Holding

The Court held that the State was justified in dispensing with the Section 5‑A inquiry on the basis of urgency, that acquisition for a public purpose is valid despite a mismatch with the Master Plan, and that no representation under Section 48 was permissible in these circumstances.

Summary

The State of Uttar Pradesh acquired 7.334 hectares of land in Agra for a fruits and vegetables market yard, invoking Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to dispense with the Section 5‑A inquiry on the ground of urgency, despite a one‑year gap between the notification and the declaration. The land owners challenged the acquisition, arguing that there was no urgency, that the land was earmarked for "light industries" (later a green belt) in the Master Plan, and that they should be allowed to file a representation under Section 48 for withdrawal of the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the government’s subjective satisfaction of urgency, supported by material evidence of the deplorable condition of the existing market, justified dispensing with the inquiry, and that a public‑purpose acquisition remains valid even if the land’s designated use in the Master Plan differs. The Court further ruled that the special procedure in Om Prakash could not be extended here, so no representation under Section 48 was permitted. All the civil appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The adequacy of the State’s claim of urgency to dispense with the Section 5‑A inquiry under Section 17(4).
Whether a delay of one year between the Section 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration defeats the claim of urgency.
Whether acquisition is invalid if the land’s use in the Master Plan is for light industries/green belt rather than a market yard.
Whether the appellants may file a representation under Section 48 for withdrawal of the acquisition when Section 5‑A was dispensed with.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 17(4), s. 4(1), s. 48, s. 5-A, s. 6
U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973s. 13

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 5-AUrgencyMaster PlanPublic purposeSection 48Market yardChange of land use

Judgment

A BHAGAT SINGH ETC.
v.
STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

DECEMBER 8, 1998

B [S.B. MAJMUDAR AND M. JAGANNADHA RAO JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

Sections 4(1), 5-A, 6 and 17(4)-Acquisition of land for setting up
C market yard-Inquiry under section 5-A dispensed with on the ground of
urgency-Delay of one year between the Notification and the declaration--
Writ petition challenging validity of land acquisition proceeding-Dismissed-
On appeal-Held, subjective satisfaction for dispensing with inquiry based
on sufficient material cannot be faulted-Delay caused has no great impact
D on the subjective satisfaction.

Sections 4(1) and 6--Change of public purpose-Land reserved for
light industries' in the Master Plan-Acquisition for construction of market
yard-Validity of-Held, acquisition will be valid even if it is for a public
purpose other than the type mentioned in Master Plan/Zonal Plan-
£ Subsequently the beneficiary of acquisition can move the competent authority
for suitable modification of Master Plan.

Section 48-Representation for withdrawal of land acquisition
proceedings-Permissibility of

The State Government by a Notification dated 5.10.1993 under section
F 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 acquired certain lands for construction
of a market yard. The provisions of inquiry under section 5-A of the Act was
dispensed with on the ground of urgency. Declaration under section 6 was
issued in 6.10.1994 acquiring the land. The appellant-land-owners' writ
petitions challenging the validity of land acquisition proceedings were
G dismissed. Hence the present appeals.

The contention of appellants was that there was a delay of full one year
between the notification under section 4(1) and declaration under sect,!?.n 6.
Thus there was no urgency requiring dispensing with inquiry under section
5-A; the land acquired was reserved for 'light industries' under the Master
H Plan and therefore it was not permissible to acquire the land for market
404
BHAGAT SINGH v. STATE 405
yard. A
Dismissing the appeals, this Court

HELD. 1.1. The High Court was right in holding that the respondents
were amply justified in dispensing with inquiry under section 5-A by
exercising powers under section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. B
[411-F)

1.2. The subjective satisfaction for dispensing with inquiry under section
5-A is based on sufficient material and cannot be faulted. The photographs
as to the filthy state of the present Mandi with garbage and stray cattle and
pigs show that the place is so loathsome that it will be precarious and C
perhaps hazardous to store vegetables foodgrains in the existing market.
Therefore, the urgency clause was rightly invoked by the Government There
are also enough precedents in connection with acquisition of land for markets
where Sections 5-A has been dispensed with and such action was upheld.
[409-A-B-C)
D
Hari Singh and ors v. State of U.P. and Ors., [1984)2 SCC 624 and
Union of India v. Praveen Gupta and Ors., (1996)9 JT 624, relied on.
Satyendra Prasad Jain (S.P. Jain) and Ors. v. State of U.P., (1987) I
A.W.C. 382 and Kailasawati v. State of U.P., AIR (1978) All. 181, approved.
1.3. The delay caused between section 4(1) Notification and section 6 E
declaration has no great impact on the subjective satisfaction arrived at for
dispensing with inquiry under section 5-A of the Act. [411-E)
2. There is no need that the land proposed to be acquired by the
Government for a particular public purpose should be for the same purpose
or use mentioned in the Master Plan or Zonal Plan for the said area. Nor F
will the acquisition be invalid merely because the land proposed to be acquired
is for a purpose other than the one permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal
. Plan applicable to that locality. Acquisition will be valid if it is for a public
purpose even if it is not for the type of user permitted by the Master Plan
or Zonal Plan in force at the time acquisition is made. It will be for the G
beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent authority under the
Development Act and obtain the sanction of the said authority for suitable
modification of the Master Plan so as to permit the use of the land for the
public purpose for which the land is acquired. In fact, it may be difficult for
the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent authority under the
Development Act seeking permission to change of land use even before the H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A land is acquired or before possession is given to the beneficiary. It is clear
that acquisition for a public purpose and obtaining permission from competent
authority under the concerned Development Act for change of land use are
Jifferent from one another and the former is not dependent upon the latter.
[413-D-E-F-G)

B Ajlatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi., (1975]4 SCC 285, relied on.

Kendriya Karamchari Evam Mura Sahkari Avas Samithi Ltd. Etc. v.
State of UP., (1988) U.P.L.B.E.C 645, approved.

3. No case is made out for permitting the appellants to submit a
C r~presentation for withdrawal of the land acquisition proceedings under
section 48 of the Act. The procedure adopted in Om Prakash cannot be
treated as a precedent in all Land acquisition cases where Section 5-A
inquiry is dispensed with. The procedure adopted in that case is based upon
the special circumstances obtaining there. In the instant case, there are no
such circumstances which warrant a similar procedure to be followed.
]) (414-A-B)

Om Prakash v. State of UP., (1998)6 SCC 1, distinguished and held
inapplicable.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6226 of 1998
E Etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.4.97 of the Allahabad High Court
in C.M.W.P. No. 39430of1994.
WITH
C.A. No. 6227/98, 6228/98, 6229-6230/98 and 6231-6235/98.
F Raju Ramachandran and O.P.Rana R.K. Khanna, Surya Kant, A.O.
Vaishnav, Vinay Kumar Garg, Pradeep Misra, T. Mahipal and Ms. Niti Dikshit,
for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J. Leave granted.
G
These appeals all arise out of the common judgment of the Allahabad
High Court dated 24.4.1997. By that judgment, the writ petitions filed by the
appellants questioning the validity of land acquisition proceedings were all
dismissed.

H The following are the facts common to all the matters. On 25.9.1991, the
BHAGATSINGH v.STATE [M.JAGANNADHARAO,J.] 407

District Magistrate, Agra sent proposals to the U.P. Government for acquisition A
of 10.175 hectares of land in village Bainpur, U.P. for construction of a market
yard for fruits and vegetables. Various plots of land were included in the
notification. The Section 4( l) notification was issued under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinunder called the Act) on 5.10.1993 for acquisition
of 7.334 hectares. The notification stated that the provisions of Section 5- B
A were being dispensed with in view of the urgency of the matter and this
was being done in exercise of powers under Section 17(4) of the Act. The
notification insofar as it related to urgency, and dispensing with Section 5-
A inquiry read as follows:
"Being of the opinion that the provisions of sub-section ( 1) of Section
17 of the said Act are applicable to the said land inasmuch as the said C
land is urgently required for the construction of Fruits and Vegetables
Market Yard in District Agra and that in view of the pressing urgency
it is as well necessary to eliminate delay likely to be caused by an
inquiry under Section 5-A of the said Act, the Government is further
pleased to direct under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the said Act, D
that the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act shall not apply.
For what purpose Required- For the construction of Fruits and
Vegetables Market Yard in District Agra.
Note-A: Site plan of the land may be inspected in the office of the
Collector, Agra." E
Thereafter, Section 6 declaration was issued on 6.10.94 acquiring the
land for the above market yard under a planned development scheme and the
notification directed the Collector to take possession of the land in 15 days
under Section 9( l) of the Act.
F
It was this acquisition that w<l'!l'questioned in the batch of writ petitions
in the High Court. The writ petitions raised two general issues, namely, that
.. there was no such urgency which required dispensing with the inquiry under
Section 5-A of the Act and that, that the land of the petitioners which was
sought to be acquired was marked in the Master Plan for Agra for the use
of 'light industries' and later as 'green belt' and it was therefore not permissible G
to acquire the same for locating the Fruits and Vegetables Market Yard for that
would amount to violating the Master Plan. Some special points were raised
in some of the writ petitions.

·The High Court of Allahabad, in an elaborate Judgment rejected the
above contentions and referred to the reasons given by the respondents in H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A their respective Counter affidavits as sufficient for dispensing with the Section
5-A inquiry. The High Court also held, following rulings of this Court and of
the Allahabad High Court that even if the user for a market yard was not one
of the permissible uses of the land as per the Master Plan, still once the land
was acquired, the Market Committee could take steps to have the Master Plan
B suitably amended. The High Court also rejected the special points raised in
some of the writ petitions.

In these appeals we have heard the arguments of Shri Raju Ramachandran,
learned senior counsel appearing in the Civil Appeals arising out of SLPs
14921-22 of 1997, Sri R.K. Khanna in appeals arising out of SLPs 14512/
C 97,14513/97 and 14848 of 1997 and Mr. Vinay Kumar Garg in the appeals
arising out of SLPs 17203-17207 of 1997 and in Contempt Petition No.381 of
1998. For the respondents, the Mandi Market was represented by Senior
Advocate Shri O.P. Rana and the State of U.P. was represented by Ms. Niti
Dikshit.

D Learned counsel for the appellant Shri Raju Ramachandran. urged that
there was no such urgency as required dispensing with the inquiry under the
Act, that the acquired land was reserved for 'light industries' (later amended
as green belt) in the Master Plan and, therefore, it was not permissible to
acquire the land for Fruit and Vegetable Market Yard, and in any event the
E appellant must be permitted to make a representation to the Government for
withdrawal of the acquisition so far as his client's land was concerned. Some
special points based on the location of the plots or present user, were also
raised. These submissions were countered by the learned senior counsel for
the Market Committee and counsel appearing for the state. We shall first deal
with these general points which are common to all the appeals.
F
On the question of urgency, the following facts and contentions emerge
from the Counter affidavits. The establishment of a Market Yard is not merely
one of mere urgency but one which makes it necessary to dispense with
inquiry under section 5-A. The existing market yard is situated in a very
G congested locality having no scope for expansion and the place where the
Market is now located is not sufficient to cater to the growing needs of its
constituents. There is no adequate space for free movement and parking of
trucks/bullock carts etc. nor for providing necessary shelter for those who
come to the market. The existing market is also devoid of any amenities
necessary for hundreds of people who visit the market every day or for the
H bullocks which are being used to draw the carts. During rainy season it
BHAGAT SINGH v. STATE [M. JAGANNADHARAO, J.) 409

becomes well-nigh impossible to find out suitable shelters for the farmers and A
producers of vegetables. It has become necessary to provide amenities and
also construct roads in a planned manner.

In our view, the subjective satisfaction for dispensing with inquiry
under Section 5-A is based on sufficient material and cannot be faulted. The
photographs as to the filthy state of the present Mandi with garbage and B
stray cattle and pigs show that the place is so loathsome that it will be
precarious and perhaps hazardous to store vegetables or foodgrains in the
existing market. We are, therefore, of the view that the urgency clause was
rightly invoked by the government. There are also enough precedents in
connection with acquisition of land for markets where Section 5-A has been C
dispensed with and such action was upheld.

In connection with a similar acquisition for a market yard, when Section
5-A inquiry was dispensed with on the ground of urgency, the Allahabad
High Court in Satyendra Prasad Jain (S.P. Jain) and others, v. State of U.P.,
[1987] A.W.C. 382 observed: D
"The question herein is whether the State was justified in dispensing
the requirements of enquiry contemplated under Section 5-A. It could
be taken judicial notice of, that in regard to agricultural produce there
were no proper market facilities. There were innumerable charges,
levies and exactions which the agriculturists were required to pay E
without having any say in the proper utilisation of the amount paid
by them. The Government of India and the various committees and
commissions appointed to study the condition of agricultural markets
in the country had stress to need to provide proper market yards for
the sale and purchase of agricultural produce. The Planning Commission F
also stressed long ago in this regard. The Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan
Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 has been enacted to provide for the regulation
of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for the establishment,
superintendence and control of markets therefore, in Uttar Pradesh.
The proposed construction of market and market yard by the Mandi
Samiti is, therefore, a step forward to ameliorate the conditions of G
producers with due representation to them in the Mandi Samities for
the fair Settlement of disputes relating to their transactions. It is a long
felt need which is said to have been included in the planned
Development Scheme."

It was further stated (P.3 & 4) as follows : H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A "It cannot be said that there is no urgency in matter of acquiring the
land in question."

The same question arose again in Kailaswati v. State of UP., AIR
(1978) All. 181. That was a case where land was acquired for purpose of
Market Yard to be constructed by the Krishi Utpadan Mani Samithi, Meerut.
B The inquiry under Section 5-A was dispensed with. The same was upheld and
it was held that there was immediate urgency as there was acute scarcity of
godowns and warehouses where foodgrains purchased by Government had

C
to be stocked. In our opinion, the above Judgment is also in point. When in
such circumstances market yards are proposed to be established, it is, in our
view, permissible to invoke the provisions of Section 17(4) and dispense with
Section 5-A inquiry.
'
The decisions of this Court in Hari Singh and others v. State of UP.
and Other, [1984] 2 SCC 624, where acquisition was made for a market yard
and Union of India v. Praveen Gupta & Ors., (1996) 9 J.T. 624 where the
D acquisition was for a timber yard-show that the establishment of markets has
been treated as one of grave urgency to remove congestion. The dispensing
with Section 5-A inquiry was upheld in these cases.

An additional point was made before us by the respondents that in M
C. Mehta v. Union of India, W.P. (Civil) No. 13381 of 1984 this Court had
E directed inspection in regard to pollution in Agra and submission of reports
by the Central Pollution Control Board & other senior officials of the Municipal
Corporation and that, a team of officials inspected Agra City on 29.11.96 and
made various observations in the 2nd Report dated 20.11.96 and one of the
observations related to the shifting of this very Mandi in Agra and read as
F follows : (See page 6 of the Report) :

"The officials from Mandi Samithi stated that the vegetable market,
which is responsible for generating huge quantity of garbage, is being
shifted. The shifting is likely to be done by June, 1997."

G Thereafter this Court issued directions on 3.12.96 that the authorities
must take steps to remedy the ills which have come to light from the above J
said Report.

No doubt, learned senior counsel for the appellants is right in his
submission that these are events of 1996 and cannot have any retrospective
H bearing on events of 1993 when Section 5-A inquiry was dispensed with. It
BHAGAT SINGH v. STATE [M. JAGANNADHARAO, J.] 411
is true that these facts may not retrospectively justify the above action but, A
in our view, they reveal a state of environmental degradation in Agra City
which was continuing from_several years before 1996. Further, learned counsel
for the respondents submitted that, in any event, the directions issued by this
Court in the above public interest case on 3.12.96 will certainly com'! in the
way of this Court in the present proceedings in holding that Section 5-A B
inquiry should have been conducted or that such an inquiry should be now
conducted. It is also submitted for the respondents that these facts are being
relied upon to show that, at any rate, this Court should not interfere in its
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. We find sufficient
force in these contentions of the respondents.

It was then urged for the appellant that there was a delay of full one
c
year between the Section 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration and this
showed the lethargy of the Government and this would reveal that Government
would not have lost anything if only a hearing under Section 5-A was given
to the owners so that they could place their grievances before the Government.
In this connection, we may state that the respondents have explained the D
delay as having been caused inasmuch as of various steps were required to
be taken to finalise the proceedings. It was necessary to issue newspaper
publications and also make local publication of the substance of the Section
4(1) notification. There was also delay on account of following other
administrative procedures. In view of the above explanation, we are not E
prepared to hold that the latter delay between Section 4( 1) notification and
Section 6 declaration has any great impact on the subjective satisfaction
arrived at when orders dispensing with the Section 5-A inquiry were passed
earlier.

For the aforesaid reasons, we agree with the High Court that the F
respondents were amply justified in dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-
A by exercising powers under Section 17(4) of the Act.

The next question relates to the contention of the appellants that under
the Master Plan for Agra City, the land of the appellants which is proposed
for acquisition is in an area where the permitted use is for 'light industries' G
and therefore it will not be permissible to use the acquired land for purposes
of a market Yard. It is pointed out that, in fact, later on the permitted use was
modified and the land is now shown as 'green belt'. On the other hand, it is
submitted for the respondents that if the land is proved to have been acquired
for a valid public purpose, then the beneficiary of the land acquisition can
later on move the concerned authority for change of land use. H
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A An analogous issue arose in the case Ajlatoon v. Lt. Governor ofDelhi,
(197 5] 4 SCC 285. In that case a notification was issued under Section 4(1)
of the Act for acquisition of a vast extent of land for the planned development
of Delhi. The said acquisition was questioned. On of the contentions was that
for such a purpose, development, action had to be taken only under the Delhi
Development Act, 1957 and that too by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi
B under that Act and not by the Central Government under the Land Acquisition
Act. It was there argued that inasmuch as there was no Master Plan nor Zonal
Plan in existence on the date of notification, the acquisition was bad. This
Court rejected objection raised by the owners and observed, after referring
to Sections 12 and 15 of the Delhi Development Act. 1957, as follows (para
c 23):

"The planned development of Delhi had been decided upon by the
Government before 1959, viz., even before the Delhi Development Act
came into force. It is true that there could be no planned development
of Delhi except in accordance with the provisions of the Delhi
D Development Act after that Act came into force but there is no
inhibition in acquiring land for planned development of Delhi under
the act before the Master Plan was ready. (See the decision in Patna
Improvement Trustv. Smt. Lakshmi Devi, (1963] Suppl. 2 SCR 312). Jn
Other Words, the fact that actual development is permissible in an
area other than a development area with the approval of sanction
E of the local authority did not preclude the Central Government from
acquiring the land for planned development under the Act. Section 12
is concerned only with the planned development. It has nothing to do
with acquisition of property; acquisition generally precedes
development."
F
This Court observed :

"For planned development in an area other than a development area,
it is only necessary to obtain the sanction or approval of the local
authority as provided in Section 12(3). The Central Government could
G acquire any property under the Act and develop it after obtaining
the approval of the local authority. "

This above decision of this Court was followed by the Allahabad High
Court in Kendriya Karamchari Evam Mura Sahkari Avas Samithi Ltd etc.
v. State of UP., (1988) U.P.L.B.E.C. 645. It was held in that case that the
H government could acquire any property under the Act and later develop the
BHAGAT SINGH v. STATE [M. JAGANNADHARAO, J.) 413
same after obtaining the necessary approval of the concerned local authority A
under the Development Act. It was stated (at page 651) :

"Amendment of Master plan is permissible with the approval of the
State Government under Section 13 of the U .P. Urban Planning and
Development Act, 1973 and in the present case the mastert plan
showing the area in question as green belt was modified with the B
approval of the State Government which approval no doubt was
accorded subsequent to the issue of notification under Section 4 and
6. However, as observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court the
mere fact that till the date of the issue of the notification under
Section 4 the necessary approval of the Government had not been C
obtained can not preclude the Government from acquiring the land for
planned development under the Land Acquisition Act. Acquisition
generally precedes development and consequently the land in question
could be acquired in anticipation of the approval of the State
Government for the change of the land use of the Master plan prepared
by the Development Authority." D
As pointed out in the above Judgments, there is no need that the land
proposed to be acquired by the Government for a particular public purpose
should be for the same purpose or use mentioned in the Master Plan or Zonal
Plan for the said area. Nor will the acquisition be invalid merely because the E
land proposed to be acquired is for a purpose other than the one permitted
by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan applicable to that locality. Acquisition will
be valid if it is for a public purpose even if it is not for the type of user
permitted by the Master plan or Zonal plan in force at the.time the acquisition
is made. It will be for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent
authority under the Development Act and obtain the sanction of the said F
authority for suitable modification of the Master Plan so as to permit the use
of the land for the public purpose which the land is acquired. In fact, it may
be difficult for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent
authority under the Development Act seeking permission to change of land
use even before the land is acquired or before possession is given to the G
beneficiary. On the principle stated in Aflatoon 's case, it is clear that acquisition
for a public purpose and obtaining permission from competent. authority
under the concerned Development Act for change of land use are different
from one another and the former is not dependent upon the latter. '.·,

For the aforesaid reasons this contention of the appellants is rfjected. H
,,_

414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A It was then argued that as done in the case of Om Prakash v. State of
U.P., [1998) 6 SCC 1, the appellants be permitted to move the Competent
authority under the Land Acquisition Act for withdrawal of these plots of
land from acquisition under Section 48 of the Act. This request is opposed
by the respondents. In our opinion, the procedure adopted in Om Prakash
B cannot be treated as a precedent in all Land acquisition cases where Section
5-A inquiry is dispensed with. The procedure adopted in that case is based
upon the special circumstances obtaining there. In the case before us there
are no such circumstances which warrant a similar procedure to be followed.
In that case, the land was acquired in a village in U .P. under a notification
of 5.1.91 for the purpose of industrial development. The appellants contended
C before this court that the land was abadi land as per a report submitted by
an officer of the department as late as on 11.3.96, that the land was being used
in 1996 for residential purposes and that the policy of the State Government
was not to acquire residential property for industrial use. This Court noticed
that by 1998, the Government of U .P. had acquired acres 496 for the purpose
D of industrial development in the village. The appellants were owners of a small
extent of 50 acres. In those circumstances, this Court, while declining to
quash the action of the Government in dispensing with inquiry under Section
5-A, thought it fit to permit the appellants therein to move the concerned
authority by way of a representation for withdrawal of the land acquisition
proceedings. This Court directed the authorities to consider whether th.ere
E was any abadi at the time when Section 4( 1) notification was issued, whether.
such abadi was a legally permissible abadi, whether the abadi continued to
exist on the date of representation, whether such abadi was covered by any
order of government in force at the time when either Section 4( 1) notification
or Section 6 declaration were made, and whether such abadi continued to be
F there as on date of representation. No such facts exist in the present case
before us. We accordingly hold that no case is made out for permitting the
appellants to submit a representation for withdrawal of the land acquisition
proceedings under Section 48 of the Act.

We shall now deal with certain supplementary points raised in the
G individual cases.
In Civil appeal, arising out ofS.L.P. (C) Nos. 14921-14922of1997 it was
argued by the learned senior counsel Shri Raju Ramachandran that as seen
from the Map of the Master Plan, it was clear that some other property is
earmarked for the Mandi and that instead of using that area, the Market
H Committee had sought the acquisition of the appellants' land. It was also
BHAGAT SINGH v. STA TE [M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J.] 415

pointed out that on 5/6-!'2.95, the Director of the Mandi had addressed a letter A
to the Joint Secretary, Agricultural Department, Government of U.P. that on
the plot No. 1324, the appellant had been running a bakery and inasmuch as
the compensation to be paid for acquisition thereof was likely to be higher,
the land might be released from acquisition. Learned senior counsel also relied
upon a similar letter dated 18.7.96 by the same director of the Mandi to the B
Government. We find from the counter affidavit of the respondent in par(\
3(viii) that the State Government has since not accepted the advice of the
Mandi Director. In the light of the Government's rejection and in view of what
we have stated earlier, we cannot permit the appellant to now go before the
Government seeking exercise of power under Section 48. We are not, therefore,
inclined to direct the Government to consider withdrawal of plot 1324 from C
land acquisition. The above appeals are, therefore, liable to be dismissed.

In the Civil Appeals arising out ofS.L.P(C) Nos.14512-14513, 14848 of
1997 learned counsel for the appellam Shri R.K. Khano argued that the plots
of his clients were on the extreme western side of the land sought to be D
acquired and were in fact separated by a road· which runs from North to
South, that the market is now proposed on the eastern side of the road large
extent and that there was no immediate need for this land and hence, Section
5-A ought not to have been dispensed with so far as his clients' plots were
concerned. He pointed out that the proposed construction of market was in
two phases, each phase divided into four sub-phases and that each sub- E
phase would take considerable time and therefore, his client's land, which was
away from the main area in the eastern side of the North-South road, should
have been excluded and that if Section 5-A were held, it would have certainly
been excluded. He also contended that in the remaining land, i.e. excluding
his client's lands, all facilities which were necessary for a market had been F
provided and hence his client's lands were not necessary for acquisition. He
argued further that on the other side of the proposed market, there were
admittedly vacant land available and that land was not included in the
acquisition because the owners thereof were highly influential.

G
It has to be stated that the appellant has not alleged malajides against
the respondents. It is not for this Court to decided whether these plots are
necessary or not for the proposed Market. Learned counsel for the State Ms.
Niti Dikshit argued,-with reference to the plan,-that the plots of these
appellants were necessary in as much the Market had to be approached from
this side where the appellants' prope1ty was located. The vacant land on the H
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A other side not being adjacent to the proposed market, could not be acquired.
The Government was able to get some land in land ceiling proceedings and
from the Gaon Sabha and therefore with the monies available and earmarked
for the market, it was considered that more land should be acquired keeping
in view the future plans for the development of the market. It is now planned
B that in the first phase, there will be four sub-phases, in the following manner
for 24 shops;- 24 shops; 40 shops and 4 auction halls. Nearly Rs.2 crores were
set apart for development of Ac 18.00 initially.

We are of the view that the above facts do show that development of
the market is in various phases and the future development of the Market in
C a growing town like Agra was kept in mind while acquiring this area. It is not
for this Court to say that there was no need to acquire the appellant's lands
for the Market and that the remaining land was sufficient. If such a contention
were to be accepted, each of the owners could equally advance such an
argument making the scheme wholly unworkable. These appeals are therefore
D liable to be dismissed.

In the appeals arising out of SLP (C} Nos. 17203-17207of1997, it was
argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants had
obtained a status quo order on 22.9.97 and in spite of that a boundary wall
was constructed in such a manner that the appellant was unable to enter his
E plot nor take any trucks into the said land. In fact, on these allegations, the
appellant has filed the Contempt case which is also now before us.

The respondents have pointed out that admittedly no construction was
made by the respondents in the appellants' plot. The wall was built by
F respondents in their own property in respect of which the status quo order
would not apply. The wall was actually put up in August 1998 to prevent
encroachment and to safeguard the respondents' property. It is pointed out
that there is enough space between the said wall and the gate of the appellants'
property for egress and ingress and the appellant was not precluded from
G reaching his property. It is also pointed out that the 2 rooms constructed by
the appel(ant in his property are vacant, none is living there and no business
is being conducted there. On the merits, the appellants' case is no different
from case of the appellants in other cases. We are of the view that these
appeals also deserve to be dismissed.

H The learned counsel in the remaining case adopted the general arguments
BHAGATSINGH v.STATE [M.JAGANNADHARAO,J.] 417
in the above cases. For the reasons already given, these appeals also deserve A
to be dismissed.

In the result, all the appeals are dismissed. In the circumstances, there
will be no order as to costs.

S.V.K Appeals dismissed
I