Holding

Witnesses possessing special knowledge of family relationships can prove such relationships under Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act, and the High Court’s rejection of their testimony was erroneous.

Summary

The dispute arose over the mutation of property left by Chartu, who had two sons and a daughter Nandi. After the deaths of the sons, the respondent claimed the land was joint coparcenary property and that Nandi and her children (the appellants) had no right, while the appellants sought to establish Nandi’s relationship to Chartu. The trial court and first appellate court differed on the nature of the property, and the High Court set aside the appellate order on the ground that the testimony of two witnesses (DW‑1 and DW‑2) did not satisfy Section 50 of the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court held that the witnesses, having special knowledge of family relationships, fell within Section 50, and that the High Court erred in rejecting their evidence. It also ruled that the question of whether the land was coparcenary was a factual issue, not a substantial question of law, and that revenue‑record entries are only presumptive of possession. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the testimony of DW‑1 and DW‑2 is admissible under Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act to prove the relationship of Nandi to Chartu/Bakhtawar.
Whether the lower courts erred in basing their findings on evidence that does not satisfy Section 50.
Whether the nature of the disputed property (coparcenary or not) constitutes a substantial question of law for the Supreme Court.
Whether an entry in revenue records is decisive regarding the status of the parties.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 50, s. 60

Subjects

Hindu lawcoparcenary propertySection 50Indian Evidence Actmutationrevenue recordssubstantial question of lawfamily relationship evidenceinheritancejoint family property

Judgment

[2008) 2 S.C.R. 1077

~ ~ BANT SINGH & ANR. A
v.
NIRANJAN SINGH(D) BY LRS,& ANR.

- (Civil Appeal No. 7162 of 2005)
FEBRUARY 15, 2008
B
[S.8. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH 8EDI, JJ.]
--"' l'
Hindu Law -Properly dispute - Transfer of property to
heirs of daughter objected on the ground that the property was
coparcenany -Relationship of parties disputed -Trial Court c
decreeing the suit - First appellate court setting aside the
decree -However, both the courts holding that the relationship
_,-
' between the parties established - High Court appreciating the
evidence of defence and holding that the same was not reliable,
not being in conformity with s. 50 of Evidence Act- On appeal,
D
held: Decree set aside -Transfer to the heirs of daughter is
-r correct as defence evidence establishing .relationship of
parties - Defence evidence is admissible being in conformity
with s. 50 of Evidence Act - Question of nature of property
cannot be gone into by Supreme Court , as no substantial
question of law was formulated in that behalf in second appeal E
- Evidence Act, 1872 -s. 50.
Deeds and Documents - Entry in revenue records -
Evidentiary value -Held: Such entry is not decisive as to status
of the party, but can be used for raising a presumption in respect
,. of possession - Evidence.
F

'C' left behind him two sons 'M' and' '8' and one
daughter 'N'. Respondent (son of 'M') inherited the
property of his father after his death. Since'8' died without
leaving behind any first class legal heir, his property G
devolved upon the respondent and appellants (children
of his sister 'N'). Mutation was done in favour of the
respondent and the appellants. Respondent filed a ·suit
challenging mutation p'roceedings. He claimed ·that the
I 1077 H
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1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A property being a joint coparcenary property, 'N' (daughter
of 'C') did not derive any interest therein; and that 'N' was
~ .
not the daughter of 'C'. Defendant-appellants examine~
four witnesses. Trial Court decreed the suit. However, jt
held that 'N' was daughter of 'C'. First appellate Court held
B that the property was not coparcenary and upheld the
finding regarding relationship of 'N' with 'C'. In second
appeal, High Court formulated substantial questions of
law regarding application of s.50 of Evidence Act. No "" f-

substantial question was formulated as to whether the
property was coparcenary. High Court appreciated the
c evidence of DWs 1 and 2 and set aside the order of first
appellate court on the ground that the evidence of DWs 1
and 2 were not in conformity with s.50 of Evidence Act.
Hence the present appeal.
..
,
D Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 It does ·not appear from the judgments of
the trial court as also the first appellate court that any
evidence was adduced on behalf of the respondent to
establish as to_ whose daughter 'N' was. Plaintiffs-
""'
E Respondents, furthermore failed to establish as to how ~
the order of the revenue authorities directing mutation of
the name of the appellants herein was illegal.[Para 13J
[1083-8, .CJ
Dofgobinda Paricha v. Nimai Charan Misra AIR 1959
F SC 914- relied on
~~-
1.2 The evidence of DW-1 and DW-2 are admissible
in evidence being in conformity with the provisions of
Section 50 of the Evidence Act. High Court for the reasons
G best known to it, did not advert to the depositions of the
witnesses examined .on behalf of the appellants at all. The
High Court could have interfered with the finding of fact 1"
in a second appeal provided it applied the right tests, but
it failed to do so. [Para 21J [1087-B, CJ
H 2. An entry made in the revenue records may not be
BANT SINGH & ANR. v. NIRANJAN SINGH(D) BY 1079
LRS.& ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
. y
decisive as regards the status of the parties but a A
presumption in regard to possession can be raised on
the basis thereof. [Para 14] [1083-D]
3.1 This Court cannot enter into the question as to
whether the suit property was an ancestral property or
not. No substantial question of law in that behalf was B
1' formulated. Out of the three substantial questions of law
" the first two questions related only to application of
Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act. The third question
formulated was not a substantial question of law at all.
[Para 22] [1087-D, E] c
~
3.2 As the respondent failed to persuade the High
Court to formulate any substantial question of law on that
point viz. that the property in question was a coparcenary
property, this Court cannot formulate such a question and
D
·; remit the matter to the High Court. [Para 22] [1087-E, F]
3.3 Whether there has been a severance of the joint
family property between the two brothers is essentially a
question of fact and, thus, the said question cannot be
permitted to be reopened before this Court. [Para 23] E
[1087-F]
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7162
of 2005.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.08.2003 of the F
High Court of Punjab and ~aryana at Chandigarh in Regular
Second Appeal No. 1290 of 1982.
P.N. Puri for the Appellants.
Manoj Swarup and Roh it Sohgaura for the Respondents. G
~-
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J 1. Application of Section 50 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 is involved in this appeal which arises out
of a judgment and order dated 27 .8.2003 passed by a learned
H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Regular
Second Appeal No. 1290 of 1982 allowing the appeal from a
judgment and order dated 12.3.1982 passed by the Additional
District Judge, Patiala setting aside the judgment and decree
dated 31.3.1981 passed by the Subordinate Judge, First Class, .
B Patiala decreeing the suit of the respondents. Before embarking
upon the said question, we may notice the genealogical tree of
the parties.
Chartu
.I I
c Munshi (son) Bakhtawar (son) Nandi (daughter)
I I I
Niranjan Singh died without Bant Singh Bachan Kaur
(Plaintiff) (Respondent) leaving any class 1 (son) (daughter)
heir Defendant Nos. 1 & 2
D (Appellant Nos. 1 &2)
2. Chartu died in 1935. According to the appellants upon
death of Chartu, the properties devolved upon his sons Munshi
and. Bakhtawar in equal shares. Entries in that behalf in the
E revenue records were made showing interest of Munshi and
Bakhtawar in equal shares.
3. On or about 16.6.1956, Munshi Singh died. His share
in the property was inherited by his son Niranjan Singh. To the
same effect allegedly mutation in the revenue records was
F carried out. Bakhtawar, the other son of Chart.u died on
25.10.1972. The share of Bakhtawar Singh in the said property
was mutated in favour of Niranjan Singh, son of Munshi Singh
and Bant Singh and Bachan Kaur, son and daughter of Nandi,
being his class two heirs. On or about 28. 7.1978, the respondent
G herein filed a suit challenging the said order passed by the
Revenue Officer in the mutati.on proceedings, inter alia, claiming
•
J
that the ·property was a joint coparcenary property and, thus,
Nandi did not derive any interest therein. It was furthermore
contended that Nandi was not the daughter of Chartu. The
H learned Trial Judge in view of the pleadings of the parties framed
BANT SINGH & ANR. v. NIRANJAN SINGH(D) BY 1081

. y

"i)
LRS.& ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
the following hssues :
Whether the disputed property is joint Hindu Family
coparcenary property of the plaintiff and the
A

deceased Bakhtawar Singh and his ancestors? OPP
ii) Whether deceased Nandi was the daughter of Chartu B
as alleged? OPD
'1'
iii) Whether defendant No. 1 and 2 are the son and
daughter of aforesaid Nandi and are heirs of
deceased Bakhtawar Singh? OPD
iv) Whether the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land?
c
If not its effect? OPD
v) Relief."
4. In its judgment and order dated 31.3.198j, the learned
Trial Judge held that the property in suit being joint coparcenary D
t~ property, Nandi did not inherit any interest therein. However, in
regard to the status of the appellants, it was held that Nandi
was the daughter of Chartu and sister of Bakhtawar Singh.
5. Appellants preferred an appeal thereagainst which, by E
a judgment and order dated 12.3.1981, was allowed.
6. While upholding the findings of the learned Trial Judge
in regard to the relationship of the appellants vis-'-vis the said
Bakhtawar Singh holding that Nandi, was the mother of the
appellants was the daughter of Chartu and the sister of F
Bakhtawar Singh. It was also held that the property in suit was
not a coparcenary property and, thus, Niranjan Singh and
Bakhtawar Singh had half shares each therein.
7. Cross objection of the respondents in regard to the
finding of the learned Trial Judge on issue Nos. 2 and 3 was G
~
also dismissed.
A second appeal was preferred thereagainst.
The following substantial questions of law were formulated
by the High Court:- H
}- ;r
~

1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

••
I
~
A "a) Whether the evidence led by the defendants conforms
to the requirements of Section 50 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 and as such can be taken to have proved the
relationship of Smt. Nandi, mother of defendants No. 1
and 2 with Bakhtawar Singh deceased?
B b) As to whether the learned courts below have returned I
!--
their findings on the basis of such evidence which is not 'r'
admissible in view of Section 50 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 and are also based upon the mis-reading of the
evidence led by the parties?
c /

c) Whether the courts .below having not dealt with the ,.i....
.....,....
matter in controversy in correct perspective, the judgments
are liable to be set aside being judicially perverse?"
8. The High Court, in its judgment, entered into the question
D offact and sought to appreciate the evidence of D.W.-1, Jhaggar
Singh and DW.2 Hajura Singh and opined that the evidence led '-+
by them was not in conformity with Section 50 of the Indian
Evidence Act. On the said finding, the Second Appeal was
allowed.
E ::
9. Mr. P.N. Puri, the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellants, submitted that the High Court committed a
serious error of law in interfering with the findings of fact arrived
at by the courts below.

F 10. Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned counsel appearing on ").--
behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, took us through the
depositions of DW-1 and DW-2 as also the decision of this
Court in Dalgobinda Paricha. Vs. Nimai Charan Misra [AIR
1959 SC 914] to contend that the evidence of the said witnesses
was rightly held to be not conforming to the requirements of
G
Section 50 of the Evidence Act. -1(

Thr learned counsel also made aa endeavour to raise a
contention that the property, in question, being a coparcenary
property, Nandi, in any event, did not inherit any right, title or
H interest upon the death of Bakhtawar Singh.
-!-

--t-

'· SANT SINGH & ANR. v. NIRANJAN SINGH(D) BY 1083
LRS.& ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
• )"
11. Relationship of Nandi as sister of Munshi Singh and A
Bakhtawar Singh was sought to be proved by Jhaggar Singh,
DW-1, Hajura Singh, DW-2, Bachan Kaur, DW-3 and Bant
Singh, DW-4.
12. The learned Trial Court in its judgment on issue Nos. 2
and 3 analysed the evidences of the said witnesses in great B
details.
13. It does not appear from the judgments of the learned
Subordinate Judge as also the learned Additional District Judge
that any evidence was adduced on behalf of the respondent to c
establish as to whose daughter Nandi was. Plaintiffs/
Respondents, furthermore failed to establish as to how the order
of the revenue authorities directing mutation of the name of the
appellants herein was illegal.
14. An entry made in the revenue records may not be D
t• decisive as regards the status of the parties but a presumption
in regard to possession can be raised on the basis thereof.
15. The High Court, unfortunately did not refer to the
depositions of the witnes~es examined on behalf of the
appellants at all. It proceeded only on the basis that the oral E
evidence of DW-1 and DW-2 do not pass the tests of Section
50 of the Indian Evidence Act.
16. DW-1, at the time of his deposition, was·aged 80 years.
~ He is the brother of Baksha Singh, husband of Nandi. He proved F
---J
the genealogy of the family of Chartu. Nandi, was the wife of his
brother. He, therefore, had special knowledge in regard to
relationship between her, on the one hand, and Munshi and
Bakhtawar Singh, on the other.
17. He attended the marriage of Nandi. Bakhtawar and G
};
Munshi, according to him, used to come to their house. The
'
-·. relationship between the appellants and the said Munshi Singh
and Bakhtawar Singh was, thus, within his special knowledge ..
He categorically stated the manner in which the appellants used
I~
to be treated by Munshi Singh and Bakhtawar Singh. H

=~
'
,.
i •
}--

1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C:R.
r
I
·~ &:t"
A In answer to a question put to him in cross-examination,
he, in no uncertain terms, categorically stated that he had heard
as well as saw Nandi calling Munshi Singh and Bakhtawar Singh
as 'brother.' He attended the marriage of Nandi when he was r'
only 15 years old.
B 18. To the similar effect is the evidence of DW-2, Hajura
Singh who was another brother of Baksha Singh. He was aged
75 years on the date of his deposition.
DW-2 is a resident of the same village. He had also
c watched the parties from a close quarter and, thus, could
depose about the conduct of Nandi vis-'-vis Munshi Singh an<;t
Bakhtawar Singh.
He apart from other things testified that Bakhtawa~ Singh
had come to attend the marriage of Bachan Kaur. He stated in
D detail about the family of both the parties. He deposed that he JI

had old dealings with Baksha Singh, being of the.same village.
He also attended the marriage of the brother of Baksha Singh,
being a close relative.
E 19. In Dolgobinda Paricha (supra), this Court relied upon
the evidence of two witnesses who had attended the marriage
of t-laripriya and the Lokanath which was in dispute. In that case,
the relationship of Ahalya and Malabati as the daughter of
Lokanath was in dispute.
F Interpreting Section 50 of the Evidence Act, this Court held:
"... On a plain reading of the section it is quite clear that
it deals with relevancy of a particular fact. It states in effect
that when the court has to form an opinion as to the
relationship of one person to another the opinion
G expressed by conduct as to the existence of such
relationship of any person who has special means of
knowledge on the subject of that relationship is a relevant ""') ._
fact. The two illustrations appended to the section clearly
bring out the true scope and effect of the section. It appears
H to us that the essential requirements of the section are (1)
BANT SINGH & ANR. v. NIRANJAN SINGH(D) BY 1085
LRS.& ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

- y there must be a case where the court has to form an A
opinion as to the relationship of one person to another; (
2) in such a case, the opinion expressed by conduct as
to the existence of such relationship is a relevant fact; (3)
but the person whose opinion expressed by conduct is

.. .,, relevant must be a person who as a member of the family B
or otherwise ha s special means of knowledge on the
particular subject of relationship; in other words, the person
must fulfill the condition laid down in the latter part of the
section. If the person fulfils that condition, then what is
-1 relevant is his opinion expressed by conduct. Opinion
means something more than mere retailing of gossip or
c
of hearsay; it means judgment or belief, that is, a belief or
a conviction resulting from what one thinks on a particular
question. Now, the 'belief' or conviction may manifest itself
in conduct or behaviour which indicates the existence of
D
+. the belief or opinion. What the section says is that such
conduct or outward behaviour as evidence of the opinion
held is relevant and may, therefore, be proved."
It was furthermore held :
7... lfwe rememberthatthe offered item of evidence under E
Section 50 is conduct in the sense explained above, then
there is no difficulty in holding that such conduct or outward
behaviour must be proved in the manner laid down in
Section 60; if the conduct relates to something which can
~
be seen, it must be proved by the person who saw it; if it F
is something which can be heard, then it must be proved
by the person who heard it; and so on. The conduct must
be of the person who fulfils the essential conditions of
Section 50, and it must be proved in the manner laid down
in the provisions relating to proof. It appears to us that that G
portion of Section 60 which provides that the person who
"' holds an opinion must be called to prove his opinion does
not necessarily delimit the scope of Section 50 in the
sense that opinion expressed by conduct must be proved
only by the person whose conduct expresses the opinion. H

"')-
~
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 2 S.C.R.

A Conduct, as an external perceptible fact, may be proved
either by the testimony of the person himself whose opinion
·~
-- .
is evidence under Section 50 or by some other person ''
acquainted with the fact which express such opinion, and
as the testimony must relate to external facts which
'
B constitute conduct and is given by persons personally
acquainted with such facts, the testimony is in each case
direct within the meaning of Section 60. This, in our opinion,
y ,..
is the true interrelation between Section 50 and Section
60 of the Evidence Act.
c
t '
20. Applying the aforementioned tests in regard to the
evidences of' Janardan Misra' and 'Dharanidhar Misra', the two
witnesses who were examined to prove the relationship between
. '
Ahalya and Malabandi, it was opined;
"9. The first question which we must consider is if Janardan
D
Misra and Dharanidhar Misra had special means of
knowing the disputed relationship. Janardan Misra was
·+
aged about 62 in 1946, and he was related to the family
of Baidyanath Misra. Kashi Nath Misra was his grandfather
and was a brother of Baidyanath Misra. Obviously,
E therefore Janardan Misra had special means of knowing
the disputed relationship, being related to Baidyanath and /

therefore to Haripriya, who was the second wife of .,
Lokenath. He said in his evidence that he knew Lokenath
Parichha, had seen his first wife Satyabhama and
F remembered the marriage of Haripriya with Lokenath
Parichha. Obviously, therefore, he fulfilled the condition of
special knowledge. He further said that he attended the
marriage of Malabati, daughter of Lokenath, when Lokenath
was living. That marriage took place in the house of
G Lokenath. He also said that he was present when the first
-.,(
two daughters of Malabati were married and also at the
time of the upanayan ceremonies of Plaintiffs 1 and 2.
According to the witness, Shyam Sundar Pujari, a son of
a sister of Lokenath, acted as a materr~al uncle at the time
H of the marriage of the eldest daughter of Malabati and
~
SANT SINGH & ANR. v. NIRANJAN SINGH(D) BY 1087
LRS.& ANR. [S.8. SINHA, J.]

-<
- ~
Dayasgar Misra carrie'd Radhika, second daughter of
Malabati, at the time of her marriage."
A

See also Shantinath Ramu Danole and Anr. Vs. Jambu
-i
Ramu Danole and Ors. [(1996) 11 SCC 88) and Munshi Singh
Vs. Mal Dass [(1977) 4 SCC 65).
21. Applying the same tests, we have no doubt that the
a
evidence of DW-1 and DW-2 are admissible in evidence being

,
.... ..,.,
in conformity with the provisions of Section 50 of the Indian
Evidence Act. It will bear repetition to state that the High Court,
for the reasons best known to it, qid not advert to the depositions
of the witnesses examined on behalf of the appellants at all. The c
High Court could have interfered with the finding of fact in a second
~ appeal provided it applied the right tests, but it failed to do so.
22. The submission of Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned counsel
for the respondent that this Court should enter into the question
D
as to whether the suit property was an ancestral property or not,
·r. in our opinion cannot be accepted. No substantial question of
law in that behalf was raised. Out of the three substantial
questions of law, as referred to hereinbefore, only the first two
questions related to application of Section 50 of the Indian
Evidence Act. The third question formulated was not a substantial E
question of law at all. As the respondent failed to persuade the
High Court to formulate any substantial question of law on that
___,.
point vis. that the property, in question, was a coparcenary
property, it is too late in the day to ask. this Court to formulate
such a question and remit the matter to the High Court. F
-f
23. Whether there has been a severance of the joint family
property between Munshi Singh and Bakhtawar Singh is
essentially a question of fact and, thus, in our opinion, the said
question cannot be permitted to be reopened before us.
G
24. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned
~ judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The

. i
appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of
this case, there shall be no order as to costs .
K.K.T. Appeal allowed. H