BHAG SINGH AND ORS.versusUNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH

                         BHAG SINGH AND ORS.                                      A
                                  v.
                    UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH

                             SEPTEMBER 8, 1992

       [L.M. SHARMA, S. MOHAN AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.]                           B

         Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

          Section 23--Market value-Enhancement of-Large number of cases
    already decided by Courts-Subsequent judgment fixing higher market value      C
    for lands in the vicinity-Whether could be acted upon to grant higher
    compensation.

          The petitioner's lands were acquired and they were granted compen-
    sation by the Reference Court. For enhancement of compensation, the
    petitioners filed appeals/cross-objections before the High Court. By a        D
    common judgment the High Court enhanced the compensation. The High
    Court also dismissed the appeals preferred by the State Government for
•   reduction in the amounts of compensation awarded by the Reference
    Court. Not satisfied with the quantum of enhancement, the petitioners
    preferred the present Special Leave petitions against the High Court's
    orders.                                                                       E

          On behalf of the petitioners it was contend.ed that in a subsequent
    judgment the High Court has awarded higher market value for land
    similar to the acquired lands and on that basis the compensation has to
    be enhanced in respect of the acquired lands belonging to the petitioners.    F
          The Respondent contested the appeal on the ground that the judg-
    ment of the High Court relied on by the Petitioners related to a stray case
    and it should not be allowed to disturb the uniform rate of market value
    rIXed by the High Court in a number of cases and has become final.
                                                                                  G
          Dismissing the Special Leave Petitions, this Court,

          HELD: 1.1. No doubt, a judgment of a Court in a land acquisition
    case determining the market value of a land in the vicinity of the acquired
    land, even though not inter parties, could be admitted in evidence either
    as an instance or one from which the market value of the acquired land H
                                        457
    458                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A   could be deduced or inferred. There will be no difficulty in accepting such
    judgment as one furnishing the basis for determining the market value of
    the acquired land under consideration, if the opposite parties do not
    genuinely dispute the position that the judgment relied upon, could be
    acted as basis for determination of the market value of the acquired land.

B                                                         [461 G-H; 462 A-C]

          1.2. However, it is unsafe to act on a subsequent stray judgment of
    a High Court in a land acquisition case to disturb its earlier large number
    of judgments, where uniform rate of market value of the acquired lands in
    same vicinity are fixed.
c
          Krapa Rangiah v. Special Duty Collector, Land Acquisition, [1982) 2
    sec 374, distinguished.
          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C)
D   Nos. 7368-7390 of 1980.

          From the Judgments and Orders dated 8.3.1979, 27.3.1979 and
    9.5.1979 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Regular First Appeal
    Nos. 477n6, 473176, 474176, 471!76, 570177, 455176, 475/76, 569/77, 469176,
    842/78, 1053178, 653/77, 4/74, 461/74, 96/76, 99176, 152/78, 100/76, 97/76,
E   101/76, 472/76, 478/76 and 476 of 1976.

                                      WITH

          S.L.P. (C) Nos. 7416-7427, 7393, 7399 and 5054 of 1980.

F         Ujjagar Singh, D.V. Sehgal, A.S. Chahal, B. Kanta Rao, Virnal Dave,
    Ms. Neelam Kalsi, Ranbir Singh Yadav, G.K. Bansal, Ms. Lily Thomas, Raj
    Birbal and R.S. Suri for the appearing parties.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G          VENKATACHALA, J. These Special Leave Petitions being those
    directed against judgments of one and the same Division Bench of the High
    Court of Punjab and Haryana by which market value of lands of the
    petitioners acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
    1894 (for short 'the Act') has been determined on common materials and
H   considerations, they could be disposed of by this common judgment.
     BHAG SINGH v. U.T. CHANDIGARH [VENKATACHALA, J.]                   459

     We shall first deal with SLP (C) Nos. 7368-7376, 7379-7390, 7393 and      A
7399 of 1980 directed against one of the common judgments of the High
Court as the decision in them will suffice for disposal of the remaining
Special Leave Petitions where common questions arise for consideration.

      Petitioners were either the appellants or cross objectors in the ap-
peals before the High Court. As they were not satisfied with the amounts       B
of compensation awarded for their acquired lands by the Court of District
Judge at Chandigarh, on references received by it under Section 18 of the
Act, grant of a higher compensation was sought by them from the High
Court. By its common judgment, the High Court granted higher amounts
of compensation for the acquired lands of the appellants and the cross-ob-     c
jectors, though it fell short of the amounts of higher compensation sought
by them. These Special Leave Petitions are now presented by them seeking
grant of leave of this Court to appeal against the judgment of the High
Court, so as to obtain from this Court higher amounts of compensation for
their acquired lands.
                                                                               D
      Parcels of lands of the appellants and the cross objectors situated in
Badheri, Kajheri, Palsaura, Nizampur Burail and Burail were proposed for
acquisition for the development of new sectors to be added to the city of
Chandigarh, by Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act published in the
local Gazette on two dates, to wit, July 28, 1970 and December 16, 1970.       E
Court of the District Judge which received References under Section 18 of
the Act broadly categorised the acquired parcels of lands into four
categories and determined the market value of lands falling in each such
category, thus:

                                                                               F
      1.       Chahi at the rate of Rs. 18,750 an acre

      2.       Chahi muster at the rate of Rs. 12,500 an acre.

      3.       Barani and Bagh barani at the rate of Rs. 10,000 an acre.
                                                                               G
     4.        Chair mumkin, bara, maken chah, tubewell, huts, pirh and
               rasta area at the rate of Rs. 5,000 an acre.

       A Division Bench of the High Court which considered the appeals
and cross-objections including the appeals and cross-objections of the
petitioners who were the appellants and cross-objectors before it, reduced H
    460                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A   the categories of their acquired lands into three and determined the market
    ''alue of lands falling in each such category, thus:

          1.        Chahi at the rate of Rs. 18,750 per acre

          2.        Chahi muster at the rate of Rs. 12,500 per acre.
B
          3.        At other types and quality of land at the rate of Rs. 12,000
                    per acre.

          As becomes apparent from the judgment of the High Court, the
C parties before it did not dispute that the acquired lands situated in various
    villages fell in the same alignment to the West of Chandigarh City and
    there was no material increase in the prices of the acquired lands between
    July 28, 1970 and December 16, 1970, the dates on which the two sets of
    lands, had been notified for acquisition. Learned Judges of the High
D   Court deciding the appeal have adverted to in their judgment, to RFA
    No. 181 of 1970 by which a learned Single Judge of the same Court had
    determined the m.rket value of a land in the village Burail, acquired
    along with the lands with the market value of which they were concerned.
    Learned Single Judge who decided that appeal, it is stated, determined
    the market value of Chahi land at Rs. 18,750 per acre, Chahi muster land
E
    at Rs. 12,500 per acre and all other types of land at the rate of Rs. 12,000
    per acre, and that determination of the market value of the lands had
    resulted in an enhancement of compensation payable to the claimants
    concerned there. Learned Judges have also adverted to in their judgment
    to another judgment of the same learned Single Judge rendered in RFA
F   No. 200 of 1973 in which he awarded for the lands of Kajheri village
    acquired pursuant to the Notifications under consideration and for the
    same purpose, at the very rates and on the same categorisation, as had
    been done in RFA No. 181 of 1970 and State's Letters Patent Appeal
    filed against that judgment having been dismissed by the Division Bench
G   without disturbing the amounts of compensation awarded by the learned
    Single Judge. Thereafter, a reference is made to 14 Regular First Appeals
    decided by the same Division Bench earlier on March 7, 1979 where they
    had determined the market value of the lands of Nizampur Burail at the
    rates determined by the learned Single Judge in the appeals decided by
H   him. Learned Judges of the Division Bench have, by following the earlier
     BHAG SINGH v. U.T. CHANDIGARH [VENKATACHALA, J.]                    461

judgment of the Court determined the market value of the acquired A
parcels of lands having regard to the categorisation of lands made
thereunder and the market value determined therefor observing, inter alia,
that the lands with the market value of which they were concerned, were
in the villages which were contiguous. That determination of the market
value of the acquired lands has resulted in grant of enhanced compensa-         B
tion to the petitioners as had been done in their earlier judgments relating
to the compensation awarded for similar lands acquired at about the same
time and for the same purpose. Consequently, appeals filed by the State
for reduction in the amounts of compensation awarded by the Court of
the District Judge have come to be dismissed while the appeals and
cross-objections of the petitioners have come to be partly allowed.
                                                                                c
       What was urged before us by the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners-claimants in support of the petitions, was that this court should
enhance the market value of the acquired lands of the claimants since a
learned Single Judge of the High Court in some other appeal had 1warded         D
a somewhat higher market value for a land similar to the acquired lands.
Their submission was that the compensation payable for the lands of the
claimants had to be enhanced by treating the subsequent judgment of the
High Court as evidence of the real market value of the acquired lands of
the claimants. Learned counsel sought to invite our attention to that           E
subsequent judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court on which
they had relied, as had been reported in a Law Report. Further, they
sought to obtain sustenance for their argument from a decision of this
Court in Krapa Rangiah v. Special Duty Collector, Land Acquisition, [1982]
2 SCC 374. In our view, the submission of the learned counsel made on
behalf of the petitioners do not merit acceptance. So also, the decision of     F
this Court from which sustenance for the submission was sought, can lend
no such sustenance.


      No doubt, a judgment of a Court in a land acquisition case deter-
mining the market value of a land in the vicinity of the acquired land, even G
though not inter parties, could be admitted in evidence either as an
instance or one from which the market value of the acquired land could
be deduced or inferred. There will be no difficulty in accepting such
judgment as one furnishing the basis for determining the market value of
the acquired land under consideration, if the opposite parties do not H
    462                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS[lQ92] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A genuinely dispute the position that the judgment relied upon, could be
    acted as basis for determination of the market value of the acquired land.
    In fact, in Krapa Rangiah's case (supra) this Court was considering a case
    where the High Court had reduced the compensation which had been
    awarded in appeal by the reference Court. ll was not disputed before this
    Court that the High Court had granted an extra rate of Rs. 2 per square
B
    yard for a similar land which adjoined the acquired land and had been
    acquired under the same Notification. It is in the said set of admitted facts,
    this Court enhanced the compensation payable for the acquired land under
    consideration before it by Rs. 2 per square yard. This decision, therefore,
    cannot lend any assistance to the petitioners claim for grant of compensa-
c   tion which could be higher than that granted by the High Court. The
    petitioners in the present petitions, it has to be noted, though have been
    granted compensation by the High Court exceeding that granted by the
    Reference Court was seeking grant of further enhanced compensation from
    this Court. But such claim for enhanced compensation is contested by
D   learned counsel appearing for the Land Acquisition Collector, by urging
    that the judgment of the High Court on which reliance is placed on behalf
    of petitioners cannot form the basis for determining the market value of
    the acquired lands of the petitioners, in as much as, there is absolutely no
    evidence adduced by them to show that in the attendant facts and cir-
E   cumstances of the cases, it would be just and reasonable to grant the
    compensation for the acquired lands of the petitioners at a higher rate in
    which compensation has been granted to the claimant concerned in a stray
    case where subsequent judgment has been rendered by the High Court.
    Judgments of the High Court given in a large number of cases determining
    the market value of lands in a huge tract at uniform rates cannot be revised,
F
    in our view, solely on the basis of claim made on behalf of petitioners that
    a learned Judge of the same High Court in a subsequent stray case has
    awarded a higher compensation for a piece of land said to be in the same
    tract of the acquired lands. If recourse is taken to such procedure, the
G   market value already determined in a large number of cases at uniform
    rates may go on requiring either enhancement or reduction, whenever
    subsequent judgment of the Court in a stray case brings about a variation
    in the market value of land concerned. To say the least, such procedure if
    is resorted to by Courts in determination of market value of lands lying in
    large tracts based on previous awards or judgments can never reach
H
           BHAG SINGH v. U.T. CHANDIGARH [VENKATACHALA, J.]                463

    finality. Besides, recourse to such procedure could give ample scope for A
    making of arbitrary and fanciful awards in land acquisition cases. Hence,
    we consider it unsafe to act on a subsequent stray judgment of a High
    Court in a land acquisition case to disturb its earlier large number of
    judgments, where uniform rate of market value of the acquired lands in
    same vicinity are fixed. Consequently, no interference with the judgment of B
    the High Court against which present SLPs are filed, is warranted.
    TheSLPs are, therefore, liable to be dismissed.

           SLP NOS. 7377-7378 AND 7423-7427 OF 1980.

          As these Sp_ecial Leave Petitions are directed against another com-     C
    man judgment of the High Court where the questions arising for decision
    are the same as those in the SLPs just now dismissed by considered
    judgment, they are liable to be dismissed by following that judgment.

           SLP NOS. 5054, 7416-7422 OF 1980.
                                                                                  D
          Again, our considered judgment in SLP (C) No. 7368 of 1980 and
    connected petitions covers these SLPs. Hence, these SLPs are also liable
    to be dismissed.

          In the result, all the Special Leave Petitions are dismissed, however
    with no costs.

    G.N.                                                   Petitions dismissed.




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