BHAIJIversusSUB DIVISIONAL OFFICER, THANDLA AND ORS.

A                                       BHAIJI
                                           V.

               SUB DIVISIONAL OFFICER, THANDLA AND ORS.

                                DECEMBER 16, 2002

B         [R.C. LAHOTI, BRIJESH KUMAR AND ARUN KUMAR, JJ.)


          Land Laws:

          MP. Land Revenue Code, i959:
c
           Section i70B-Transfer of/and owned by aboriginal tribal to aboriginal
    tribal-Applicability ofthe provision to such transaction-Held, its applicability
    is wide-it is not confined to transaction by aboriginal tribal to non-aboriginal
    tribal, but also to transaction to aboriginal tribal.

D        Sections I 70B(i), (2). and (3) and sub-section (2-A)-Distinction
    between-Discussed
                                                                                        "
          interpretation ofstatutes: interpretation ofprevious statute by reference
    to the statute enacted subsequently-Held, not correct.

E          Statement of Objects and Reasons of Statute-Aid of-Scope-Held, it
     is permissible for understanding the background, the antecedent state ofaffairs,
    surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute and the evil which the
    statute sought to remedy-But it cannot be utilized/or the purpose ofrestricting
    and controlling the plain meaning ofthe language employed in the statute and
p   for excluding from its operation such transactions which ii plainly covers.

          The land in question was owned by members of a tribe which had
    been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under Section 165(6) of M.P. Land
    Re\•enue Code, 1959 as contemplated by Section 1708(1) of the Code. The
    appellant claimed to be a similar aboriginal tribal. The land was sold by
G   the aboriginal tribal bhumiswamis through ' registered sale deeds to the
    appellant, during the period attracting applicability of Section 1708(1).
    The appellant did not furnish the information in the form and in the
    manner prescribed, within period of two years. Sub-Divisional Officer
    initiated proceedings under Section 1708(1) of the Code and issued show

H                                          116
              BHAIJI v. SUB DIVISIONAL OFFICER, THANDLA                  11 7
cause notice. Appellant filed writ petition in High Court on the ground           A
that the appellant and the vendor bhumiswamis, both being aboriginal
tribals, the applicability of Section 1708 was not attracted and, therefore,
the notice issued by the SDO was illegal and without any authority in law.
The Writ Petition \yas dismissed by High Court.

      Jn appeal to this Court appellant contended that in view of scheme          B
of the Code, specially Sections 165, 168, 170A and 1708 thereof, it is clear
that Section 1708 proposes to embrace within its fold only such
transactions which are fraudulent and entered into by aboriginal in favour
of non-tribals; the statements of objects and reasons and language of sub-
section (2A) of Section 170 B makes it clear that legislature had intended        C
to enact the provisions for enquiry into transfers made by members of
aboriginal tribe to non-tribals.

      Dismissing the appeal, the Court

      HELD: I.I. The petition filed by the writ petitioner before the High        D
Court was entirely misconceived and, in a way, premature. The show cause
notice issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer cannot be said to be without
jurisdiction. The appellant should have participated in the enquiry after
showing cause. (126-H)

      I.2. The purpose of enacting Section 1708 of the Code is very wide.
                                                                                  E
The object sought to be achieved, as its drafting indicates, is to gather and
make available all statistics with the State officials so as to find out how
much land belonging to aboriginal tribals is in possession of anyone to
whom it does not belong as on the cut off date. Nowhere in the entire
scheme of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of-Section 170 B of M.P. Land             F
Revenue Code, 1959 as enacted in 1.\180, there is the least indication of
confining the applicability of the provision to such transactions of transfer
as were entered into by a member of aboriginal tribe in favour of a
member not belonging to aboriginal tribe. No exception has been enacted
by the Legislature so as to exclude from the purview of Section 1708,
transactions of transfer between two persons both of whom are members             G
of aborigin!ll tribes. Had it been so, the Legislature would have specifically
said so. The language of the Section as drafted in 1980 is clear and
unambiguous and does not admit of any doubt so far as this aspect is
concerned. 1123-E-F; 124-A-CI
                                                                          ,,,,.   H
                                                 -
    118                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A        Dhirendra Nath Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr., AIR
    (1986) MP 122 and Atmaram and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors., (1995)
    MPLJ 633, referred to.

          2.1. Sub-section (2-A) of Section 170-8 came to be enacted in 1998.
    An attempt at placing construction on the language of a statute enacted
B   in the year 1980 and trying to find out its meaning and extent of operation
    by reference to the words employed in drafting a piece of legislation in
    the year 1998 may not be countenanced by principles of interpretation.
                                                                     (124-C-D(

C         2.2. Sub-section (2-A) of Section 170-8 contemplates a limited
    category of cases. The very fact that the language employed by the
    Legislature in 1998 while drafting sub-Section (2-A) is materially different
    from the language employed by it in 1980 while drafting sub-sections (I),
    (2) and (3) of Section 170-8 is rather suggestive of the fact that the
    Legislature was conscious of the wide scope of the original provision and
D   therefore kept the scope of sub-section (2-A) confined to a limited category
    of transactions as the power was being conferred on Gram Sabha. The
    essential ingredient vitiating the transaction of transfer under Section 170-
    8 as enacted in 1980 is fraudulent nature of transaction resulting in
    deprivation of legitimate right of an aboriginal tribal while all that is
    required to be seen for the purpose of sub-section (2-A) as inserted in 1998
E   is transfer by an aboriginal tribal in favour of a non-aboriginal tribal and
    that transfer being without any lawful authority, without regard to the
    nature of transaction-whether it is fraudulent or not. Sub-Sections (I),
    (2) and (3) of Section 170-8 employ the expressions 'every person', 'any
    person' and 'all such transactions of transfer' respectively; Sub-section
F   (2-A) speaks of 'any person, other than a member of aboriginal tribe'.
    That is a material distinction. (124-D-E(

          2.3. Reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons is permissible
    for understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the
    surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute, and the evil which
G   the statute sought to remedy. The weight of judicial authority leans in
    favour of the view that Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot be
    utilized for the purpose of restricting and controlling the plain meaning
    of the language employed by the Legislature in drafting statute and
    excluding from its operation such transactions which it plainly covers.
                                                                     (125-F-Gl
H
     BHAIJI v. SUB DIVISIONAL OFFICER, THANDLA [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 119

      Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, Eighth        A
Edition 2001, pp.206-209, referred to.

      2.4. The wide scope of transactions covered by the plain language
of Section 170-B as enacted in 1980 cannot be scuttled or narrowed down
by reading the Statement of Objects and Reasons. (126-CI
                                                                                  B
     Dhirendra Nath Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr., AIR
(1986) MP 122, distinguished.

        Mis. Girdhari Lal and Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur and Ors., (1986) 2·
sec 237, referred to.
                                                                                  c
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1263 of
1992.

     From the Judgment and-Order dated 30.8.1991 of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in Writ Petition M.P. No. 312/84.                                      D
     S.K. Gambhir, Rijo Raj Singh, Amish Sinha Anil Sharma, Ms. Anindita
Gupta and H.K. Puri for the Appellant.

     J.M. Khanna, Jog Singh, Balvendra Singh and Ambhoj Kumar for
the Respondents.                                                                  E
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       R.C. LAHOTI, J. The M.P. L~nd Revenue Code 1959 (Act No.20 of
1959) was enacted by the Legislative Assembly of Madhya Pradesh to
consolidate and amend the law relating to land revenue, the powers of Revenue     F
Officers, rights and liabilities of holders of land from the State Government,
agriculture tenures and other matters relating to land and the liabilities
incidental thereto in Madhya Pradesh. There were different laws relating to
land revenue, land tenure and other matters touching thereto prevalent in the
different regions of the State and the Legislature considered it desirable that
there should be one uniform law enacted for whole of the State. There are         G
tribal land holders in many a regions of the State of Madhya Pradesh. Tile
Code took care to enact some special provisions taking special care of
protecting the interest of such tribals.

        In the year 1980, the State Legislature enacted the Madhya Pradesh        H
    120                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A   Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, I 98Q (Act No:59 of 1980) whereby
    certain amendments were incorporated and a few new provisions were inserted
    into the body of the Code. One such amendment is the insertion of Section
    170-B which read as under:-

               "170-8. Reversion of land of member of aboriginal tribe which
B          was transferred by fraud. (I) Every person who on the date of
           commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code
           (Amendment) Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment
           Act of 1980) is in possession of agricultural land which belonging to
           a member of a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe
c          under sub-section (6) of section 165 between the period commencing
           on the 2nd October, 1959 and ending on the date of the commencement
           of Amendment Act of 1980 shall, within one year .of such
           commencement, notify to the Sub-Divisional Officer in ~ucb form
           and in such manner as may be prescribed, all the infonnation as to
           how he has come in possession of such land;
D
                (2) If any person fails to notify the information as required by
           sub-section (I) within the period specified therein it shall be presumed
           that such person has been in possession of the agricultural land without
           any lawful authority and the agricultural land shall, on the expiration
           of the period aforesaid revert to the person to whom it originally
E
           belonged and if that person be dead, to his legal heirs;

               (3) On receipt of the information under sub-section (I), the Sub-
           Divisional Officer shall make such enquiry as may be deemed
           necessary about all such transactions of transfer and if he finds that
F          the member of aboriginal tribe has been defrauded of his legitimate
           right he shall declare the transaction null and void and pass an order
           revesting the agricultural land in the transferor and, if be he dead, in
           his legal heirs."

          Subsequently, there have been a few changes incorporated in the text
G of Section 170-B abovesaid. For example, the period of one year specified
    in sub-section (I) of Section 170-B later on came to be enlarged to one and
    a half years_ and then to two years as it now stands. Similarly, sub-Section (3)
    has been recast by virtue of notification No. l-70-Vll-N-2-83 dated 5th January
    1984 issued under sub-paragraph I of paragraph 5 of the Fifth Schedule to
H   the Constitution of India which amendment we are ignoring for the purpose
     BHAIJI v. SUB DIVISIONAL OFFICER, THANDLA [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 121

of this judgment as the language of the essential part of the sub-Section (3) A
remains as before and what has been amended is the consequential direction
required to be made where certain building or structure have come up on the
land forming subject matter of enquiry under sub-Section (3). However, sub-
section (2-A) was inserted between sub-Sections (2) and (3) by Act No. I of
1998 passed by the State Legislature which reads a,s under:-
                                                                                  B
            "(2-A) If a Gram Sabha in the Scheduled area referred to in
        clause (I) of Article 244 of the Constitution finds that any person,
        other than a member of an aboriginal tribe, is in possession of any
        land of a Bhumiswami belonging to an aboriginal tribe, without any
        lawful authority, it shall restore the possession of such land to that    C
        person to whom it originally belonged and if that person is dead to
        his legal heirs:

        Provided that if the Gram Sabha fails to restore the possession of
        such land, it shall refer the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer, who
        shall restore the possession of such land within three months from the    D
        date of receipt of the reference."

                                                          (emphasis supplied)

       The land forming subject matter of these proceedings was owned by
8hikala and Thanwaria who are members of a tribe which has been declared          E
to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-Section (6) of Section 165 of the Code as
contemplated by Section 170-8( I). The appellant too claims to be a similar
aboriginal tribal. It appears that the land was sold by the aboriginal tribal
bhumiswamis through registered sale deeds and it came to be purchased by
the appellant. All these transactions have taken place between 2nd October
 1959 and the date of the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1980,              F
meaning thereby, during the period attracting applicability of Section 170-
8( I). The appellant did not furnish the information in the fonu and in the
manner prescribed within the period of two years. In the year 1982-83, the
Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla Petlawad, Distt. Jhabua, within whose
jurisdiction the land is situated, initiated proceedings under Section 170-8 of   G
the Code by calling upon the appellant to show cause in response to the
notice issued by the SDO. Soon on service of the notice the appellant filed
a writ petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh submitting that the
appellant and the vendor bhumiswamis, both being aboriginal tribals notified
under Section 165(6) of the Code, the applicability of Section 170-8 was not
attracted and therefore the notice issued by the SDO was illegal, uncalled for    H
    122                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A and without any authority in law. The challenge has been rejected by the
    High Court.

         The singular contention advanced by Shri S.K. Gambhir, the learned
   senior counsel for the appellant, is that looking to the scheme of the Code
   specially Sections 165, 168, 170-A and 170-B thereof, it is clear that what
B Section 170-B proposes to embrace within its fold are such transactions as
   are fraudulent and entered into by aboriginal tribals in favour of non-tribals.
   The Code does not contemplate any enquiry into and consequent annulling
   of transactions or reverting back of land from the person in possession to the
 · aboriginal tribe bhumiswami where both the parties are aboriginal tribals
C notified under Section 165(6) of the Code. Strong reliance was placed on the
   statement of object and reasons and the language employed by the Legislature
   in framing sub-Section (2-A) of the Code.

           The Statement of Object and Reasons appended to the M.P. Land
    Revenue Code (Amendment) Bill 1980, as published in M.P. Government
D   Gazette dated 26.9.1980, so far as Section 170-B abovesaid is concerned, is
    as under:-

            "Clause 10-All transfers made by members of aboriginal tribes to
            non-tribals between 2.10.1959 and the date of commencement of the
            proposed measure will be subject to review and the burden of providing
E           all the necessary information of such transactions and thereby
            establishing that such transactions were not made due to use of
            fraudulent methods will be on the purchaser. Failure to notify the
            information would meet with a consequence of reverting the land to
            the original aboriginal." (emphasis supplied)
F          Shri Gambhir submitted that the Statement of Objects and Reasons
    makes it very clear that the Legislature had intended to enact the provision
    for enquiry into transfers made by members of aboriginal tribe to non-tribals.
    The same inference follows from the language employed by the State
    Legislature in drafting sub-Section (2-A) of the Code.
G
          Challenge to vires of Section 170-B abovesaid along with Section 170-
    A was laid before a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
    in Dhirendra Nath Sharma v. State ofMadhya Pradesh and Anr., AIR (1986)
    MP 122. Justice J.S. Verma (Acting CJ, as His Lordship then was) speaking
    for the Division Bench, upheld the constitutional validity of Section 170-A
H   and Section 170-B both. The history of legislation resulting in enactment of
          BHAIJI v. SUB DIVISIONAL OFFICER, THANDLA [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 123

     Section 170-B has been succinctly set out by the Division Bench in paras 2 A
     to 4 of its judgment and it is not necessary to restate the same hereat and if
     needed the reference can be had to the reported decision. Suffice it to observe
     that the Division Bench, by tracing the legislative histol)', concluded vide
     para I 0 that the impugned provisions form a part of the principles of
     distributive justice by avoidance of illegal transactions of transfers of . B
     agricultural lands by members of the aboriginal tribes who were unequals
     and the legislation is also in implementation of the directive principle contained
     in Article 46 of the Constitution, which enjoins the State to protect the
     Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from all social injustice and from all
     forms of exploitation. It is true that the Division Bench of the High Court has
     made a reference to illegal transactions of transfers of agricultural land by C
     members of the aboriginal tribes to non-tribals in these transactions. But that
     is so because the Division Bench was dealing with the petition filed by a\l)on-
     tribal and did not have an occasion to examine the transfers as amongst
     tribals inter se.

              It is well known that some of the aboriginal tribes are nomadic and D
     some indulge into crimes traditionally and historically. The purpose of settling
     land with the tribals mostly which is done at vel)' concessional rates and at
     times even without involving an obligation to pay the land revenue, is so
     done with a view to see that the aboriginals settle at one place abandoning
     nomadism and picking up tilling the soil as their vocation by settling at one E
     place and earning livelihood by labour and toil. It is also well known that
     creamy layers have developed and even as. amongst socially unprivileged
     some have acquired affluence. An affluent shrewd tribal may indulge into
     exploiting his fellow beings. Possibility cannot be ruled out where a non-
     tribal may manage to have land transferred apparently but"not in reality in the
     name of a tribal and taking advantage of his status, affluence or any other F
.>   means, conferring him with capacity to exploit, may till the land to his own
     advantage depriving the aboriginal tribal from the benefits of the land settled
     by the State with him. All such cases are taken care of by Section 170-B. The
     purpose of enacting Section 170-B of the Code is vel)' wide. The object
     sought to be achieved, as its drafting iridicates, is to gather and make available G
     all statistics with the State officials so as to find out how much land belonging
     to aboriginal tribals is in possession of anyone to whom it does not belong
     as on the cut off date. The information having been collected the enquiry
     under sub-Section (3) shall be directed towards finding out the nature of
     transaction resulting into transfer ofland--whether such transaction of transfer
     has resulted in the aboriginal tribal having been defrauded of his legitimate H
    124                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A   right in the land? Sub-Sections (1), (2) and (3), as enacted in 1980, have to
    be read as part of one whole scheme. If the submission of Shri Gambhir is
    correct then the object of enquiry under sub-Section (3) would have been to
    find out if such transaction of transfer has resulted in an aboriginal tribal
    having been defrauded of his legitimate right by person not belonging to
B   aboriginal tribe. But that is not so. Nowhere in the entire scheme of sub-
    sections (I), (2) and (3) of Section 170-8, as enacted in 1980, there is the
    least indication of confining the applicability of the provision to such
    transactions of transfer as were entered into by a member of aboriginal tribe
    in favour .of a member not belonging to aboriginal tribe. No exception has
    been enacted by the Legislature so as to exclude from the purview of Section
C   170-8 transactions of transfer between two persons both of whom are members
    of aboriginal tribes. Had jt been so, the Legislature would have specifically
    said so. The language of the Section as drafted in 1980 is clear and
    unambiguous and does not admit of any doubt so far as this aspect is
    concerned.

D          Sub-Section (2-A) came to be enacted in 1998. An attempt at placing
    construction on the language of a statute enacted in the year 1980 and trying
    to find out its meaning and extent of operation by reference to the words
  . employed in drafting a piece of legislation in the year 1998 may not be
    countenanced by principles of interpretation. Sub-Section (2-A) contemplates
E a limited category of cases where (i) any person other than a member of an
    aboriginal tribe is in possession of any land of a bhumiswami belonging to
    an aboriginal tribe, and (ii) without any lawful authority. The power is
    conferred on the Gram Sabha. It contemplates a summary and quick remedy
    for restoration of possession so as to provide quick relief at the hands of a
    local body to an aboriginal tribe on the twin conditions being satisfied. The
F very fact that the language employed by the Legislature in 1998 while drafting
    sl!b-Section (2-A) is materially different from the language employed by it
    in 1980 while drafting sub-Sections (I), (2) and (3) of Section 170-8, is
    rather suggestive of the fact that the Legislature was conscious of the wide
    scope of the original provision· and therefore kept the scope of sub-Section
G (2-A) confined to a limited category of transactions as the power was being
    conferred on Gram Sabha. The essential ingredient vitiating the transaction
    of transfer under Section I 70-8 as enacted in 1980 is fraudulent nature of
    transaction resulting in deprivation of legitimate right of an aboriginal tribal
    while all that is required to be seen for the purpose of sub-Section (2-A) as
    inserted in 1998 is transfer by an aboriginal tribal in favour of a non-aboriginal
H tribal and that transfer being without any lawful authority, without regard to
      BHAIJI v. SUB DIVISIONAL OFFICER, THANDLA [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 125

the nature of transaction whether it is fraudulent or not. Sub-sections(!), (2)     A
and (3) of Section 170-B employ the expressions 'every person', 'any person'
and 'all such transactions of transfer' respectively; Sub-section (2-A) speaks
of 'any person, other than a member of aboriginal tribe'. That is a material
distinction.

        The Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dhirendra                B
Nath Sharma 's case has held that sub-Section (2) would not result in the
person in possession being divested of his land without an enquiry under sub-
section (3) though sub-Section (2) by itself does not speak of any enquiry.
In spite of failure to furnish information within the period prescribed by sub-
section (I), the consequence which flows is the raising of a presumption, not       C
conclusive but a rebuttable one, which shall be taken into consideration while
holding an en"quiry under sub-Section (3). This interpretation was placed by
the Division Bench in Dhirendra Nath Sharma 's case because it was necessary
to do so for saving sub-Section (2) from being rendered ultra vires the
Constitution. One of the submissions made before the Division Bench was
that the person in possession of the land would be deprived of means of             D
livelihood necessary for his existence without any enquiry and that would
contravene Article 21 of the Constitution. It was submitted before the Division
Bench by the learned Additional Advocate-General appearing for the State
that the practice which was being followed by the Sub-Divisional Officers of
the State was to hold an enquiry under sub-Section (3) and then pass a final        E
order irrespective of the fact whether the person in possession has notified
the information as required by sub-Section (I) or not. The Division Bench
held that the fact that an order contemplated by sub-Section (3) has to be
passed even in cases falling within the ambit of sub-Section (2) it is sufficient
to indicate that there is no usurpation of judicial function thereby and there
is no arbitrariness in the procedure nor is there the vice of absence of enquiry.   F
This was further explained by another Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh
High Court in Atmaram and Ors. v. State of MP. and Ors., (1995) MPLJ
633.

        Reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons is permissible for
understanding the background, the a.ntecedent state of affairs, the surrounding     G
circumstances in relation to the statute, and the evil which the statute sought
to remedy. The weight of judicial authority leans in favour of the view that
Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot be utilized for the purpose of
restricting and controlling the plain meaning of the language employed by
the Legislature in drafting statute and excluding from its operation such           H
    126                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A transactions which it plainly covers. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation
    by Justice G.P. Singh, Eighth Edition 200 I, pp.206•209).

           The learned senior counsel for the appellant placed strong reliance on
    Mis. Girdhari Lal and Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur and Ors., [1986] 2 SCC
    237 wherein it has been held that the courts can by ascertaining legislative
B   intent place such construction on statute as wou Id advance its purpose and
    object. Where the words of statute are plain and unambiguous, effect must be
    given to them. The Legislature may be safely presumed to have intended
    what the words plainly say. The plain words can be departed from when
    reading them as they are leads to patent injustice, anomaly or absurdity or
C   invalidation of a law. The Court permitted the Statement of Objects and
    Reasons, Parliamentary Debates, Reports of Committees and Commissions
    preceding the Legislation and the legislative history being referred to for the
    purpose of gathering the legislative intent in such cases. The law so stated
    does not advance the contention of Shri Gambhir. The wide scope of
    transactions covered by the plain language of Section 170-B as enacted in
D   1980 cannot be scuttled or narrowed down by reading the Statement of Objects
    and Reasons.

           It is true that in para 10 of Dhirendra Nath 's case (supra) the Division
    Bench makes a casual reference to 'avoidance of illegal transactions of transfers
    of agricultural land by members of aboriginal tribes who were unequals with
E   the non-tribes in these transactions', but that observation about the legislative
    history of the provision is clearly based on the Statement of Objects and
    Reasons. The Division Bench was not dealing with the question whether the
    case of a tribal in poss.ession of agricultural land of another tribal would
    attract applicability of Section 170-B(I) or not; nor was it dealing specifically
F   with the question whether a transaction of transfer, the transferor wherein is
    a member of aboriginal tribe though made in favour of a similar member
    would be covered by sub-section (3) or not even ifthe transaction has resulted
    in a member of aboriginal tribe being defrauded of his legitimate right. The
    expression employed by the Division Bench while dealing with legislative
    history of the enactment cannot be pressed in service. for supporting the
G   submission seeking to restrict and narrow down the application of the
    provision.

          It is not necessary to refer to Sections 165, 168 and 170-A as it is
    unnecessary, in our opinion.

H          The petition filed by the writ petitioner before the High Court was
     BHAIJI v. SUB DIVISIONAL OFFICER, THANDLA [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] j 27

entirely misconceived and, in a way, premature. The show cause notice issued A
by the Sub-Divisional Officer cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. The
appellant should have participated in the enquiry after showing cause. Instead
he chose to rush post haste to the High Court. The High Court rightly turned
down the writ petition.

        The appeal is held devoid of any merit and is liable to be dismissed.   B
It is dismissed accordingly though without any order as to the costs.

K.K.T.                                                    Appeal dismissed.