Supreme Court of India
BAJAJ AUTO LTD.versusBHOJANE GOPINATH D. AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2003 INSC 729
- Decided
- 17 December 2003
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- Y K SABHARWAL
Holding
Rule 4C of the Model Standing Orders is ipso facto applicable to establishments in Maharashtra and cannot be deleted; the finding of unfair labour practice under Item 6 stands, there is no unfair practice under Item 9, and the High Court’s reinstatement and back‑wage order is not justified, with compensation under Section 30(1)(b) of the 1971 Act being the appropriate remedy.
Summary
The workmen of Bajaj Auto Ltd. alleged that the company employed a rotation system of temporary workers to avoid granting permanency after 240 days of uninterrupted service, invoking Rule 4C of the Model Standing Orders. The Industrial Court found unfair labour practices under Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, and directed absorption of the temporary workers as permanent. The High Court upheld the unfair‑labour‑practice finding but set aside the absorption order, directing reinstatement with 50% back wages. The Supreme Court held that, under Maharashtra’s amendments, Model Standing Orders (including Rule 4C) are ipso facto applicable and cannot be deleted; the finding of unfair practice under Item 6 stands, but there is no unfair practice under Item 9, and the High Court’s reinstatement order is not justified. The Court ordered reasonable compensation under Section 30(1)(b) of the 1971 Act for the remaining workmen and set aside the operative portions of the lower courts’ orders.
Issues considered
- Whether Rule 4C of the Model Standing Orders is applicable to the establishment despite its omission in the certified standing orders.
- Whether the employer committed an unfair labour practice under Item 6 of Schedule IV of the 1971 Act.
- Whether the employer committed an unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV (failure to implement award).
- Whether the High Court's direction for reinstatement and payment of 50% back wages is legally valid.
- Whether the interim order of the High Court qualifies as an 'award' under the 1971 Act.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Unfair labour practiceModel Standing OrdersRule 4CIndustrial Employment (Standing Orders) ActMaharashtra labour lawCompensation under Section 30Certification of standing orders
Judgment
A. BAJAJ AUTO LTD.
v.
BHOJANE GOPINATH D. AND ORS.
DECEMBER 17, 2003
B [Y.K. SABHARWAL AND B.N. AGRAWAL, JJ.]
Labour Laws :
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair
C · Labuor Practices Act, 1971-Sections 28, 30 and 3(18), Schedule IV item
Nos. 6 and 9-fndustrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946-
Sections 3, JO and 13(1)-lndustrial Employment (Standing Orders)
Central Rules, 1946-Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946
as amended by State Legislature-Sections 2A(J), 3 and 13(1}-Bombay
D Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1959-Rule 4C-Indus-
trial establishment within the State of Maharashtra-Complaint alleging
that Company appointing workmen for less than 240 days and thereafter
replacing them by different set of workers to deprive them benefit of
permanency on completion of 240 days uninterrupted service in a year as
E envisaged under Rule 4C-Cmnpany contending that in the Certified
Standing Order there is no provision akin to Rule 4C-Industrial Court
held unfair labour practice under item Nos. 6 and 9 and directed company
to absorb all complainants and make them permanent-Writ applications-
Interim order by High Court directing Company to continue services of
workrnen, though liberty granted to terminate their services after observing
F legal requirements-Termination of services of all workmen-High Court
upheld finding of Industrial Court regarding unfair labour practice but set
aside the direction and also held that termination of services of workmen
was in violation of interim order and directed that such workmen should
be ;·einstated with 50% back wages-On appeal held : Model Standing
G Orders are ipso facto applicable to establishment within State of
Maharashtra as notified by State Government-Though it is optional for
workmen to submit draft to Certifying Officer for amendment but no
amendment which has the ejfeCt of deleting or omitting any of the rule in
the Model Standing Orders can be sought-Also Rule 4C has been
H fncorporated relating to matter set out in 10-C of Schedule, deletion of the
958
BAJAJ AUTO LTD. v. B.G.D. 959
same would be without jurisdiction, null and void-Further, finding of A
Industrial Court regarding unfair trade pactice under item 6 recorded on
sufficient evidence-High Court justified in not inte1fering with it-Interim
order passed by High Court not an award-Hence no unfair labour
practice under item 9-0n facts and circumstances not a fit case for
reinstatement of workmen, with payment of 50% back wages-However, B
workmen entitled to reasonable amount of compensation in terms of
Section 30(1)(b) of the Act.
Respondent-workmen were in employed in the appellant-Com-
pany within the State of Maharashtra. They filed complaints alleging C
unfair labour practices. It was alleged that the appellant appointed
temporary workers for period less than 240 days and thereafter
replaced them by different set of workmen to deprive them the benefit
of permanency on completion of 240 days uninterrupted service in the
aggregate in any establishment during a period of preceding twelve
calendar months as envisaged under Rule 4C of the Model Standing D
Orders. Appellant-Company took the stand that there was no provision
akin to Rule 4C in the Certified Standing Orders. Industrial Court held
that there was no unfair labour practice as enumerated in Item Nos.
5 and 10 but under Item Nos. 6 and 9 of Schedule IV appended to the
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair E
Labour Practices Act, 1971 and directed the appellant-Company to
absorb all the temporary employee-complainants in employment as
per seniority, make them permanent and still if there is neecl then
engage temporary worker:.. Parties filed writ applications. During the
pendency of the applications, High Court directed the appellant- F
.Company to continue services of the workmen, granting liberty to
terminate services of any of the workmen after observing legal
requirements. However the services of all the respondent-workmen
were terminated. High Court upheld the finding of unfair labour
practice recorded by the Industrial Court but set aside the direction
given by the Industrial Court and held that the termination of services G
of the respondent-workmen was in violation of interim order passed
by the High Court and as such the respondents be reinstated in service
with 50% back wages. Hence the present appeals.
Appellant contended that Rule 4C of the Model Standing Orders H
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A was not applicable since there was no such Rule in the Certified
Standing Order; and that the High Court was not justified in upholding
the finding of the Industrial Court that the appellant-company had
employed unfair labour practice covered, by Item Nos. 6 and 9 of
Schedule IV of the Act.
B
Respondent-workmen contended that under law, Rule 4C of the
Model Standing Orders which related to matter set out in Item No. 10-
C of the Schedule appended to the 1946 Act, as amended by the State
Legislature, could not have been deleted while certifying the amend-
ments in the Model Standing Orders by the competent authority and
c the said Order being in violation of the mandatory provisions of law
is ab initio void and is to be ignored, as such Rule 4C would be
applicable to the instant case.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
D
HELD : I.I. With regard to State of Mahrashtra drastic amend-
ments have been made by the State Legislature in the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 by virtue of Industrial
Employment (Standing orders) (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1957 and
E Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) (Maharashtra Amendment)
Act, 1974. Under Section 3 of the 1946 Act there is a compulsion upon
the employer to submit draft standing orders for certification failing
which he entails penalty of prosecution under Section 13(1) whereas
under Section 3, as amended by the State Legislature, there is no such
requirement and consequently no penalty is provided under Section
F 13(1). Further under Section 3 as amended, it is optional either on the
employer or the workmen to apply for amendment in the Model
Standing Orders, however, the proviso to Section 3(1) mandates that
no amendment which provides for deletion or omission of any Rule in
the Model Standing Orders relating to any matter set out in the
G .. schedule shall be submitted under this Section. If there is a mandate
upon a party not to apply for such amendment, the Certifying Officer
in the purported exercise of power cannot assume jurisdiction to grant
such an amendment. Further, by Section 4 of the l 946 Act a duty has
been cast upon the Certifying Officer and Appellate Authority to
H adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of any
BAJAJ AUTO LTD. v. B.G.D. 961
draft standing orders which have been submitted before the Certifying A.
Officer whereas with regard to State of Maharashtra no such discre-
tion has been given at all either to the Certifying Officer or the
Appellate Authority in view of the fact that Section 4 has been deleted
by State Amendment. This shows that provisions of the 1946 Act as
are applicable to the State of Maharashtra are more stringent, as the B
Model Standing Orders are ipso facto made applicable to industrial
establishments within the State of Maharashtra from the date notified
by the State Government and no such amendment can be made in the
Medel Standing Orders which may have the effect of deleting or
omitting any of the rules therefrom in relation to matters enumerated C
in the Schedule. [977-A-C, G-H; 978-C-E; 979-C-F)
1.2. Rule 4C in ~he Model Standing Orders has been incorporated
relating to the matter set out in Item No. 10-C of· the Schedule
'employment or re-employment of probationers or badlis or tempo-
rary or casual workmen, and their conditions of service' as such D
deletion of Rule 4C by the Certifying Officer, being in the teeth of
legislative command incorporated in proviso to Section 3(1), was
wholly without jurisdiction and would make the order of Certifying
Officer to that effect null and void and liable to be disregarded as it
is well settled that if an order is null and void, the same can be E
disregarded in collateral proceeding or otherwise. (979-A-CI
Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University and Ors., JT
(2001) 5 SC 578, referred to.
1.3. It appears from the Award of the Industrial Court in extenso p
that the Court recorded the finding that the appellant-company had
employed unfair labour practice in its establishment in relation to the
matters enumerated in Item No. 6 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra
Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of unfair Labour Prac-
tices Act, 1971 after threadbare discussion of evidence adduced on
behalf of the parties and there being no infirmity, High Court was G
justified in not interfering with the same, as such it is not possible for
this Court to disturb the same as the said finding is a pure finding of
fact and no interference therewith is called for. (981-B-DJ
1.4. In the instant case, there is neither any averment nor evidence H
962 .SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A to show that there was failure on the part of the employer to implement
any award, settlement or agreement. In the writ petition only point was
raised arising aut of order passed by the Industrial Court in the present
proceeding. An interim order was passed by the High Court permitting
the employer to terminate services of workmen in accordance with the
B procedure prescribed under the law and there was failure on the part
of the employer to carry out the said direction. The interim order
passed by the High Court in the writ application cannot be treated to
be an award, as interim or final determination of any industrial dispute
or any question relating thereto by Labour Court and Tribunals, alone
C would come within the definition of 'award' under section 2(b) of the
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 which is applicable by virtue of section
3(18) of the 1997 Act. Therefore, appellant-company did not employ
unfair labour practice covered by Item No. 9 of Schedule IV as such
the High Court was not justified in upholding the finding of the
Industrial Court. [981-E-H; 982-A-C)
D
1.5. According to Section 30 of the 1971 Act, ifan In~ustrial Coor~
or Labour Court comes to the co~clusion that t:te employer has employed
or is employing any unfair labour practice, it.may pass a declaratory
I
order to that effect and direct such employer to cease and desist from
E unfair labour .practice. Further, in such an eventuality, such courts
could pass any of the consequential orders enumerated under Sections
30(1)(b) of the 1971 Act, namely, reinstatement of the employees with
or without back wages or the payment of reasonable compensation to
the employees affected by the unfair labour practice. Therefore, in the
facts and circumstances of the instant case, it was not a fit case in which
F High Court should have directed reinstatement of the workmen. It was
also not justified in directing payment of 50% back wages to them as
they were entitled to payment of reasonable amount of compensation in
terms of Section 30(1)(b) of the 1971 Act. (982-D-G]
G 2. In Civil Appeal No. 5003 of2002, out of total 1197 respondents,
matters of 1006 workmen has been settled and entire compensation
amount has been paid to them as paid to other workmen in terms of
the previous order. With regard to the remaining workmen it would
be just and expedient that they are paid a reasonable amount of
H compensation order Section 30 of the 1971 Act. Furthermore, the
BAJAJ AUTO LTD. v. B.G.D. [AGRAWAL, J.] 963
directions given by the Industrial Court as well as the High Court ill' A
operative portion of their orders are set aside. 1983-F; 985-A)
Dunlop India Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 11972) 3 SCC 616; The United
Provinces Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. TN Chatterjee & Ors., AIR (1972)
SC 1201 and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Maharas~tra General B
Kamgar Union & Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 626, distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5003 of
2002.
From the Judgment and Order dated 8.9.200 I of the Bombay High C
Court in W.P. No. 523 of 2001.
WITH
C.A. Nos. 5005, 5025, 5026, 5027 and 5028 of 2002.
D
J.P. Cama, K.K. Singhvi, Shekhar Naphade; S.K. Dholakia and C.A.
Sundram, Ghuge R.V., D.N. Ray, Arjun Bobde, Mrs. Nandini Gore, Ms.
Pragya Baghel, Ashish Jha, Mrs. Manik Karanjawala, Prabhakar Joshi, R.S.
Hedge, Chandraprakash, A. Nagabhushnam, Devesh P., Mrs. Savithri
Pandey for P.P. Singh, D.M. Nargolkar, Ravindra K. Adsure, R.N. E
Karanjawala, Padmalakshmi Nigam, R.B. Muley, A.B. Dhongde, Avinash
Salve, Savitri Pandey, P.P. Singh, Nitin S. Tambwekar, P.M. Gore,
C. Ravichandran Iyer, BST Sai, Bhomal~ Deshmukh, R.Y. Joshi, Mukesh
K. Giri, G.B. Sathe, Bharat Sangal, Sangeeta Panicker, R.K. Kumar,
Vishwajit Singh, Tripurari Ray, Mrs. Rohini Musa, P. Venugopal,
P.S. Sudheer and K.J. John for the Appearing Parties. F
The J4dgment of the Court was delivered by
B.N. AGRAWAL, J. : These appeals by special leave have been filed
by appellant-Company against judgment rendered by Aurangabad Bench G
of Bombay High Court in writ applications whereby Award made by
Industrial Court, Aurangabad, in the individual complaints filed by re-
spondents-workmen has been modified.
The short facts are that the respondents-workmen, 1197 in number,
who were in employment of the appellant-Company in its factory at Bajaj H
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A Nagar, Waluj, within the District of Aurangabad, filed individual com-
plaints before the Industrial Court at Aurangabad, under Section 28 of the
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair
Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1971 Act')
complaining thereunder that unfair labour practices enumerated in Item
B Nos. 5, 6, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV appended to the 1971 Act were
employed by the appellant-Company in the establishment in question.
According to the workmen, they were appointed as welder, fitter, turner,
mechanic, helper, grinder, etc., and were working since the year 1990 and
used to be granted employment in each year for about a period of seven
C months and after expiry of the said term their services used to be
discontinued, which practice went on for a period of seven years till before
filing of the complaints by them in the year I 997. It was stated that a
rotation system was followed by the appellant-Company whereby different
set of workmen came to be appointed by rotation displacing the workmen
appointed earlier which was indicative of the fact that work of pennanent
D nature was available with the appellant-Company, but the rotational system
was introduced by it with a view to deprive the workmen of rights and
privileges of permanent employees so that they may not be entitled to claim
benefit of permanency on completion of 240' days uninterrupted. service
in the aggregate in any e_stablishment during a period of preceding twelve
E calendar months as envisaged under rule 4C of the Model Standing Orders
which was applicable to the establishment in question.
The appellant-Company contested claims of the workmen by stating
that conditions of employment of the workmen were governed by the
Standing Orders, duly ce11ified on I 0th March, I 986 by the Certifying
F Officer under the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, I 946 (hereinafter referred to as 'the I 946 Act') wherein there
was no provision akin to rule 4C of the Model Standing Orders. According
to the appellant-Company, it had employed 4250 workmen on permanent
basis so as to meet the requirement of normal production. However, due
G to periodical fluctuations of a temporary nature in the quantum of
production at the factory from time to time, dictated by the conditions at
the national and international market, to which the said establishment is
exposed, the work force is increased or decreased. In order to meet the
fluctuations, the appellant-Company was required to employ workmen on
H temporary basis and, so also, as to when production decreased, it was
BAJAJ AUTO LTD. v. B.G.D. [AGRAWAL, J.] 965
required to terminate services of the temporary workmen. Further, as, A
undisputedly, none of the workmen had worked continuously for 240 days,
much less during a period of preceding twelve calendar months, they were
not entitled to claim any benefit on that count.
In support of their respective cases, both the pa11ies led oral and B
documentary evidence and the In_dustrial Court came to the conclusion that
no unfair labour practice, as enumerated in Item Nos. 5 and 10 of Schedule
IV, could be established, but found that the workmen had succeeded in
proving the unfair labour practices enumerated under Item Nos. 6 and 9
of the said Schedule. After recording the aforesaid findings vide Award
dated 9 .11.2000 the Industrial Court directed the appellant-Company "how C
many permanent employees are required as per the production norms be
fixed and after making the employees permanent from these temporary
employees, if there is a need of any temporary workers, they can engage
but after absorbing all these complainants in the employment they can
engage temporary workers, as per seniority". The appellant~Company was D
further directed "to prepare a seniority list of all the temporary workers who
are in employment and who are not in the employment and give them
continuous work and after completion of 240 days of service, make them
permanent in the employment".
Aggrieved by the aforesaid Award, five writ applications were filed
E
before the High Court on behalf of the workmen challenging the aforesaid
directions of the Industrial Court. The appellant-Company also filed a writ
application challenging the directions regarding permanency and finding
of the Industrial Cou11 whereby it had come to the conclusion that the
appellant-Company had employed unfair labour practice in its establish- F
ment in relation to matters enumerated in Item Nos. 6 and 9 of Schedule
IV. During the pendency of the writ applications, on prayer heing made
on behalf of the workmen, the High Court by its order dated 30th
November, 2000 directed the appellant-Company to continue services of
the workmen, although liberty was granted to it to terminate services of G
any of the workmen after observing legal requirements, but in spite of that
order on 9.1.200 l the services of all the respondents-workmen were
terminated. By the impugned order passed on 8.9.2001, the High Court
dismissed the writ application filed on behalf of the appellant-Company,
but, while upholding the finding of unfair labour practice recorded by the H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A Industrial Court, set aside the ultimate direction given by it and found that
as the termination of services of the respondents-workmen was in violation
of interim order passed by the High Court on 30th November, 2000, they
were entitled to restitution. In effect and substance, it was directed that
the respondents-workmen shall be reinstated in service with 50% back
B wages from 10th January, 2001 till the date of High Court judgment. The
Court further directed that the services of the respondents-workmen shall
be regularised and they be made permanent from the date of filing of the
complaints before the Industrial Court. Challenging the aforesaid judgment,
the present appeals by special leave have been filed by the appellant-
C Company.
Shri J.P. Cama, learned Senior Counsel, in support of the appeals
submitted that the appellant-Company had not employed any unfair labour
practice enumerated under Item No. 6 of the Schedule inasmuch as rule
4C of the Model Standing Orders, whereby a right of permanency could
D be acquired by a workman upon completion ofuninterrupted service of240
days in the aggregate in an establishment during a period of preceding
twelve calendar months, was not applicable in the present case in view of
the fact that there was no such rule in the Standing Orders duly certified.
On the other hand, Shri K.K. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing
E on behalf of the respondents-workmen, submitted that under law rule 4C
of the Model Standing Orders which related to matters set out in Item No.
I 0-C of the Schedule appended to the 1946 Act, as amended by the State
Legislature, could not have been deleted while certifying the amendments
in the Model Standing Orders by the competent authority and the said
Order to that effect being in. violation of the mandatory provisions of law
F is ab initio void and has got to be ignored, meaning thereby rule 4C would
be applicable in the case on hand.
Question that falls for our consideration is as to whether rule 4C of
the Model Standing Orders would be applicable to the respondents-
G workmen of the appellant-Company. To appreciate the point involved, it
may be useful to refe~ to the relevant provisions of Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946 enacted by the Parliament, rules framed
thereunder by the Central Government and Model Standing Orders pre-
scribed thereunder vis-a-vis provisions of the said Act applicable to the
H State of Maharashtra after incorporating State amendments in the Act, State
BAJAJ AUTO LTD. v. B.G.D. [AGRAWAL, J.] 967
Rules and Model Standing Orders prescribed thereunder, which run thus:- A
Provisions oflndustrial Employment Provisions of the Industrial
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946, Central Employment (Standing Orders)
Rules and Model Standing Orders Act, 1946 applicable in the State
presc"ribed thereunder of Maharashtra after incorporating B
State amendments together with
State Rules and Model Standing
Orders prescribed thereunder
TITLE OF Ti-IE ACT TITLE OF THE ACT C
An Act to require employers in An Act to provide for Rules
industrial establishments formally to defining with sufficient precision
define conditions of employment certain conditions of employment
under them in industrial establishments in the
State of Bombay. D
PREAMBLE PREAMBLE
Whereas it is expedient to require Whereas it is expedient to provide
employers in industrial for defining with sufficient
establishments to define with precision certain conditions of E
sufficient precision the conditions of employment in industrial
employment under them and to make establishments in the State of
the said conditions known to Borhbay, and for certain other
workmen employed by them. matters.
F
. Section 2(1-a): Not incorporated Section 2( 1-a): "amendments"
means in relation to the model
standing orders, any amendments
proposed to such orders under
Section 3 and includes any
alterations, variations or additions G
proposed thereto.
Section 2(ee): Not incorporated Section 2(ee): "model standing
orders" means standing orders pre-
scribed under section 15. H
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A Section 2A: Not incorporated Section 2A: Application of model
standing order in every industrial
establishment.-(!) Where this Act
applies to an industrial establishrnent,
the model standing order for every
matter set out in the Schedule
B applic~ble to such establishment shall
apply to such establishment from
such date as the State Government
may by notification in the Official
Gazette appoint in this behalf;
c Provided that nothing in this
section shall be deemed to affect any
Standing Orders which are finally
certified under this Act and have
come into operation under this Act
D in respect of any industrial
establishment before the date of the
coming into force of the Industrial
Employment [Standing Orders
(Bombay Amendment) Act, 1957]
E (2) Notwithstanding anything
contained in the proviso to sub-
section (1) model standing orders
made in respect of additional matters
included in the Schedule after the
coming into force of the Act referred
F to in that proviso (being additional
matters relating to probationers or
badlis or temporary or casual
workmen) shall, unless such model
standing orders are in the opinion of
G Certifying Officer less advantageous
to them than the corresponding
standing orders applicable to them
under the said proviso, also apply in
relation to such workmen in the
establishments referred to in the said
H
BAJAJ AUTO LTD. v. B.G.D. [AGRAWAL, J.] 969
proviso from such date as the State A
Government may, by notification
in the Official Gazette, appoint in
this behalf.
Section 3: Submission of draft Section 3: Submission of amend-
standing orders.- (I) Within six ments.-(!) Within six months from B
months from the date on which this the date on which the model
Act becomes applicable to an standing orders apply to any
industrial es tab I ish ment, the industrial establishment under
employer shall submit to the Section 2-A, the employer or any
Ce1tifying Officer five copies of workman employed therein may C
the draft standing orders proposed submit to that Certifying Officer
by him for adoption in his industrial five copies of the draft amendments
establishment. for adoption in such industrial
establishment :
(2) Provision shall be made in such
draft for every matter set out in the Provided that no amendment which D
Schedule which may be applicable provides for the deletion or omission
to the industrial establishment, and . of any rule in the model standing
where model standing orders have orders relating to any matter set out
been prescribed, shall be, so far as in the Schedule shall be submitted
is practicable in conformity with under this Section.
such model. E
(2) Deleted.
(3) The draft standing orders (3) The draft amendments submitted
submitted under this Section shall under this section shall be
be accompanied by a statement accompanied by a statement giving
giving prescribed paiticulars of the prescribed particulars of the F
workmen employed in the industrial workmen employed in the industrial
establishment including the name establishment including the name
of the trade union, if any, to which of the trade union, if any, to which
they belong. they belong.
(4) Subject to such conditions as (4) Subject to such conditions as G
may be prescribed, a group of may be -prescribed, a group of
employers in similar industrial employers in similar industrial
establishments may submit a joint establishments may submit a joint
draft of standing orders under this draft of amendments under this
section. section.
H
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A Section 4: Conditions for certifi- Section 4: Deleted.
cation of standing orders.-
Standing orders shall be ce1tifiable
under this Act if -
(a) provision is made therein for
B every matter set out ir. the Schedule
which is applicable to the industrial
establishment; and
(b) the standing orders are
otherwise in conformity with the
C provisions of this Act;
and it shall be the function of the
Certifying Officer or appellate
authority to adjudicate upon the
fairness or reasonableness of the
D provisions of any standing orders.
Section 5: Certification of standing Section 5: Certification of amend-
orders.-(1) On receipt of the draft ments.- (I) On receipt of the draft
under section 3, the Certifying under Section 3, the Certifying
Officer shall forward a copy thereof Officer shall forward a copy thereof
to the trade union, if any, of the
E to the trade union, if any, of the workmen, or where there is no such
workmen, or where there is no such
trade union, to the workmen in such
trade union, to the workmen in such manner as may be prescribed or the
manner as may be prescribed, employer, as the case may be,
together with a notice in the together with a notice in the
prescribed form requmng prescribed form requmng
F objections, if any, which the objections, if any, which the
workmen may desire to make to the workmen, or empioyer may desire
draft standing orders to be to make to the draft amendments to
· substituted to him within fifteen be submitted to him within fifteen
days from the receipt· of the notice. days from the receipt of the notice.
G (2) After giving the employer and (2) After giving the employer, the
the trade un10n or such other workmen submitting the
representatives of the workmen as amendment and the trade union or
may be prescribed an oppo1tunity such other representatives of the
of being heard, the Certifying workmen as may be prescribed an
H Officer sh~JI decide whether or not opportunity of being heard the
BAJAJ AUTO LTD. v. B.G.D. [AGRAWAL, J.] 971
any modification of or addition to Certifying Officer shall decide A
the draft submitted by the employer whether or not any modification of
is necessary to render the draft the draft submitted under sub-
standing orders certifiable under section (I) of Section 3 is necessary,
this Ac.t, and shall make an order in and shall make an order in writing
writing accordingly. accordingly.
B
(3) The Certifying Officer shall (3) The Certifying Officer shall
thereupon certify the draft standing thereupon certify the draft
orders, after making any amendments after making any
modifications therein which his modifications therein which his
order under sub-section (2) may order under sub-section (2) may
require, and shall within seven days require, and shall within seven days C
thereafter send copies of the thereafter send copies of the model
certified standing orders standing orders together with copies
authenticated in the prescribed of the certified amendments thereof,
manner and of his order under sub- authenticated in the prescribed
section (2) to the employer and to manner and of his order under sub-
the trade union or other prescribed section (2) to the employer and to D
representatives of the workmen. the trade union or other prescribed
representatives of the workmen.
Section 6: Appeals.-Any employer, Section 6: Appeals.-( 1) Any
workman, trade union or other employer, workman, trade union or
prescribed representatives of the other prescribed representatives of E
workman aggrieved by the order of the workmen aggrieved by the order
the Certifying Officer under sub-
of the Certifying Officer under sub-
section (2) of section 5 may, within
section (2) of Section 5 may, within
thirty days from the date on which
thirty days from the date on which
copies are sent under sub-section
(3) of that section, appeal to the copies are sent under sub-section F
appellate authority, and the (3) of that section, appeal to the
appellate authority, whose decision appellate authority, and the
shall be final, shall by order in appellate authority, whose decision,
writing confirm the standing orders shall be final, shall by order in
either in the form certified by the writing confirm the amendments G
Certifying Officer or after amending either in the fonn certified by the
the said standing orders by making certifying officer or after further
such modifications thereof or modifying the same as the appellate
additions thereto as it thinks
authority thinks necessary.
necessa1y to render the standing
orders certifiable under this Act. H
972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A (2) The appellate authority shall, (2) The appellate authority shall,
within seven days of its order under within seven days of !ts order under
sub-section (1 ), send copies thereof sub-section (I), send copies thereof
of the Certifying Officer, to the to the Ce11ifying Officer, to the
employer and to the trade union or employer and to the trade union or
B other prescribed representatives of other prescribed representatives of
the workmen, accompanied, unless the workmen accompanied unless it
it has confirmed without has confirmed without further
,•
amendment the standing orders as · modifications the amendments as
certified by the Certifying Officer, ce11ified by the Certifying Officer
by copies of the standing orders as by ccpies of the model standing
C certified by it and authenticated in orders together with the amendments
the prescribed manner. as certified by it and authenticated
in the prescribed manner.
Section 7. Date of operation of Section 7. Date of operation of
D standing orders.- Standing Orders standing orders or amendments.-
shall, unless an appeal is preferred Standing Order or amendments shall,
under section 6, come into unless an appeal is preferred under
operaticn on the expiry of thirty Section 6, come into operation on
days from the date on which the expiry of thirty days from the
E authenticated copies thereof are sent date on which authenticated copies
under sub-section (3) of section 5, thereof are sent under sub-section
or where an appeal as aforesaid is (3) of section 5, or where an appeal
preferred, on the exp!ry of seven as aforesaid is preferred, on the
days from the date on which copies expiry of seven days from the date
of the order of the appellate on which copies of the order of the
F authority are sent under sub-section appellate authority are sent under
(2) of section 6. sub-section (2) of Section 6.
Section 10: Duration and Section 10: Duration and
modification of standing orders. - modification of standing orders.-
G (I) Standing orders finally certified (!) Standing Orders or the
under this Act shall not, except on amendments finally certified under
agreement between the employer this Act shall not, except on
and the workmen or a trade union agreement between the employer and
or other representative body of the the workmen or a trade union or
workmen be liable to modification other representative body of the
H until the expiry of six months from workmen be liable to modification
BAJAJ AUTO LTD. v. B.G.D. [AGRA WAL, J.] 973
the date on which the standing until the expiry of six months from A
orders or. the last modifications the date on which the standing
thereof came into operation. orders or the amendments or the
last modifications thereof came into
operation and where model standing
orders have not been amended as B
aforesaid, the model Standing
Orders shall not be liable to such
(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-
modification until the expiry ofone
section (I), an employer or
year from the date on which they
workman or a trade union or other
were applied under Section 2-A.
representative body of the workmen c
may apply to the Certifying Officer (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-
to have the standing orders modified section (I), an employer, workman
and such application shall be or a trade union or other
accompanied by five copie.s of the representative body of the workmen
modifications proposed to be made, or any prescribed representatives of D
and where such modifications are workmen desiring to modify the
proposed to be made by agreement standing orders or the model
between the employer and the standing orders together with the
workman or a trade union or other amendments, as finally certified
representative body of the workmen under this Act, or the model standing
a certified copy of that agreement orders applied under Section 2-A, E
shall be filed along with the as the case may be, shall make an
application. application to the Ce1tifying Officer
in that behalf, and such application
(3) The foregoing provisions of this
shall be accompanied by five copies
Act shall apply in respect of an
of the standing orders, or the model F
application under sub-section (2) as
standing orders, together with all
they apply to.the certification of the
amendments thereto as certified
first standing orders.
under this Act or model standing
(4) Nothing contained in sub-section orders in which shall be indicated
(2) shall apply to an industrial the modifications proposed to be G
establishment in respect of which made and where such modifications
the appropriate Government is the are proposed to be made by
Government of the State of Gujarat agreement between the employer
or the Government of the State of and workmen or a trade union or
Maharashtra. other representative body of the H
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A workmen a certified copy of the
agreement shall be filed along with
the application.
(3) The foregoing provisions of this
Act shall apply in respect of an
B application under sub-section (2) as
they apply to the certification of the
first amendments.
(4) Nothing contained in sub-section
(2) shall apply to an industrial
c establishment in respect of which
the appropriate G.overnment is the
Government of the State of Gujarat.
Section 13(1): Penalties and Section 13(1): Penalties and
procedure.- (1) An employer who procedure.- (l) Ari employer who
D fails to submit draft standing orders modifies the standing orders, model
as required by section 3, or who standing orders or amendments,
modifies his standing orders otherwise than in accordance with
otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act shall, on
section 10, shall be punishable with conviction, be punished with fine
E · fine which· may extend to five which may extend to five thousand
thousand rupees, an in the case of rupees, an in the case of continuing
a continuing offence with a further bffence with a further fine which
fine which may extend to two may extend to. two hundred rupees
hundred rupees for every day after for every day after the first during
F the first during which the offence which the offence continues.
continues.
THE SCHEDULE THE SCHEDULE
Matters to be provided in standing Matters to be provided in Standing
G orders under this Act. Orders (Model Standing Orders and
Amendments) under this Act.
10-C: Not incorporated
I 0-C: Employment or re-employment
·for probationers or badlis or
temporary or casual workmen, and
H their conditions of service.
BAJAJ AUTO LTD. v. B.G.D. [AGRA WAL, J.] 975
INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT BOMBA YINDUSTRIAL A
(ST ANDING ORDERS) EMPLOYMENT (ST ANDING
CENTRAL RULES, 1946 ORDERS) RULES, 1959
SCHBDULE I SCHEDULE I
Model Standing Orders Model Standing Orders
B
Rule 4C: Not incorporated Rule 4C: A badli or temporary
workman who has put in 190 days'
uninterrupted service in the
aggregate in any establishment of C
seasonal nature or 240 days
"uninterrupted service" in the
aggregate in any other establishment,
during a period of preceding twelve
calendar months, shall be made D
permanent in that establishment by
order in writing signed by the
Manager, or any person authorised
in that behalf by the Manager,
irrespective of whether or not his E
name is on the muster roll of
the establishment throughout the
period of the said twelve calendar
months.
F
Explanation.- For purposes of this
clause any period of interrupted
service, caused by cessation of work
which is not due to any fault of the
workman concerned, shall not be G
counted for the purpose of
computing 190 days or 240 days, or,
as the case may be, for making a
badli or temporary workman
permanent.
H
976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A From a bare perusal of the relevant provisions of the 1946 Act,
promulgated by the Parliament, it would appear that the very title of the
Act requires the employers in industrial establishments formally to define
conditions of employment under them. Preamble to the Act shows that
it was found expedient to require employers in industrial establishments
B to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under
them and to make the said conditions known to the workmen employed
by them. This shows that the conditions of employment of workmen in
an industrial establishment are required to be defined by the employer in
accordance with the procedure prescribed under the 1946 Act and the rules
C framed thereunder. Under Section 3, within a period of six months from
the date on which the Act becomes applicable to an industrial establish-
ment, every employer has no option but to submit to the Certifying Officer
draft standing. orders proposed by him for adoption in his industrial
establishment. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 lays down that provisions shall
be made in such draft for every matter set out in the Schedule which may
D be applicable to the industrial establishment, and where model standing
orders have been prescribed, shall be, as far as is practicable, in conformity
with model standing orders. Under Section 4 draft standing orders shall
be certifiable if provision is made therein for every matter set out in the
Schedule which is applicable to the industrial establishment and the same
E are otherwise in conformity with the provisions of the Act inasmuch a duty
has been cast upon the certifying officer or the appellate authority to
adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of any
draft standing orders. Under s·ection 5 the certifying officer is required
to give notice to the parties concerned inviting their objections. Upon
F receipt of the objection, if any, the certifying officer is required to pass an
order certifying the draft standing orders as it is or with any modification
or addition. Section 6 provides for an appeal against the order of certifying
officer. Section 7 lays down that the standing orders so certified shall
become operative on the expiry of 30 days from the date on which
authenticated copies of the certified standing orders are sent to the
G employer and to the trade union or other prescribed representatives of the
workmen and in case an appeal is preferred within 7 days from the date
on which copies of appellate order are sent to the aforesaid persons.
According to Section I 0, the standing order so certified shall not be liable
to rµodification unless agreed to by the parties by making an application
H to that effect before the certifying officer any time after the expiry of period
BAJAJ AUTO LTD. v. B.G.D. [AGRAWAL, J.] 977
of six months from the date the certified standing orders came into A
operation, which shows that once standing orders are certified, no modi-
fication whatsoever is permissible unless both the parties consent to the
same. Under Section 13(1 ), if an employer fails to submit draft standing
orders for ce1iification, he shall be liable to be prosecuted.
So far as the State of Maharashtra is concerned, drastic amendments
B
in the 1946 Act have been made by the State Legislature by vi11ue of
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) (Bombay Amendment) Act,
1957 and Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) (Maharashtra Amend-
ment) Act, 1974. The State Legislature amended the title ofthe 1946 Act
to provide rules defining with sufficient precision certain conditions of C
employment in industrial establishments in the State of Maharashtra. It
also amended Preamble of the 1946 Act as it was found expedient to
provide for defining with sufficient precision certain conditions of employ-
ment in industrial establishments in the State of Maharashtra and certain
other matters. By Section 2(1-a) the expression 'amendments' has been D ·
defined in relation to model standing orders to mean any amendments
proposed to such orders under Section 3 and includes any alterations,
variations or additions proposed thereto. Under Section 2(ee), as inserted
by State amendment, the expression 'model standing orders' was defined
to mean standing orders prescribed by Rules framed under Section 15. E
Section 2A(l) lays down that where the Act applies to an industrial
establishment, the model standing orders for every matter set out in the
Schedule applicable to such establishment shall apply to such establish-
me'lt from such date as the State Government may by notification in the
Official Gazette appoint in this behalf and the State Government has
appointed 15th of January, 1959 to be the date for the purposes of the said F
sub-section. This shows that model standing orders, prescribed by Bombay
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1959 framed under
Section 15 by the Government of Maharashtra, ipso facto would be
applicable with effect from 15th January, 1959. In Section 3 of the 1946
Act, as amended by the State Legislature, a complete departure has been G
made vis-a-vis Section 3 of the 1946 Act. Under the 1946 Act, as stated
above, there is a compulsion upon the employer to submit draft standing
orders for ce1iification failing which he entails penalty of prosecution under
Section 13(1) whereas under Section 3, as amended by the State Legisla-
ture, there is no such •equirement and consequently no penalty provided H
978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A under Section 13(1) in view of the fact that by virtue of sub-section (1)
o.f Section 2A the model standing orders ipso facto apply to the industrial
establishment from the date enumerated in the notification issued by the
State Government. However, under Section 3., if the_ employer or any
workman employed in an establishment intends any amendment in the
B model standing orders, in that eventuality alone any of them may submit
to the Certifying Officer such draft amendments for adoption in such
industrial establishment within six months from the date on which the
model sanding orders applied to the industrial establishment under sub
section (1) of Section 2A. This shows that it is not imperative either on
C the employer or the workmen to apply for amendments in the model
standing orders, but it is optional. However, even this step on their part
is controlled by the proviso to Section 3(1) which lays down that no
amendment which provides for deletion or omission of any rule in the
model standing orders relating to any matter set out in the Schedule shall
be submitted under this Section. Proviso mandates the employer as well
D as the workmen not to seek any amendment which has the effect of
deleting or omitting any rule in the model stanciing orders relating to any
matter set ciut in the Schedule. If there is a mandate upon a party not to
apply for such amendment, the certifying officer in the purported· exercise
of power under Section 5 cannot assume jurisdiction to grant such an
E amendment as the same will be in flagrant violation of legislative mandate
which is in the form of a negative command.
It would be relevant to state that Item No. 10-C has been incorporated
in the Schedule of 1946 Act by the State Legislature in the year 1974 with
effect from 2nd October, 1977 which enumerates matters to be provided
F in the model standing orders in relation to "employment or re-employment
of probationers or badlis or temporary or casual workmen, and their
conditions of service". By virtue of Bombay Industrial Employment
(Standing Order) (Amendment) Rules, 1977, which were published in the
Bombay Gazette on 28th September, 1977 and came into force with
G immediate effect, rule 4C was incorporated in the model standing orders
which lays down that a temporary workman, who has put in 240' days
uninterrupted service in the aggregate in any establishment during a period
of preceding twelve calendar months, shall be made permanent in that
establishment by order in writing signed by the manager or any person
H authorised in that behalf by the manager, irrespective of whether or no.t his
BAJAJ AUTO LTD. v. 8.G.D. [AGRAWAL, J.] 979
. name is on the muster roll of the establishment throughout t.he period of A
said twelve calendar months. Rule 4C in the model standing orders has
been incorporated relating to the matter set out in Item No. 10-C of the
Schedule, as such deletion of the said rule by the certifying officer, being
in the teeth oflegislative command incorporated in proviso to Section 3(1 ),
was wholly without jurisdiction and would make the order of certifying B
officer to that effect null and void and liable to· be disregarded as it is well
settled that if an order is null and void, the same can be disregarded in
collateral proceeding or otherwise. Reference in this connection may be
made to decision of this Court in the case of Dhurandhar Prasad Singh
v. Jai Prakash University and Ors., JT (2001) 5 SC 578.
c
By Section 4 of the 1946 Act, as amended in 1956 by the Parliament,
which is not applicable to the State of Maharashtra, as would appear from
the State amendment, a duty has been cast upon the certifying officer and
appellate authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the
provisions of any draft standing orders which have been submitted before D
the certifying officer. Thus the provision in the l946 Act being much more
wider, the question of fairness or reasonableness of the draft standing
orders submitted for certification is required to be considered by the
aforesaid authorities. So far as the State of Maharashtra is concerned, no •
such discretion has been at all given either to the certifying officer or the E
appellate authority in view of the fact that Section 4 has been deleted by
State Amendment. This shows that provisions of the 1946 Act as are
applicable to the State of Maharashtra are more stringent as the model
standing orders are ipso facto made applicable to industrial establishments
within the State of Maharashtra from 15th of January, 1959 as notified by
the State Government and no such amendment can be made in the model F
standing orders which may have the effect of deleting or omitting any of
the rules therefrom in relation to matters enumerated in the Schedule.
In suppo1t of the submission that wherever there are certified standing
orders of an industrial establishment, the rules thereof shall govern service G
conditions of the workmen in that establishment and not the rules in the
model standing orders, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of Dunlop India
Ltd. v. Their workmen, [1972] 3 sec 616 wherein it has been laid down
that upon certification, it is rules in the certified standing orders which shall H
980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A be binding on the employer as well as the workmen which would obviously
mean that the workmen will not be bound by rules in the model standing
orders. Reliance has been also placed upon another decision of this Court
in the case of The United Provinces Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. TN Chatterjee
& Ors., AIR (1972) SC I 201 wherein it has been laid down that the
B certifying officer and the appellate authority are duty bound to examine
the question of fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of draft
standing orders at the time of considering the same for its certification. In
our view, ratio decided in none of the two decisions, is applicable in the
present case as the first case related to industrial establishment which was
C within the State of West Bengal and the other one Uttar Pradesh where no
drastic amendments were made by the State Legislature as were made by
the State Legislature·in Maharashtra. Learned counsel next relied upon
the decision of this Court in the case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
v. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union & Ors., [1999] 1 SCC 626 which
was a case brought to this Court from Maharashtra where before this Court
:D on behalf of the workmen, argument was advanced that in the certified
standing orders, no departure could be tnade either in principle or policy,
from the model standing orders. There, according to model standing
orders, an employee of the corporation could be represented in the
disciplinary proceeding by an employee of another establishment with the
E only restriction that he should be an office bearer of a trade union but in
the· certified standing orders, provision was made that an employee of the
corporation could be represented in the disciplinary proceeding only by
another employee of that very corporation. The prayer for certification was
refused by the Certifying Officer but granted by the appellate authority.
F When the matter was taken to the Bombay High Court in writ, order passed
by the appellate authority was set aside and the order of rejection of
Certifying Officer restored. Thereafter, on appeal being preferred before
this Court by the management, the order of appellate authority granting
certification was restored holding that such an amendment in the model
standing orders was permissible. In the said case, what was proposed was
G variation of the rule in the model standing orders by suitably amending the
same and not the deletion or omission of any rule from the model standing
orders. What is barred under Section 3 of the 1946 Act is deletion or
omission of any rule from the model standing orders relating to any matter
set out in the Schedule. In the case on hand, the amendment allowed was
H not for suitably modifying the rules of the model standing orders but for
BAJAJ AUTO LTD. v. B.G.D. [AGRAWAL, J.] 981
deleting the same which is impermissible. Thus the ratio, laid down in A
the case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra) does not run counter
to the submission of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the workmen.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-Company made
an· in vain attempt to challenge finding recorded by the Industrial Court B
to the effect that the workmen succeeded in proving that the appellant-
Company had employed unfair labour practice in its establishment in
relation to the matters enumerated in item No. 6 of Schedule IV of the 1971
Act. We have been taken through the Award of the Industrial Court in
extenso from which it appears that the Court recorded the said finding after
threadbare discussion of evidence adduced on behalf of the parties and C
there being no infirmity therein, the High Court was quite justified in not
interfering with the same, accordingly, it is not possible for this Court to
disturb the same in view of the fact that the said finding is a pure finding
of fact and no interference therewith is called for.
D
Learned counsel next submitted that the High Court was not justified
in affirming finding of the industrial court that the appellant-company had
employed unfair labour practice as enumerated in item No. 9 .of Schedule
IV of the 1971 Act. From a bare perus?.l of item No. 9 of the said Schedule,
it would appear that the unfair labour practice on the part of the employer E
enumerated thereunder is "failure to implement award, settlement or
agreement". In the present case, undisputedly, there is neither any averment
nor evidence to show that there was failure on the part of the employer
to implement any settlement or agreement. The only point raised was that
in the_ writ application arising out of order passed by the Industrial Court
in the present proceeding, an interim order was passed by the High Court F
permitting the employer to terminate services of workmen in accordance
with the procedure prescribed under the law and there was failure on the
part of the employer to carry out the said direction. Thus, the only question
that arises is as to whether the aforesaid order of High Court in writ
application can be treated to be an award. The expression "award" has G
not been defined in the 1971 Act. Sub-section (18) of Section 3 lays down
that where words and expressions used in the 1971 Act are not defined
therein, the same shall have the meaning assigned to them by the Central
Act which would obviously mean Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 enacted
by the Parliament, Section 2(b) whereof defines "award" to "mean an H
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A interim or final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question
relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National
Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section
lO(A)." The interim order passed by the High Cou1t in the writ application
ca,nnot be treated to be an award, as determination interim or final by labour
B court and tribunals, alone would come within the sweep of the said
definition. Thus, in our view, it cannot be said that the appellant company
was in any manner employing unfair labour practice enumerated under
item No. 9 of Schedule IV, as such the High Court was not justified in
confirming finding of the Industriai Court on that score.
C Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-Company then
submitted that the High Court was not justified in holding that principle
of restitution would apply as restitution cannot be resorted to if any action
has been taken in violation of interim order passed by a court. On the other
hand, learned counsel appearing on behalfofthe respondent submitted that
.:
D the said principle shall have application in the present case. In our view,
in the case on hand, it is not necessary to go into this question in view of
the nature of order which we propose to pass. According to Section 30
of the 1971 Act, if an Industrial Court or Labour Court, as the case may
be, comes to the conclusion that the ~mployer has employed or is
E employing any unfair labour practice, it may pass a declaratory order to
that effect and direct such employer to cease and desist from such unfair
labour practice. Apart from that, fu1ther, in such an eventuality, such courts
could pass any of the consequential orders enumerated under Secti.ons
30(l)(b) of the 1971 Act, namely, reinstatement of the employees with or
without back wages or the payment of reasonable compensation to the
F empioyees affected by the unfair labour practice. In the facts and
circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that it was not a fit
case in which the High Court should have directed reinstatement of the
workmen. It was also not justified in directing payment of50% back wages
to them as, in our view, they were entitled to payment of reasonable
G amount of compensation in terms of Section 30(l)(b) of the 1971 Act.
At this stage it may be stated that during the course of hearing, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the parties stated that disputes between the
appeJJant-Company and 1006 workmen, who are respondent Nos. 4, 5, 7-
H 10, 13-15, 11, 21-33, 35-36, 38, 40, 42, 44-49, 51-67,.69-74, 76-87, 89-
BAJAJ AUTO LTD. v. B.G.D. [AGRA WAL, J.] 983
90, 92, 94-106, 108-123, 125-129, 131, 133-135, 137-145, 147-184, 186- A
187, 190-198, 202-205, 207-208, 210-219, 221-223, 227-228, 230-233,
235, 237-244, 247-250, 252-258, 260-268, 270-276, 278-297, 299-302,
304-308, 310, 312, 315, 316, 318-321, 323, 325-345, 347-351, 353-354,
356-359, 361-364, 367-377, 379-380, 382-394, 397-399, 402-403, 405,
407-424, 426-428, 431, 433, 435, 436-437, 439-441, 443-458, 460, 463- B
464, 471~478, 480-481, 483-484, 488, 490, 491-492, 496-502, 504-507'
509-522, 524-527, 529-533, 535-537, 539-540, 542-548, 550, 552, 554-
576, 578-622, 624, 626-628, 630-633, 635-641, 645-646, 648-654, 656-
657, 659-661, 663-671, 673-674, 676-685, 689-707, 710, 712-715, 717-
718, 720, 722-750, 752-753, 755-760, 762-763, 766-768, 770-773, 775,
777, 779-791, 793-794, 796-803, 805-808, 810-813, 815-820, 822, 824- c
847, 849-850, 852-866, 870-872, 873-882, 884, 886-896, 898-902, 904,
906, 908-909, 911-915, 918, 920-935, 937, 939-942, 945-950, 952-958,
961-965, 967-1002, 1004, 1006-1009, 1011-1012, 1014-1035, 1037-1038,
1040-1048, 1050-1051, 1053-1057, 1059-1063, 1065-1073, 1075-1078,
1080-1081, 1083-1130, 1132-1137, 1139-1142, 1144-1148, 1150-1160, D
1163-1165, 1167, 1169-1182, 1184-1192, 1194, 1196 and 1197 in Civil
Appeal No. 5003 of 2002, have been settled and entire compensation
amount has been paid to them as was paid to other workmen in terms of
order dated 11th September, 2003 passed in Civil Appeal No. 5002 of2002
and a prayer has been made that the appeal in relation thereto may be E
disposed of on the terms enumerated in the said order. In our view, prayer
is justified and must be granted.
In Civil Appeal No. 5003 of 2002, the total number of respondents
is 1197 out of which l 006 have compromised the matter as stated above.
Now, so far as the remaining workmen are concerned, we are of the view F
that it would be just and expedient that ~hey are paid a reasonable amount
of compensation under Section 30 of the 1971 Act which would be
calculated in the manner indicated hereinafter. Each of the remaining
workmen shall be paid a iump-sum amount calculated at 85 days' salary,
inclusive of all allowances, for the number of years each workman had G
actually workec irrespective of the days a workman may have put in in
a year. The calculation would be made on the basis of work during a
calendar year and that the calendar year in which a workman may not have
worked at all would be kept out of considera~ion while calculating the
!
amount. In calculating the salary for each workman, the minimum salary H
984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A that would be taken into account would be Rs. 8,000 per month subject
to the condition that if on the date of termination, the salary of any
particular workman was more, then the calculation would be made on
actual last drawn salary. The calculation in the above said manner would
be made for the period up to the date of termination in the year 1997-98.
B For the period after termination till date, the basis of calculation would be
lump-sum three years of service on the ba:;is aforesaid, namely, 85 days
for each calendar year i.e. salary for 255 days.
In view of the aforesaid order which we intend to pass, it would be
expedient that the following directions, given by the Industrial Court and
C the High Court in the impugned orders should not be allowed to continue.
"It is hereby directed to respondent Company to prepare a
seniority list of ~II the temporary workers who are in employment
and who are not in the employment and give them continuous
D work and after completion 240 days of services, make them
permanent in the employment. How many permanent employees
are required as per the production norms be fixed and after making
the employees permanent from these temporary employees, if
there is a need of any temporary workers, they can engage but
after absorbing all these complainants in the employment, they
E can engage temporary workers, as per seniority."
"The petitioners/complainants shall be regularized in service and
be made permanent as and from the date of filing of the
complaints before the Industrial Court. The respondent/Company
F shall pay fifty percent of the amount of back wages (pay and
allowances) to the petitioners/complainants, for the period com-
mencing from 10th January, 2001 till today, within a period of
one month from today."
G For the foregoing reasons, Civil Appeal No. 5003 of2002 in relation
to 1006 respondents enumerated above is disposed of on the terms
indicated in consent order dated 11th September, 2003 passed by this Court
in Civil Appeal No. 5002 of 2002. The finding of the industrial court as
well as the High Court in relation to unfair labour practice employed, as
enumerated in item No. 9 of Schedule IV ofthe 1971 Act and the aforesaid
H
BAJAJ AUTO LTD. v. B.G.D. [AGRA WAL, J.] 985
directions given by the Industrial Court as well as the High Court in A
operative portion of their orders are set aside and the Management is
directed to pay compensation to the remaining workmen within a period
of three months after calculating the same in the aforesaid manner. The
said appeal is thus disposed of. In view of the order passed in Civil Appeal
No. 5003 of2002, no further order need to be passed in other appeals which B
are accordingly disposed of. In the facts and circumstances of the case,
we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs.
N.J. Appeals disposed of.
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