition), nevertheless refused
to issue any direction for the release of the suit lands. The
rationale given was that the adjoining areas had been acquired
E and were used by the Union for defense purposes. The impugned
judgment granted indefinite time to the Union to take steps to
acquire the suit lands. The Union has not chosen to do so these
last 12 years. These facts paint a stark, even sordid picture.
[Para 24][996-F-H; 997-A]
F 5. To permit the State: whether the Union or any State
Government to assert that it has an indefinite or overriding right
to continue occupying one’s property (bereft of lawful sanction)–
whatever be the pretext, is no less than condoning lawlessness.
The courts’ role is to act as the guarantor and zealous protector
G of the people’s liberties: be they assured through the freedoms,
and the right to equality and religion or cultural rights under Part
III, or the right against deprivation, in any form, through any
process other than law. Any condonation by the court is a validation
of such unlawful executive behavior which it then can justify its
conduct on the anvil of some loftier purpose, at any future time-
H
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 977

aptly described as a “loaded weapon ready for the hand of any A
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need.” [Para 26][998-C-F]
Korematsu v. United States 323 US 214 (1944) –
referred to.
6. The impugned judgment committed an error in refusing B
relief to the appellants. 33 years (based upon cessation of the
Union’s legal possession) is a long enough time, even in India, to
be kept away from one’s property. The respondent Union is
directed to hand back possession of the suit lands to the
appellants, within three months. Furthermore, it is open to the C
appellants to seek compensation based on fresh fixation of capital
value and recurring annual value, based on the different five-
year periods for the last 20 years. Such a claim shall be referred
to arbitration, within four weeks of receipt of the reference. The
arbitrator shall proceed to pronounce the award within six months
of receipt of the reference. This is independent of the Union’s D
obligation to vacate and hand over peaceful possession of the
suit lands within three months. [Para 27][999-A-C]
Special Military Estates Officer v. Munivenkataramiah
and Anr. [1990] 1 SCR 4; Union of India v. B. M.
Krishnamurthy 1995 (4) KarLJ 607; Vidya Devi v. State E
of H.P. (2020) 2 SCC 569; State of Haryana v. Mukesh
Kumar (2013) 1 SCC 353 : [2012] 13 SCR 29 –
referred to.
Case Law Reference
F
[1990] 1 SCR 4 referred to Para 9
(2020) 2 SCC 569 referred to Para 15
[2012] 13 SCR 29 referred to Para 15
[1994] 3 SCR 746 followed Para 19
G
[1997] 1 SCR 1056 relied on Para 20
[2011] 12 SCR 191 relied on Para 21
[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 1 relied on Para 21

H
978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A [2011] 13 SCR 636 relied on Para 22
[2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 534 relied on Para 22
[2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 911 relied on Para 22
[2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 517 relied on Para 22
B [2013] 2 SCR 664 relied on Para 22
[2007] 6 SCR 799 referred to Para 22
[2016] 9 SCR 373 referred to Para 22
(2020) 4 SCC 572 relied on Para 23
C
[1961] 1 SCR 158 stood overruled Para 25
[1967] 2 SCR 170 relied on Para 25
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1460
of 2010.
D From the Judgment and Order dated 11.01.2008 of the High Court
of Judicature at Karnataka in W.P. No. 8340 of 2006(LA).
Mohan Parasaran, V. Krishnamurthy, Sr. Advs. V. Balachandran,
Siddharth Naidu, M/S. KSN & Co., K.M. Natraj, Abhishek Kumar,
Sharath Nambiar, Arvind Kr. Sharma, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, V. N.
E Raghupathy, Manendra Pal Gupta, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. This appeal by special leave questions a judgment of the
F Karnataka High Court1. The High Court rejected the appellants’ claim
to direct the respondent (hereafter called “the Union”) to vacate their
lands, leaving it open to the latter to initiate appropriate proceedings for
acquisition of certain lands (which belonged to the appellants).
2. Parliament, in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Union,
G enacted the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable properties Act,
1952 (hereafter called “the Requisitioning Act”). It was brought into
force on 15.03.1952.2 The object of the Act was to enable the Union to
1
Dated 11.01.2008 in W.P. 8340/2006
2
By virtue of Section 1(3), the Act was initially temporary, and to remain in force for
H six years.
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 979
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

requisition or acquire immovable property if the competent authority was A
of the opinion that any property was necessary for a public purpose. By
Section 1(3), the Requisitioning Act was to be in force for six years.
Section 3 clothed the Union with the power to requisition properties for
any public purpose; Section 7 provided the procedure to requisition (or
acquire) lands. It also spelt-out the condition precedents for exercise of
B
the power. Section 8 provided for compensation with regard to property.
Section 8(2) laid out the principles applicable for determination of
compensation for the property as a recurring one3. On 27.02.1958, the
Requisitioning Act was amended and the period of its operation extended.
In the meanwhile, the Defence of India Act, 1962 (hereafter referred to
as “the DIA”) was enacted by Parliament empowering the Central C
Government with powers akin to those enacted under the Requisitioning
Act. The Union invoked its powers under the DIA and requisitioned the
three described properties which belonged to the predecessor of the
appellants (hereafter referred to as “the suit lands”). These comprised
of Survey Nos. 101/1 & 101/2 - the two survey numbers aggregating 2
D
acres 39 guntas and Survey No.104 (2 acre 8 guntas) in Byppanahalli,
Bangalore South Taluk. The then owner, i.e. late B.M. Krishnamurthy,
the appellants’ predecessor handed over the possession of the suit lands
under protest; these were taken over under Section 30 of the DIA. The
competent authority fixed the compensation for these lands by order
dated 18.12.1964. The approval for this compensation fixation was given E
much later - in 1968.
3. By Act 48 of 1963, Section 1(3) of the Requisitioning Act was
amended, and the period of operation of the Requisitioning Act was
3
Section 8(2) (a) provided inter alia, as follows:
“a recurring payment in respect of the period of requisition of a sum equal to the rent F
which would have been payable for the use and occupation of the property, if it had been
taken on lease for the period.”
Section 8 (2) (b) provided for payment of
(b) such sum or sums, if any, as may be found necessary to compensate the person
interested for all or any of the following matters, namely:
(i) pecuniary loss due to requisitioning;
(ii) expenses on account of vacating the requisitioned premises; G
(iii) expenses on account of reoccupying the premises upon release from
requisition; and
(iv) damages (other than normal wear and tear) caused to the property during
the period of requisition, including the expenses that may have to be incurred
for restoring the property to the condition in which it was at the time of
requisition.
H
980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A extended till 14.03.1970. In the meanwhile, the DIA lapsed with effect
from 10.01.1968. The Requisitioning Act was amended, incorporating
Section 25, which enacted that the immovable property requisitioned
under the DIA, which had not been released as on 10.01.1968 was
deemed to have been requisitioned under the Requisition Act. It also
continued the status quo with respect to determination of compensation
B
completed under the DIA. This Amendment Ordinance was replaced
by an actual amendment, to the Requisitioning Act. The Requisitioning
Act was again amended in 19704, to delete Section 1(3) of the main Act.
The Amendment Act also enabled requisitioning of property and stated
that requisitions were to be continued and were to be released after 12
C years (subsequently the period of 12 years was extended to 17 years) 5.
4. In late 1972, the predecessor of the appellants felt that the
compensation fixed for the suit lands was inadequate and applied for
enhancement. This was in terms of the amendment of 1970 (because
the land requisitioned in 1963 was deemed to have been continued by
D the Act of 1968). As required by Section 8 of the Requisitioning Act, this
dispute was referred to an arbitrator under Section 8(2). The reference
made was in respect of the amount of compensation payable, the recurring
payments in respect of the periods of requisition and the sums equal to
the rent that would have been payable for the occupation and use of the
property and other sums towards 4 years of losses, i.e. pecuniary loss
E expense on account of the vacating of the requisitioned premises,

4
Act 1 of 1970. The effect of this amendment Act was to change the temporary
character of the legislation.
5
Section 6(1A) reads as follows:
F “ 6. Release from requisitioning.—(1) The Central Government may at any time release
from requisition any property requisitioned under this Act and shall, as far as possible,
restore the property in as good a condition as it was when possession thereof was taken
subject only to the changes caused by reasonable wear and tear and irresistible force:
Provided that where the purposes for which any requisitioned property was being used
cease to exist, the Central Government shall, unless the property is acquired under
G section 7, release that property, as soon as may be, from requisition.
[(1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Central Government
shall release from requisition,—
(a) any property requisitioned or deemed to be requisitioned under this Act before the
commencement of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property
(Amendment) Act, 1970 (1 of 1970), on or before the expiry of a period of [seventeen
years] from such commencement;”
H
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 981
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

expenses on account of re-occupying of premises after release from A
acquisition and damages other than normal repairs. At that point in time,
Section 6(1A) contemplated retention of property for a total period of 3
years. Therefore, the recurring payment was in respect of a short
duration. The period of requisition under Section 8(2A)6 for the purpose
of compensation determination was, during the pendency of the
B
reference, increased to five years.
5. The reference was notified in a Gazette notification published
by the Central Government. On 17.07.1975, the Arbitrator pronounced
an Award which determined compensation as 6% per annum on the
capital value of land, assessed at 3 per square foot accepting the land
requisitioned to be in Survey nos.103/2 and 104 in Byppanahalli. The C
Central Government had, in the arbitration proceeding, contended that
the suit lands had also been acquired by virtue of a prior notification.

6
“Section 8(2A) reads as follows:
The recurring payment, referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (2), in respect of any D
property shall, unless the property is sooner released from requisition under Section 6
or acquired under Section 7, be revised in accordance with the provisions of sub-section
(2-B)—
(a) in a case where such property has been subject to requisition under this Act for the
period of five years or a longer period immediately preceding the commencement of the
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property (Amendment) Act, 1975—
(i) first with effect from the date of such commencement, and E
[(ii) secondly with effect from the expiry of five years, and thirdly with effect from the
expiry of ten years, from such commencement;]
(b) in a case where such property has been subject to requisition under this Act
immediately before such commencement for a period shorter than five years and the
maximum period within which such property shall, in accordance with the provisions
of sub-section (1-A) of Section 6, be released from requisition or acquired, extends
beyond five years from such commencement,— F
(i) first with effect from the date of expiry of five years from the date on which
possession of such property has been surrendered or delivered to, or taken by, the
competent authority under Section 4, and
[(ii) secondly with effect from the date of expiry of five years, and thirdly with effect
from the date of expiry of ten years, from the date on which the revision made under
sub-clause (i) takes effect;]
[(c) in any other case,—
G
(i) first with effect from the date of expiry of five years from the date on which
possession of such property has been surrendered or delivered to, or taken by, the
competent authority under Section 4, and
(ii) secondly with effect from the date of expiry of five years, and thirdly with effect
from the date of expiry of ten years, from the date on which the revision under sub-
clause (i) takes effect.] H
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A The arbitrator considered this contention too and after examining the
award of the LAC held:
“From the evidence of RW-2 and also from the copy of the
Ex-R-13 and possession certificate as per Ex.R-14, it is
established that 24 guntas and 29 sq. yards of land in
B S. No.103/2 and 8 guntas of land and 22 yards of land in
S. No.104 of Byyappanahali were acquired for the purpose
of NGEF and possession was taken by NGEF deducting the
said acquired portion of the land in S. No.103/2 and 104 of
Byyappanahalli the claimant would be the owner of the said
lands in ARE No.72-73.”
C
6. In view of the evidence it was also held that the appellants’
predecessor was entitled to receive compensation in respect of Survey
No.104, deducting the portion of land acquired for the purposes of NGEF.
This Award was made on 17.07.1975.
D 7. The Requisitioning Act underwent a further amendment7.
Section 8(2B) stated that recurring payment would be revised by re-
determining the amount8. As a consequence of this amendment of 1975,
the recurring payment required to be determined and fixed under Section
8(2) had to be first decided and fixed with effect from the date of
commencement of the Act and again with effect from the expiry of five
E years from the commencement of the amending Act. The amending Act
came into force on 07.03.1975.
8. To continue the narrative, the arbitrator’s award was appealed
against by the UOI. The award had determined compensation in terms
of the DIA and later – since it lapsed in 1968, also having regard to the
F principles spelt-out in Section 8 of the Requisitioning Act as amended.
On 21.07.1978, the Central Government’s appeal was disposed of in
7
Act 2 of 1975, which amended Section 6(1A) and substituted 10 years for the existing
period for compensation determination. It also added Section 8(2A) by creating a
deeming fiction that unless the property was released from requisition under Section 6
or duly acquired under Section 7, the recurring payment would be revised under provision
G
of newly added sub-section (2B).
8
Section 8(2B) reads as follows:
“(2B) The recurring payment in respect of any property shall be revised by re-determining
such payment in the manner and in accordance with the principles set out in sub-section
(1), read with clause (a) of sub-section (2), as if such property had been requisitioned
under this act on the date with effect from which the revision has to be made under such
H sub-section (2A)”
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 983
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

terms of a joint memo filed by the parties by which it was agreed that A
the matter with respect to determination of compensation would be
remanded/remitted for fresh adjudication; however, the compensation
fixation of 10.01.1968 was agreed to be final and binding. The only caveat
added was that the question of maintainability of appeals under Section
11 of the Requisitioning Act was pending before this Court in certain
B
proceedings. However, the parties agreed that till disposal of appeal by
the arbitrator, the compensation fixed @ 3 per square foot would be
operative. It was further agreed that in case the appeals were not held
to be maintainable, the compensation fixed by the award was to be treated
as final. But on the other hand, if the appeal was held to be maintainable,
the arbitrator had to decide the fixation of compensation for the period C
prior to 10.01.1968.
9. By a judgment of this Court9, it was held that an award covering
the period of requisition can be challenged in appeal and that the award
made under DIA was not appealable. Thus, the compensation fixation
for the period upto 10.01.1968 in this case (when the requisition of suit D
lands was made under DIA) became final.
10. On 28.01.1985, in the second arbitration proceeding, based on
the fixation of compensation till 10.01.1968, it was held that the fixation
of compensation till 10.01.1968 had to be accepted and basic fixation of
rent was to be increased for over 5 years thereafter. The arbitrator then E
proceeded to fix the rental compensation payable per square foot for 3
distinct periods, i.e. 10.01.1968 to 10.01.1973 (@ 4.10 per square
foot); 10.01.1973 to 10.01.1975 (@ 5.40 per square foot) and
10.01.1978 to 10.01.1985 ( Rs.10.20 per square foot). The parties
appealed against this judgment. By common judgment and order10 in
MFA 1405/1985, decided on 24.11.1994, a Division Bench of the F
Karnataka High Court noted that the issue as to the extent of land for
which compensation had to be determined was one that required decision
by the arbitrator. The High Court noted that there was no evidence to
deduce whether notice under the Land Acquisition Act had been served,
and that there was nothing to show when the award was made by the G
Collector, to support the Union’s contention about the acquisition of certain
portions of the suit land. These were, therefore, left for enquiry and
fresh decision. The Court proceeded to decide on the issue of
9 Special Military Estates Officer v. Munivenkataramiah and Anr. 1990 (1) SCR 4
10 Reported as Union of India v B.M. Krishnamurthy 1995 (4) KarLJ 607. H
984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A compensation and held that the agreed compensation in terms of the
previous joint memo, i.e. for the period up to 10.01.1968 was final. The
Division Bench further noted that the arbitrator was not bound to treat
the amounts fixed for the period as on 10.01.1968 as the basic figure
and proceed to increase the rent periodically. It was noted that the question
of fixation for a period of five years arose after Section 8(2A) was
B
introduced to the Requisitioning Act– thus the recurring compensation
question had to be decided from 10.01.1968 and then from the
commencement of the Amendment Act and again from the expiry of
that Act. It, therefore, held, upon a reading of Section 8(2A) that
“recurring compensation payable in this case from 10.01.1968
C to the commencement of the amendment Act 2 of 1975 upto
07.03.1975 shall be fixed and for the period 07.03.1975 it
should be done as indicated in Section 8(2A).’’
11. The award, therefore, was set aside and the matter was
remitted for fresh consideration by the arbitrator. In this fresh (third)
D round, the arbitrator published two awards – one dealing with the extent
of land, and the other the compensation payable. After examining all the
evidence, including the documentary evidence, presented by the parties,
as well as the oral testimony, i.e. the oral deposition on behalf of the
UOI, it was held that Survey nos. 103/1 and 103/2 were not validly
E acquired by the Central Government and that Survey No.104 was validly
acquired. The other award determined the land value and recurring annual
value at different rates, which is set out below in a tabular form:

Sl . No. Perio d Rate (Capital value) (t o be Annual
recurring
calcu lated for 2 acres 39
F rate
guntas )

1. 10.1.1968 to 07.03.19 75 ` 1 per s quare foot 6% p.a.

2. 07.0 3.197 5 to 07 .03.1980 ` 1 .5 per s quare foot 6% p.a.
G 3. 07.0 3.198 0-07 .03.1985 ` 5 per s quare foot 6% p.a.

4. 07.0 3.198 5-07 .03.1990 ` 2 5 per square foot 6% p.a.

5. 07.0 3.199 0-07 .03.1995 ` 4 5 per square foot 6.5% p.a.

6. 07.0 3.199 5-07 .03.2000 ` 1 00 p er s quare foot 6% p.a.
H
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 985
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

12. Aggrieved by the two awards, both dated 28.02.2000, the Union A
preferred an appeal (MFA 2220/2002) before the Karnataka High Court.
During its pendency, the widow of the late BM Krishnamurthy and the
present appellants, her children, filed a writ petition (WP 8340/2006)
claiming that since the period of requisition had ended and the suit lands
had not been acquired, the possession of the Union after 1987 was
B
untenable in law. In a judgment delivered on 11.01.2008 (i.e. the same
day when the impugned judgment was pronounced) the Division Bench
of the Karnataka High Court rejected the contentions of the Union vis-
a-vis its acquisition of suit lands, or any part thereof, and noted that the
court was concerned “only with Sy. Nos. 103/1 and 103/2 for the
period between 1968 and 2000 and so far as Sy. No. 104 is C
concerned, between the period 1968 and 1977, as the portion of
the land measuring 11985.24 square feet undisputedly came to be
acquired”. It upheld the awards of the arbitrator fixing the compensation
in 2000 and held that:
“Accordingly, in view of the discussion and reasoning stated D
above, we confirm the fact that neither Sy. No. 103/1 nor Sy.
No. 103/2 ever came to be validly acquired by the authorities
for the benefit of appellant herein. We hold the rental
compensation computed by the arbitrator is just and proper.”
13. The Union sought special leave to appeal under Article 136 of E
the Constitution, against the said judgment dismissing its appeal11. By
order dated 10.09.2010, that special leave petition was dismissed, keeping
it open for the Union to acquire the property, in accordance with law.
Thus, as regards the question of ownership and the rental payable till the
period 07.03.2000, the issue attained finality. By the impugned judgment
delivered 11.01.2008, the Division Bench after considering the records, F
dismissed the appellants’ writ petition and held that
“It is also noticed from the records, originally the land in
question came to be handed over to the defence authorities It
is also noticed from the records, originally the land in question
came to be handed over to the defence authorities by invoking G
the provisions of defence of India Act 1962 which act came
to be repealed on 10.01.1968. By virtue of Section 25 of the
Requisitioning Act, 1952, whatever has been done under the
Defence Act of India, is presumed to have been done under
11 SLP (C) CC No. 12634/2008. H
986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A the Requisitioning Act, therefore, u/s 6 of the Requisitioning
Act, the authorities could not have held the property beyond
08.03.1987 at any cost. We say so because withing the said
period, of 07.03.1987, apparently, there was no valid
acquisition of properties by the concerned authorities as noted
above.
B
It is also brought to our notice that though portions of land
in different Sy. Numbers adjacent to these lands came to be
acquired in the year 1972 and also on earlier occasions, such
acquisitions never came to be challenged by the respective
owners and the defence authorities continued to be in
C possession of those properties as beneficiaries after acquiring
the said lands by the competent authority. We notice that from
the contentions of the defence authorities right from 1941 till
date, about 600 acres is in possession of them and some of
the lands are acquired other than the lands in question. This
D Sy. No. 103 seems to be in the centre of that 600 acres on this
vast area of 600 acres which is enclosed by a fence by the
authorities. They have put up firing range, buildings, parade
ground etc.
In that view of the matter, as we noted above already, at this
E late hour of the day, it would not be just and proper to direct
the respondents to hand over the possession of those
properties. In the connected MFA No. 2220/02, we have
already approved the computation of rental compensation
awarded by the arbitrator upto 07.03.2000. The petitioners
are entitled to seek compensation for the subsequent period
F in accordance with law.
The Respondents - defence authorities and the State
Government are at liberty to initiate acquisition proceedings
so far as these lands are concerned if they need in respect of
property in Sy. No. 102/1 and 103/2 as well, for the benefit of
G the defence authorities.”
The contentions
14. Mr. Mohan Parasaran, the appellant’s senior counsel, argued
that having upheld the main contentions with respect to the ownership
and title of the suit lands, the impugned judgment erred in law, in refusing
H
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 987
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

to grant the reliefs claimed in the writ proceedings. It was argued that A
even if arguendo any acquisition notification had covered any period
upto 1975, with the coming into force of the 1984 amendments to the
Land Acquisition Act, a period of 2 years was statutorily granted by
Parliament to complete the acquisition, i.e. to issue the award. Since
concededly there was no award valid ever made by virtue of the operation
B
of law, i.e. Section 11A12, the question of ownership, which was decided
by the arbitrator in the first and third award, became conclusive and
binding. It was also urged that the directions of the earlier Division Bench
ruling in B.M. Krishamurthy13 were specifically to determine the extent
of land acquired; in compliance, the arbitrator, in the third arbitration
proceedings, by the first award, decided the extent of acquired land. C
Those findings of the arbitrator, rendered by virtue of the earlier remand,
became final because the Union’s appeal was rejected by the Division
Bench. Further, the special leave petition against that judgment was
rejected by this court.
15. It was argued that once the issue of ownership stood settled D
conclusively, the Union had to vacate the suit property, because its
possession was not justified or authorized by law. Learned counsel relied
on the ruling of this court14 which held, recollecting an earlier judgment
in State of Haryana v Mukesh Kumar15 that the right to property is
“not only a constitutional or statutory right, but a human right”.
This court quoted with approval earlier judgments, which had ruled that E
deprivation of possession of one’s property without a law was untenable.
It was argued that the determination of compensation was up to the
period ending in 2000, i.e. 20 years ago. In the meanwhile, the value of

12
Section 11A reads as follows: F
“11A. Period shall be which an award within made. - The Collector shall make an
award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of
the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceeding for the
acquisition of the land shall lapse:
Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the
commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), the award G
shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement.
Explanation - In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period
during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration
is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.”
13
Supra n. 10
14
Vidya Devi v. State of H.P. 2020 (2) SCC 569.
15
2013 (1) SCC 353 H
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A property, as well as recurring value of compensation had risen
astronomically as the suit lands had great commercial potential.
16. Mr. K.M. Natraj, learned Additional Solicitor General, urged
this court not to interfere with the impugned judgment. According to
him, the High Court correctly denied the claim to release of lands, since
B it was a dispute which had to be decided by the civil court. The learned
ASG sought to argue that the findings with regard to extent of ownership
were ambiguous and the courts committed errors in ignoring that the suit
lands were acquired through notifications in 1941. Mr. Natraj contested
the submission that the lands were unlawfully occupied, pointing out that
the properties were requisitioned validly and that those orders were never
C questioned by either the predecessor of the appellants or them, in any
properly instituted proceedings.
Analysis and findings
17. From the narration of events, it is clear that first, the suit
D properties were requisitioned in 1963, under the DIA. The amendment
to the Requisition Act, which enacted Section 25 in 1968, had the effect
of creating a deeming fiction that requisitions under the DIA were deemed
to be under the Requisitioning Act. Thereafter, due to successive
amendments to the Requisitioning Act, the period of requisition continued;
it finally ended in 1987. In the meanwhile, the original landowner, late
E Krishnamurthy, sought and was granted a reference to arbitration, on
the issue of compensation payable. The first award made in 1975, decided
both the question of extent of land requisitioned (and also the land owned
by the landowner). The award was questioned, but the appeal was
disposed of by the High Court on 21.07.1978, on the basis of a joint
F memo. The fresh determination which was made through the award
dated 28.01.1985, again re-determined the compensation payable for
the period after 1.10.1968, using the capital value fixed earlier as the
basis. This led to the judgment of the High Court16 which held that there
was no evidence to support the Union’s contention that some part of the
suit lands had been acquired. However, on that question as well as the
G issue of basis for the recurring compensation (as well as its computation),
the dispute was remitted. This time, the arbitrator rendered two awards-
one, deciding the question of ownership or its extent and the second, on
the question of compensation determination. The Union appealed to the

H 16 Dated 24.11.1994
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 989
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

High Court; that appeal17 was dismissed by a judgment, delivered on the A
same day as the impugned judgment. The Union’s special leave petition
was dismissed 10 years ago (on 10.9.2010). This court left it open to the
Union to take steps in accordance with law, with respect to the property.
The impugned judgment too, held that the question of ownership had
attained finality – and in favour of the appellants. That part of the judgment
B
has not been appealed against by the Union.
18. The legal effect of requisitioning immovable property, it goes
without saying, is that temporarily- i.e. for the period the requisition order
is in operation, the owner loses her possessory rights, even though the
title remains undisturbed. Since the deprivation of possession is through
authority of law, in keeping with fair procedure, the law (in this case, the C
Requisitioning Act) provides for payment of compensation in accordance
with predetermined principles. Yet, the taking of property by definition is
finite: it cannot result in expropriation or deprivation of title altogether,
unless another process for acquiring it, is initiated.
19. Whilst dealing with a similar enactment18 this court, in Grahak D
Sanstha Manch v. State of Maharashtra19 held through a Constitution
Bench, that requisition, by its nature, is temporary and that the
landowner’s right to property cannot remain suspended indefinitely, at
the wishes of the state or its agencies:
“16. We find ourselves in agreement with the view taken in E
the cases of Collector of Akola [(1968) 1 SCR 401 : AIR 1968
SC 244] and Jiwani Kumar Paraki [Jiwani Kumar
Paraki v. First Land Acquisition Collector, (1984) 4 SCC 612]
that the purpose of a requisition order may be permanent.
But that is not to say that an order of requisitioning can be F
continued indefinitely or for a period of time longer than
that which is, in the facts and circumstances of the particular
case, reasonable. We note and approve in this regard, as did
this Court in Jiwani Kumar Paraki case [Jiwani Kumar
Paraki v. First Land Acquisition Collector, (1984) 4 SCC 612],
the observations of the Nagpur High Court in the case G
of Mangilal Karwa v. State of M.P. [ILR 1955 Nag 34 : AIR
1955 Nag 153] which have been reproduced above. That the
17
MFA 2220/2002
18
The Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948
19
(1994) 4 SCC 192 at page 204
H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A concept of requisitioning is temporary is also indicated by
the Law Commission in its Tenth Report and, as pointed out
earlier, by the terms of the said Act itself, as it originally stood
and as amended from time to time. There is no contradiction
in concluding that while a requisition order can be issued for
a permanent public purpose, it cannot be continued
B
indefinitely. Requisitioning might have to be resorted to for a
permanent public purpose, to give an example, to tide over
the period of time required for making permanent premises
available for it. The concepts of acquisition and requisition
are altogether different as are the consequences that flow
C therefrom. A landlord cannot, in effect and substance, be
deprived of his rights and title to property without being paid
due compensation, and this is the effect of prolonged
requisitioning. Requisitioning may be continued only for a
reasonable period; what that period should be would depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it would
D
ordinarily, be for the Government to decide.”
20. When this court had to adjudicate, in Rajendra Kumar Gupta
v. State of U.P20 on somewhat similar facts, i.e. the requisition having
been resorted to during a national emergency under the DIA, and its
continuance under the Requisitioning Act, the question which arose was
E the continued possession by the state. The court held that such possession,
long after the requisition period had ceased, was contrary to law and
observed that:
“14. We, therefore, will have to examine the efficacy of the
impugned order from the point of view of its prolonged
F duration uptil now which as seen earlier has been spread
over more than two decades from the date on which it got its
birth on 29-10-1976. For deciding this question we will assume
with the respondents, for the sake of argument, that on the
day on which it was passed it was validly passed under the
G provisions of Section 23. Even then the moot question still
remains whether such an emergency order of requisition which
might be justified in those days when it was passed could
now be permitted to continue indefinitely. For answering this
question we may usefully refer to the decision of the

H 20 (1997) 4 SCC 511 at page 525
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 991
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Grahak A
Sanstha Manch [(1994) 4 SCC 192] . The Constitution Bench
has in terms laid down that even though a requisition order
can be issued for a permanent public purpose under the
provisions of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 it cannot
be continued indefinitely. We may usefully refer to the relevant
B
observations made in this connection by Bharucha, J.
speaking for the majority of the Constitution Bench, in
paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Report: (SCC p. 204)
****** *******
We have already shown that in the context of the emergency C
provisions of the Act in question the powers which could be
exercised for requisitioning properties under Section 23 by
their very nature could not be utilised for requisitioning
immovable properties for an indefinite period. Such requisition
virtually amounts to acquisition. In the facts and circumstances
of this case it must be held that when years back the parent D
Act had ceased to operate and the internal and external
emergency declarations had stood withdrawn, now obviously
there is no rhyme or reason why such a requisition order,
which by efflux of time has become stale and its very purpose
has become obsolete, should be permitted to be continued E
any further and the appellants’ properties should be still
permitted to remain requisitioned and in possession of the
respondents. In the facts and circumstances of the case,
therefore, it must be held that continued requisition of the
appellants’ leasehold premises by now at least must be treated
to have become unreasonable and it would necessarily F
indicate abuse of power and a colourable exercise thereof. It
must be held that the impugned requisition order even
assuming that it was valid and kicking and was not stillborn
when it was passed in 1976, by now it has lost its efficacy
and has become a dead letter, in the present set of G
circumstances obtaining today. Even on this ground the
continuance of the impugned requisition order cannot be
sustained and has to be put an end to. The third point is also,
therefore, answered in the affirmative in favour of the
appellants and against the respondents.
H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A 15. In this connection we may also note that it is not the case
of the respondents that now they require to acquisition the
requisitioned premises on a permanent basis for the purpose
for which they were initially requisitioned, by exercise of
powers under Section 30 of the Act. In fact the said provision
could have been pressed in service by Respondent 3, if at all,
B
during the currency of the Act which provision is obviously
not available to them now. Non-exercise of powers under
Section 30 for acquiring these requisitioned properties during
the time the Act was in force itself shows that even according
to the respondents the Government did not require the said
C requisitioned land to be acquired for its purposes or that it
was felt that the cost of restoration of the requisitioned
property by the Government would be excessive. During the
pendency of these proceedings this Court had earlier directed
by order dated 21-9-1984 that status quo will remain so far
as the construction in any part of the open space is concerned.
D
That status quo was continued by an order of 29-10-1984.
However by a latter order dated 9-2-1987 while granting
special leave this Court had refused to grant stay but had
made it clear that the respondents will not be entitled to claim
the benefit of Section 30 of the Defence and Internal Security
E of India Act, 1971 in the event of the appeal being allowed.
Any further construction effected by the respondents will not
be pleaded as defence during the hearing of the appeal.
Under these circumstances, therefore, there cannot remain
any valid defence for the respondents against the restoration
of possession of the requisitioned premises to the appellants
F
once the impugned order of requisition is found to be invalid
in view of our findings on the aforesaid points for
determination.
16. In the result the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order
of the High Court are set aside. The writ petition filed by the
G appellants before the High Court is allowed. The impugned
order of requisition of the premises in question dated
29-10-1976 is quashed and set aside. The respondents are
directed to restore the possession of these requisitioned
properties forthwith to the appellants by clearing off whatever
H
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 993
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

construction may be existing on the spot and making available A
the requisitioned properties in their original form and shape
to the appellants. The respondents are directed to comply with
this order within eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy
of this order at their end. In the facts and circumstances of
the case there will be no order as to costs.”
B
21. Although the right to property is not a fundamental right
protected under Part III of the Constitution of India21, it remains a valuable
constitutional right. The importance of this right has been emphasized
and iterated several times by this court. In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt
Ltd v. State of U.P22 for instance, this court underlined the issue as
follows: C

“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different
political thinkers that some amount of property right is an
indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic
oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that
liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property.” D
Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was
the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property
itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other
constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among
political thinkers and jurists.” E
Earlier, in State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata23, this court
highlighted that a property owner’s rights cannot be deprived, stating
that:
“59. ..In absence of any substantive provisions contained in
a parliamentary or legislative act, he cannot be refrained from F
dealing with his property in any manner he likes. Such
statutory interdict would be opposed to one’s right of
property as envisaged under Article 300-A 300-A of the
Constitution.”
G
21
By reason of deletion of Article 19 (1) (f) and Article 31 with sub heading “Right to
Property” which were omitted by the Constitution 44th Amendment Act, 1978. Article
31(1) was in effect, enacted as Article 300A – through an insertion in Chapter IV Part
XII of the Constitution.
22
(2011) 9 SCC 354
23
(2005) 12 SCC 77 H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A The decision in K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka24
interpreted Article 300A and held that:
“168. Article 300A proclaims that no person can be deprived
of his property save by authority of law, meaning thereby
that a person cannot be deprived of his property merely by
B an executive fiat, without any specific legal authority or
without the support of law made by a competent
legislature. The expression “property” in Article 300-A
confined not to land alone, it includes intangibles like
copyrights and other intellectual property and embraces
every possible interest recognized by law.
C
169. This Court in State of W.B. v. Vishnunarayan and
Associates (P) Ltd. 6, while examining the provisions of the
West Bengal Great Eastern Hotel (Acquisition of Undertaking)
Act, 1980, held in the context of Article 300-A that the State
or executive officers cannot interfere with the right of others
D unless they can point out the specific provisions of law which
authorises their rights.”
22. Other judgments of this court have also highlighted the
importance of the right under Article 300-A, in the context of regulatory
laws and enactments, which do not directly result in expropriation or
E acquisition, but rather, in an oblique and indirect fashion, block the right
to enjoyment of properties, underlining that the essential theme of Article
300-A is unauthorized deprivation, which would result in an indefinite
suspension of the right to property. The court stressed that the law (of
development or town planning, of any other such enactment) should be
F explicit about the nature and effect of the deprivation, expressing
the intention to do so. Therefore, in T. Vijayalakshmi v. Town Planning
Member25, this court observed that:
“13. Town Planning legislations are regulatory in nature. The
right to property of a person would include a right to construct
a building. Such a right, however, can be restricted by reason
G
of a legislation. In terms of the provisions of the Karnataka
Town and Country Planning Act, a comprehensive
development plan was prepared. It indisputably is still in force.

24 (2011) 9 SCC 1
H 25 (2006) 8 SCC 502
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 995
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

Whether the amendments to the said comprehensive A
development plan as proposed by the Authority would
ultimately be accepted by the State or not is uncertain. It is
yet to apply its mind. Amendments to a development plan must
conform to the provisions of the Act. As noticed hereinbefore,
the State has called for objection from the citizens. Ecological
B
balance no doubt is required to be maintained and the courts
while interpreting a statute should bestow serious
consideration in this behalf, but ecological aspects, it is trite,
are ordinarily a part of the town planning legislation. If in
the legislation itself or in the statute governing the field,
ecological aspects have not been taken into consideration C
keeping in view the future need, the State and the Authority
must take the blame therefor. We must assume that these aspects
of the matter were taken into consideration by the Authority
and the State. But the rights of the parties cannot be
intermeddled with so long as an appropriate amendment in
D
the legislation is not brought into force.
***
15. The law in this behalf is explicit. Right of a person to
construct residential houses in the residential area is a
valuable right. The said right can only be regulated in terms
of a regulatory statute but unless there exists a clear provision E
the same cannot be taken away. ….”
(emphasis supplied)
This court has also recognized that regulatory laws, which have
the effect of impacting the right to property, should be strictly construed.26
26
F
State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126; Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. (supra);
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111; Shrirampur
Municipal Council v. Satyabhamabai Bhimaji Dawkher, 2013 (5) SCC 627 : especially
the following observation:
“Shri Naphade’s interpretation of the scheme of Sections 126 and 127, if accepted,
will lead to absurd results and the landowners will be deprived of their right to
use the property for an indefinite period without being paid compensation. That G
would tantamount to depriving the citizens of their property without the sanction
of law and would result in violation of Article 300-A of the Constitution.”
Ref. also to Shrirampur Municipal Council v. Satyabhamabai Bhimaji Dawkher, (2013)
5 SCC 627 Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals
Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 705; Ramchandra Ravindra Waghmare v. Indore Municipal
Corporation, (2017) 1 SCC 667; and, more recently in M.C. Mehta v Union of India
2020 SCC Online (SC) 658. H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A 23. In a very recent judgment, D.B. Basnett v. Land Acquisition
Officer,27 the court approved the findings of the courts below that the
lands were never acquired, because the procedure prescribed was not
followed; notice of acquisition had not been given, nor was any amount
proved to have been received. The court also turned down the state’s
plea of adverse possession, and granted relief in the following terms:
B
“20. We are conscious that the land is being used by the
respondent State through Respondent 2 Department. That,
however, does not give such a licence to the State Government.
We had endeavoured to refer the matter for mediation, to find
an amicable solution, but that did not fructify. We, however,
C would like to give some time to the respondent State to analyse
the consequences of this judgment, and, in case they so desire,
to acquire the land through a proper notification under the
said Act, and to take proper recourse in law so as to enable
them to keep the land. We grant three (3) months’ time from
D the date of the judgment for the respondent State to make up
their mind as to what they want to do. Would they still like to
retain the land by issuing a proper notification, or would they
like to surrender possession of the land. In either eventuality,
the question of payment for use and occupation would still
arise, which will have to be determined in accordance with
E law. Mesne profits would be determined by a Court
Commissioner, to be appointed by the trial court, as a relief
in that behalf has been sought in the plaint itself.”
24. To sum up the facts, repeatedly the Union asserted that it had
acquired at least some parts of the suit lands; these were examined by
F the High Court on two occasions, and in arbitration proceedings under
the Requisitioning Act, on three occasions. Each time, the factual findings
went against the Union. The Union’s occupation ceased to be lawful,
with the lapse of the Requisitioning Act, in 1987. Yet, it has implacably
refused to hand back possession, each time asserting that it has some
G manner of rights over it. The High Court, while noticing that the Union’s
claim had no merits (in both its appeal, which was dismissed, as well as
in the impugned judgment, disposing of the writ petition), nevertheless
refused to issue any direction for the release of the suit lands. The
rationale given was that the adjoining areas had been acquired and

H 27
(2020) 4 SCC 572 at page 580
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 997
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

were used by the Union for defense purposes. What is more the A
impugned judgment granted indefinite time to the Union to take steps to
acquire the suit lands. The Union has not chosen to do so these last 12
years. These facts paint a stark, even sordid picture.
25. The United States of America set up an exclusive court (the
United States Court of Federal claims, since 1866, referred to as “keeper B
of the nation’s conscience” to enable citizens to claim justice against
the Federal government with a poignant motto28. By contrast, the Indian
experience has been that the governments, taking a cue from the English
experience, initially asserted that they are not subject to the law insisting
upon the continuation of the royal prerogative (by virtue of Article 372
of the Constitution) which enabled the crown in the UK to assert its C
right to insist that it was not bound by the law, unless there was express
statutory intent 29 .Mercifully, a later judgment 30 overruled that
understanding. In Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs
(supra, f.n. 29) this court held that
“23. The next question is whether this Court should adopt D
the rule of construction accepted by the Privy Council in
interpreting statute vis-a-vis the Crown. There are many
reasons why the said rule of construction is inconsistent with
and incongruous. In the present set-up we have no Crown,
the archaic rule based on the prerogative and perfection of E
28
The motto of that court aptly summarizes its task, and the duty of the Federal
government:
“It is as much the duty of Government to render prompt justice against itself, in
favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same, between private individuals.”
29
In Director of Rationing and Distribution v. Corporation of Calcutta [(1961) 1 SCR
158] where this Court held that the State was not bound by the provisions of a state law F
and was not liable to prosecution for its contravention. Sinha, C.J., spoke for the
majority; Sarkar, J., concurred separately and Wanchoo, J., recorded his dissent. The
reasoning of Sinha, C.J., is found in the following passage:
“It is well-established that the common law of England is that the King’s
prerogative is illustrated by the rule that the Sovereign is not necessarily bound
by a statutory law which binds the subject…. That was law applicable to India
G
also, as authoritatively laid down by the Privy Council in the case referred to
above [(1946) L. Rule 73 I.A. 271]…… it (law in force under Article 372 of the
Constitution) must be interpreted as including the common law of England
which was adopted as the law of this country before the Constitution came into
force.” (At p. 173).
30
Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Corpn. of Calcutta, (1967) 2
SCR 170 H
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A the Crown has no relevance to a democratic republic; it is
inconsistent with the rule of law based on the doctrine of
equality….”
26. It is, therefore, no longer open to the state: in any of its forms
(executive, state agencies, or legislature) to claim that the law – or the
B constitution can be ignored, or complied at its convenience. The decisions
of this court, and the history of the right to property show that though its
pre-eminence as a fundamental right has been undermined, nevertheless,
the essence of the rule of law protects it. The evolving jurisprudence of
this court also underlines that it is a valuable right ensuring guaranteed
freedoms and economic liberty. The phrasing of Article 300-A is
C determinative and its resemblance with Articles 21 and 265 cannot be
overlooked- they in effect, are a guarantee of the supremacy of the rule
of law, no less. To permit the state: whether the Union or any state
government to assert that it has an indefinite or overriding right to continue
occupying one’s property (bereft of lawful sanction)– whatever be the
D pretext, is no less than condoning lawlessness. The courts’ role is to act
as the guarantor and jealous protector of the people’s liberties: be they
assured through the freedoms, and the right to equality and religion or
cultural rights under Part III, or the right against deprivation, in any form,
through any process other than law. Any condonation by the court is a
validation of such unlawful executive behavior which it then can justify
E its conduct on the anvil of some loftier purpose, at any future time- aptly
described as a “loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority
that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.” 31

F 31
The phrase is quoted from Justice Robert Jackson’s powerful and timeless dissent in
Korematsu v United States 323 US 214 (1944). The full text of the relevant extract,
where the judge dissented from the majority of the US Supreme Court, which upheld
the indefinite internment of American citizens of Japanese origin, is reproduced below:
“a judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain this order is
a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the [military] order
itself. A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than
G the military emergency. … once a judicial opinion rationalises such an order to
show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalises the Constitution
to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all times has
validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of
transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible
H claim of an urgent need.”
B. K. RAVICHANDRA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 999
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

27. For the above reasons, this court holds that the impugned A
judgment committed an error in refusing relief to the appellants. 33 years
(based upon cessation of the Union’s legal possession) is a long enough
time, even in India, to be kept away from one’s property. The respondent
Union is directed to hand back possession of the suit lands to the appellants,
within three months. Furthermore, it is open to the appellants to seek
B
compensation based on fresh fixation of capital value and recurring annual
value, based on the different five-year periods for the last 20 years.
Such a claim shall be referred to arbitration, within four weeks of receipt
of the reference. The arbitrator shall proceed to pronounce the award
within six months of receipt of the reference. This is independent of the
Union’s obligation to vacate and hand over peaceful possession of the C
suit lands within three months.
28. The appeal is allowed in the above terms; the appellants shall
be paid costs, quantified at 75,000/-.

D
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal allowed.

E

F

G

H