Holding

Section 91 proceedings are not summary; a pucca tenant must first resort to Section 91 before filing a civil suit, and such filing arrests adverse possession, making the suit not barred by limitation, and Section 91 is not pari materia with Section 250 of the MP Land Revenue Code.

Summary

The appellants, pucca tenants, filed an application under Section 91 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 seeking reinstatement after being dispossessed, but the revenue authorities dismissed their claim. They subsequently filed a civil suit for declaration of title and possession, which the trial court upheld, holding the suit was within the limitation period. The respondents argued that the suit was barred by limitation and that Section 91 proceedings are summary, allowing a suit without first using the revenue remedy. The Supreme Court held that Section 91 proceedings are not summary, that a pucca tenant must first exhaust the remedy under Section 91 before approaching a civil court, and that filing an application under Section 91 arrests the running of adverse possession, rendering the suit timely. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court’s decision.

Issues considered

Whether proceedings under Section 91 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 are summary in nature akin to Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Whether a pucca tenant must first exhaust the remedy under Section 91 before filing a suit under Section 93 of the same Act.
Whether filing an application under Section 91 arrests the period of limitation for adverse possession, thereby affecting the limitation defence.
Whether Section 91 of the Madhya Bharat Act is pari materia with Section 250 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Land lawTenancyPucca tenantReinstatementSpecific Relief ActLimitationAdverse possessionPari materiaCivil suitRevenue law

Judgment

BABU KHAN AND ORS. A
v.
NAZIM KHAN (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS.

APRIL 16, 2001

[V.N. KHARE AND SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.] B

Land Laws:

Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950:

Section 91-Proceedings under-Nature of-Tenant-Reinstatement of- C
Civil suit-Maintainability of-Pucca tenant filed application before Revenue
authorities for his reinstatement as he was allegedly dispossessed-Application
dismissed-Thereafter, such pucca tenant filed suit before civil courtfor decla-
ration and possession-Held: Proceedings under S. 91 are not surnmary in
nature and akin to S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act-A pucca tenant who '""been
D
dispossessed is first required to take recourse under S. 91-Hence, suit filed in
civil court without resoning to remedy under S. 91 not maintainable-Specific -
Relief Act, 1963, S. 6.

Limitation Act, 1963 : Section 14, Anicle 65.

Jf!nant-Reinstate1nent of-Limitation-Pucca tenant filed ci.vil suit for E
declaration and po:;session after reso11ing to re1nedy available under relevant
Land & Tenancy Act-Adverse possession-An-esting of-Held: once a suit for
recovery of possession is filed adverse possession is arrested-Hence, such a
suit is not barred by limitalion.

Interpretation of Statutes :
F

Pari Materia provisions-lnterp1-etation of-Principles-Held: {f two
provisions of different statutes are pari materia, couns generdly follow the
decision on similar provision of the other statute to avoid contradiction-But
if the two statutes are not in pari materia the same principle does not hold good. G
The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-plaintiffs filed an appli-
cation under Section 91 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy
Act, 1950 for this reinstatement as pucca tenant as he was allegedly dispos-
sessed by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent-defendants. The
Tehsildar allowed the application. But the Sub-divisional Officer reversed H
1199
1200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A this decision. The Commissioner dismissed the second appeal filed by the ~
appellants. The revision petition filed before the Board of Revenue was
also dismissed. It was held by the Board of Revenue that the respondents
were already in possession of the land and they had planted trees and also
constructed two houses over the said land.

B Thereafter, the appellants brought a suit for declaration of title and
delivery of possession against the respondents. The respondents contended
that the suit brought by the appellants was barred by limitation. The trial
court held that the time spent in prosecuting the case in the revenue court
should be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 while
c computing the period of limitation for the suit and came to the conclusion
that the suit was filed within the period of limitation. Consequently, the
suit was decreed. The first appellate court affirmed the decree of·lhe trlal
curt. However, the High Court allowed the second appeal filed by· the
respondents. Hence this appeal.
D
On behalf of the appellants it was contended that the remedy of filing
the suit for recovery of possession of the land under Section 93 of the Act
was available to a pucca tenant only after exhausting the remedy provided
under Sections 91 and 92 of the Act and, therefore, the suit brought by the
appellants was not barred by limitation; and that once an application
E under Section 91 of the Act was filed by the appellant before the Tehsildar, i
the adverse possession ceased to continue thereafter. ...
On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the remedy
under Section 91 of the Act was summary in nature, akin to Section 6 of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963; that it was always open to the appellant
F
either to take recourse to the summary proceedings under Sections 91 and
92 of the Act or to file a regular title suit in the civil court and also claim
possession in the same suit and, therefore, the suit brought by the appellant
was barred by limitation; and that Section 91 was in pari materia to Section
250 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code and a Full Bench of the High Court
G while interpreting Section 250 of the Code had held that proceedings
under Section 250 of the Code was summary in nature and, therefore, in
view of the said decision the proceedings under Section 91 of the Act has to
be held as summary in nature.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
H
BABU KHAN v. NAZIM KHAN 1201
HELD : 1.1. The applicant under Section 91 of the Madhya Bharat A
Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 has to prove and establish that he is
a pucca tenant and that he has been dispossessed otherwise than in due
course of law. Thus, Section 91 of the Act requires the Court to go into the
title of the applicant who has applied for restoration of possession. In view
of the nature of enquiry, which is required to be made by the Court, the
B
proceedings under Section 91 of the Act cannot be termed as snmmary in
nature and akin to Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. [1206-G-H]

1.2. An analysis of Section 91 read "ith Section 93 shows that the
recourse to a civil court is not available to a pucca tenant who has been
dispossessed unless he exhausts the remedy under Section 91 of the Act. In c
this connection the use of the expression in Section 93 of the Act "that no
order passed under Sections 91 and 92 shall preclude any person from
establishing such rights" shows that a pucca tenant who has been dispos-
sessed and claims recovery of possession is first required to take recourse
to the remedy available under Section 91 of the Act. [1207-H; 1208-A-B]
D
1.3. The scheme envisaged under the Act which comprises of Sec-
tions 91, 92 and 93 of the \ct shows that where a pucca tenant who has
been dispossessed without due course oflaw and such a pucca tenant wants
restoration of possession, there is an implied exclusion of jurisdiction of the
civil court to grant relief to a pucca tenant. In such a situation, a pucca E
tenant who has been dispossessed is at first instance required to file an
application for restoration of his possession before the Tehsildar under
Section 91 of the Act. In view of the matter, it cannot he said that the
remedy available under Section 91 of the Act is discretionary and it is open
to a pncca tenant either to take recourse to Section 91 of the Act or file a F
snit under Section 93 of the Act. If such a suit is filed in a civil court at the
first instance without resorting to the remedy under Section 91 of the Act,
the same would not be maintainable. [1208-E-G]

2. Once a suit for recovery of possession against the defendant who is
in adverse possession is filed the period of limitation for perfecting title by G
adverse possession comes to a grinding halt. In the present case, as soon as
the predecessor-in-interest of the applicant filed an application under Se~
tion 91 of the Act for restoration of possession of the land against the
defendant in adverse possession, the defendant's adverse possession ceased
to continue thereafter in view of the legal position that such adverse H
1202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001i 2 s.c.R.
A possession does not continue to run after filing of the suit. Thereafter, the
suit brought by the appellant-plaintiff for recovery of possession of the
land was not barred by limitation. (1210-A-C]

Sultan Khan v. State oJM.P, (1991) MP LJ 81, Sultan Jehan Begum v.
Gui Mohd., AIR (1973) MP 72 and Ragho Prasad v. P.N. Agarwa~ (1969) All
B LJ 975, approved.

3. It is true that the courts while construing a provision of an enact-
ment often follow the decisions by the courts construing similar provision
of an enactment in pari materia. The object behind the application of the
said rule of construction is to avoid contradiction between the two statutes
c dealing with the same subject. But Sections 91, 92 and 93 of the Act are not
pari materia \vith the provision of Section 250 of the M.P. Land Revenue
Code. It is not a sound principle of construction to interpret a provision of
an enactment following the decision rendered on similar provision of an
enactment when two statutes are not in pari materia. [1207-D-F]
D
Nathu v. Dilbande Hussain, AIR (1967) MP 14 and Ramgopal v. Chettu
Batte, AIR (1976) MP 160, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 774 of 1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 19.7.96 of the Madhya Pradesh
E High Court in S.A. No. 49 of 1981.
j

U.N. Bachawat, S.B. Tripathi for Ashok K. Srivastava for the Appel-
!ants.

S.K. Gambhir, Awanish Sinha for R.K. Maheshwari for the Respond-
F ents.

The Judgment of the Comt was delivered by

V.N. KHARE, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of
Madhya Pradesh High Comt whereby the High Court has allowed the second
G appeal preferred by the defendants/respondents and dismissed the suit brought
by the appellants herein.

The faets of the case in brief are these:

On 14.5.1954, one Nathe Khan, predecessor-in-interest of the
H appellants herein, and one Shankar Rao, filed an application before the
r

BABU KHAN v. NAZIM KHAN [V.N. KHARE, J.] 1203
Tehsilda. under Section 91 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy A
Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for reinstatement of pucca tenant
Nathe Khan who was alleged to be dispossessed by Najim Khan, predecessor-
in-interest of respondents l(a) to l(k) in respect of agricultural land
measuring .135 hectare, situated at village Maksi, Dist!. Shajapur. The case
of Najim Khan was that the land in dispute was given to him on patta for
B
consideration of a premium of Rs. 100 and he, thereafter, planted trees and
constructed two houses over the said land. On 31.8.1960, the Tehsildar
allowed the application with a direction to late Najim Khan to restore back
possession of .the land to Shankar Rao instead of Nathe Khan. Feeling
aggrieved, late Najim Khan filed an appeal before the Sub-divisional Officer,
Shajapur. Nathe Khan also filed a cross-objection against the order of the C
Tehsildar directing delivery of possession to Shankar Rao. The Sub-divisional
Officer, on 20.3.1963, allowed the appeal of Najim Khan and dismissed the
cross objection filed by Nathe Khan. Nathe Khan and Shankar Rao thereafter
filed second appeal before the Commissioner, Bhopal, being Revenue Case
No. 357/63. The Commissioner by order dated 30.4.1963, dismissed the D
appeal and affirmed the order passed by the Sub-divisional Officer. The
revision petition filed before fue Board of Revenue, M.P. Gwalior by Shankar
Rao and Nathe Khan was also dismissed. It was held by the Board of Revenue
that Najirn Khan and Pan Mal were already in possession of the land since
1950 and they planted trees and also constructed two houses over the said
plot of land. On 9.2.1972, the appellant herein, brought a suit for declaration E
of title and delivery of possession against Najim Khan and Shankar Rao.
Defendant Najirn Khan filed a written statement wherein it was pleaded that
the suit brought by plaintiff was barred by limitation. The trial court framed
vmious issues and one of the issues framed was whether the suit laid by the
plaintiff was barred by limitation. The trial court was of the view that the F
time spent in prosecuting the case in the revenue court should be excluded
under Section 14 of the Limitation Act while computing the period of
limitation for the present suit. In vic!w of the matter, the trial court held that
the suit was filed within the period of limitation. Consequently, the suit was
decreed. The decree of the trial court was affirmed by the first appellate court.
However, the defendants/respondents' second appeal was allowed by the
G
High Court. The High Court was of the view that the benefit of Section 14(1)
of the Limitation Act can be availed by the plaintiff only if the court had
not entertained the plaintiffs earlier suit on the ground of defect of jurisdic-
tion or other cause of like nature. Since the earlier application of the plaintiff
was entertained and decided on merit, the benefit under Section 14( 1) of the H
1204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A Limitation Act was not available to the plaintiff. In view of the matter, the
suit stood dismissed. It is against the said judgment the plaintiffs/appellants
are in appeal before us.

On 30.9.1996, this Court while entertaining the Special Leave Petition
passed the following order:
B
"The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the
petitioner could not have filed civil suit without resorting to remedies
available before the revenue courts and the suit could not be filed
only when he fails before the revenue court under Sections 9 I and
92 of the Act and that being so the question of limitation ca1111ot be
c raised against the petitioner as according to him limitation will
commence only after the decision by the revenue court. The second
submission is that after resorting to the remedy under Sections 91
and 92 of the Act the limitation for adverse possession remains
asserted.
D
Issue notice. Mr. Gambhir accepts notice on behalf of legal heirs
of respondent No. I. Issue notice to respondent No. 2. Issue notice
on application for stay also."

E
Shri U.N. Bachawat, learned senior counsel raised two submissions.
The first submission is that the remedy of filing the suit for recovery of
-
possession of the land under Section 93 of the Act is available to a pakka
tenant only after exhausting remedy provided under Sections 91 and 92 of
the Act and, therefore, the suit brought by the plaintiff was not baned
by limitation. The second submission is that once an application
under Section 91 of the Act was filed by the plaintiff before the
F
Tehsildar, the adverse possession of the defendant ceased to continue
thereafter and in view of this legal position, the suit brought by the
plaintiff was not barred by limitatitm. Whereas. the contention of
Shri S.K. Gambhir, learned senior counsel, is that the remedy under
Section 91 of the Act is summary in nature, akin to Section 6 of Specific
G Reliefs Act and further, it is always open to the plaintiff either to take recourse
to the summary proceedings under Sections 91 and 92 of the Act or to file
a regular title suit in the civil court and also claim possession in the same
suit. In nut-shell, the argument is that the filing of the suit is not envisaged
only after the recourse had been taken under Sections 9 I and 92 of the Act
H and in view of the matter, the suit brought by the plaintiff was barred by
BABU KHAN v. NAZIM KHAN [V.N. KHARE, J.] 1205
limitation. A
On the arguments of leamed cormsel for the parties the questions that
arise for consideration are whether the proceedings rmder Section 91 of the
Act is summary in nature and, secondly, whether it was pennissible rmder law
to file a snit for recovery of possession without resorting to remedy available
under Section 91 of the Act. In order to appreciate the arguments of learned B
counsel appearing for the parties it is necessary to reproduce Sections 91, 92
and 93 of the Act which rrm as under :

"91. Re-instatement of pakka tenant improperly dispossessed - (!)
If a pakka tenant has been dispossessed of the whole or any part of
his holding otherwise than in due course of law, he or his successor
c
in interest may apply to the Tehsildar within three years from the date
of dispossession for the restoration of the possession.

(2) The Tehsildar shall, alier making an enquiry into the respective
claims of the parties, pass necessary orders in the matter and shall Dr
hand-over possession of the land to the party entitled to it.

(3) Before proceeding to make the full enquiry prescribed by the
foregoing sub-section, tlie Tehsildar may pass after such enqui1y as
he may deem proper, an interim order for handing-over the possession
of the land to the applicant if he finds that he was dispossessed by E
the opposite party within six months prior to the submission of the
application under this section. In such a case the opposite patty shall
be ejected, if necessary, rmder orders of the Tehsildar.

(4). When an interim order has been passed regarding possession of p
the land under the foregoing sub-secti0n, the opposite patty may be
required by the Tehsildar to execute a bond for such sum as the
Tehsildar may deem fit for abstaining from taking possession of the
land until the final order is passed by the Tehsildar.

(5) If the person executing a bond is formd to have entered into or G
taken possession of the land in contravention of the bond, the
Tehsildar may forfeit the bond in whole or in part and may recover
such amormt as arrears of land revenue.

(6) If the order passed rmder sub-section (2) is in favour of the
H
1206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.

A applicant, the Tehsildar shall also award a reasonable compensation
to be paid to the applicant by the opposite party.

(7) The compensation awarded under this section shall be recoverable
as arrears of land revenue.

B (8) When final order has been passed under sub- section (2), the
Tehsildar may require the opposite party to execute a bond for such
sum as the Tehsildar may deem fit for abstaining from taking
possession of !he land in contravention of !he order.

92. Reinstatement of ordinary tenant or sub tenant improperly dispos-
c sessed - If an ordinary tenant or a sub-tenant has been dispossessed
of the whole or any part of his holding otherwise than in due course
of law, he or his successor in interest may apply to the Tehsildar
within two years from the date of dispossession for the restoration of
!he possession. The Tehsildar shall after making necessary enquiry in
D accordance with the provisions of section 91, pass such orders as he
thinks fit.

93. Civil Court's jurisdiction in regard to sections 91 and 92 - No
order passed under sections 91 and 92 shall preclude any person from
establishing such rights as he may claim in the whole or any part of
E !he holding and from obtaining possession of such holding or part
thereof by means of a regular suit in a competent civil court."

A perusal of Section 91 of the Act shows that if a pakka tenant has been
dispossessed from !he land, otherwise than in accordance with law and if he
wants restoration of possession he is required to file an application before the
F Tehsildar within 3 years from the date of dispossession. The remedy for
restoration of possession is not available to anyone else except to a pakka
tenant who has been dispossessed otherwise than in accordance wilh law.
When such an application is moved by an applicant for restoration of his
possession, the first thing what the court is required to enquire into and find
G out is whelher !he applicant is a pakka tenant or not. The applicant under
Section 91 of !he Act has to prove and establish !hat he is a pakka tenant
and he has been dispossessed otherwise lhan in due course of law. Thus,
Section 91 of !he Act requires the Court to go into !he title of !he applicant
who has applied for restoration of possession. In view of nature of enquiry
which is required to be made by !he Court, !he proceedings under Section
H
BABU KHAN v. NAro.t KHAN [V.N. KHARE, J.] 1207
91 of the Act cannot be termed as summary in nature and akin to Section A
6 of the Specific Relief Act. Under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, a
person who has been dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law can
claim restoration of possession without proving his title to the land. He can
sncceed merely by establishing that he was in possession over the land and
has been dispossessed otherwise than in accordance with law. We do not,
B
therefore, find that proceedings Wider Section 91 of the Act is akin to Section
6 of the Specific Relief Act. Learned coW1sel appearing for the respondent
then pointed ont that Section 91 is in pari materia to Section 250 of M.P.
Land Revenue Code and a Full Bench of M.P. High Court while interpreting
Section 250 of the Code has held that proceedings Wider Section 250 of the
Code is summary in nature and, therefore, in view of the said decision the c
proceedings Wider Section 91 of the Act has to be held as summary in nature.
In the case of Nathu v. Dilbande Hussain, AIR (1967) M.P. p.14 which was
subsequently approved in the case of Ramgopal v. Chetu Batte, AIR (1976)
M.P. p.160, it was held by the Madhya Pradesh High Court that proceedings
Wider Section 250 of the Code are summary in nature and it is open to the
D
plaintiff to file suit for recovery of possession without resorting to remedy
available Wider Section 250 of the Code. It is true that the courts while
construing a provision of an enactment often follow the decisions by the
courts construing similar provision of an enactment in pari materia. The
object behind the application of the said rule of construction is to avoid
• contradiction between the two statutes dealing with the same subject. But in E
the present case , what we find is that the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and
Tenancy Act contains one integrated scheme providing for remedy to a pakka
tenant claiming restoration of possession Wider sections 91 and 93 of the Act.
The Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act was repealed by M.P.
Land Revenue Code. In repealing Act i.e., M.P. Land Revenue Code we do F
not find any provision like Section 93 of the Act. We are, therefore, of the
view that Sections 91, 92 and 93 of the Act are not pari materia with the
provision of Section 250 of the M.P. Code. It is not soW1d principle of
construction to interpret a provision of an enactment following the decisions
rendered on similar provision of an enactment when two statutes are not in
pari materia. For the aforesaid reasons we fmd that Sri U.N. Bachawat is G
absolntely correct when he contended that proceeding Wider Section 91 of
the Act is not summary in nature.

Coming to the next question whether the plaintiff could have brought
a suit for restoration of possession Wider Section 93 of the Act without H
~

1208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A resorting to remedy provided under Section 91 of the Act, it is necessary to
look into the relevant provisions of the Act. An analysis of Sections 91 read
with Section 93 shows that the recourse to a civil court is not available to
a pakka tenant who has been dispossessed unless he exhausts the remedy
under Section 91 of the Act. In this connection the use of the expression in
Section 93 of the Act "that no order passed under Sections 91 and 92 shall
B
preclude any person from establishing such rights" shows that a pakka tenant
who has been dispossessed and claims recovery of possession is first required
to take recourse to the remedy available under Section 91 of the Act. This
matter may be examined from another angle. Section 9 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that the civil courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits
c of a civil nature except suits of which their cognizance is either expressly
or impliedly barred. Section 147 of the Act runs as thus :

"147. Exclusive jurisdiction of Revenue Authority -Except as other-
wise provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit
instituted or application made, to obtain a decision or order on any
D matter which the Government are, or a Revenue Officer is, by this
Act, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of."

If Section 93 of the Act for the time being is kept out of sight, it could be
easily said that any civil suit by a pakka tenant for recovery of possession
is barred by virtue of Section 147 of the Act. The provisions of the Act ~
E
besides conferring right on a pakka tenant for restoration of possession of the >j
land from which he has been dispossessed provides for complete procedure
and machinery for getting the relief of restoration of possession. The scheme
envisaged under the Act which comprises of Sections 91, 92 and 93 of the
Act shows that where a pakka tenant who has been dispossessed without due
F course of law and such a pakka tenant wants restoration of possession, there
is implied exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court to grant relief Lo a
pakka tenant. In such a situation a pakka tenant who has been dispossessed
is at first instance required to file an application for restoration of his
possession before the Tehsildar under Section 91 of the Act. In view of the
G matter, it cannot be said that remedy available under Section 91 of the Act
is discretionary and it is open to a pakka tenant either to take recourse to
Section 91 of the Act or file suit under Section 93 of the Act. If such a suit
is filed in a civil court at the first instance without resorting to the remedy
under Section 91 of the Act, the same would be not maintainable. We,
therefore, uphold the contention of Shri Bachawat that unless remedy con- "'
H
BABU KHAN v. NAZIM KHAN [V.N. KHARE, J.] 1209
templated under Section 91 of the Act is resorted to, there would be no cause A
of action to a pakka tenant for filing a suit under Section 93 of the Act.

The third question that arises for consideration in this case is whether
once a remedy available under Section 91 of the Act is resorted to the period
of limitation for adverse possession is an-ested. In other words, whether filing
an application under Section 91 of the Act causes an interruption to the B
continuity of adverse possession.

Article 65 of the Limitation Act runs as under :

"65 For possession of Twelve When the possession
immovable property or years of the defendant becomes c
any interest therein adverse to the plaintiff'
based on title

For biinging a suit for possession of innnovable property the peiiod of
limitation is 12 years when the possession of a defendant becomes adverse
to the plaintiff. Once a suit for recove1y of possession is instimted against D
a defendant in adverse possession his adverse possession does not continue
thereafter. In other words, the runoing of time for acquiring title by adverse
possession gets arrested.

Jn Sultan Khan v. State of M.P. & Anr., (1991) M.P. Law Journal p.81 E
• it was held as under :

"It is true that in instant case no suit for recovery of possession was
filed but only proceedings under Section 248 of the Code were filed.
Section 248 of the Code only provides an alternative forum for
recove1y of possession and therefore, proceedings under this provi- F
sion will have the same effect as a suit in a regular Civil Court. Since
a suit for recovery of possession is sufficient to interrupt the adverse
possession, proceedings under Section 248 of the Code must have the
same effect.

In Sultan Jehan Begum & Ors. v. Gui Mohd. & Ors. AIR (1973) G
Madhya Pradesh p.72 it was held that very institution of the suit arrests the
peiiod of adverse possession of the defendant.

• In Ragho Prasad v. P.N. Aga1Wal & Ors., (1969) Allahabad Law
Journal p.975 it was held as under: H
1210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A "It is not . <sible to hold that if the defendant has been in adverse
possessiou "efore the institution of the suit, such adverse possession
continues to run even after the institution of the suit so as to prescribe
a good title in favour of the defendant."

The legal position that emerges out of the decisions extracted above is that
B once a suit for recovery of possession against the defendant who is in adverse
possession is filed, the period of limitation for perfecting title by adverse
possession comes to a grinding halt. We are in respectable agreement with
tl1e said statement of law. In the present case, as soon as the predecessor-in-
interest of the applicant filed an application under Section 91 o. the Act for
c restoration of possession of the land against the defendant in adverse posses-
sion, the defendant's adverse possession ceased to continue thereafter in view
of the legal position that such adverse possession does not contiuue to run
after filing of the suit, we are, therefore, of the view that the suit brought
by the plaintiff for recovery of possession of the land was not ban·ed by
limitation.
D
For the aforesaid stated reasons this appeal deserves to succeed. We
accordingly set aside the judgment under challenge. The appeal is allowed.
There shall be no order as to costs.

V.S.S. Appeal allowed.

'"