Holding

A claim for legal fees based on a percentage of the subject matter of litigation cannot be the basis of a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act; such a claim is contrary to public policy and amounts to professional misconduct.

Summary

The appellant, B. Sunitha, issued a cheque to the respondent advocate for legal fees, which the advocate later claimed were 16% of the compensation awarded by a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. The cheque was dishonoured and the advocate filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The appellant contended that the fee arrangement, based on a percentage of the decretal amount, was void under Section 23 of the Contract Act, violated Advocates' Fee Rules and public policy, and therefore no enforceable debt existed. The High Court rejected the petition and upheld the criminal complaint. The Supreme Court held that a fee claim calculated as a percentage of litigation outcome cannot constitute a debt for purposes of Section 138, that the burden of proving a valid fee contract lies on the advocate, and that such a claim amounts to professional misconduct and abuse of process. Consequently, the proceedings against the appellant were quashed, while the issue of professional misconduct was left to the appropriate disciplinary forum.

Issues considered

Whether a fee claim based on a percentage of the decretal amount creates a legally enforceable debt for the purposes of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Whether the burden of proving the existence and terms of a fee contract lies on the advocate when the client disputes the fee.
Whether such percentage‑based fee arrangements violate professional ethics, public policy and Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.
Whether the criminal complaint under Section 138 constitutes an abuse of the process of law.

Legislation cited

Indian Contract Act, 1872s. 23
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881s. 138, s. 139

Subjects

Negotiable Instruments ActSection 138Legal feesPercentage feeProfessional misconductAdvocates' ethicsPublic policyContract lawAbuse of processAccess to justice

Judgment

(2017] 14 S.C.R. 456

A B. SUNITHA
v.
THE STATE OF TELENGANA & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2068 of 2017)
B DECEMBER 05, 2017.
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL AND UDAY UMESH LALIT, JJ.]
Negotiable Instruments Act. 1881 - s.138 - Dishonour of
cheque alleged to be issued by the client to the advocate as
C percentage of decretal amount fixed as his fee - Complaint filed
under s.138 - Held: Claim based on percentage of su~ject matter
in litigation cannot be the basis of a complaint under s.138 ~(the
Act - Such claim is against the public policy and amounts to an act
of professional misconduct - Criminal proceedings initiated by the
advocate is abuse of process of law and is liable to be quashed.
D
Legal pr~fession - Violation of professional ethics - Need
for legislation - Discussed.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Mere issuance of cheque by the client may not
E debar him from contesting the liability. If liability is disputed, the
advocate has to independently prove the contract. Claim based
on percentage of subject matter in litigation cannot be the basis
of a complaint under Section 138 of the Act. In view of that, the
claim of the respondent advocate being against public policy and
being an act of professional misconduct, proceedings in the
F complaint filed by him have to be held to be abuse of the process
of law and have to be quashed. While proceedings against the
appellant will stand quashed, the issue of professional misconduct
is left to be dealt with at the appropriate forum. [Paras 18, 19,
21] (465-B-C, E)
G 2. Undoubtedly, the legal profession is the major component
of the justice delivery system and has a significant role to play in
upholding the rule of law. Significance of the profession is on
account of its role in providing access to justice and assisting the
citizens in securing their fundamental and other rights. In its 131''
H Report dated 31'' August, 1988, the Law Commission of India,
456
B. SUNITHA v. STATE OF TELENGANA 457

examined the role of the legal profession in strengthening the A
system of administration of justice. It was observed that recurring
strikes by the bar had contributed to the piling up of arrears
jeopardizing the consumers of justice and has thus led to
weakening the system of administration of justice. While
considering the mounting cost of litigation, it was observed that B
fee charged by some senior advocates are astronomical in
character. The corporate sector is willing to retain talent at a
high cost. It develops into a culture and it permeates down
below. Role of the legal profession in strengthening the
.administration of justice must be in consonance with the mandate
of Article 39A to ensure equal opportunity for access to justice. c
The legal profession must make its services available to the needy
by developing its public sector. It was observed that like public
. hospitals for medical services, the public sector should have a
role in providing legal services for those who cannot afford fee.
Maintenance of irreducible minimum standards of the profession D
is a must for ensuring accountability of the legal profession. The
methodology was required to be devised as a part of social audit
of the profession wherein consumers of justice were required to
• be given role. Referring to the lawyers' fee as barrier to access
to justice, it was observed that it was the duty of the Parliament
to prescribe fee for services rendered by members of the legal E
'. profession. First step should be taken to prescribe floor and
ceiling in fees. With regard to the role of the legal profession for
: strengthening the administration of justice; it was observed that
members of the legal profession could have a decisive say in law
making being largest group in legislative bodies. [Paras 23-
27)[465-G; 466-C, G; 467~A-G]
F

3. Though the 131" Report was submitted in the year 1988,
no effective law appears to have been enacted to regularize the
fee or for providing the public sector services to utmost needy
litigants without any fee or at standardized fee. Mechanism to
· deal with violation of professional ethics also does not appear to G
.· • have been strengthened. Success of administration of justice to
· a great extent depends on successful regulation of legal
~ profession in the light of mandate under Article 39A for access to
justice. Mandate for the Bench and the bar is to provide speedy
· and inexpensive justice to the victim of justice and to protect H
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 14 S.C.R.

A their rights.· The legal system must continue to serve the victims
of in.justice. In view of this mandate, this Court requested the
Law Commission to have a re-look at the regulatory mechanism
and expressed the hope that the Government of India will
consider the recommendation of the Law Commission. In its
B 266'h Report dated 23rd March, 2017 submitted in the light of
decision of this Court in Mahipal Singh Rana case it was noted
that conduct of members of the legal profession who do not follow
ethics contributes to the pendency of cases. Element of public
service has to remain predominant. The Commission noted that
there was a huge loss of working days by call of unjustified strikes
C in jurisdiction of various High Courts resulting in denial of justice
to the litigant in public. Such dilatory tactics including seeking
adjournments on unjustified grounds affect the speedy disposal
of cases. The Commission also noted the instances of
browbeating the courts for getting favourable orders obstructing
D administration of justice. The Law Commission also noted the
contemptuous conduct of some members of the legal profession.
The Law Commission thereafter considered the issue of review
of regulatory framework of the legal profession. Referring to the
developments in other countries it was observed that there was
dire necessity of reviewing regulatory mechanism not only in the
E matter of discipline and misconduct but also in other areas. It
was suggested that constitution of the Bar Council required a
change for which an Amendment Bill was also recommended. The
concerned authorities in the Government arc expected to take
cognizance of the issue of introducing requisite legislative changes
F for an effective regulatory mechanism to check violation of
professional ethics and also to ensure access to legal services
which is major component of access to justice mandated under
Article 39A of the Constitution. [Paras 28-31)(467-F; 468-A-G;
469-A-B]
VC Rangadurai v. D. Gopalan (1979) 1 SCC 308 :
G (2009} 11 SCR 1054; Tahil Ram Jssardas Sadarangani
v. Ramchand Jssardas Sadarangani (1993} Suppl. 3
sec 256 - relied on
M1: G, a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court 11955]
1 SCR 490; R.D. Saxena v. Bairam Prasad Sharma
H
B. SUNITHA v. STATE OF TELENGANA 459

"", - - (2000) 7 sec 264 : 120001 2 Suppl. scR 598; J.S. A
Vasu vs. State of Punjab (1994) 1 SCC 184 : (1993) 3
Suppl. SCR 486; C. Manohar vs. B.R. Poornima (2004)
Crl.L.J 443; Re: KL Gauba AIR 1954 Born 478; A
Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court [1955) 1 SCR
490; O.P. Sharma v. State of Punjab (2011) 6 SCC 86:
B
[2011) 6 SCR 301; R.D. Saxena v. Bahram Prasad
Sharma (2000) 7 SCC 264 : (2000] 2 Suppl. SCR 598;
Mahipal Singh Rana Advocate v. State of Uttar Pradesh
(2016) 8 sec 335 - referred to
Case Law Reference
c
(1955) 1 SCR 490 referred to Para 10
(2000) 2 Suppl. SCR 598 referred to Para 10
(1979) 1 SCR 1054 relied on Para 10
(1993) 3 Suppl. SCR 486 referred to Para 12 D
(2004) Crl.L.J 443 referred to Para 13
AIR 1954 Born 478 referred to Para 14
[1955) 1 SCR 490 referred to Para 15
(1993) Suppl. 3 sec 256 relied on Para 23 E
[2011] 6 SCR 301 referred to Para 23
[2000] 2 Suppl. SCR 598 referred to Para 23
(2016) 8 sec 335 referred to Para 28
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. F
2068of2017.
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.10.2015 of the High Court
of Jud.icature at Hyderabad for the State ofTelangana and the State of
Andhra Pradesh in Criminal Petition No. 3526 of2015.
G
K. Parameshwar, G. Seshagiri, Advs. for the Appellant.
Rakesh Kumar Khanna, Sr. Adv., S. Udaya Kumar Sagar,
Mrityunjai Singh, Azim H. Laskar, Sachin Das, Aditya Archiya,
Ms. Mahima Rathi, Mohit Nayar, C. S. N. Mohan Rao, Advs. for the
Respondents.
H_
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 14 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J. 1. This appeal has been
preferred against the order dated 14'h October, 2015 of the High Court
of Judicature at Hyderabad in CRLP No.3526 of 2015, thereby, the
High Court declined to quash the proceedings initiated against the
B appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 188 l('the
Act').
2. The proceedings were initiated by the respondent who is an
advocate in whose favour the appellant executed a cheque allegedly
towards his fee. The same was dishonoured. The stand of the appellant
c is that Section 138 of the Act is not attracted as there was no legally
enforceable debt. The appellant having already paid a sum of Rs. IO
lakhs towards fee, the cheque was taken from the appellant by way of
abuse of position and the transaction was void under Section 23 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872 ('Contract Act'). Claim for fee based on
percentage of the decretal amount was unethical. It was submitted that
D the appellant, as a client, being in fiduciary relationship, burden to prove
that the fee was reasonable and had been voluntarily agreed to be paid
was on the Advocate. The Advocate by using his professional position
could not be allowed to exploit a client by taking signatures on a cheque
and no presumption of enforceable debt arises, specially when no account
E maintained in regular course of business was furnished.
3. Reference may be briefly made to the facts on record. The
appellant's husband died in a motor accident on 30'h July, 1998. She
along with her children and parents of the deceased filed a claim before
the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) through the respondent as
F an advocate. The MACT awarded compensation. The appellant paid a
sum of Rs. I 0 lakhs towards fee on various dates. However, the
respondent forced the appellant to sign another cheque of Rs.3 lakh on
25th October, 2014 despite her stating that she was unable to pay more
fee as she had no funds in her account. The respondent sent e-mail
dated 211d November, 2014 claiming his fee to be 16% of the amount
G received by the appellant.
4. Complaint dated 11th December, 2014 was filed before the
Court under Section 138 of the Act stating inter alia that the cheque
which was issued in discharge ofliability having been returned unpaid
for want of funds, the appellant committed the offence for which she
H
B. SUNITHA v. STATE OF TELENGANA 461
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

was liable to be punished. The appellant was summoned by the Court A
against which she approached the High Court stating that there was no
legally enforceable debt as fee claimed was exorbitant and against law.
The claim was in violation of Advocates Fee Rules and Ethics as fee
could not be demanded on percentage of amount awarded as
compensation to the appellant. Her signatures were taken when she B
was under distress.
5. The petition was contested by the respondent by submitting
that the appellant having agreed to pay the professional fee and having
availed his professional services, she could not contest the claim for fee.
It was submitted that the respondent had engaged services of other
senior advocates and paid huge amount for their services at various C
courts including the Supreme Court.
6. The appellant, in support of her prayer for quashing, inter alia,
argued before the High Court that the fee claimed by the respondent
was against the A.P. Adovcates' Fee Rules, 2010 of Subordinate Courts.
It was also submitted that the.claim of the respondent was against ethics D
and public policy and hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act.
7. The High Court held that Advocates' Fee Rules are only for
guidance and there was no bar to fee being claimed beyond what is
fixed under the Rules. The claim of the respondent was that the amount
.included his fee for engaging an advocate in the High Court and the E
Supreme Court. Thus, the High Court dismissed the quashing petition.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
9. The main contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that F
charging percentage of decretal amount by an advocate is hit by Section
23 of the Contract Act being against professional ethics and public policy,
the cheque issued by the appellant could not be treated as being in
discharge of any liability by the appellant. No presumption arose in
favour of the respondent that the cheque represented legally enforceable
debt. In any case, such presumption stood rebutted by settled law that G
claim towardsAdvocate's fee based on percentage ofresult oflitigation
was illegal. Signing of the cheque was by way of exploitation of fiduciary
r~lationship of Advocate and the client.
I·

H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 14 S.C.R.

A 10. In support of his submission that charging of exorbitant fee
and calculating the sum with reference to the result of the litigation was
against public policy, reliance has been placed on judgments of this Court
in In the matter ofMr. G, a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court1,
R.D. Saxena versus Bairam Prasad Sharma 1, V.C. Rangadurai
versus D. Gopalan3
B
11. Learned counsel for Respondent No.2-complainant supports
the impugned order. He submitted that the cheque of the appellant having
dishonored, statutory presumption was available in his favour and no
ground was made out for quashing. There was no legal bar to the claim
of the complainant towards his professional fees. Learned counsel for
C the complainant did not dispute that a sum of Rs. IO lakhs has already
been received towards fee. There was no written agreement about the
quantum of fee nor any account was maintained. He also did not dispute
the e-mail dated 2"dNovember, 2014 wherein basis of the claimoffee is
16% of the decretal amount received by th~ appellant.
D 12. The first question which needs consideration is whether fee
can be determined with reference to percentage of the decretal amount.
Second question is whether the determination of fee can be unilateral 4
and if the client disputes the quantum of fee whether the burden to
prove the contract of fee will be on the advocate or the client. Third
E question is whether the professional ethics require regulation ofexploitation
in the matter of fee.
13. One of the issues was dealt with by a single Bench Judgment
of the Madras High Court in C. Manohar versus B.R. Poornima 5• R.
Banumathi, J (as her Lordship then was) held that no presumption could
F arise merely by issuance of a cheque that amount stipulated in the cheque
was payable towards fee. In absence of independent proof, issuance of
cheque could not furnish cause of action under Section 13 8 of the Act in
the context of an advocate or client. The observations relevant in the
context are as follows :
G "The case in hand is an example of the present day trend of
the legal profession. Legal profession is essentially service
1 (1955) I SCR 490 at 494
2
(2000) 7 sec 264, para 41
·' ( 1979) 1 sec 308
'J.S. Vasu versus State of Punjab (1994) 1 SCC 184, para 20
H '(2004) Crl.L.J 443
B. SUNITHA v. STATE OF TELENGANA 463
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

oriental. Ancestor of todays lawyers was no more than a A
spokesperson. who rendered his services to the needy
members of the society, by putting forth their case before the
authorities. Their services were rendered without regard to
remuneration received or to be received. With the growth of
litigation. legal profession became a full time occupation. The B
trend of the legal profession has changed ... profession has
almost became a trade. There is no more service orientation.
12. The relationship between the lawyer and the client is one
of trust and confidence. The client engages a lawyer for
personal reasons and is at liberty to leave him for the same
reasons. Considering the relationship between the lawyer and C
the client and the present day trend in the profession. it has to
be carefully seen whether the complainant has proved that
the amount due of Rs. 43.600/- is being payable towards him.
13. To attract the penal provisions under Section 138 N. I.
Act. a cheque must have been drawn by the accused on an D
account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any
amount of money to another person from out of that account
for the discharge in whole or in part. of any debt or other
liability due. That means. the cheque must have been issued
in discharge of debt or other liability wholly or in part. The E
cheque given for any other reasons not for the satisfaction
of any debt or other liability. even if it is returned unpaid-,
will not meet with penal consequences.
14. Case of the complainant is that on behalf of the accused,
he has filed claim petitions in M C. 0. P Nos. 2339 of 1?92 F
and 246 of 1993. Two civil cases were also filed. There is
nothing to show that the complainant/Advocate himself has
paid the stamp duty and bore the legal fees. The complainant
has not produced any agreement showing as to what was the
arrangement between him and the accused. as to how much
is the fee payable and whether the accused agreed for G
payment of stamp duty by her counsel itself. Jn the absence
ofany agreement. Ex. P-1 cheque cannot be said to have
been issued for the purpose of discharge of any substantial
debt or liability. Urging the Court to raise the presumption
tinder Section 139 N. I. Act, the learned counsel for the H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 14 S.C.R.

A appellant has relied upon Mis. Modi Cements Ltd. versus
Kuchil Kumar Nandi [(1998) 3 SCC 249} wherein the Supreme
Court has held that once the cheque is issued by the drawer
a presumption under Section 139 N. I. Act must follow and
merely because the drawer issues a notice to the drawee
(Payee) or to the Bank for stoppage of the payment it will not
B
preclude an action under Section 138 of the Act by the drawee
(Payee) or the holder of a cheque in due course. Of course,
under Section 139 N. I. Act, there is a presumption that unless
the contrary is proved the holder of the cheque received the
cheque for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or
c other liability. But even in Section 139 N. I. Act, the legal
presumption is created only for the cheque so received for
the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability.
In the case on hand, the complainant being a practising
advocate, has not proved the debt amount payable towards
him by the accused, who has engaged him as his lawyer to
D
conduct the case. The finding of the trial Court that there is
no debt or legally enforceable liability' does not suffer from
any infirmity warranting interference. "
14. The Bombay High Court in Re: KL Gauba6 held that fees
conditional on the success of a case and which gives the lawyer an
E interest in the subject matter tends to undermine the status of the
profession. The same has always been condemned as unworthy of the
legal profession. If an advocate has interest in success of litigation, he
may tend to depart from ethics.
15. Jn ill the matter ofMr. G: A Senior Advocate ofthe Supreme
F Court7, this Court held that the claim of an advocate based on a share in
the subject matter is a professional misconduct.
16. In VC Rangadurai versus D. Gopalan 8, it was observed
that relation between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary in nature.
The advocate is in the position of trust.
G
17. Rule 20 of Part VI, Chapter II, Section II of the Standard of
Professional Conduct and Etiquette reads as follows :
'AIR 1954 Born 478
7
(1955) I SCR 490
' (1979) 1 sec 308, para 31
H
B. SUNITHA v. STATE OF TELENGANA 465
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

"An advocate shalt not stipulate for a fee contingent on the results A
of litigation or agree to share the proceeds thereof."
18. Thus, mere issuance of cheque by the client may not debar
him from contesting the liability. Ifliability is disputed, the advocate has
to independently prove the contract. Claim based on percentage of
subject matter in litigation cannot be the basis ofa complaint under Section B
138 of the Act.
19. fu view of the above, the claim of the respondent advocate
being against public policy and being an act of professional misconduct,
proceedings in the complaint filed by him have to be held to be abuse of
the process of law and have to be quashed
c
20. We may note tha.t after the hearing was concluded, learned
counsel for Respondent No.2 mentioned the matter to the effect that
Respondent No.2 wanted to withdraw the complaint. An e-mail to this
effect was also handed over to Court. The same has been kept on the
record. However, we did not permit this prayer. Having committed a
serious professional misconduct, the respondent No.2 could not be D
allowed to avoid the adverse consequences which he may suffer for his
professional misconduct. The issue of professional misconduct may be
dealt with at appropriate forum.
21. Thus, while proceedings against the appellant will stand
quashed, the issue of professional misconduct is left to be dealt with at E
the appropriate forum.
22. However, apart from the present individual case, the general
issue, having been highlighted, may need further consideration by this
'Court in the larger interest of the legal profession and the system of
administration ofjustice. F
23. Undoubtedly, the legal profession is the major component of
the justice delivery system and has a significant role to play in upholding
the ruJe oflaw. Significance of the profession is on account of its role in
providing access to justice and assisting the citizens in securing their
fundamental and other rights. Can justice be secured with the legal G
professionals failing to uphold the professional ethics? This Court has
even earlier expressed the concern on the falling professional norms in
the legal profession9 • In Tahil Ram lssardas Sadarangani versus
'R.K. Anand v. Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC 106, para 333 ; Sanjiv Datta, Deputy
Secretary, Ministry ofinfom1ation and Broadcasting, In Re. ( 1995) 3 SCC 619, para
m H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 14 S.C.R.

A Ramchand Issardas Sadarangani1° , this Court noted the trend of
increasing element of commercialization and decreasing element of
service. In VC Rangadurai (supra) 11, this Court observed that
confidence of the public in the legal profession was integral to the
confidence of the public in the legal system. Commercialization to the
B extent of exploiting the litigant and misbehavior to the extent of
browbeating the Court, breach of professional duties to the court and
the litigant on the part of some members of the legal profession, affecting
the right of the litigants to speedy and inexpensive justice, need to be
checked. This has also been observed earlier in the decisions of this
Court 12 •
c 24. In its 131" Report dated 31" August, 1988, the Law
Commission of India, examined the role of the legal profession in
strengthening the system of administration of justice. The issue
considered included :
(i) the state of profession and its public image;
D
(ii) profession's attitude towards the policy of social change
intended under the Constitution;
(iii) the functioning of the Bar Councils and the question of
disciplinary jurisdiction;
E (iv) the strike by lawyers, its implications and fall out;
(v) the question ofhobnobing between the Bar and politicians,
between the Bar and the Judiciary;
(vi) regulation and standardization of fees chargeable by the
members of the profession in relation to the monopolistic
F character of the profession."
25. It was observed that recurring strikes by the bar had contributed
to the piling up of arrears jeopardizing the consumers ofjustice and has
thus led to weakening the system of administration of justice 13 • While
considering the mounting cost of litigation, it was observed that fee
G charged by some senior advocates arc astronomical in character. The
10
1993 Supp. (3) sec 256,
11
Paras 30 to 32
12
0.P. Sharn1a versus State of Punjab (2011) 6 SCC 86, paras 18 to 23; R.D. Saxena
versus Bairam Prasad Sharma (2000) 7 SCC 264, para~ 14,28,41,42
'-'Para 2.17
H
B. SUNITHA v. STATE OF TELENGANA 467
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

corporate sector is willing to retain talent at a high cost. It develops into A
a culture and it penneates down below 14 • Role of the legal profession in
strengthening the administration of justice must be in consonance with
the mandate of Article 39A to ensure equal opportunity for access to
justice. The legal profession must make its services available to the
needy by developing its public sector. It was observed that like public
B
hospitals for medical services, the public sector should have a role in
providing legal services for those who cannot afford fee 15 • Maintenance
of irreducible minimum standards of the profession is a must for ensuring
accountability of the legal profession 16 • The methodology was required
to be devised as a part of social audit of the profession wherein consumers
of justice were required to be given role 17 • c
26. Referring to the lawyers' fee as barrier to access to justice, it
was observed that it was the duty of the Parliament'to prescribe fee for
services rendered by members of the legal profession. First step should
be taken to prescribe floor and ceiling in fees 18 •
27. With regard to the role of the legal profession for strengthening D
the administration of justice, it was observed that members of the legal
profession could have a decisive say in law making being largest group
in legislative bodies 19 • They could contribute to reduce the litigation instead
of perpetuating disputes by counseling the parties and could contribute
to reduce the delay in proceedings 20 • Alternative mode~ ofresolution of E
disputes should be explored and one such may be pre-trial conciliation
proceedings21 • Reducing the number of witnesses to be examined by
deleting the irrelevant witnesses reducing the length of cross-examination
by avoiding unnecessary questions22 and avoiding adjournments could
help the administration ofjustice.
F
28. Though the 131" Report was submitted in the year 1988, no
effective law appears to have enacted to regularize the fee or for
providing the public sector services to utmost needy litigants without any
" Paras 2.22, 2.24
1.< Para 3.30
11
' Paras 3.4, 3.8, 3.25
G
17
Para 3.31
'"Para 3.28
"Para 3.6
"-Para 3.11, 3.13
21
Para 3.21
'-'Para 3.17
H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 14 S.C.R.

A fee or at standardized fee. Mechanism to deal with violation of
professional ethics also does not appear to have been strengthened.
Success of administration of justice to a great extent depends on
successful regulation of legal profession in the light of mandate under
Article 39A for access to justice. Deficiency in the working of the present
B regulatory mechanism has been acknowledged by this Court in several
decisions23 • Mandate for the Bench and the bar is to provide speedy
and inexpensive justice to the victim ofjustice and to protect their rights.
The legal system must continue to serve the victims of injustice.
29. In view of this mandate, this Court requested the Law
Commission to have a re-look at the regulatory mechanism and expressed
C the hope that the Government of India will consider the recommendation
of the Law Commission. In its 266 1h Report dated 23rd March, 2017
submitted in the light of decision of this Court in Mahipal Singh Rana
(supra), it was noted that conduct of members of the legal profession
who do not follow ethics contributes to the pendeney of cases. Element
D of public service has to remain predominant. The Commission noted
that there was a huge loss of working days by call of unjustified strikes
in jurisdiction of various High Courts resulting in denial ofjustice to the
litigant in public 24 • Such dilatory tactics including seeking adjournments
on unjustified grounds affect the speedy disposal of cases. The
Commission also noted the instances ofbrowbeating the courts for getting
E favourable orders obstructing administration of justice25 • The Law
Commission also noted the contemptuous conduct of some members of
the legal profession 26 •
30. The Law Commission thereafter considered the issue ofreview
of regulatory framework of the legal profession. Referring to the
F developments in other countries it was observed that there was dire
necessity of reviewing regulatory mechanism not only in the matter of
discipline and misconduct but also in other areas. It was suggested that
constitution of the Bar Council required a change for which an
Amendment Bill was also recommended27 •
G
2·1Mahipal Singh Rana Advocate versus State ofUttar Pradesh (2016) 8 SCC 335,
para 56
"Para 6.3
"Paras paras 8.7 to 8.12, 8.14 to 8.19
" Chapter IX
27
Para 17.10
H
B. SUNITHA v. STATE OF TELENGANA 469
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.] .

31. We hope that the concerned authorities in the Government A
will take cognizance of the issue of introducing requisite legislative changes
for an effective regulatory mechanism to check violation of professional
ethics and also to ensure access to legal services which is major
component of access to justice mandated under Article 39A of the
Constitution.
B
32. The appeal stands disposed ofaccordingly.

Devika Gujral Appeal disposed of.

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