Holding

Sections 14(1)(b) and 10(3)(c) operate in separate fields, so the landlady may obtain relief under Section 10(3)(c) even without pursuing Section 14(1)(b); the amendment to plead Section 10(3)(c) was valid, and "building" in Section 10(3)(c) is to be given its ordinary meaning, not limited by the definition in Section 2(2).

Summary

The landlady, owner of Gomathi Lodge, filed eviction proceedings against several tenants seeking demolition and reconstruction of the premises under Section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, and later amended the petition to claim additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c). The Rent Controller dismissed both claims, but the appellate authority allowed them, a decision later reversed by the High Court and again remanded by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the landlady could obtain relief under Section 10(3)(c) without pursuing Section 14(1)(b), whether the amendment introducing Section 10(3)(c) was valid, and how the term "building" should be interpreted in Section 10(3)(c). The Court held that the two statutory provisions operate in distinct fields, allowing a decree under Section 10(3)(c) even if Section 14(1)(b) is not pressed, that the amendment was justified because the landlady had specifically pleaded for additional accommodation, and that "building" in Section 10(3)(c) must be given its ordinary meaning, not confined to the definition in Section 2(2). Consequently, the appeals were dismissed and the landlady's claim under Section 10(3)(c) was upheld.

Issues considered

Whether the landlady can obtain a decree under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act when she does not pursue relief under Section 14(1)(b).
Whether an amendment to introduce relief under Section 10(3)(c) is permissible without separate pleadings.
What is the proper meaning of the word "building" in clause (c) of Section 10(3) of the Act.
Whether the proviso to clause (e) of Section 10(3) regarding comparative hardship affects the relief.

Legislation cited

Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960s. 10(3)(c), s. 14(1)(b), s. 2(2)

Subjects

rent controlevictiondemolitionadditional accommodationbuilding definitionTamil Nadu Buildings ActSection 14Section 10landlord-tenanthardshipamendment of pleadings

Judgment

B. KANDASAMY REDDJAR ETC. A
v.
0. GOMATHI AMMAL

MARCH 27, 2001

[A.P. MISRA AND D.P. MOHAPATRA, JJ.) B

Rent Control & Eviction :

Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960 :

Section 14(1Xb)and10(3)(c)-Landlady filing eviction petition on ground C
of demolition and reconstruction-Raising ground of additional accommoda-
tion alternatively-Held, alternate ground can be raised by way of an amend-
ment.

Section 14( l)(b)-Relief under-Held, though not pressed for-Land-
lady could get a decree for additional accommodation. D

Section 2(2) and 10(3)(c)-"Building" "part ofthe building"-Fictionally
includes various structures which otherwise could not be building.

Worru and Phrases-"Building", "part of a building"-Meaning of
E
The respondent filed eviction petitions against the appellants on the
ground of demolition and reconstruction, under Section 14(1)(b) of the
Tamil Nadu Buildings Act, 1960 and subsequently through amendment,
raised the ground of requirement of additional accommodation under
Section 10(3)(c). The Rent Controller dismissed respondent's petition on
F
both the grounds. The Rent Controller held that landlady wants only to
demolish a portion of the accommodation in question and not to construct
a new building hence it will not be a case covered under Section 14(1)(b).
The landlady's case of requirement of additional accommodation under
Section 10(3)(c) was rejected and with reference to the comparative hard-
ship it was held that hardship caused to the appellant-tenant will outweigh G
the advantage to the landlady. Respondent-landlady appealed against this
order and the appeal was allowed by the appellate authority. The revision
application filed by appellant before the High Court was rejected. In
appeal to this Court the case was remanded back to the appellate authority
since the High Court held that the appellate authority erred in considering H
835
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200lj 2 S.C.R.
A the evidence compositely while considering the case under two provisions,
namely under Section 14(1)(b) and Section 10(3)(c) simultaneously, though
they are two separate and independent statutory provisions.

After remand the appellate authority allowed the eviction petition of
the respondent as against the present appellant. The appellant's revision
B application before the High Court was rejected. In appeal this Court again
remanded the case back to the High Court, as it felt that the High Court
has not taken into consideration the proviso to Clause (c) of Section 10(3).
The High Court again dismissed the claim of tenants and upheld that of
the landlady.
c In the present appeal, the Appellant contended that once the land-
lady withdrew her claim under Section 14(l)(b), her claim under Section
'
10(3)(c) should not have been allowed; that Section 14(1)(b) is applicable
when landlord requires for erection after demolition and if this is with-
drawn, then landlady cannot claim her relief under Section 10(3)(c) for
D additional accommodation, and since on the facts of this case it cannot be
satisfied without demolition no relief can be granted. The appellants in
connected Appeals contended that the definition of 'building' as defined
under sub-section (2) of Section of the Act, which includes 'part of build-
ing' to be building to submit that the word 'building' used under Section
E 10(3)(c), the landlords could only invoke relief under it if he is occupying
part of a building; that since the tenants are on the ground floor while
landlady is on the first and second floors, the landlady could not be termed
to occupy part of the building as defined in sub-section (2) of the Section 2;
and that since the 'building' is defined to be a 'part of building', the same
meaning has to be given to it under Section 10(3)(c) and that requirement
F of additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c) cannot be merely for
desire and it would not cover cases where it is for augmenting the income.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD : 1. Both Sections 14(1)(b) and Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil
G Nadu Rent Control Act operate in two different fields. Section 14(1)(b)
covers the field where the bona fide requirement of landlord is for immedi-
ate demolition of the building for the purpose of erecting a new building on
its site. In other words it refers to a case or erection or new building after
demolition on the same site. This would not cover a case of mere alterna-
H tion or changes to be brought in through internal constructions in an
B. KANDASAMY REDDIAR v. 0. GOMATfll AMMAL 837
existing building even if it requires through partial demolition. In such A
cases erection is for a new building. Ou the other hand Section 10(3)(c)
covers the field, where landlord requires an additional accommodation,
residential or non-residential, where question of demolition of the whole
building does not arise. Thus, even if some alteration by demolition of a
part of the existing building is to be made, it would not be a case covered
B
under Section 14(1)(b). Thus the landlady could get a decree under Section
10(3)(c) of the Act even if she did not press her relief under Section
14(1)(b). [840-G-H; 841-A-B)

2. The respondent-landlady bas made specific pleadings about the
additional accommodation. Hence amendment by introducing Section C
10(3)(c) was justified and valid. [841-C]

3. "Building'' as defined in sub-section (2) of Section 2 is an inclusive
definition. This fictional definition is for a purpose that 'building' as com-
monly understood in a general sense may not he construed in all situations
as one composite whole. Under Section 2(2), 'building' is defined as build-
D
ing, or hut or part of a building or hut and includes, gardens, grounds,
outhouses etc. The definition of building does not give a go-by to the whole
structure of building as 'building' as generally understood, as it opens with
the definition of 'building' to mean 'any building'. In other words both
building and 'part of building' independently is to be construed as 'build- E
ing' within this definition clause. This statutory definition fictionally in-
cludes various structures, huts, including part of a building, which other-
wise could not be a building to he 'building', to he applied as such in the
various statutory provisions of the Act for subserving the objects of the Act.
If part of the building occupied by the tenant is construed ro he a building
F
then landlord could never he in a position to occupy other part of the build-
ing. Such interpretation forgets that definition clause itself is flexible to make
a 'building' to be a 'building' and a part of building to be a building also to
he used accordingly wherever necessary. Ifinterpretation sought to be given
on behalf of the appellant is accepted, this would completely dismantle the
purpose engrafting of opening word of Section 10(3)(c), namely, 'the land- G
lord who is occupying only part of the building'. [844-D-E; 845-D-E]

Lalchand (dead) by llls. & Ors. v. Radha Krishnan, (1977) 2 SCC 88
and Ganapathi Pandian v. Sheik Mohammed and Bros, (1957) 74 Law Weekly
45, referred to. H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A A. Mohammed Jaffar Saheb v. A. Palaniappa, (1964) MLJ 112, ap-
proved.

4. The very word 'part of the building' in the definition clause
admits to the meaning of the word 'building' to be understood as in the
general sense. When it refers to 'building' also in the definition clause to be
B a building it refers to 'building' as understood commonly. Unless it is, so,
part of building could not be conceived. Part means out of whole. The
artificial definition is for a purpose. Thus the submission made on behalf of
the appellant that the landlady cannot be said to occupy another part of
the building as part occupied by the tenant is itself a building, is rejected.
C The word 'building' used in sub-clause (c) of Section 10(3) is building as
commonly understood and cannot be restricted to the limited definition of
'part of building' as defined under Section 2(2) of the Act. (846-B-C]

P. Ramanatha Aiyer "Law Lexicon"; Stroud's "Judicial Dictionary",
referred to.
D 5. There is nothing on record to construe that requirenient is merely
out of desire. Neither this nor the other submission, viz. Augmenting
income was made nor there is anything on record to show both in law and
on fact, about the non-applicability of Section 10(3){c) on this court.
Finally, the submission is with reference to the proviso to sub-clause (e) to
E Section 10(3) about the hardship of the tenants. On the facts and circum-
stances of this case it bas been found that advantage of the landlady
outweighs the hardship of the tenants. This finding does not require any
interference. (846-F] •

P. Annakili Ammal & Anr. v. H.C. Hussain and Bussan & Anr., (1984) 1
F MLJ 340, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLA1E JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2397 of 2001.

From lhe Judgment and Order dated 20.4.2000 of lhe Madras High
Court in C.R.P. No. 979 of 1994.
G
WITH

Civil Appeal Nos. 2398/2001 and 2399 of 2001.

K.K. Maui for the Appellant iu C.A. No. 2397/2001.

H S. Balakrisbnau and S. Prasad for the Appellant iu C.A. No. 2398/2001.
B. KANDASAMY REDDIAR v. 0. GOMATHI AMMAL [MISRA. J.] 839
V. Prabhakar, A. Radhakrishnan and Revathy Raghavan for the Appel- A
!ant in C.A. No. 2399/2001.

* K.B. Sonnder Rajan for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Cowt was delivered by
B
MISRA, J, Leave granted.

The aforesaid appeals raise common questions except few others in
,(_
individual cases, which we shall be referring, hence are being disposed of by
means of this common judgment.

The questions up for consideration in these appeals are namely :
c
(i) Whether the landlady could exclusively get a decree nnder Section
l0(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control Act), 1960
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') when she did not press her relief nnder
Section 14 (l)(b), on the facts and circumstances of this case? D
(ii) Whether landlady initially filing petition nnder Section 14(l)(b) of
the aforesaid Act then could she by way of an amendment introduce Section
10(3)(c) without making necessary pleadings?

(iii) What would be the true meaning of the word 'building' used in E
clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act?

In order to appreciate the controversies we are herennder giving certain
essential facts.

The respondent-landlady is the owner of a building known as Gomathi F
Lodge and in its first and second floors she rnns lodging house. In the gronnd
ii( floor there are three shops of which one is Beta! sr.op and the other is door
no. 147 in which a restaurant is rnn by the appellant of C.A. No. 2397 of
2001 (@ SLP ©No. 9797 of 2000). The respondent filed eviction petitions
against the appellants on the gronnd of demolition and reconstruction, nnder
G
Section 14 (l)(b) of the said Act and subsequently through amendment,
also on the gronnd of requirement of additional accommodation nnder
Section 10(3)(c). So far as Door No. 147 she wants for car parking. After

...' contest, the Rent Controller dismissed respondent's suit on both the gronnds.
The Rent Controller held that landlady wants only to demolish a portion of
the accommodation in question and not to construct a new building hence H
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] 2 S.C.R.
A it will not be a case covered under Section 14(l)(b). He also rejected
landlady's case of requirement of additional accommodation under Section
l0(3)(c) and also held with reference to the comparative hardship that
hardship caused to the appellant-tenant will outweigh the advantage of the
landlady. Respondent-landlady appealed against this order which was allowed.
by the appellate authority on 7th March, 1984. The same was challenged by
B
the appellant (tenant) in the revision before the High Court which was •
rejected. Thereafter appellants filed appeal before this Court which remanded
the case back to the appellate authority because High Court felt that the
appellate authority erred in considering the evidence compositely while
considering the case under two provisions, namely, under Section 14(1)(b)
c and Section 10(3)(c), simultaneously though they are two separate and
independent statutory provisions.

After remand the appellate authority allowed the eviction petition of the
landlady against the present appellant. Thereafter the appellant's revision
before the High Court was also rejected. Then the appellants came to this
D Court through C.A. No. 4952 of 1998 in which this Court remanded the case
back again but this time to the H!gh Court, as it felt that the High Court has
not taken into consideration the proviso to Clause (c) of Section 10(3)
(comparative hardship). After remand, through impugned judgment, the High
Court again dismissed the claim of tenants and upheld that of the landlady.
E Aggrieved by that the present appeals have been preferred.

Pressing appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) 9797 of 2000, learned counsel
Mr. K.K. Mani submits, once the landlady withdrew her claim under Section
14(l)(b), her claim under Section 10(3)(c) should not have been allowed. The
submission is Section 14(l)(b) is applicable when landlord requires for
F erection after demolition and if this is withdrawn, then landlady cannot claim
her relief under Section 10(3)(c) for additional accommodation, if it could
only be satisfied after demolition and since on the facts of this case it cannot
be satisfied without demolition no relief can be granted. This submission in
our considered opinion is· misconceived. Both sections 14(1)(b) and Section
10(3)(c) operate in two different fields. Section 14(1)(b) covers the field
G where the bona fide requirement of landlord is for immediate demolition of
the building for the purpose of erecting a new building on its site. In other
words it refers to a case of erection of new building after demolition on the
same site. This would not cover a case of mere alteration or changes to be
brought in through internal constructions in an existing building even if it
H requires through partial demolition. In such cases erection is for a new
B. KANDASAMY REDDIAR v. 0. ~MATIII AMMAL [MISRA. J.] 841
building. On the other hand Section 10(3)(c) covers the field, where landlord A
requires an additional accommodation, residential or non-residential, where
question of demolition of the whole building does not arise. Thus, even if
some alteration by demolition of a part of the existing building is to be made,
would not be a case covered under Section 14(1)(b). Thus we have no
hesitation to answer the first question referred by us above by holding that
the landlady could get a decree under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act even if she
B
did not press her relief under Sectio(\' 14(l)(b).

So far as aforesaid second question, we have perused the pleadings and
found respondent landlady has made specific pleadings about the additional
accommodation hence amendment by introducing Section 10(3)(c) was jus-
tified and valid. Hence this question is held against the tenant.
c
Now we proceed to examine the aforesaid third question. In Civil Appeal
No. 2398/2001 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11515 of 2000), learned senior
counsel Mr. S. Balakrishnan, referred to the definition of 'building' as defined
under sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act, which includes D
'part of building' to be building to submit that the word 'building' used under
Section 10(3)(c), the landlords could only invoke relief under it if he
is occupying part of a building. As the tenants are on the ground floor
while landlady is on the first and second floors, the landlady could not be
termed to occupy part of the building as defined in sub-section (2) of Section
2. The submission is, since the 'building' is defined to be a 'part of building', E
the same meaning has to be given to it under Section 10(3)(c) also. He referred
to I.alchand (dead) by LRs. and Ors. v. Radha Krishan, [1977] 2 SCC 88 :

"The rule is well settled that where the same expression is used
in the same statute at different places the same meaning ought to be
F
given to that expression, as far as possible".

~ Based on this the submission is, since the landlady is occupying another
part of the building which under the definition clause itself would be a
building, it would not constitute to be a part of the building within the
meaning of sub-clause (c) of Section 10(3). If it is not part of a building, G
then the landlady fails to qualify for any relief .under sub-clause (c) pre-
requisite of which is that landlord should be in possession of a part of the
building.

·' He further submits there is a conflict of opinion in the Madras High
Court on the interpretation of this sub-clause (c) of Section 10(3). A. H
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A Mohammed Jaffar Saheb v. A. Palaniappa Chettiar, (1964) MLJ 112 refers
and relies on the earlier decision of the same court Veerappa Naidu v. ~
Gopalan, (1961) MLJ 223 to hold :

"There is no warrant to deprive the words in section 7(3)(c) of
the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control), Act 1949 (corre-
B sponding to section 10(3)(c) of Act (XVIII) of 1960) of theirordinary
and natural meaning by engrafting upon them the artificial definition
of the word 'building' in section 2(1) of the Act. The definition itself
is restricted in its operation only when there is nothing repugnant in
the subject or context. A part of a building means physically and
c structurally a limb or portion of a building and it will not cease to be
so because of the definition of the word 'building' ......... The word
"part of a building" in section 7(3) (c) of the Act should receive their
ordinary meaning without in any way being influenced by the
definition of the word "building" in section 2. We would also like to
point out that the definition in section 2 itself is hedged in by the
D following words "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or
context."

This decision considered the dissenting decision of Justice Mack in A.
Arunachala Naicker v. V. Gopal Stores, (1955) 2 MLJ 206, which is said to
be the conflicting judgment. The dissenting note of Justice Mack which is
E
considered in this case is quoted hereunder :

"The position is not free from difficulty in view of the statute
defming a building as also part of a building. It is in the light of this,
that section 7(3)(c) has to be applied to the present case. As I see it,
F the position is in no way different to that of a landlord doing business
in one building purchasing a building next to his and seeking to eject
from it a long-standing tenant doing business there for twenty-five
years. To such a case section 7(3)(c) would in my opinion not apply. 1
Nor will it apply to the present case merely by reason of the fact that
the portions of this building in which petitioner and respondent did
G business separately are comprised in one structural building the whole
of which was purchased by the respondent".

Disagreeing with the view of Justice Mack the Court held :

"In substance, the view of the learned Judge is that what is
H physically a part of the building would become artificially a separate
B. KANDASAMY REDDIAR v. 0. GOMATHI AMMAL [MISRA. J.] 843
building because of the operation of the special definition of "build- A
ing" in the Act. We must observe, speaking with respect, that the logic
and reasoning of the learned Judge do not appear to be sound."

In fact in another decision in Ganapathi Pandian v. Sheik Muhammad
and Brothers, (1957) 74 Law Weekly 45, Madras High Court was confronted
with the same dissenting judgment of Justice Mack, which again was dis- B
sented by the Court. This decision was also considering the word 'building'
as used under Section '.7(iii)(c) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act, 1949 (coiresponding to Section I0(3)(c) of the aforesaid Act)
with reference to the definition clause of section 2 in which it is held :

"He (counsel for the respondent) said that the ruling in question
c
would not apply to this case, ·and that the definition of a 'building as
including a portion of building' in section 2, will not prevent 'the
building' in section 7(iii)(c) being construed in a different way. There
is no doubt whatever in my mind that he is right ......... It is clear,
therefore, to me that the word 'building' which is defined in section D
2 as meaning 'any building or portion e>f a building let or to be let
separately' cannot have the san1e 111eaning as the word, 'building' in
section 7(iii)(c) where the phrase 'who is occupying only a portion
of a building' will have a wider connotation. It is absurd to say that
'building' should always mean 'a portion of a building'." E
Tilis decision also considered the judgment of Mack, J. in Arunachala
Naicker, (supra) and dissented through the following words:

"With great respect to the learned Judge, Mack, J. I am unable
to agree with the latter proposition. A part of a building in occupation F
of the landlord will not be building as defined by the Act, though the
part in the occupation of the tenant will be one. Section 2(1) which
defined building creates a fiction in regard to certain cases, whereby
a part of a building is deemed to be a building. A part of building
to which that fiction would not apply obviously constitutes a building
under the Act but would still be called a part of the building. Section G
2(1) states that 'building' means any building or hut or part of a
building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-
residential purposes, etc. Therefore, a part of a building will be
deemed td be building for the purpose of the Act only if it is let or
intended to be let. A portion in the occupation of the landlord cannot H
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.

A be said either to be let or intended to be let. Therefore, that portion
will not constitute a building under the Act, and could only be termed >'
a part of the building."

Finally, the Madras High Court held in A. Mohammed Jaffar Saheb
(Supra) that there is no warrant to deprive the word in Section 7(iii)(c) of
B the 1949 Act of its ordinary and natural meaning by engrafting the artificial
definition of the word 'building' in Section 2. It further held, the definition
itself is restricted in its operation only when there is nothing repugnant in
the subject or context. It held, it cannot be assumed that part of the building
which means physically or structurally a limb or portion ceases to possess
c that character because of the definition and finally it followed the decision
in Veerapa Naidu (Supra) and disagreed with the decision of the Mack J. in
Aruriaclzala Naicker (Supra). This principle as deduced by the Madras High
Court is reasonable view which we approve .

In addition we find, 'building' as defmed in sub-section (2) of Section
D 2 is an inclu.sive definition. This Fictional defmition is for a purpose that
'building' as commonly understood in a general sense may not be construed
in all situations as one composite whole. There may be a situation that a 'tenant'
may occupy a part of as building, so for the purposes of the Act by virtue of
the defmition clause this may be construed as building. Under Section 2(2),
E 'building' is defmed as building, or hut or part of a building or hut and
includes, gardens, grounds and outhouses etc. The defmition of building does
not give a go-by to the whole structure of building as 'building' as generally
understood, as it opens with the definition of 'building' to mean 'any building'.
In other words both 'building' and part of building' independently is to be
construed as 'building' within this defmition clause. This statutory defmition
F
fictionally includes various structures, huts, including part of a building, which
otherwise could not be a building to be 'building', to be applied as such in
the various statutory provisions of the Act for subserving the objects of the
Act. When building takes various forms it has to be used differently in different
provisions of this statutes. How only one form of defmition viz., 'part of a
G .building' to be carried and used restrictively in sub clause (c) of Section 10(3).
The 'tenant' is also defined under sub-section 8 of section 2 to mean, 'tenant
means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a 'build-
ing' and includes surviving spouse, or any son or daughter, or the legal rep-
}--
resentative of a deceased tenant ..... If this artificial defmition was not given
H to the word 'building' then rent payable for a building as referred in the
B. KANDASAMY REDDIAR v. 0. GOMATHI AMMAL [MISRA. J.] 845
definition of. tenant could only be for the whole building and not part of the A
building. Here 'building' as referred would include 'part of a building'. So
tenancy could be of part of a building. In fact, various provisions of the Act
would stand testimony and legitimacy of this wider definition clause of
the word 'building'. When definition clause itself gives artificial meaning
of 'building' to be not one but more than one, then how only one form
B
of definition clause, viz., 'part of a building' be said to be understood for
a 'building' in every provision of this statute wherever the word building is
used.

It may be examined from another angle, when Section 10(3)(c) refers
to the landlord occupying a part of the building it inherently refers to another C
part of the building being occupied by the tenant. It is true that part of the
building occupied both by the tenant and the landlord would by itself
constitute to be a 'building' under the definition clause. This itself reveals,
which is under current that there is another part of the building or may be
more than one part of the building either with tenants or landlord. If part of
the building occupied by the tenant is coQstrued to be a building then landlord D
could never be in a position to occupy other part of the building. Such
interpretation forgets that definition clause itself is flexible to make a 'build-
i~g· to be a 'building' and a part of building to be a building also to be used
accordingly where ever necessary. If interpretation sought to be given on
.y behalf of the appellant is accepted, this would completely dismantle the E
purpose engrafting of opening word of Section 10(3)(c), namely, 'the landlord
who is occupying only part of the building'. According to Stroud' s Judicial
Dictionary the 'building' has been defined as :

"Building: What is a "building" must always be a question of
degree and circumstances: its "ordinary and usual meaning is, a block F
of brick or stone work, covered in by a roof (per Esher M.R. Moir
v. Williams, [1892] l Q.B. 264. The ordinary and natural meaning of
the word "building" includes the fabric and the ground on which it
stands (Victoria City v. Bishop of Vancouver Island, (1921) A.C. 384,
at p.390." G
Similarly, P. Ramanatha Aiyar in Law Laxicon defines 'building' as :

"Building : What is a "building" must always be a question, of
degree, and circumstances : its "ordinary and usual meaning is, a
block of brick or stone work, covered in by a roof (per Esher M.R.
Moir v. Williams, [1892] 1 Q.B. 264)". H
846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A Under Section !0(3)(c) when it refers, landlord occupying a part of the
building, it refers to the 'building' as understood commonly and also as
defined. When it refers to part of building it reveals there is some other part
of which is in the possession of tenant may be one or more than one. The
very word 'part of the building' in the definition clause admits to the meaning
of the word 'building to be understood as in the general sense. When it refers
B
to 'building' also in the definition clause to be a building it refers to 'building'
as understood commonly. Unless it is, how can part of a building could be
conceived. Part means out of whole. The artificial definition as we have said
is for a purpose. Thus we have no hesitation to reject this submission made
on behalf of the appellant that the landlady cannot be said to occupy another
c part of the building as part occupied by the tenant is itself a building. So we
answer the aforesaid third question by holding that the word 'building' used
in sub clause (c) of Section 10(3) is building as commonly understood and
cannot be restricted to the limited definition of 'part of a building' as defined
under· Section 2(2) of the Act.
D Finally in Civil Appeal No. 2399/2001 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.
12100 of 2000), Mr. V. Prabhakar, learned counsel referred to P. Annakili
Ammal and Another v. H.C. Hussain and Hassan and Another, (1984) I MLJ
340 that requirement of additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c)
cannot be merely for desire and it would not cover cases where it is for
E augmenting the income. This submission is misconceived. On the facts and
circumstances of this case, it has been found that additional need of the
landlady is bonafide. There is nothing on record to construe that requirement
is merely out of desire. Neither this nor the other submission, viz., augment-
ing income was made nor there is anything on record to show both in law
and on fact, about the non-applicability of section !0(3)(c) on this count.
F
Finally, the submission is with reference to the proviso to sub-clause (e) to
Section 10(3) about the hardship of the tenants. On the facts and circum-
stances of this case it has been found that advantage of the landlady out
weighs the hardship of the tenants. This finding does not require any
inference.
G
For the aforesaid reasons, we find there is no merit in the aforesaid
appeals and the same are, accordingly, dismissed. Costs on the parties.

V.M. Appeals dismissed.